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Editor

Wendy Hinde

Editorial Office

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Tel. 01-930 2233

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Marcello de Cecco, Professor of International Economics at the University of Siena, is at present a Research Fellow at Chatham House working on international financial integration.

Michael Brenner is a Fellow at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University where he prepared this paper under the auspices of the Program on Science in International Affairs. He wishes to express his appreciation for their comments on the manuscript to Professor George Kistiakowsky of Harvard University, Mr. Ian Smart and Colonel Ted Atkeson of the United States Army. Mr. Brenner's writings on security problems and foreign policy have appeared in *World Politics*, *International Studies Quarterly*, the *Stanford Journal of International Studies*, and other journals.

Professor **Isaiah Litvak** and Professor **Christopher Maule** hold joint appointments in the Department of Economics and School of International Affairs, Carleton University. Their publications include *Dual Loyalty: Canadian-U.S. Business Arrangements* (1971) and *Cultural Sovereignty: The Time and Reader's Digest Case in Canada* (1974).

Geoffrey Warner is Professor and Director of the Institute of European Studies at Hull University.

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John Pinder is Director of Political and Economic Planning (PEP).

Lord Gladwyn was Permanent Representative of the UK to the United Nations 1950–54 and British Ambassador to France 1954–60. He is now a Vice-Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

Hedley Bull is Professor of International Relations in the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University, Canberra. From 1965–67 he was Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit at the Foreign Office.

Ronald Dore is Professorial Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex and was formerly Professor of Sociology, with special reference to the Far East, at the London School of Economics and the School of Oriental and African Studies.

Colin Legum is Africa and Commonwealth correspondent for the *Observer*. He has written several books on Africa and is editor of the annual publication *Africa Contemporary Record*.

Dorothy Pickles lectures on French foreign policy at the London School of Economics. Her latest book is *The Government and Politics of France* (2 volumes). 1973.

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

J. L. S. Girling is Fellow in International Relations at the Australian National University, Canberra.

Dr. **W. Klatt,** O.B.E., St. Antony's College, Oxford, was for many years economic adviser at the Foreign Office. He is at present engaged on a study of agricultural development in Asia.

Richard B. Lillich is Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law and Director of the Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute. His most recent book is *International Claims: Their Settlement by Lump Sum Agreements* (University Press of Virginia, 1975). He has also edited and contributed to three volumes on *The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law* (1972–1975).

Jonathan Power is an economist and journalist specialising in race and development issues. He is at present writing a book on immigration in Europe.

Joseph Frankel is Professor of Politics at Southampton University, with a special interest in the theory of international relations and foreign policy analysis.

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Stanley Henig was formerly Member of Parliament for Lancaster and i now Lecturer in Public Administration at the Civil Service College. The view contained in this article are entirely his own.

Vittorio Barattieri is a member of the staff of the Bank of Italy in Rome and **Anthony Thomas** writes for *The Economist* on EEC affairs fron Brussels. Both authors would like to stress that the views expressed in thei article are personal.

W. E. Butler is Reader in Comparative Law at the University of London His most recent book is a translation, with introduction, of G. I. Tunkin's *Theory of International Law* (Allen and Unwin 1975).

Michael Leifer is Reader in International Relations at the London Schoo of Economics and Political Science and is author of *Cambodia: The Search for Security* (1967). His most recent book is *The Foreign Relations of the New States* (Longman 1974).

Ian Smart is Deputy Director and Director of Studies at Chatham House

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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ITALY AND ITS PARTNERS

A CASE STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT

A Chatham House Conference

Introduction

SINCE the onset of the oil crisis in the autumn of 1973 we have tried at Chatham House to maintain some kind of continuous monitoring process of its international economic and financial effects. It became evident during the early part of 1974 that Italy was going to be the worst affected victim among the developed industrial countries of the Western world. It was also evident that other victims were going to follow; and so it seemed a useful idea to try to discover what could be learnt from Italy's experience to date, most especially in regard to the degree of co-operation or support on which it could depend from its European partners in the Community and from the wider group of Western nations.

Our intention therefore was to treat Italy as a case study in international collaboration; but in order to do that effectively, and above all to discover how much of the story was peculiarly Italian and how much could reasonably be regarded as being of a more general character with possible applications to other nations, we needed, first of all, the active co-operation of the Italians themselves. This was willingly given, most particularly by the Bank of Italy, which has in recent years had close relations with Chatham House, and by a number of independent Italian economists and expert commentators. We were fortunate in having with us on a two-year attachment to the research staff of Chatham House Marcello de Cecco, Professor of International Economics at the University of Siena. He supplied the initial impulse to the dialogue, which took place at Chatham House on November 4th and 5th, in the form of a paper which he presented to the conference; it is published below, with some minor revisions made in the light of the discussion at Chatham House.

We thought it would be useful to get a view of the problem from the vantage point of a creditor country, and Dr. Kurt Richebächer, General Manager of the Dresdner Bank, agreed to perform that task. As the

résumé of the discussion which we publish indicates, his analysis of the thrust of German economic policy and of its probable international consequences was the subject of keen debate. It was of course important for any assessment of the next stage in the development of Italy's crisis, and of the prospective crises of other countries, to make a judgment on how restrictive German financial policy really was. Dr. Richebächer argued—very.

Other participants in the Chatham House conference were drawn from the United States, Britain, France and other European countries. It was a fairly heterogeneous group including some officials, some bankers, and a number of academic experts in the fields of international finance and international politics. We conducted our discussion under modified Chatham House rules, with no restriction on the reporting of the content of the discussion but a bar on the attribution of any personal views without the prior agreement of the person responsible.

Those who took part were: Paolo Baffi, Director-General, Banca d'Italia; Michael Balfour, Bank of England; Vittorio Barattieri, Banca d'Italia; Elio Battiati, Banca d'Italia; Miriam Camps, Council on Foreign Relations, New York; Guido Carli, Governor, Banca d'Italia; Guy de Carmoy, European Institute of Business Administration, Fontainebleau; Fabio Luca Cavazza, Editor, *24 ORE*, Milan; William Clarke, Director, Committee on Invisible Exports; William Diebold, Jr., Council on Foreign Relations, New York; Christopher Dow, Bank of England; Ronald Grierson, Panmure Gordon & Co.; Wolfgang Hager, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bonn; André de Lattre, President, Crédit National; Arrigo Levi, Editor, *La Stampa;* Geoffrey Littler, Under Secretary, H.M. Treasury; Giovanni Magnifico, Banca d'Italia; Peter Marshall, Assistant Under Secretary, FCO; Cesare Merlini, Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome; John E. Nash, EEC Commission, Brussels; Joseph Nye, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Theodore Peeters, University of Leuven; Kurt Richebächer, Dresdner Bank, Frankfurt; Paolo Savona, Banca d'Italia; Luigi Spaventa, Institute of Economics, University of Rome.

And from Chatham House: Marcello de Cecco, Richard Holland, Roger Morgan, Andrew Shonfield, Ian Smart, Susan Strange, Ann-Margaret Willis.

As will be seen, our discussion led to no clear conclusion of a prescriptive character. What follows is presented as an interim report on a continuing international problem, which seems likely to get worse before it gets better.

ANDREW SHONFIELD

ITALY'S PAYMENTS CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Marcello de Cecco

WITHIN a decade, the Italian balance of payments has experienced a large deficit, a prolonged surplus, and a new and larger deficit. In 1963–64 and again in 1973–74, the Italian monetary authorities used the international credit market to balance the Italian external accounts in the short run. In both instances, foreign newspapers were full of Italy's chaos and impending doom. In what follows, I do no more than attempt to put a decade of Italian balance-of-payments swings into its necessary international economic relations perspective; my point of departure, very firmly, is that in international economic relations the tail cannot wag the dog.

The 1963–64 precedent

Italy's boom (1959–62) was not checked in time by fiscal measures. Also, monetary policy remained easy perhaps until too late. The boom-induced balance-of-payments deficit could be financed by ample recourse to the Euro-dollar market.

The Community's deflationary prescriptions, issued with regard to France and Italy in the early summer of 1963, were disregarded by Italy, but applied by France. In the early autumn of 1963, monetary policy had to be relied upon to bring the Italian boom to a halt, and to solve the balance-of-payments crisis. The resulting turn-around in the Italian payments situation was most swift and impressive. It took only six months to change the heavy deficit to a large surplus. Nevertheless, the Community continued to prescribe deflation as the cure for Italy's problems well into 1964, especially as the position of the lira on the exchange markets continued to be shaky in the spring of 1964, in spite of the realignment in the basic balance. Bilateral aid was sought by Italy and given by the United States in March 1964, and this brought about an avalanche of criticism from the EEC partners; the Community renewed its calls for deflation, in the 'Marjolin letter', and finally got its way, as Mr. Colombo brought about a savage squeeze in public expenditure. The Italian economy, its internal demand depressed for several years, continued to develop mainly thanks to exports: these found their way onto the world's markets, as the continuing Italian squeeze coincided with a remarkable boom in the other major countries, also spurred on, it must not be forgotten, by the Vietnam war boom in the United States. Investment, however, lapsed most miserably, and the 1963 levels were not regained until 1968 (in nominal terms).

The 1968–69 Italian 'boomlet' was brought to a sudden halt by the great American deflation which, beginning in the summer of 1969, caused interest rates all over the world to align themselves to the American levels, through the large capital outflows that the Euro-dollar market made possible.

Summing up, it is not unreasonable to maintain that, by accepting the EEC recipe, the Italian government found itself unable to prevent the economy from falling into a slump as regards internal demand (and especially as regards investment) which lasted certainly four years (1964–68) and, arguably, until 1972. The Italian government, most unfortunately, sought to remedy this situation, in the years following 1964, by injecting funds into private consumption and by swelling the numbers of public and semi-public employees. Investment, or what there was of it, was also delegated to public and semi-public agencies. By 1971, as a result, 50 per cent of total investment was effected by the public sector. This proportion was more than double what it had been in 1963. Moreover, the Italian government deficit was, from the beginning of this period, structurally transformed: it came more and more to consist of transfers from the public to the private sector, generally designed to keep up internal demand for consumption, particularly for consumer durables.

It is also arguable that, in the years from 1964 to 1969, the unwillingness of the Italian authorities, faced as they were with embarrassing trade surpluses, to revalue the lira, led them to encourage the massive financial outflow that kept the external accounts of Italy in overall balance.[1] This has been denied by the Italian monetary authorities, but the figures seem clearly to suggest that it was so. In any case, from the point of view of the collective economic stability of the West, it was wise, since Italy stuck to the Bretton Woods rules. From the point of view of national interest, it prevented the accumulation of gold and foreign exchange reserves that would otherwise have resulted from the surpluses. The Italian authorities traded off centralised foreign reserve building in favour of private foreign reserve building, and private

[1] Financial outflows from a country with a relatively 'strong' currency, as the lira was, between 1965 and 1969, would be hard to explain; but one has to remember that Italian bank deposit rates were consistently lower than those ruling in other Western financial centres throughout these five years, that a good part of the outflow was motivated by the desire to avoid taxes, and that the Italian monetary authorities repeatedly induced Italian commercial banks to lend foreign exchange on the Euro-dollar market, by giving them the required foreign exchange at attractive swap terms. The extent of the financial outflows can be gauged by looking at the following figures:

Total financial outflows, from Italy to other countries, as a percentage of Italian current national income

1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
3·5	2·4	3·5	2·9	0·9	1·6	1·2

Source: G. Rota, *Struttura ed evoluzione dei flussi finanziari in Italia* (Turin, Fondaz. Agnelli, 1974).

reserves are hardly mobilisable, if the need arises, in the short or even the medium run. (That this sticking to fixed exchange rates also responded to internal Italian political requirements—the export industry's firm rejection of revaluation—is not an important consideration in the international context.)

Thus, throughout the 1960s, Italy played a very responsible part, *vis-à-vis* the international economic system: having developed a deficit, it cured it promptly and effectively and, having swung into surplus, it was a 'good creditor' country, exporting capital for several years. It also stuck to the Bretton Woods rules and maintained the parity of its currency unchanged.

The 1973–74 episode

It is impossible to get a clear idea of Italy's difficulties during 1973–74 if we do not study them within the context of international economic relations in the same years. The main events that influenced that context were the two United States devaluations. In addition, a peculiarity in the same context must be noted, namely the lack of synchronisation of the German economic cycle with that of the other Western countries. The first US devaluation will merely be mentioned: perhaps the recent literature on world inflation has not devoted enough attention to the inflationary impact that devaluing the world trading and reserve currency, the US dollar, had on liquidity preference. The first dollar devaluation put the most faithful creditors of the USA, Germany and Japan, in the unenviable position of counting large capital losses; and of having to think again about a more appropriate mix for their reserves, but with the constraint of being unable to buy gold. Japan reacted very harshly, getting rid of perhaps 10 billion* dollars within a very few months, in order to acquire whatever stable-valued liquid capital assets it could get hold of, especially raw materials and primary commodities. Germany 'decided' to absorb the loss with a smile. But it was certainly with very little concern for international equilibrium that the German authorities set about deflating their economy late in 1972 and early in 1973, discarding the fiscal weapon of economic policy until very late, and relying heavily on monetary policy and on a measure —the *bardepot*—which was in clear contravention of the freedom of capital movements. This disregard for collective economic security on the part of the German authorities can only be understood if one remembers the rudeness with which the American authorities had enforced the realignment of their international accounts in the second half of 1971. In those six months leading to the Smithsonian Agreement,

* 1 billion = 1,000 million.

the American authorities legalised the 'everyone for himself' approach and found very eager pupils in the Japanese and the Germans.

Superficially, the European Community gave the impression of reacting in a concerted fashion to the American challenge. The joint float was launched, and adhered to, for some months. But it could certainly not have lasted without a much higher degree of mutual consistency between the internal economic policies of the countries in the 'snake'. Basically, the decision on the part of the German authorities to deflate their economy at the end of 1972, and to rely only on monetary policy, directly or indirectly induced Italy to leave the 'snake', and caused the dollar to be devalued again early in 1973. One has only to look at the levels to which interest rates had to climb in Germany before the economy began to cool off, to understand the gigantic shift into Deutschmarks from all other currencies. The existence of the Euro-dollar market undoubtedly made such gigantic shifts possible, and easy. But the Euro-dollar market had been in existence for a decade, continuously growing in size, and the German monetary authorities, who had skilfully used it for years as a substitute for their under-developed internal money market, knew very well what it meant to try to enforce short-term interest rates of up to 15 per cent at a time when the United States, Italy, Britain and France were all intent on reflating their own economies by means of relatively easy money policies.

For Italy, caught by the international currency storm of early 1973 just as a long-awaited and desperately-needed investment boom was about to take place, there was no alternative but to let the exchange rate go. The devaluation of the lira was forced upon the Italian authorities by the sheer size of the wave of international short-term capital flows set in motion by the glaring discrepancy between American and German monetary policies.

Devaluation, coupled with the wild rise in raw materials prices, meant for Italy a very high rise in import prices. The deterioration in the Italian balance of trade in 1973 is almost completely explained by the worsening in the terms of trade. Exporters were certainly helped by the devaluation, but it is much less clear that this coincided with a macro-economic benefit. Internal demand being, as it was, buoyant in many important countries, the international market was certainly a sellers' market. The actual availability of exportables was the real limiting factor, as the German export performance in the same period has abundantly shown.

In the course of 1973, the Italian authorities had to face the following policy constraints:

(a) a magnet for capital outflows represented by soaring interest rates in the major countries and especially in Germany;

(b) radically worsened terms of trade caused, as mentioned above, by rising world commodity prices and the devaluation of the lira;
(c) the near-impossibility of mobilising the gold part of the Italian international reserves. (As a result of American policy, the gold market was frozen and could not absorb large sales.)

The only course left, before it was decided to impose another monetary squeeze on an economy still far below its capacity output and its potential output limits, was that of using the Euro-dollar market once again, as had been done in 1962–63. This course was made easy by the extraordinary amounts of excess liquidity poured into that market since the dollar devaluation of August 1971 induced official and private dollar holders to try to offset capital losses by interest gains. The quadrupling of oil prices and the big increases in raw materials prices, however, made the relevant borrowing needs look enormous, when compared with the equivalent 1963 figures. The Italian authorities, moreover, did not refrain from using all the official borrowing capacity available to them through the various international agreements. The EEC short-term intervention fund was activated, and so were the inter-central bank swap lines and the IMF facilities. In the summer of 1974, a bilateral deal was concluded between the Italian and German central banks, according to which two billion dollars were made available to the Banca d'Italia for five years, against a swap transaction in gold. (The Banca d'Italia sold the equivalent of two billion dollars of gold to the Bundesbank at the price of $120 an ounce, and the Bundesbank agreed to re-sell the same gold to the Banca d'Italia, on maturity.) With the transaction, the post-1971 rules imposed by the US authorities were clearly shattered: dollars were sold against gold at a market-related price, between central banks. If one remembers the endless debate about the 'means of settlement of official imbalances' in which talks on the reform of the international monetary system were bogged down, perhaps this aspect of the Italo-German transaction has received less attention than it deserves.

When comparing 1973–74 with 1963–64, we immediately notice that, in 1963–64, the unfriendly attitude of the EEC Commission and of the EEC members to Italy's difficulties was coupled with a basic international economic situation which rendered the turn-around in the Italian balance of payments extremely swift and easy; in 1973–74, on the contrary, the relative friendliness of the EEC, the IMF, and the main central banks, has been combined with a basic international economic situation which makes the turn-around in the Italian external accounts much more difficult.[2]

[2] In using the expression 'relative friendliness' I have not lost sight of the fact that, at the same time, 'an assorted set of national and international officials, bankers, politicians and chancellors'—as Luigi Spaventa graphically puts it in a forthcoming paper—stated the following principles of international economic behaviour:

'First, let each country find its own way out of the mess. But, second, don't let any country break those rules of gentlemanly behaviour, which, more than pre-

For a country like Italy, a financial readjustment of external accounts is clearly not possible. Italy lacks the financial infrastructure that helps Britain, for instance, to buy time by attracting short-term funds and rolling them over. Whether this infrastructure is going to be of much help in the future is another matter. What is certain is that Italy can only effect the readjustment of its own external accounts by a real transfer of resources.

But this is exactly what the international economic system, and especially its chief actors, do not seem to want. Both the United States and Britain seem inclined to attempt to solve the basic imbalance in their accounts caused by the oil and non-oil deficits by financial intermediation. At the same time, the German authorities do not seem at all ready to readjust the real side of their international accounts, by reflating the economy and keeping the value of the Deutschmark high, thus generating imports of manufactures into Germany. Between May and early October 1974, the effective exchange rate of the Deutschmark decreased by about 5 per cent. At the same time, the German government's efforts to induce state and local authorities to borrow on the international market, in order to circumvent the Bundesbank squeeze, have been thwarted by the German monetary authorities. In Washington, talks about re-cycling have focused on various proposals of IMF-based solutions; these would require appropriate reshuffling of IMF quotas in favour of oil producing countries, and the IMF itself suggests that this would take one to two years to come through.[3]

On looking at the Italian experiences of both 1963–64 and 1973–74, some general lessons can be learnt:

(A) First and foremost, the striking failure, in the two largest western countries, as well as in the smaller ones, to activate the fiscal arm of short-term economic policy. The last attempt, in the United States, to impose fiscal restrictions on demand, was the ill-fated one of 1968, during the Johnson Administration. Its failure to gain Congressional approval determined the subsequent over-harsh monetary squeeze, which led to the 'interest-rate war', to the German revaluation, to the subsequent American recession, to the attempt to cure it by monetary release, to the short-term capital outflows that accompanied the enforcement of this policy, and to the dollar devaluations of 1971 and 1973.

venting a damage from being done, prescribe *how* the damage should be done. Third, an increase in international liquidity is to be avoided, because of its alleged inflationary effects. Fourth, the market can take care of the problem of finance: provided, however, fifth, that countries do not attempt to live 'beyond their means' and citizens of wealthier countries are *not called* upon to pay for the excesses of others.'

[3] Cf. 'Executive Board begins first phase in three part process of amendment' by J. V. Surr, senior counsellor to the IMF Legal Department, in *IMF Survey*, November 4, 1974, pp. 344–345.

Appropriate fiscal measures were postponed by the Italian government both in 1963 and 1973, until they were adopted, too late and too harshly, in 1964 and 1974. Necessary fiscal restraint was postponed by the German government until after the 1972 Bundestag elections. In all these cases monetary policy was required to substitute for fiscal policy. The ensuing short-term capital flows, which are to be expected in a world where the short-term capital markets have become highly integrated, have only reflected the basic failure, on the part of governments, to come to grips with the unpleasant task of implementing politically unpalatable fiscal restraint. Economic policy has, in this way, been depoliticised as much as possible, by entrusting it to central banks, thus systematising a highly dangerous form of taxation without representation.

(B) There was little, in such a context, that the international financial community (including the central banks) could do to relieve Italy in 1973–74 which it did not actually do. As was said above, all existing borrowing facilities were used by the Italian authorities but, in a world where all the relevant governments refrained from doing their duty about fiscal policy, all the burden of adjustment had to fall on interest rates, and thus on debtors. What Italy needed in 1973 and 1974, and will need in 1975, was and still is a German and American reflation. This would make the adjustment much easier, and would require Italian interest rates less punitive than the ones that have been imposed in the last nine months. No measure of international financial assistance can be a good substitute for this basic readjustment. In the last fifteen years, German monetary squeezes have been frequent and harsh, but invariably they occurred in coincidence with American monetary ease. It is only in the last year that we have witnessed the coupling of monetary squeeze in the two pivots of the world economy. It was Italy's bad luck that it attempted to revive investment in such an inauspicious international climate. And the situation, in spite of whatever international loans the Italians may manage to get, will become desperate if the German-American monetary squeeze continues in 1975, and world depression necessarily goes with it. No degree of international co-operation can be substituted for such a basic, real readjustment. International assistance must be limited to extending bridging loans to see debtor countries through, while the United States, Germany and the oil producers find an agreement on how the transfer of real resources that the oil-price increases entail can be effected, and while the United States and Germany put their fiscal and monetary houses in order. But bridging loans have a meaning only if these real readjustments take place.

Ironically, however, it will not be the debtors who will have to be particularly concerned about the debts they incur. This is especially true

in the case of Italy: the stock of Italian debts is so high that creditors just cannot afford to see Italy go bankrupt. Like Samson, Italy would go down together with all the Philistines. While it remained virtuous, Italy had no power to ignite the powder keg. Now it does have it, and it is indeed sad that the international economic system should have worked itself into such a situation.

(C) Throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s both the United States and Germany have been able to export their economic political difficulties abroad. The United States has had the international monetary system at its disposal to get rid of its internal excess demand. Germany, for its part, has extended its labour supply by using a foreign labour force which cannot vote during its residence in Germany but whose contribution to the German social security and pension schemes must not be overlooked. At the same time, the size of the foreign labour force has been tailored to the needs of the German economy. Moreover, both countries have played the free trade game only while it suited them: the United States imposed the burden of readjustment on its creditors after August 1971 by openly and plainly threatening a trade war; Germany, for its part, has closed the immigration window whenever it has felt like doing so, and has not refrained from imposing the *bardepot*, a measure which, as mentioned earlier, clearly goes against the letter and the spirit of economic liberalism.

At the same time, both countries have emitted a constant stream of virtuous statements about collective international economic security: the United States has come forward with repeated offers to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance by adding an economic wing to it; Germany has been active in fostering a greater degree of European economic and political integration. Seen against the background of their real policies, these pious attempts, on the part of both countries, must be considered more than mildly schizophrenic. They can at least be likened to Penelope's weaving endeavours.

CONFERENCE DISCUSSION

The International Context

Before examining the specific case of Italy, the conference considered the international economic background against which its difficulties must be seen. The discussion turned on alternative views of short-term economic trends. Were the developed countries heading for continuing inflation, or for recession, or both? In his paper presented to the conference, and in his remarks elaborating his propositions, Dr. Kurt Richebächer

argued that the danger we faced was that of deflation. The economic and monetary climate had undergone a dramatic change. To a situation of existing imbalances was added the four-fold increase in the price of oil. He argued that the effects of the oil crisis on domestic economies had been largely misunderstood. Few bankers, politicians or commentators had gone into the underlying implications for liquidity and employment; one danger was thought to be continued inflation, acting first on wages and then on demand, and the solution to be the imposition of tighter credit and fiscal policies, as well as cutting the oil consumption. Another danger, in the eyes of orthodox financiers, was the prolongation of large balance-of-payments deficits, which should be eliminated as soon as possible. Dr. Richebächer argued that to see the situation only in these terms was to fail to perceive that in reality it was one of a massive shift in income to the oil producers, who were amassing claims on the national products of the West, amounting, on average, to 2 per cent. of GNP. These claims could only be met by a real transfer of goods.

No one disagreed with the conclusions of Richebächer and de Cecco that the major influences on the world financial system were exerted by the two surplus countries among the industrialised oil consumers, the United States and Germany; the course of the system over the next year depended upon the policies which they adopted. Germany had a large overall balance-of-payments surplus, in which its oil deficit was offset by a vast surplus on non-oil account. The United States was in deficit on its current account but in overall surplus, because of the surplus on capital account caused by large inflows of Middle East capital. (Kurt Richebächer estimated that as much as seven-eighths of the oil producers' surplus funds had been put into dollars, either into US Treasury Bills, or into the Eurodollar market.) Up to now, the two surplus countries had been running severe credit and fiscal policies, which, it was argued, could be prolonged only with great danger to the international economic system. Signs of deflation in European economies were becoming clear, as counter-inflationary policies were reinforced. If the United States and Germany did not reflate in the near future, depression would accelerate; it would not then be enough for the deficit countries to 'tighten their belts', cutting demand and increasing exports.

German Prospects

The effects of such a depression would in time be felt even in the surplus countries. Despite its currently strong export position, Germany would of course be vulnerable to world recession. There were already

signs that economic activity was contracting sharply, and that this contraction was having its effect on employment. Seasonally adjusted, German unemployment was running at 3·4 per cent. or nearly 800,000. How far was German monetary and fiscal policy taking this threat into account? Some participants in the discussion argued that the German authorities were fully aware of the danger of recession and the threat to employment; the government had adopted an expansionary budget with a deficit of DM 40 billion. Against this it was argued by Richebächer and others that credit policy still pointed in the opposite direction. The banks' lending policies were becoming tighter instead of easing; business was being discouraged on the grounds that the preservation of large margins was preferable to increased activity; deposits were increasing very slowly. No money was being created, while additional demands for credit were arising as a result of inflationary pressures. It was contended that the effects of the expansionary budget would not be felt for some considerable time. Even a more deliberate effort to combine this budget with a reversal of credit policy would not produce an improvement until the second half of 1975. This would be too late to bring the relief needed by Germany's trading partners in the European Community on whom the burden of its surplus had fallen—Italy, France and Britain. Without a reversal of policy by Germany, it was contended, recession was a certainty.

The United States—debt collector for the Arabs?

If Germany had particular responsibilities in the European context, the United States, as the recipient of most of the oil money, had a vital role to play in implementing and managing a scheme by which these funds could be recycled back to the countries which were in need of them, but at least until the autumn of 1974 the attitude of America to recycling had been discouraging. It was asserted that the American government and monetary authorities had taken the view that the problem was unmanageable, but that at the same time it was not a serious one because the Eurodollar market could cope with the flow of funds.

The conference attempted to define the cause of American opposition to recycling schemes. The United States did not welcome the prospect of being a lender of last resort and guarantor of Arab loans, a position which it was being put in because its financial system was attractive to the Arabs. If funds placed in the United States were lent on again, the Americans would be responsible as intermediary for repaying the loan should it suddenly be called in. Even if this drastic event did not occur, the United States would still be in the position of collecting interest on behalf of the Arab lenders.

So far, an obstacle to the implementation of schemes of recycling through the IMF had been the objections of the Arabs to using the Fund as a vehicle on account of the small size of their quotas. This argument could not be sustained indefinitely; proposals had been made to make use of the IMF by giving Middle East countries considerably larger quotas, in the context of the general increase which was about to take place. Even without this, a solution outside the formal structure of the IMF, along the lines of the General Arrangements to Borrow, was a possibility. But this was only part of the problem. For the producers, a market solution was preferable because it could be a private, non-political one. Lending governments preferred to place their money anonymously in the Eurodollar market, where they could choose in which country to invest, and could achieve as wide a spread of investment as possible, rather than to be seen by their own people to be committing large sums to the West.

It was thought by some that this problem was being approached too narrowly. Only one aspect of current American policy had been discussed, as if it were the only one. In fact there were many views of the oil crisis among Americans, and many solutions were being put forward. It was argued that the United States was perfectly justified in its unwillingness to participate in recycling schemes, and not only because of its reluctance to become the ' debt-collector for the Arabs ', and the lender of last resort. How could the consumers reproach the producers for destroying the international system by their action in raising oil prices, and then ask them to co-operate in schemes for coping with the consequences of that action? The question of price was as important as that of flow of funds; and talking down the price, as the Americans were attempting to do, was a legitimate exercise and one that might succeed. A lower price for oil, together with cuts in consumption, would go some considerable way towards solving the problem. The defenders of the American policy admitted that it was a high risk strategy, one of brinkmanship. On the other side it was objected that the strategy did indeed represent high risks for the rest of the world, but hardly for the United States itself.

If the United States was confident that the economic and financial problems created by the oil crisis could be solved by a reduction in the oil price and cuts in demand, how well could the market cope for the moment in absorbing and redistributing the flow of oil funds? It was contended that the limitations on the capacity of the Eurodollar market were becoming apparent. The American view that the market could cope with recycling had perhaps been justified up to now; it was still functioning as a provider of short-term finance, but its continued ability to furnish medium- and long-term funds was in serious doubt. Apart from the strains now being experienced by the banking system, the

very existence of the market in its present form was uncertain. One participant pointed out that it would vanish completely were it not for a considerable degree of leniency on fiscal and other regulatory matters on the part of governments. Both the Eurodollar and the longer term Eurobond markets flourished because governments turned a blind eye to the flouting of their rules, and should this state of affairs cease, the market would suffer a sharp decline.

Central bank co-operation had also functioned smoothly up to now, as Marcello de Cecco's analysis of the Italian case had demonstrated. But here too the importance of the political dimension was clear. It was suggested by one participant that central banks could be brought in as guarantors of commercial bank loans. But a central banker emphasised that the problem was too large; without the authority of governments behind them, central banks could not act as guarantors.

The deficit countries

It was argued that economies throughout the industrialised world were weaker as a result of the oil crisis; but that deficits would fall unevenly on the developed countries, particularly on France, Britain and Italy. Furthermore, these countries could not go on indefinitely financing their non-oil deficits through borrowing. Marcello de Cecco argued that there was little that the debtors could do at present except swim with the tide; but others thought that there was more to be done. Some sympathy was expressed with the views of orthodox financiers that domestic restraint should be imposed, that the deficit consumers must begin to make the adjustment which would allow them to divert some portion of GNP to the export sector in order to meet the claims of the producers by a transfer of real resources. Unless they imposed restraints, they would be creating problems for themselves. France, it was pointed out, was beginning to act on the oil deficit by imposing heavy cuts on consumption.

The Italian case

What lessons could be learnt from the Italian case, and how far was that experience a foretaste of conditions that might apply to other countries, notably to France and Britain? In certain respects the situations of France and Italy were similar. Both countries were heavily dependent on imports of oil, and could expect no long-term relief in that area. Britain, on the other hand, had the medium-term assets of the North Sea. It was argued that France's official reserves were increasing, and that its current account deficit was matched by a surplus on capital account. Nevertheless, the non-oil deficit was substantial, and was increasing to a considerable extent: France's payments imbalance, like

Italy's, was brought about through the agency of Germany, whose best customer it was. A further similarity between the French and Italian economic situations was noted: a contributory factor to the high inflation suffered by both countries in the last two years was the reduction in hours of work and the implementation of regulations requiring longer training periods, which lowered productivity for the same cost.

Some aspects of the Italian case were special, however; and these derived to a considerable extent from failures in Italy's political and administrative system. De Cecco argued that the case was an example of the abdication by Western governments of their powers to raise taxes, which left restraint to be exercised through monetary policy operated through unrepresentative central banks. It was argued against this that this abdication of responsibility was not typical of contemporary Western governments—attention was drawn to the severe fiscal measures imposed by British governments in 1973 and 1974. Furthermore, Italy's politicians had not so much failed to exert their fiscal powers, as to control government expenditure. In the early 1960s government saving represented 5 per cent. of GNP; ten years later, there was a dis-saving of minus 5 per cent. Italy's deficit was caused by mismanagement of the public sector, where there had been an enormous waste of resources; laws on the statute book providing for the reduction of public expenditure had not been applied, and the amount of self-financing that had existed had disappeared.

The inadequacies of the government machine had led to failures of policy in other respects. The slowness of the public sector to react to changing situations had contributed to the perpetuation of a structure of interest rates that were among the lowest in Europe; they were a product of laws providing for credit to be given out at rates which were concessionary and, sometimes, as a result of inflation, negative. Another peculiar feature of the Italian case lay in the large flows of capital exports mentioned by de Cecco, who argued that the central bank had encouraged outflows by maintaining low interest rates. The existence of such a deliberate policy was denied; it was argued that many other factors contributed to capital outflows, among them the absence of choice for investors on the domestic market. Capital exports could be seen as frustrated private investment.

Drastic solutions

It was agreed that Italy did present in some respects an extreme case among the deficit countries. Was it likely to adopt an extreme response to its present difficulties, in the absence of immediate relief proceeding from reflation by Germany and the United States? How could it buy time in which to put its house in order? A drastic solution was suggested by an Italian participant—that of having recourse to Articles

108–109 of the Treaty of Rome, in order to impose emergency import restrictions for balance of payments reasons. Two opposing views were put forward on this point. It was argued that such restrictions, because they were limited and short-term, could be tolerated by the international community, as the import curbs imposed by Britain in 1964, France in 1968 and the United States in 1971 had been tolerated for a while. Such restrictions could achieve their object; they would help to shift the Italian deficit onto Germany. But others maintained that this course would be highly dangerous. The spirit of protectionism remained strong in Europe; and if others followed Italy down the same road, the survival of the EEC, not to mention the progress of international trade liberalisation, would be put in jeopardy. So far from tolerating the restrictions imposed in previous instances, the international community had fought them hard, and this pressure had led to their curtailment; the same opposition ought to be shown if Italy attempted to limit its imports by quantitative restrictions.

The European Community

It was argued that the European Community would be most reluctant to allow the imposition of restrictions under Article 108. What could the Community do to alleviate Italy's difficulties? So far, a considerable amount of help had been forthcoming, and far greater generosity shown than in the crisis of 1963–64. Italy had drawn upon the Community's short-term support to the tune of $1·9 billion; this three-month loan had been renewed twice since the original drawing in March 1974, and it was intended to convert it into a medium-term loan when it expired again in December. Italy was almost certain to be the first candidate for assistance under the scheme set up in October 1974 for raising a series of medium-term loans from the oil-producing countries. The Community had therefore acquired a certain amount of experience in this area of short-term assistance, although it might seem that its contribution was small in relation to the size of the problem. On the other side it was doubted whether there would be any value in increasing the level of assistance beyond that anticipated; Italy's burden of debt was already considerable, and to add to it could place intolerable strains on the economy.

It was agreed that financial assistance should remain on this limited scale; but that there was scope for the European Community to help Italy in other ways, both by influencing it towards restructuring its economy, and by bringing the economies of the Nine more into line. As far as structural change was concerned, it was suggested that Italy's creditors had a positive duty to impose a certain amount of restraint, and that the Italian government would be wrong to object to the imposition of conditions for financial assistance. The Community could

easily lay down some conditions which would fall short of macro-eco omic recommendations (such as stipulating a certain level of unemplo ment) but which might nevertheless bring about adjustments. precedent existed in the case of the British stand-by credit in 1969 whe the IMF recommended—and the British authorities welcomed—a spe fic limit on Domestic Credit Expansion. Perhaps some action on t oil deficit might be achieved by conditions relating to non-essenti energy consumption. There was considerable agreement that spendi in the public sector might provide a suitable area for scrutiny, and t suggestion for setting up a European Efficiency Review Board, whi would establish standards of efficiency, met with support. Potential f Community help outside the area of short-term monetary assistance l in the fields of agricultural and regional policies, through a high degree of direct investment in Southern Italy, and changes in t agricultural regulations. Italy had to bear a certain amount of the blan for not taking advantage of the EEC funds that were already availabl notably agricultural funds; these had not always found their way in the appropriate coffers. It was urged that anything given in futu should be tied and conditional; it was suggested that credits fro agricultural funds might be given not in dollars, but in commodity loan

However, there was some scepticism whether surveillance by t Community would achieve a great deal in producing reforms in t execution of Italian economic policy. There was even greater pessimis about the likelihood of action on a wider front to co-ordinate t divergent economies of the Nine. What was needed, for example, w concerted demand management for the Community as a whole— present pressures of demand were uneven. If there was a tendency f one country to export capital, the solution would be to organise capit flows through financial institutions consistent with the requirements a balanced growth policy. But the conference remained doubtful wheth at present the Community had enough power to achieve this. Th machinery was there; the debtors could be scrutinised; but could t creditors be influenced and the economies brought into line? It w doubtful whether political pressures, which on a national scale, mig moderate the deflationary tendencies of certain central banks, cou operate in a Community context. The Community would not becon the source of economic management until all the governments of i members co-ordinated their objectives or at least did not ha recourse to the argument that a particular scheme of economic manag ment was socially and politically unacceptable.

Conclusions

What sort of balance sheet could be drawn up after this consideratic of the prospects for Italy and for the whole system? It was argued t

some participants that there were grounds for optimism. The oil-consuming countries had coped perhaps rather better with their problems in 1974 than might have been expected. The official reserves of the developed countries were increasing—including those of deficit countries. In the case of Japan, the improvement in its balance of payments had been spectacular—more than had been expected by the OECD six months ago; it had been achieved, however, by massive deflation. Of the other deficit nations, France and Britain gave some cause for concern; but the latter might cope rather better in future, thanks to its North Sea oil assets. Even the less developed countries were at present in a less difficult situation than had been envisaged. It was contended that the experience of 1974 had shown that we could survive by pragmatic solutions, by increasingly able crisis management. Provided the mechanism continued to function, we could go on living with indebtedness. If Italy could eliminate its non-oil deficit, it could, some thought, cope with the remaining problem of the oil deficit by continuing to borrow and roll over its debts.

But many remained pessimistic about economic trends. We had lived with the problem for a year; but there was no reason to suppose, it was thought, that we could cope with it for the next ten years. It was not a solution for deficit countries to borrow their way out of their balance-of-payments difficulties; there was a great danger of increasing indebtedness, of building up a structure of credit which might collapse as a similar edifice did in 1929. So far, markets had coped with oil funds; but the limits had almost been reached. Central bank co-operation had worked reasonably well, but the political limitations to the role of central banks as guarantors of loans had been emphasised. The examination of the constraints on the European Community's power to bring economies into line confirmed the importance of the political dimension. For the immediate future, it was possible that a deliberate change of policy by America and Germany, from deflating to reflating their economies, might bring results quickly enough to avert depression; but it was by no means certain that this would come soon enough. Beyond these uncertainties lay that of the Middle East situation; another war was possible, and its results, all members of the conference agreed, would be unforeseeable and likely to be extremely unpleasant.

ANN-MARGARET WILLIS

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CRISIS

PROLOGUE: 1973

June

18 Italian measures in defence of lira. Italy's reserves stood at $5,674 million plus swap lines at $1,630 million with EEC countries and BIS, and $1,250 million with US.

22 Deutsche Bundesbank and Banque de France agreed to a swap of $500 million each for Banca d'Italia. In addition, Italy accorded a line of assistance of $1,900 million under EEC short-term support agreement.

* * *

1973 Italian *trade deficit:* 3,267 billion lire.
(The largest previous maximum deficit was in 1963, when it was 1,600 billion lire.)

1973 *Balance of payments deficit:* 252 billion lire; borrowing on the Euro-dollar market totalled $13,300 million in 1973.

* * *

ITALY: 1974

February

7 Banks raised prime rate to 11%.

11 13 Guido Carli and Rinaldo Ossola, Governor and Deputy Governor Banca d'Italia, in Washington.
Ugo La Malfa, Minister of the Treasury, held talks with Arthur Burns, Chairman of Federal Reserve Board, and George Shultz, US Secretary for the Treasury, during the Washington energy conference.

17 Banca d'Italia announced that IMF had agreed to a stand-by credit of SDR 1 billion (US$1·2 billion). The terms included the imposition of a credit ceiling of It. L. 22,400 billion for 1974; the holding of the budget deficit at It. L. 8,800 billion, and the trade deficit at It. L. 900 billion.

25 Refusal of Socialists to accept these terms because of their severity.

28 Resignation of La Malfa.

March

3 Resignation of coalition government led by Mariano Rumor (Christian Democrat).

15 Rumor government reformed, with Emilio Colombo replacing La Malfa at Treasury.

18 Banca d'Italia raised its discount rate from 6·5% to 9%.
Banca d'Italia activated EEC short-term support.

19 Carli speech to Naval College, Livorno: his chief fear the effects of inflation, not those of deflation. Defence of lira had taken precedence over maintenance of level of production, in absence of coherent government policy. There was a need to divert resources to exports.

22 Two-tier foreign exchange market abolished.

26 An improvement in the lira reported: the effective devaluation since floating now 17·7%.

30 Announcement of increases in VAT, postal charges and railway fares.

April

7 15% credit ceiling imposed on growth of bank lending between March 31, 1974 and March 31, 1975.

10 IMF approved stand-by for $1·2 billion, on original terms.

30 Import deposit scheme introduced on imports other than raw materials and investment goods. Surcharge of 50% of value of imports to be put into a non-deposit bearing account with Banca d'Italia for six months. Italy justified introduction of scheme by

recourse to Article 109 of the Treaty of Rome, which permits restrictions to be adopted in an emergency for balance-of-payments reasons. Surcharge would affect nearly 45% of value of Italy's imports.

May

1 Euro-dollar borrowing amounted to around $7·5 billion since July 1972. Reserves at the end of February stood at It. L. 2,339,400 million, of which It. L. 1,804,300 million were in gold.

1 EEC Commission met and announced it did not accuse Italy of ignoring consultation requirement of Treaty of Rome, although the measures did jeopardise the spirit of the EEC.

3 Colombo talks in Brussels. He announced that surcharge not an anti-EEC measure, but was taken for internal reasons, in order to regulate domestic liquidity. The scheme would operate for a year.

6 EEC Commission proposed consolidation of short-term EEC loan to Italy for two years.

7 EEC foreign and agriculture ministers discussed Italian case, and authorised Commission to approve Italy's surcharge. They failed to agree on a support package.

15 The leading banks raised their prime rate to 14%.

31 Carli told Banca d'Italia Annual Meeting that if gold reserves could be valued at free market prices (as discussed by EEC ministers of finance in April), Italy's solvency would be guaranteed. He suggested a buffer stock of gold, and warned that Italy could not live beyond its means much longer. No more credit would be forthcoming from abroad. Too many imports; more taxes needed; productivity too low. In last two years, Italy had borrowed $10,500 million from abroad, and Banca d'Italia had sold $8,850 million on foreign exchange markets in support of lira.

31 W. German Bundesrat vote deploring Italian measures, and calling on government to press for consultation in Brussels.

June

4 EEC Council of Ministers agreed on package drawn up by Commission to deal with import deposits. It included special arrangements for beef and young live cattle. The 'green lira' to be devalued (by 12½%) in return for eventual withdrawal of deposits Colombo gave assurance that austerity programme was under discussion.

8-9-10 Cabinet in continuous session; deadlock over economic measures. Christian Democrats accepted Carli's views in favour of credit restrictions, plus increases in prices of electricity, fares, petrol, meat. Socialists opposed credit squeeze which they contended would hit medium and small businesses and create unemployment.

10 Resignation of Rumor government.

10-14 BIS Annual Meeting in Basle. Reports of discussion on how to set credit for Italy in motion; either by joint Euro-dollar market loan guaranteed by EEC countries and the US; or by German bilateral loan; or by unfreezing Italy's gold stocks. Germany ready to provide $1,000 million.

11 Group of Ten ministers meeting in Washington decided informally to value gold reserves at free market prices. Reports that German loan for Italy forthcoming.

13 Statement by Hans Apel, West German Finance Minister, in

Washington: Germany did not rule out possibility of loan to Italy; but Italy must first have a government, with a majority and an economic programme.

13 President Leone refused to accept resignation of Rumor coalition.

19 Compromise economic programme, including easing of credit squeeze, higher taxes and electricity, etc. charges; aim of taking It. L. 3,000 billion out of economy. Banks to increase their bond holdings from 9 to 12%. These measures presented to parliament on June 27.

July

5 Kissinger in Rome for talks with government, including discussion of Italy's economic problems.

6 Italian government introduced VAT increase on beef and other items (from 6% to 18%); higher petrol prices; levy on property, cars, tax on purchase of cars, pleasure boats.

14 Credit squeeze eased.

22 Farm trade with EEC resumed; border taxes adjusted.

22 Report that from June 14 Banca d'Italia had ceased to intervene in support of lira. A repatriation of currency taking place.

31 End of price controls introduced in 1973. Budget deficit no higher than 1974–75: It. L. 7,373 billion.

August

8 Banca d'Italia statement that $600 million of stand-by credit had been drawn from IMF; and 3·5 billion Belgian francs to settle debt to Belgian central bank for support given to lira.

19–20 Colombo and Carli in Bonn to prepare for Rumor-Schmidt summit to be held at end of month. Communiqué described talks as 'extraordinarily useful'. Reports in Italian press that loan of around DM. 12 billion promised; other sources reported that Germany will only give aid in EEC context.

22 Official German statement that no loan had been promised.

23 Interview in *l'Espresso* by Altiero Spinelli, Commissioner for Industry and Technology: EEC Commission was preparing ground for massive international loan, possibly of $5 billion. Strict political conditions would be imposed.

25 Colombo met President of EEC Commission. Colombo statement that there had been a discussion of how to postpone the repayment of the short-term loan due by September 18.

30 Carli interview in *l'Espresso*; German attitude now more positive. This was key to success of Italian financial diplomacy, which consisted of:

(1) increasing swap lines which now stood at $900 million from IMF and $3·5 billion from central banks;
(2) consolidating short-term debt to EEC;
(3) obtaining further medium-term loans from central banks;
(4) obtaining a long-term loan from EEC. Carli suggested that an EEC fund could be backed by borrowing from Arabs.

30–31 Schmidt-Rumor talks in Bellagio. An immediate $2 billion bilateral credit for Italy was agreed on, to be backed by 20% of gold reserves at $120 an ounce. Schmidt said Germany not asking Italy to take further deflationary measures, and emphasised that this loan was a technical central bank operation.

31 Report that US Office of the Comptroller of Currency had

instructed banks to consider loans to Italy in 'problematical' category.

September

4 Comptroller of Currency's office refused to deny specifically this report.

16 EEC finance ministers agreed without discussion to extend Italy's short-term loan for another three months until December 18. Scheme for raising medium-term loan from oil producers discussed.

24 Italy completed arrangements to borrow $312 million from the IMF's oil facility, and to draw $540 million from the stand-by.

24–30 Visit of President Leone to USA. Communiqué issued after talks with President Ford stated that US prepared to play an appropriate, constructive and responsible rôle in a return to economic equilibrium in Italy.

October

2 The Social Democrats accused Socialists of destroying the coalition.

3 Resignation of Rumor government accepted by Leone.

14 Carli statement: Italy was negotiating to consolidate its short-term borrowing with medium-term Community aid; need for import cuts remained. New criteria should be adopted for assessing the creditworthiness of industrial countries in situation caused by the oil price increases.

16 Apel press conference: Germany would agree to Community loan from oil producers, on certain conditions:
(1) upper limit of 3 billion units of account for 1975;
(2) maximum loan period of 5 years;
(3) beneficiary must be identified in advance;
(4) credits to be paid direct to central banks, and used to cover balance-of-payments deficits only:
(5) strict conditions to be imposed on beneficiary;
(6) Bundestag must consent to each new loan.

21 EEC finance ministers agreed to launch an initial five-year loan of $3 billion from oil producers. A second operation in 1975 not ruled out; West Germany, France and UK to be main guarantors. Italy revealed that it would be first applicant for assistance under this scheme.

At 22 Italy's borrowing stood at:

	$ million
—Foreign loans underwritten by various companies and institutions	3,600
—Balance-of-payments deficit's compensatory finance	8,200
—Stand-by arrangement with IMF	1,200
—Drawing on IMF oil facility	312
—EEC short-term support, expiring December 1974	1,889
—Loan from West Germany against gold guarantee	2,000

In addition, there remained unutilised central bank swaps of $3,750 million, of which $3,000 million was with the Federal Reserve.

ANN-MARGARET WILLIS

TACTICAL NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND EUROPEAN DEFENCE: A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL

Michael J. Brenner

IT is often noted that if we were ever to be visited by the horrors of nuclear warfare it would most likely result from military conflict in Europe. The location of several thousand tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) assigned a key role in war-fighting scenarios in the central arena of great power confrontation is the obvious reason for this estimate. Yet there has been a remarkably uncritical acceptance of these formidable theatre forces and of the doctrines for their use. In contrast to the repetitive, systematic review of strategic weapons, the former receives only the intermittent attention of public officials and analysts.[1]

It is appropriate to examine the disposition of tactical nuclear forces, plans for their contingent use, and proposals for the reform of both at a time when a number of diplomatic and military developments are nudging the subject into more prominent view. First, the capabilities and purposes of the American nuclear arsenal as a whole are being re-examined by an Administration in Washington which is seriously concerned about the ramifying political effects of parity with the Soviet Union. Second, the initiative by the Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger, to shift the focus of our strategic forces towards counterforce targeting has the demanding requirements of the American commitment to Europe's defence as a major point of anxious reference. Third, the Pentagon is making a strong push for re-equipping Nato with ' mini-nukes ', a ' new family of precision guided miniaturised weapons ', that could be linked to revised plans for their early use in the event of hostilities.[2] Finally, the problematic outcome of the interbloc negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions heightens the general un-

[1] After a considerable period of relative neglect, recently there has been a flurry of writing on the subject. The most significant analysis is in Wolfgang Heisenberg, *The Alliance and Europe: Part 1: Crisis Stability in Europe and Theatre Nuclear Weapons*, Adelphi Papers Number Ninety-Six (The IISS, London, Summer 1973). See also Colin S. Gray, ' Mini-nukes and Strategy ', *International Journal*, vol. XXIX, No. 2, Spring 1974; James H. Polk, ' The Realities of Tactical Nuclear Weapons ', and W. S. Bennett, R. R. Sandoval and R. G. Schreffler, ' A Credible Nuclear-Emphasis Defense for NATO ': both in *Orbis*, Summer 1973. The last mentioned is a testament to the enduring faith in technological answers to problems of strategic planning and doctrine.

[2] A series of news stories report Administration concerns and proposals: ' Use of Outside American Atomic Forces Is Favoured by NATO In A Nuclear War ', *New York Times*, December 2, 1973, and ' Small Atomic Arms Are Urged for NATO ', *New*

certainty about the permanence and effectiveness of Nato's conventional forces. In combination, these circumstances indicate a renewed emphasis on tactical nuclear arms, underline the paradox inherent in the alliance's reliance on them for both deterrence and defence, and increase the very considerable dangers of their premature and uncontrollable use. Our criticism of existing arrangements, and reason for disquietude over the direction of proposed changes, is threefold:

(A) Given the perceived weakness of its conventional forces, the prevailing Nato doctrine of forward defence anticipates resort to nuclear weapons at such a low threshold of hostilities that it unnecessarily reduces the opportunities for diplomatic efforts to neutralise the crisis;

(B) The calibre of the weapons in Nato's tactical nuclear arsenal, its magnitude, and the command and control structures that have been established, make it exceedingly difficult to restrict its use to the immediate battlefield and preclude any limited employment for purely demonstration purposes:

(C) The proposed linkage of these weapons in Europe to ICBMs based in the United States favours the swift escalation of combat into general nuclear war.

The overall stress of warfighting modes violates the principle that nuclear weapons should fulfil their function only as instruments of deterrence, being peculiarly unsuited to strategies of use aimed at victory. It also unduly restricts the margin for discretionary judgment if deterrence should fail. I believe that a more prudent approach to TNWs can be devised that mitigates their dangers, while according them a continuing, but sharply reduced, role in European defence planning (a role I believe is dictated by the realities of alliance politics as much as by the turn of East-West relations). It would however depend on a f indamental shift in the premises of Nato strategy, a modification of the weapons themselves, and the imposition of tighter controls on their operational use.

We can best specify the liabilities of present arrangements, and sharpen our criticism of them, by reviewing how they emerged, and sketching their practical implications in scenarios of East-West conflict in Europe. This assessment will serve as background to our recommendations for reform.

The early strategy

The paramount role assigned to TNWs is to reinforce Nato's deterrent against aggression by Warsaw Pact forces to the east. As was explained when first introduced in the early 1950s, they stand as an unequivocal statement of the United States commitment to defend Europe, and of

York Times January 27, 1974. A critical view of these tendencies is expressed by Walter Pincus, 'Nobody Needs Nukes', in *The New Republic*, April 20, 1974.

its readiness to use all means available for doing so.[3] With the Soviet Union appearing at its most threatening, and the allies unable to muster the conventional armies adequate to repel an attack, military planners deemed nuclear arms to be absolutely essential to the alliance's viability. The desire to exploit American technological strength in compensation for an enemy manifestly superior in conventional arms, had been given global expression in John Dulles's assertive strategy of 'massive retaliation'. The development of Nato's nuclear capability was a logical extrapolation of this thinking. The nature of the weapons emplaced, and the plans for their use, reveal this doctrinal parentage.[4]

By 1960, the United States had accumulated in Europe an enormous arsenal of some thousands of atomic warheads, to be delivered by a formidable array of field artillery, rockets, and aircraft. With the exception of the artillery, their range permitted, and established doctrine called for, retaliation against a wide range of military targets throughout Eastern Europe. Their reach was matched by their firepower. Although a few of the artillery (and smaller rocket) warheads were in the kiloton range, the largest portion of the overall forces was composed of aircraft-delivered bombs, most with a yield of approximately 1 megaton, 50 times greater than the bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Guided by the twin ideas of 'more bang for the buck' and deterrence as a measure of maximum threat, Nato acquired a nuclear capability that was tactical only by courtesy of nomenclature. (The weapons' characteristics themselves were dictated as much by the bureaucratic disposition to use available technology as by a conscious adaptation of design to function.) Since, at that epoch, war in Europe was seen as part of, or a prelude to, a global conflict, no overriding reason was seen for limiting the inventory to the precise weapons required for restricted battlefield tasks.

The preponderance of the nuclear segment of the alliance's forces over its conventional armies, which were taken to be puny compared to those of the Eastern bloc, created a strong tendency to look upon the conventional forces simply as a tripwire that would trigger a nuclear response in the event of war. This attachment to the idea of a 'low threshold' was reinforced by the deterrent principle that there is an inverse correlation between an enemy's readiness to attack and the magnitude of the damage he would suffer as a consequence. Then, as now, the logical

[3] The classic analysis of alliance policy and nuclear planning in those years is Robert Osgood, *The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[4] The desire to exploit the United States lead in nuclear technology, in the effort to compensate for the superiority of Soviet conventional forces, pervaded American strategic thinking at the time. It inspired critics as well as the proponents of massive retaliation. Among those who made the case for limited, tactical nuclear war was Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations; London: Oxford University Press, 1957).

weakness of this approach is two-fold. First, there is the issue of credibility—can one pose a credible deterrent by threatening an incredible action? The lethal quality of the nuclear force installed in Europe made it highly probable, if not certain, that the conflict would rapidly grow into all-out war. With the growing vulnerability of the United States to Soviet air attack, a tactical nuclear response to conventional assault implied massive destruction on both sides, *i.e.*, an intolerable outcome of an 'incredible' action. Second, even were we to make the not unreasonable assumption that a potential aggressor would be dissuaded by the enormous costs of misjudging his opponent's will, there is the further problem of controlling a conflict that might have erupted through accident or miscalculation. The inherent paradox in nuclear strategy is that the doctrine, and force configuration, most effective for deterrent purposes is the one a statesman would least like to employ if deterrence were to fail. It is of the utmost importance to retain some margin of time in which to assess the progress of the conventional battle, and to seek diplomatic resolution of the conflict. Even under the most pessimistic of conditions, that approach seems preferable to a quick, probably irrevocable, escalation to nuclear weapons. In essence, the relative weight that military planners attach to one objective as opposed to the other is determined by their interpretation of the enemy's intentions and the estimates of his strength. Washington in the 1950s, as we noted, saw a European conflict in terms of the much discussed and, for many, expected final confrontation between the great powers.

It was Robert McNamara who forced the military strategists to shift their attention to hypothesised hostilities that would be geographically restricted, and more limited in their objective, as would be the case if fighting broke out at the height of a tension-laden, acute political crisis. Whether escalating from a direct clash of the great powers over Berlin, or triggered by some revolt in East Germany followed by West German intervention, the resulting military challenge to Nato forces had to be placed in a political context where both sides maintained an overriding interest in settling the matter short of resort to ultimate weapons. McNamara's keen desire to introduce 'pauses', to allow for diplomatic initiatives between steps of the escalation ladder, combined with doubts about the credibility of a deterrent strategy that threatened swift escalation to TNWs to inspire the doctrine of 'flexible response'. As formulated in the early 1960s and explained to sceptical allies, it promised a wider range of options for Nato which, in the case of war, would permit a more careful and effective synchronisation of military and diplomatic action. The successful implementation of the strategy had three requirements: above all, a considerable strengthening of the alliance's conventional forces; a modification of plans for the employ-

ment of nuclear weapons that stressed the use of TNWs in a geographically restricted military conflict; and the upgrading of both Nato's consultative procedures and the command communications so as to enable political authorities and military commanders to exercise careful control over the application of the forces at their disposal.

The several initiatives taken by the Kennedy Administration to implement 'flexible response', and to gain European backing for it, consumed considerable bureaucratic and diplomatic energies on both sides of the Atlantic.[5] The cumulative result however was something less than the rather drastic qualitative changes in Nato defence that had been the declared goal. After years of strained dialogue, American entreaties and some coercion, flexible response was given the alliance's official imprimatur in 1967. Strikingly, the new doctrine entailed a marked augmentation of the nuclear arsenal (bringing it close to today's figure of 7,000 warheads), even as some of its components were modified: the unguided rockets were superseded, if not entirely replaced, by the Sergeant and Pershing missiles; the atomic artillery was modernised; more sophisticated control systems (including Permissive Action Links—PALs—placed on weapons under joint United States-allied control) were established to avoid accidental, unauthorised use of weapons; and command procedures were streamlined. Despite these modifications, a review of the Nato force structure reveals *that in its essentials it is unchanged since 1960*. Its drawbacks and dangers also remain.

Nato planning

Although the principle supposedly guiding the organisation of that force is 'flexible response', Nato officials and army officers are almost unanimous in the often expressed belief that they lack the conventional means to build an effective defence against attacking Warsaw Pact armies. Accordingly, the general assumption, as substantiated by the contingency plans in effect, is that the SACEUR command will be constrained to resort to its tactical nuclear arms within a couple of days of the outbreak of hostilities. Moreover, there is every expectation of a rapid spread and escalation to new levels of intensity from these initial nuclear exchanges since there is no provision for a demonstration use of the weapons.

The thrust of all Nato planning is skewed in this direction by the perceived weakness of its non-nuclear forces. Member governments have consistently failed to attain their agreed troop levels (or even to maintain levels reached), whether those stipulated at the alliance's inauguration

[5] The McNamara initiatives are related in Robert McNamara, *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office* (New York: Harper & Row; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1968); William Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).

or as redefined in the 1960s. In recent years, the capability of these forces has been further undermined by France's withdrawal from the Nato command structure (if not from the alliance), the drain on the American Seventh Army's manpower by the demands of the war in Vietnam, its associated loss of morale, and the mounting campaign by Congress to cut appreciably the American commitment. Having officially assigned conventional means a prominent place in its strategy of mixed deterrence, military planners have felt obliged to compensate for its weakness by lowering the tactical nuclear threshold. The disposition to shift forward in time, and downward in the scale of hostilities, the point at which atomic weapons are used is given a powerful impetus by two other factors. First is the very strong emphasis on war-fighting capabilities that pervades the military. Despite the reiterated political aim of using each component of the available forces for the defensive purpose of blocking an enemy incursion and creating, at the first instance, room for diplomatic manoeuvre, the dominant military attitude is to exploit all available force to subdue an opponent on the battlefield. The practical consequence with regard to tactical nuclear weapons is they would be called upon to beat back an assault as close to the point of attack as feasible, and that operational plans anticipate the very extensive use of these weapons once employed.

Second, this ' forward strategy ' is reinforced by the political preference of America's Nato allies for a low threshold with its presumed maximum deterrent effect. In particular there is West Germany's staunch opposition to any plan that envisages its territory serving as a battlefield. Although the evaluation of tactical nuclear war games has brought home the point that the resulting casualties would exceed appreciably those expected from a conventional defence, the perceived deterrent benefits of the lower threshold have continued to outweigh an undeniable concern over the consequences of its failure. Official German policy therefore rejects an alternative approach (whose desirability we shall argue) that would entail a greater readiness to exchange ground for diplomatic time, and would see the first use of nuclear arms as a *signalling device*, informing the enemy of our will, ultimately, to go all the way, and our unwillingness to accept the accomplishment of his military and/or political purposes. Whereas there is a certain sympathy for the idea of controlling the scale of nuclear response, prevailing German thinking, and that of the alliance in general, opposes both using the initial strikes for demonstration effect rather than integral elements of the military campaign, and shifting the threshold upwards.

(As we discuss below in elaborating its ingredients and desirability, such an approach must: (a) acknowledge, and deal with the genuine discomfort of the United States allies with the implied decoupling, even partially, of nuclear from conventional defence, and (b) overcome

the military's resistance to the idea of restraining or inhibiting the use of the forces at their disposal. For by training and professional temperament they have little tolerance for ambiguity and rule out orders that are not concrete and specific.)

The deployment of our tactical nuclear arsenal, the weapons of which it is composed, and their operational plans all reflect the present stress on war-fighting scenarios; and each raises disquieting questions about our ability to keep the conflict in check once it breaks out. The inventory includes Short Range Ballistic Missiles, the Sergeant and the Pershing (scheduled to be supplanted by the shorter range Lance), numbering about 750, with a range from 85 to 450 miles, and armed with warheads whose yields are in the tens of kilotons range; some vintage Honest John rockets endowed with warheads of similar yield and a range of approximately 25 miles; several hundred strike aircraft, land based and carrier based, which have a flight range varying from 2,000 to 3,400 miles and which are armed with bombs of variable yield, but probably also in the tens of kilotons range; and an array of 500 or 600 dual-capable field artillery, mostly 155-millimetre and 8-inch howitzers, that fire atomic shells in the kiloton, and sub-kiloton range up to ten miles.[6] (With the exception of some more modern aircraft, and the ancient Honest Johns, these weapons systems all date from the early and mid-1960s.) It is sobering to realise that only a small portion of this force is truly tactical in any reasonable sense of the term, *i.e.*, can be used with some precision against unambiguous military targets on or near the battlefield. These are the howitzers, and those aircraft which have been supplied with low-yield 'smart' bombs (technically, precision-guided ordnance). The more extensive introduction of the latter, along with adjustment of the operational plans, has received the most serious discussion in the past few years. We shall consider the military and doctrinal implications of such a reform later in this article. Two comments seem appropriate here. First, the utility of smart bombs in a genuinely tactical role depends on still unclear targeting plans as well as the bombs' technical precision; second, the primary role envisaged for aircraft still extends their conjectured operation well beyond the battlefield.

The present manner of the weapons' deployment further complicates the task of controlling their use. The warheads are concentrated in a hundred special ammunition sites, many in West Germany and the others scattered elsewhere in the Nato countries. Delivery systems are sited from within several miles of the border, as with artillery pieces, to the widely dispersed aircraft. Some significant portion of the aircraft, both American and those commanded by allied forces, according to a recent

[6] This information is taken from *The Military Balance 1973–1974*, IISS, London.

report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, are 'kept loaded at all times on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA)'.[7] More recently, atomic demolition teams have been formed in Italy and Germany to place atomic mines at strategic points in the path of invading armies. The American proposal that these Atomic-Demolition Munitions (ADMs), be prechambered, *i.e.*, holes prepared to receive them, has been rejected by the Bonn government for fear of premature or accidental ignition.

Given the location of these weapons, particularly the front line disposition of the artillery (and attendant arrangements for the distribution of warheads from nearby casernes) and in the light of contingency plans drawn to war-fighting specifications, there seems little question but that they would be activated at an extremely early stage of hostilities. Since a force of this construction and magnitude is at best a very crude signalling device, it is also clear that their function is to inflict large-scale damage on enemy forces, support systems and staging areas. Targeting plans and command procedures support this contention.

As the conventional war unfolds, Nato commanders would be reviewing the battle on an hour by hour basis to assess the effectiveness of the conventional defence. Their evaluation of the situation could at any time produce a request for permission to use nuclear weapons that would pass from the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe to the Nato governments. (A similar request could be made by a member government itself.) Consultation would begin immediately in the Defence Planning Committee between the two governments in whose possession the weapons reside (*i.e.*, the United States, and secondarily, the British) and their allies on the need, feasibility, and consequences of their employment. The final decision rests with the President of the United States—and the British Prime Minister—who are obliged to consult further only to the extent that time and circumstances permit. The procedures established to assure civilian control of the decision when first to use theatre nuclear weapons approximate to those governing the use of strategic weapons based in the United States.[8]

The danger of premature use arises from a force structure and contingency plans that key decision-making authority at all levels of command to the expectation of their full engagement in battle. Forward deployment of the arms themselves (where they are both vulnerable to capture and potential targets of a *pre-emptive* Soviet nuclear attack of their own), the emphasis on active defence at the point of attack, the integration of nuclear units into battlefield formations, and the officially stated position that there is an unmistakable linkage between the different steps on the retaliatory ladder, taken together create a precise,

[7] Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, *U.S. Security Issues in Europe: Burden Sharing and Offset, MBFR, and Nuclear Weapons*, December 2, 1973, pp. 17–18.

[8] These procedures are outlined in *ibid.*

and unequivocal set of expectations militating in favour of using tactical nuclear arms. Moreover, a President faced with the decision whether to cross the atomic threshold, would be confronted with tens of thousands of American casualties which, if not anticipated and accepted as the painful cost of avoiding instigation of nuclear war, could introduce a strong emotional factor into his deliberations. The overall effect may be to lend a sense of logical necessity and inevitability to the decision to go nuclear.

Controlling nuclear war

A similar set of doctrinal presumptions and procedural arrangements greatly complicates the problem of controlling the level of violence once tactical nuclear warfare is initiated. Targeting and operational plans indicate that once given the Presidential green light, Nato commanders will make generous use of their 7,000 warheads, in an area ranging far beyond the front lines. The alliance's General Strike Plan does make a distinction between 'selective use' and 'general nuclear response'. Further options grading levels of attack are laid down both for the army command responsible for the atomic artillery, and for the air force command in charge of missiles and aircraft; apparently, Nato's Nuclear Planning Group has also agreed that the initial employment of TNWs should be restricted. But the gradations implied might well be more formal than real under combat conditions. Although the details are classified, a few conclusions can be deduced from available information. First, it is not clear that there exists specific provision for a demonstration use of tactical nuclear arms at one or a few select points on the front. Second, Soviet retaliation with TNWs to Nato's initial employment of them, however restricted, can be expected to evoke a rapid escalation as army commanders resort to pre-established plans for saturation firing on enemy troop concentrations and rear echelons. Third, any use of missiles, rockets, and aircraft in an interdiction role against supply lines and staging areas would create the prospect of hundreds of nuclear weapons detonating across a wide area and producing considerable civilian damage. Fourth, as the Senate report notes, the SACEUR commander has stand-by authority for 'deliberate escalation with which he can expand the scope and increase the intensity of combat in order to strengthen his defensive effort or to insure the survival of his forces'.[9] Military considerations alone, therefore, could easily motivate rapid movement through the option phases. (At a further stage of hostilities General Nuclear Response extends this already formidable retort to incorporate wider deployment of missiles and aircraft against broadly defined military targets throughout Eastern Europe, and possibly into the

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

Soviet Union as well.) On the whole there is reason to fear that the development of nuclear war would be rapid and unidirectional.

Just as the assertion of political control over actual military operations is operationally difficult, so there are also formidable impediments to SACEUR fine-tuning its combat units (even if it was so inclined). The United States army's unclassified field manuals take as given a condition of general European warfare in which field officers will enjoy near normal authority to manage the weapons available to them once the enabling order is made. Whatever the instructions about the possible rationed use of nuclear arms, there appears to be no explicit reference to the possibility of a follow-on command to limit or halt their firing. Instead emphasis is on established army tactics that call for enveloping the enemy's forces with nuclear fire. (The fact that the military forces of every Nato member represented in the battle zone will also have acquired operational authority over some portion of the force underlines the problem of their control.)

The military see nuclear arms primarily as the means by which to win a war, not as diplomatic tools. There are always severe difficulties in defining for commanders objectives of a political character that necessarily introduce ambiguity into their operations. Where the overall strategy itself emphasises war-fighting capability to repel a conventionally superior force at or near the border, there is little basis for expecting anything other than the massive use of available firepower. Criticism should properly be levelled at those who formulate the strategy and propagate the myth that the resulting nuclear war can be readily demarcated and kept separate from general nuclear war. Faith alone, not reasonable analysis, can sustain this distinction while contemplating the explosion of thousands of atomic bombs in the combat zone and throughout Eastern Europe (many, we should recall, significantly larger than the Hiroshima bomb)—a magnitude of violence to be matched by a reciprocal Soviet attack.

It is difficult to avoid the disturbing conclusion that we have created a veritable Doomsday machine in Europe. An imprudent and excessive stress on deterrence that devalues the consequences of its failure; acceptance of questionable assumptions about the scale of the enemy challenge we are likely to confront; adherence to a doctrine of forward defence; the deployment of weapons systems inappropriate to their purpose; and tolerance of the military's normal propensity to pursue the conventional goal of victory—all these are the sources of this unhappy situation.

Administration initiatives

The renewed interest in the structure of European defence in the Nixon, and now Ford, Administration considers reforming the present

arrangements, but does not appear likely to call into question its principles. The main initiatives, all still under review, pull in opposite directions. Most recently, Mr. Schlesinger has acknowledged publicly some of the excessive risks that now exist. He has expressed a desire to reduce marginally any nuclear stockpiles in Europe, voiced concern about maintaining plans on Quick Reaction Alert, and advised America's allies of the need to increase conventional troop levels. But no specific steps have been taken to implement these ideas, and Dr. Kissinger has stressed that none will be forthcoming until carefully negotiated with Nato; he has also intimated that to raise the issue at this time threatens to revive the Soviet-American debate, in the SALT context, over Forward Based Systems.[10]

Two other proposals are less positive, if also uncertain of implementation. The first is Schlesinger's plan to tie strategic weapons based in the United States directly to the targeting of the tactical nuclear force in Europe; the second is the emplacement of 'mini-nukes' as the primary battlefield weapon. Voicing concern that the codification of parity with the Soviet Union has degraded Nato's overall nuclear deterrent, Schlesinger has sought to increase the flexibility of America's ICBMs so that they might be used with relative precision, and in limited numbers, against military targets in Eastern Europe which are at present allocated to theatre forces (as well as allowing for a wider range of options in the context of a direct Soviet-American strategic encounter). As viewed by Pentagon planners, there is a dual need: (a) to improve deterrent credibility by publicising a physical link between American strategic weapons and the American forces in place in Europe; and (b) to sharpen the signal to the Russians that a continuation of their aggression could mean global nuclear war. The issue however seems to be wrongly defined, and the proposed solution as dangerous as it is inadequate for its own stated objective.

First, there is now little reason to doubt the American willingness, and ability, to use nuclear arms in Europe's defence. Not only do the United States' conventional forces in Europe serve as hostages to its commitment, but also, as we noted, the escalation to tactical nuclear defence is as automatic as one can reasonably make it. Second, signalling the seriousness of American intent by striking East European targets is a purpose that can be carried out by using aircraft or missiles based in Europe without the employment of ICBMs. Since the former are capable of reaching Moscow or Leningrad (on one-way missions), as well as anywhere in East Germany, Poland or Hungary, there is no technical

[10] See Secretary Schlesinger's press conference, January 14, 1974. I analyse the Schlesinger strategic initiatives in *Strategic Doctrine and SALT*, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, August 1974. Laurence Martin provides a perceptive assessment of the new strategy in 'Change In American Strategic Doctrine—An Initial Interpretation', *Survival*, vol. XV, no. 4, July/August 1974.

problem involved. Moreover, since there is no assurance, under war conditions, that the origin of a missile can readily be determined, there is also questionable psychological benefit to be derived from a trans-Atlantic nuclear retort.

The use of high yield warheads delivered either way against targets like munitions factories has the further drawback of producing considerable collateral damage on civilian populations, and threatening to provoke Soviet attacks on West European cities with Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles. Deterrence cuts both ways. Schlesinger has argued, in this regard, that an enhanced ability to strike at these missiles from the United States denies the Russians the leverage of their threatened use. This seductively attractive idea suffers, however, from two shortcomings: first, the existence in the enemy inventory of light bomber aircraft also capable of a nuclear role; and second, the publicised vulnerability of those missiles might possibly encourage rather than discourage their use in response to our attacks against Eastern Europe. Third, the Schlesinger plan offers no solution to the ultimate dilemma of how to respond if Warsaw Pact forces were to gain ascendancy in a tactical nuclear war (however unlikely the prospect that in fact there would be time for a thoughtful contemplation of options). Residual doubts as to whether the United States would sacrifice New York for Bonn or Paris cannot be resolved by the targeting of ICBMs on military sites since it leaves open the question as to whether we are prepared to threaten Moscow at the point when conventional *and* tactical nuclear resistance fails. At that juncture, we would be faced with the unhappy alternative of accepting the *fait accompli*, or seeking to compel withdrawal through attacks on the Soviet homeland, whether counterforce or civilian targeted. Surgical strikes by highly accurate ICBMs, by virtue of the comparatively light damage they produce, could theoretically be launched with some expectation of avoiding general nuclear war as a consequence. But the restricted damage also implies a greater enemy tolerance to absorb it and to maintain territorial gains in Western Europe. In addition, the effectiveness of such a strategy depends, technically, on the perfection of far smaller and more precise warheads than are now available; and politically, on Soviet restraint in not replying with a counterforce attack of equal or greater size against ICBM silos and SAC bases. The dangers of such a game of escalating 'chicken' should be obvious.

Finally, the physical linkage of missiles based in the United States to theatre weapons in Europe further obscures the already contrived distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear warfare. There is risk enough in the facile jump from conventional conflict to the tactical threshold without a gratuitous rejection of the geographical demarcation as well. As with the Administration's infatuation with counterforce

models generally, the idea bears all the earmarks of an excessively subtle intellectual exercise, the seeming sophistication of which obscures its inadequate grasp of the blunt realities of nuclear warfare.

Whereas it is doubt about the American nuclear guarantee that has inspired the targeting initiative, the proposed 'mini-nukes' are motivated primarily by a renewed pessimism about the alliance's conventional capabilities. The uncertain status of the United States army in Europe, with the likelihood that adequate steps will be taken to compensate for its weakening, has deepened these sceptical judgments. As the Nato Supreme Commander, General Goodpaster, has testified before the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, a new generation of atomic weapons with small warheads would enhance our ability to attack precise military targets with sharply reduced collateral damage.[11] The warheads envisaged would be used in an adapted version of the 155-millimetre and 8-inch artillery, and with laser-guided or other 'smart' bombs. As Goodpaster argued, this virtuosity would not only improve our chances of achieving specific military objectives but would also produce a greater willingness to use the warheads. (At the moment, Congressional opposition to the multi-billion dollar cost of the programme along with some latent doubts about the desirability of improving the utility of tactical nuclear weapons has placed the issue temporarily in abeyance.)

This linkage between weapon miniaturisation and a lower threshold is almost universally made. Although a responsible argument can be made for designing tactical nuclear weapons better suited to perform limited functions, they also have the unfortunate effect of encouraging plans for their ready use. Innovations in technology tend to drag policy changes in their wake. So long as the doctrinal foundations, and command procedures for Nato forces remain in their present form, the deployment of 'mini-nukes' could only increase the considerable dangers of premature and uncontrolled war. (Proposals for the introduction of 'mini-nukes' as compensation for the possible reduction of American troop levels are particularly prone to have this undesirable effect.) Furthermore, there is no sign that the appearance of 'mini-nukes' in the inventory will herald the removal of any significant number of the long-range, high-yield weapons whose prominence makes the idea of limited tactical nuclear war so unlikely.

An alternative strategy

The time has arrived to give the most serious attention to a fundamental revision of force structures and operational plans for theatre nuclear weapons in Europe. What follows is a proposal for a series of

[11] Testimony of General Andrew Goodpaster, *Joint Committee on Atomic Energy*, 'Military Application of Nuclear Technology', May 22, June 29, 1973 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office).

interlocking changes in hardware and doctrine that aim at reducing the risks of nuclear war while meeting the requirements for West European defence.

(A) Our strategy is predicated on the belief that the likelihood of a calculated Soviet attack on Western Europe is low; that the most probable scenarios for conflict involve a political crisis over an issue of major importance that escapes diplomatic control (for example, the hearty perennial, Berlin, or a disintegration of the political structure in Yugoslavia that produced Soviet intervention); that both sides would continue to acknowledge an overriding mutual interest in preventing the escalation of hostilities; that the core of our deterrent to any ambitious Soviet attack is the intolerable risk of triggering off general war; the danger of which is underlined both by the presence of American troops and by 7,000 tactical nuclear warheads; and that therefore premiums should be placed on containing the scale and scope of the fighting. Accordingly, it is appropriate to trade some portion of the deterrent advantage of a low nuclear threshold (which is not directly applicable to the political-tension scenario, anyway, in its first phases) for a greater latitude in crisis management. The consequent loss of deterrent effect is not likely to be crucial in determining whether there will be war in Europe. There is little, if any, reason to believe that the Soviet high command, much less the members of the Presidium, estimate the dangers of an aggressive attack as varying directly with Nato's contingency plans and the exact configuration of its nuclear forces. A leader faced with an undeniably high risk of triggering off nuclear war cannot afford to act on the basis of a refined calculus about marginal shifts in the probability factor. Conflict growing out of a deteriorating political crisis will be determined more by a series of incremental decisions under the pressure of immediate circumstance than by a careful estimation of just when the nuclear flash-point will be reached if the cumulative result of those reciprocal actions is military engagement. The background reality of possible escalation to nuclear combat will remain a constant no matter the precise disposition of forces.

(B) The deployment of our forces should be such as to permit the maximum extension of the conventional war phase. Ideally, troop levels should be raised and their firepower strengthened. Admittedly, budgetary and other domestic political obstacles in all the member countries do not at present make this a realistic prospect. However, the demonstrated effectiveness of anti-tank weapons in the Middle East might well indicate a major shift in favour of defensive forces operating against large, mechanised armies. Although, to date, only the roughest assessments have been made of the implications for the military balance in Europe, there is substantial reason to believe that Nato armies, generously equipped with those weapons, could perform far more effectively against

the numerically superior enemy than is now generally assumed. Moreover, if we are speaking of limited, unplanned incursions that do not envelop the entire front, the enemy's numerical edge might be of only marginal advantage.

In principle, the prevailing 'forward defence' strategy should be replaced by one that is prepared to give ground in exchange for time before resort to tactical nuclear weapons. This would probably be the most controversial change, since America's European allies, and the West Germans in particular, have been adamant in their refusal to accept the idea of protracted conventional war on the bulk of their territory, and in their emphasis on a relatively low tactical nuclear threshold for deterrent purposes. Hopefully, a critical and sober review of the alliance's orthodoxies would reveal the dangers and inadequacies of existing arrangements; the possibilities for improved conventional defence would be recognised; and the latent fears about American commitment would be moderated in a more congenial intra-alliance political climate.

(C) Redeployment of TNWs away from the front-lines, and their dissociation from orthodox war-fighting plans, is central to our proposed strategy. The element of automaticity in present contingency plans can only be reduced if nuclear arms cease to be deployed in conventional formations where their availability, and vulnerability to attack, implies their ready use. Rather they should be held in reserve some distance behind the front lines and set apart from normal fighting units. Most important, clear and specific provision should be made for the firing of very limited, demonstration shots if adverse military, and diplomatic, developments indicate the need to remind the enemy of the risks entailed in his pressing the attack. Given what is now a near exclusive interest in war-fighting capability, that option does not now exist. The idea of employing TNWs mainly as a signalling device is the keystone of French tactical nuclear strategy, and it might well be emulated. Either aircraft or missiles held in rear echelons could be assigned this task. Whether the target is on the battlefield, or a stated, relatively unpopulated site, it is crucial that the symbolism should be accentuated by direct communication from the President to his Soviet counterpart as to its intent and meaning.

Admittedly, the implementation of these structural and doctrinal changes would have to overcome air force and perhaps army resistance, and necessitate a thorough overhaul of their training procedures and command arrangements. However, the deeply entrenched, classical military approach to war has been qualified with respect to strategic weapons, and the unprecedented nature of the problem points up the vital importance of extending those modifications.

The substitution of signalling for war-fighting in the initial use of

TNWs does not preclude an intensification of hostilities, and the consonant need to employ them on a larger scale to prevent the collapse of allied armies. At that stage of hostilities, it is essential to establish and to maintain the discrimination between battlefield artillery and other delivery systems. To avoid rapid escalation to all-out nuclear war, every effort must be made to restrict use to the immediate military task and to minimise civilian damage. High yield weapons directed at targets deep in enemy territory are entirely out of order for this function. The General Strike Plan accordingly should be revised to reflect the overall change in strategy, and the necessary command and control arrangements should be established.

'Mini-nukes', with their more accurate guidance systems and lower yields, do appear suited to these more modest tactical nuclear purposes. However, as we noted, given these attributes, their introduction to the inventory also carries the very considerable risk that their availability will itself result in their relatively facile use. Their apparent utility is a strong inducement to their incorporation into war-fighting plans as a complement to conventional forces. If it could be assumed that 'mini-nukes' would be installed only if this could be done in conjunction with the doctrinal and operational reforms outlined here, along with the removal of all high yield weapons, then the case for their deployment becomes more attractive. But since those other associated arrangements are likely to be imperfect, and their permanence always in doubt, the dangers—on balance—would appear to outweigh the advantages.

A strategy to defer the point at which recourse is made to nuclear weapons, and which anticipates conceding territory for diplomatic time, undeniably means that the initial atomic detonations, if any, will occur on friendly soil. Understandably, the West Germans do not view this prospect dispassionately. We should remind ourselves, however, that even were the first use made at, or close to, the point of engagement, the Russians' tactical nuclear response (which, in keeping with their doctrine, would be massive) would be directed at allied military targets located throughout the Federal Republic. So in practice there is no protection from the ravages of nuclear combat to be derived from a forward strategy dependent on those weapons.

In keeping with our stress on the parsimonious use of nuclear arms, there should be no literal coupling of theatre weapons to the nuclear forces based in the United States. Were hostilities to grow to the point where it was deemed imperative to call more immediately to the attention of Soviet leaders the ultimate risks of nuclear war, through attacks on military targets in Eastern Europe, aircraft and missiles on the Continent seem perfectly adequate to do the disagreeable job. It would remove the possibility of our ICBM launches being monitored and misinterpreted as the opening salvos of general nuclear war. Here again, it appears

desirable to restrict those attacks to a select number of distinctly military objectives, rather than raining Hiroshima size bombs from the Elbe to the Bug.

A Soviet first use?

This series of steps to revise Nato strategy for TNWs aims at reducing the chances of nuclear warfare resulting from conventional hostilities, and of their escalating into a global conflict. In discussing possible trade-offs between deterrence and defence, and the planned response to an outbreak of fighting, we have assumed that any hostilities would originate as conventional warfare, and so remain through their initial phases. The general acknowledgement of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces' preponderant strength is the self-evident reason for predicating assessments of alliance strategy on this premise. It is also why analyses made here, and elsewhere, tend to place the question of the alliance's nuclear threshold at the centre of discussion. Yet, there remains the possibility that enemy forces may initiate nuclear fire, and do so at the outset of the contest. This is not merely a theoretical consideration, since Warsaw Pact exercises indicate that their forces are trained to fight with tactical nuclear support from an early stage (an orientation matched by some Soviet military commentaries). It is therefore incumbent on the advocate of a radical revision of Nato force structures to consider whether the proposed changes carry the danger of reducing our capability of deterring the initiation of nuclear exchanges.

The defence of my proposed reforms against this line of potential criticism is twofold. First, there is the issue of plausibility. Given what we know about the sober, cautious way the Russians approach nuclear policy, it would appear unreasonable, and out of keeping with their normal conduct, to make no clear distinction between conventional and nuclear war in their operational planning. Adherence to that principle is not logically contrary to Soviet interest in tactical nuclear warfare. It is hardly surprising that very considerable emphasis should be given to the requirements for combat in a nuclear battlefield in the light of what has been for a generation Nato's stress on the integration of TNWs into its own forces. (The Soviet tendency to follow Western fashions in nuclear doctrine and weaponry could well have reinforced this interest in the practicalities of tactical nuclear warfare.) But it is a critical step from what is most likely contingency planning to the establishment of TNWs as the keystone of Soviet military doctrine in Europe. One further point on the question of plausibility: were the Russians to be so rash as to plot the initiation of nuclear warfare, they would only do so in the context of an all-out attack on Western Europe where inherent stakes necessarily would be enormously high. However, as we argued above, that seems the remotest of all circumstances in which

we can contemplate East-West hostilities in Europe, and should not be permitted to distort Nato planning by serving as the exclusive reference point for alliance policy.

The second argument to be made in support of the contention that a revised Nato strategy will not increase vulnerability to an initial Soviet nuclear attack is to reiterate the insensitivity of deterrence to the particulars of force structure and doctrine. Just as it seems improbable that the Soviet leadership's judgment as to the dangers of a conventional war in Europe are markedly influenced by the precise location of Nato's TNWs, and the contingency plans for their use, so there is good reason to reject the idea that an enemy decision to make first use of TNWs will be dictated by a similar finely tuned calculation. Deterrence derives from the unavoidable risk of suffering the intolerable damage of a general nuclear war. That risk, a probable one even were the American physical commitment purely conventional, seems undeniable so long as TNWs remain associated with Nato forces. Pre-emptive attack on Nato TNWs is precluded by their number and dispersion, and the irreducible indeterminancy factor as to exactly when and how they would be used denies the Soviet command the confidence to restrict its nuclear attack geographically to a point short of the Nato threshold (even if we could conceive of a limited objective worth such a dangerous venture). Thus, although the changes we have recommended do appear of some significance in reducing the possibilities of premature nuclear war, they cannot alter the overwhelming logic of nuclear deterrence. We should take advantage of the margin permitted us by the strength of that logic.

Total withdrawal?

My proposed reconstruction of Nato's defence posture envisages the retention of TNWs in Europe, and contemplates circumstances under which they would be used, albeit in a highly restricted way. As such, it is open to criticism by those who consider that any theatre role for TNWs poses unacceptable dangers out of all proportion to conjectured gain. They look upon the deployment of those forces as a historical error that should be completely rescinded through total withdrawal of non-conventional arms.

This 'totalist' position is built upon three premises. First, that the sobering effect of nuclear weapons on great power action (including a prudent approach to all major conflicts of interpower politics), stems from the very existence of those arms, and is not a function of their geographic location, specifications, or the doctrines to which they are attached. Second, as a corollary, their availability in Europe gives Nato no tangible advantage; the only reasonable scenario for conflict and crisis escalation could not be safely managed with TNWs; and even consideration of the nuclear response option, as made possible by the

weapons' simple presence, detracts from diplomatic initiative while creating tensions over pre-emption. Third, in the light of previous experience in attempting to reconstitute military organisation, command structures and planning, there can be no confident assurance that TNWs would be kept small in numbers and size, segregated from conventional forces and used only under exceptional circumstances with great selectivity (a concern applicable to Soviet TNWs as well).

Much of this assessment coincides with the critique I made earlier, and has been incorporated into my prescription for reform. Yet my advocacy stops short of a total withdrawal of TNWs. It does so for two reasons: one concerns the interpretation of the weapons' utility; the other is on the question of feasibility and time perspective.

Of the three hypothetical functions performed by Nato's nuclear arsenal—deterrence, war-fighting, crisis signalling—my assessment discounts the first two while suggesting the practicality of employing—in an extreme situation—small calibre TNWs to communicate to the Soviet Union that the military seizure of Western Europe is intolerable. Initial battlefield successes gained in the wake of an attack triggered off by miscalculation or political confrontation, could swell ambition to unplanned levels unless striking evidence is given of the risks attendant upon such a course.

The use of TNWs, however selectively, cannot but introduce the gravest dangers of general nuclear war. I believe, however, that a clear demonstration firing in the zone of combat accompanied by direct Presidential communication as to its purpose and nature does offer a genuine prospect of containing its scale and geographic limits. Of course, judgments as to the probabilities of doing so, along with weighting the consequences of failure and the stakes in question, will vary. But this sort of calculation is unavoidable so long as one still attaches enough importance to certain international goals, such as the political integrity of Western Europe (in addition to the survival of the United States as an organised society), to consider the bearing that nuclear weapons—wherever located—have on them.

The conclusion reasonably can be in favour of their retention.

The importance ascribed to TNWs as signalling devices is not fixed, but rather situationally determined. Were Western Europe, and the alliance in general, better able to provide for its own conventional defence; were detente consolidated; and were Nato better prepared to review dispassionately its military requirements and political assets, then a total withdrawal of American nuclear arms would become a more feasible proposition. In present conditions such a unilateral initiative would most probably throw the Europeans into disarray with no assurance of their sorting themselves out. The strategy I propose can be viewed as creating an interim, or transition between the prevailing

posture, and a future in which American TNWs, at least, cease to play a European role. For even innovations on a more modest scale could not be implemented swiftly or painlessly. Reform would entail wrenching changes in deeply rooted attitudes and beliefs, of American military planners as well as of allied governments, far-reaching reorganisation of Nato's force and command structures, and significant modifications in hardware.

A carefully conceived, and skilfully implemented diplomatic campaign would be required to achieve the necessary changes. Internationally, it may be hoped, it could be linked to (although not entirely dependent on) favourable outcomes of the present inter-bloc negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, and indirectly of SALT. In the United States, the exertion of Presidential authority to achieve what perhaps would be an unprecedented control over military organisation and operational plans is indicated. If successful, the revised posture of Nato's nuclear forces and doctrine would both indicate, and support, attitudes and outlooks more conducive to a later review of whether TNWs are vital for even those limited purposes.

This approach admittedly does not provide a wholly satisfactory resolution of the problems posed by TNWs in Europe. It offers no blanket formula for resolution of the alliance's multiple problems; nor, frankly, is it entirely without risk of Soviet misinterpretation. However, on balance it seems best suited to deal with the present threat in ways that minimise the dangers inherent in nuclear deterrence and defence. In the past, the principle that arms should be subordinate to political judgment, which is so critical to safe management of these weapons, has been subverted by an unfortunate series of actions dictated more by the vagaries of alliance politics, the expediencies of military organisation, and available weaponry than by a clear calculation of ends and means. The restoration of that principle is long overdue.

NATIONALISATION IN THE CARIBBEAN BAUXITE INDUSTRY*

Isaiah A. Litvak and Christopher J. Maule

IN 1971 the government of Guyana nationalised the Demerara Bauxit Company (Demba), a subsidiary of Alcan Aluminium Limited, an the largest Canadian-based multinational enterprise. This actio focused worldwide attention on a small country which occupies 83,00 square miles on the north-eastern corner of the South America continent and is the homeland of about 740,000 Guyanese of mainl East Indian (51 per cent.) and African (31 per cent.) origin. Guyana ha a per capita income in 1970 of approximately US $400, and wa categorised as a developing economy, having gained independence fro British political rule in 1966. In the Caribbean, Guyana has spearheade efforts in what is claimed to be the decolonisation of the Commonwealt Caribbean economies, which are at present dominated by America British and Canadian capital.

The takeover act, which 'Guyanised' a large part (15–20 per cent.) (Canadian investment in the region, was ideologically justified b Guyana's proclamation of co-operative socialism in 1970, which stip lated domestic control of the development of resources.[1] The Demb nationalisation mirrored in large part the demands of a group of milita Caribbean economic nationalists, who are challenging the tradition commercial links between Caribbean countries and North American a European business. The Guyanese action has been the most dramati concrete and extreme application to date of the nationalists' formula f speedy and fundamental economic change.

The United States, Britain, the Netherlands, France and Canada a the dominant trading partners of the Caribbean region, and collective constitute the major sources of aid and investment in that area. Canad however, is the one nation in this group which does not have a colonial heritage in the Caribbean. On the contrary, Canada, like mo of the Caribbean nations, perceives its own political and econom sovereignty to be threatened by foreign investment. Nonetheless,

* The authors gratefully acknowledge the grant given by the Canadian Departm of Energy, Mines and Resources in support of their research. We wish also to tha Paul Hanrahan for his excellent research assistance.

[1] See 'Planning for a New Era', Address by Prime Minister Burnham to the 1 Annual Delegates Congress of the People's National Congress, Georgetown, Guya April 5, 1970.

Canadian-owned subsidiary became the focal point of the first major act of nationalisation in resource development in the Commonwealth Caribbean.

Acts of nationalisation affecting the overseas assets of multinational corporations inevitably involve the governments of the parent and host countries in whose jurisdictions the corporation resides. In the case of multinational corporations, governments and enterprises of other countries can be expected to take a keen interest as well, and may even become involved themselves if their interests are threatened. These conditions were apparent in the nationalisation of Demba.

This article examines the role played by the Canadian government in promoting the economic interests of Alcan in Guyana before nationalisation, and the subsequent posture adopted by the Canadian government on nationalisation and on the issue of compensation. An explanation as to why the Canadian government adopted a detached position during the negotiations will be provided. The implications of this position will be drawn for Canadian foreign policy and for the operations of Canadian-based multinational corporations, as well as for the current negotiations between the Jamaican government and the international aluminium companies.

Canada and the Caribbean

The foreign presence in Caribbean economies is extensive. The bauxite industry, the region's most important mining activity, is controlled by six multinational companies with headquarters in North America: Alcoa, Anaconda, Kaiser, Reynolds, and Revere of the United States, and Alcan of Canada. The sugar industry, the region's most important agricultural activity, is controlled by two British companies, Booker McConnell and Tate and Lyle. The banana industry is controlled by the United Fruit Company and Geest Industries, and oil and its related industries are controlled by Shell, Standard Oil of Indiana, Texaco and W. R. Grace and Company.

By 1970, Canadian private direct investment in the Caribbean was estimated to be $435 million, more than in any other developing region.[2] Canadian investment was concentrated in banking, insurance and bauxite-aluminium production, and Alcan, the major Canadian investor in the Caribbean (almost $300 million of investments in 1970), operated subsidiary companies in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad.

By 1970, North American control of Guyana's bauxite resources had long been complete, with Alcan accounting for more than 80 per cent. of total bauxite production, and Reynolds Metals Company of the United States for the remainder. These two bauxite companies were vertically

[2] *Statistics Canada, Canada's International Investment Position*, Ottawa, Information Canada, 1971, p. 77.

integrated into the international operations of their corporate parents. Since some of their corporate policies were decided in Montreal and in Richmond, Virginia, the Guyanese government considered that their operations conflicted with national objectives.[3]

Guyanese nationalists perceived many parallels between their country's state of economic dependence and that of Canada's. The metropole-hinterland thesis was used to illustrate the similarity of Canada-Guyana to the United States-Canada situation.[4] Widespread resentment in the Caribbean against the dominance of foreign investment, however, remained subdued until an incident at Sir George Williams University in Montreal in 1969 proved a timely catalyst. The disruptions centred around charges of racism made by six Trinidadian students against a university professor.[5] Demonstrations in Trinidad in support of the students soon escalated into mass protests against alleged Canadian racism and economic exploitation. The nationalists singled out Canada as a major 'neo-colonial' economic power contributing to economic underdevelopment and dependency in the region, and Canadian business, aid and trading policies were suddenly challenged.

Nationalists in the Caribbean believed that the old relationship of exploitation was being re-established through the guise of the multinational corporation. Alcan, along with Canadian banks and insurance companies, was criticised for rarely permitting local ownership or participation in its subsidiary companies, for reinvesting insufficient profits in the Caribbean, and for failing to hire local people in ample numbers for responsible jobs.[6]

However, Canadian business was not alone in contributing to the poor image of Canada in the Caribbean; the Canadian government must take some of the responsibility. The Commonwealth Caribbean is a major recipient of Canadian foreign aid—about $25 million in 1970—the highest recipient on a per capita basis.[7] The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Canadian Senate interpreted this as 'an important recognition of the region's "special status" in Canadian external policy'.[8] But the aid programme has generated criticism because of its 'tied'

[3] See 'Guyana's Bauxite', Broadcast by Prime Minister Burnham, Georgetown, Guyana, November 28, 1970; Norman Girvan, *The Caribbean Bauxite Industry*, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica, 1967.

[4] See Kari Levitt, *Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada*, Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1970, pp. 23–24. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970.

[5] See S. D. Ryan; *Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago: A Study of Decolonization in a Multiracial Society*, Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1972, pp. 365–372, 454–462.

[6] *Final Report of the Committee Respecting Canada-Caribbean Relations*, Proceedings of the Canadian Senate's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 12, June 1970, pp. 65–70.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

nature and its contribution to a rapidly expanding Canadian presence in the Caribbean, which has raised anxieties about Canada's motives.[9]

Caribbean governments were especially upset by recent changes in Canada's sugar policy. After the Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada Conference in 1966, Canada, which bought sugar at world market prices, undertook a programme of tariff rebates, which was welcomed by Caribbean governments, despite the preferential prices paid by Britain and the United States. In 1970, however, Canada unilaterally ended the rebate scheme and replaced it with a direct annual grant of $5 million to an Agricultural Assistance Fund for use not only by sugar exporting countries but by all Caribbean members. Certain Caribbean governments protested bitterly against this action and it was condemned in a resolution passed at the 6th Commonwealth Caribbean Heads of Government Conference in April, 1970.[10]

When Dr. George Eaton, the Jamaican economist, testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs in April, 1970, he was asked to assess Canada's image in the Caribbean. He replied: 'I would say, at the moment, there is stronger resentment and hostility to Canada as a power than against any other power that I know of in recent years.'[11]

The Canadian interest in Guyana

Early in 1964, the Canadian government announced that it would establish diplomatic relations with the colony of British Guiana. Two major considerations underlay this decision: Canadian socio-economic interests and Guyanese political events that might jeopardise them. This move, stemming in part from Alcan's pressures, reflected the concern of the Canadian government that Alcan should continue to have access to Guyanese bauxite.

In 1962, Alcan's operations in Canada were dependent upon a reliable supply of raw material from Guyana, with Guyanese bauxite accounting for about 50 per cent. of Alcan's aluminium production in Canada; its main smelter in Arvida, Quebec, was almost totally dependent upon Guyanese bauxite, while its smelter in Kitimat, British Columbia, received Guyanese bauxite during the Canadian winter.

In Canada, the company supported two industrial communities, Arvida, with a population of 14,000, and Kitimat, with a population of 8,500; and was the major industry in four Quebec towns, Beauharnois, Isle Maligne, Port Alfred and Shawinigan. Alcan employed 17,200 people in Canada, which accounted for $95 million in wages, and paid government taxes amounting to $14·3 million. Exporting products valued at over $227 million, Alcan ranked as Canada's sixth largest exporter.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 55, 59.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[11] Proceedings of the Canadian Senate's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 11, pp. 7–26

At that time, Alcan's dependency upon bauxite from Guyana was unlikely to decrease for some years, for Alcan had yet to develop significant alternative sources of supply. Therefore, any severe disruption in Demba's operations, resulting from a prolonged strike, sabotage or nationalisation, could have critically impaired Alcan's ability to smelt aluminium in Canada. The benefits that Canada derived from Alcan's worldwide operations made a compelling case for Canadian government support for Alcan.

The future of the bauxite industry became insecure in the climate of political and economic instability that troubled Guyana throughout its years of transition from a colony to an independent state. In bitter contention for political office were two racially-based parties: the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and the People's National Congress (PNC). The policy of the PPP called for nationalisation of the 'commanding heights of the economy', including the bauxite and sugar industries, whereas the PNC seemed to favour less government control.[12]

The PPP was in office intermittently between 1953 and 1964, with the last years bringing much civil disruption. Because of prolonged and violent general strikes, Demba's production was sharply cut; these events caused great concern in Canada, which had the largest economic stake in Guyana of any foreign country.

Canada could not afford to appear indifferent to the many problems afflicting Guyana; yet the subject of Canadian aid was complicated by the politics of that country, specifically by the rule of the PPP and its leader, Dr. Cheddi Jagan, a self-proclaimed Marxist. Even though Canada did not favour using its aid programme as an extension of its foreign policy, the Canadian government considered aid to Guyana under Jagan's leadership to be politically unattractive. In addition, the United States government was putting pressure on Britain for a deferment of Guyanese independence, until the devices for the possible removal of the PPP from office were in place.[13]

In October 1963, Britain announced the introduction of an electoral system of proportional representation in Guyana, thereby facilitating a change of government. After the Guyanese election in 1964 the PNC formed a coalition government with the United Force party. With the spectre of Jaganite communism subsiding, the Canadian government offered assistance to Guyana to help stabilise the environment in which

[12] See C. Paule Bradley, *The Party System in British Guiana and the General Election of 1961*, Institute of Caribbean Studies, University of Puerto Rico, San Juan; and Ralph R. Premdas, 'Competitive Party Organizations and Political Integration in a Racially Fragmented State: The Case of Guyana', in *Caribbean Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1973.

[13] See Colin V. F. Henfrey, 'Foreign Influence in Guyana: The Struggle for Independence', in Emanuel de Kadt, ed., *Patterns of Foreign Influence in the Caribbean*, London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1972. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1973, p. 517.

Demba operated and to foster a favourable Canadian image. In February 1964, the Minister of External Affairs, Paul Martin, announced the appointment of the first Canadian High Commissioner to Guyana—Milton F. Gregg, formerly a Minister of Labour in an earlier Liberal government, and from 1958 an official with the United Nations. Mr. Martin said that relations were established because of Canadian business, educational and religious links with Guyana; the Canadian government, however, entered Guyana primarily to promote its economic interests, which were related to those of Alcan.

Constraints on Canadian government support for Alcan

The entry of the Canadian government into Guyana reflected an interest in supporting Alcan's investment there. Yet in 1970, when Alcan came into conflict with the Guyanese government, the Canadian government provided negligible help. Six considerations that constrained the Canadian government from adopting a more active policy can be identified.

(1) *Alcan's decreasing dependency upon Guyana.* By 1970, Alcan's socio-economic contribution to Canada had increased, and Alcan still had a considerable stake in Guyana, for Demba, which represented an investment of nearly $130 millon, continued as a major supplier of Alcan's raw material needs. Alcan purchased some bauxite from Reynolds in Guyana as well. But Alcan's dependency upon bauxite from Guyana was decreasing, and would become even less later in the 1970s.

Since the 1950s, Alcan had relied mainly on bauxite from Guyana and Jamaica to feed its smelters all over the world. But in April 1970, Alcan announced that it expected to use alternative sources of bauxite which were being opened up in Australia, Brazil and Guinea.[14] The Canadian government thus knew that, if Alcan could no longer obtain bauxite from Guyana, alternative sources were in preparation, a belief encouraged by Alcan. On November 30, 1970, two days after the Guyanese government announced its participation plans for Demba, Alcan said that 'if the supplies of alumina and metal grade bauxite from Guyana are affected, Alcan believes that alternative sources of supplies can be arranged.'[15] The Canadian government, therefore, might have seen the need for strong government aid to Alcan as less imperative than it had

[14] Address by Nathanael V. Davis, President, Alcan Aluminium Limited at the Annual Meeting of Shareholders, Montreal, April 2, 1970.

[15] 'Alcan Statement Concerning Guyana Negotiations', Press Release, Montreal, November 30, 1970. Similar assurances were given in February 1971, see Alcan Press Release. On February 25, 1971, Canada's Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce was asked in the House of Commons to assure Alcan workers in the Saguenay area that the supply of bauxite to the smelter at Arvida would be maintained at its present level. The Minister replied that Alcan had assured the Canadian government that its Canadian operations would not be affected by events in Guyana, particularly regarding the supply of raw materials. *Debates*, Canadian House of Commons, February 25, 1971, p. 3738.

been earlier when alternative supplies of raw materials were not on the immediate horizon.

(2) *Canada's poor image in the Caribbean.* By early 1970, antagonism in the Caribbean towards both the Canadian government and business community had reached a high point. A few incidents, including Canada's 'tying' of aid, Canada's ending of its sugar rebate programme, and the Sir George Williams University affair, proved sufficient to stamp Canada as a country out of sympathy with the problems of the Caribbean. A loss of influence among Caribbean governments accompanied Canada's poor image, and if Canada had emerged as a tough defender of Alcan, it is likely that its image would have deteriorated even more.

(3) *Canada's lack of economic leverage.* The policy of the Canadian government was shaped by what realistically could be achieved. The retaliatory measures available to Canada included withdrawal of aid (in the last half of the 1960s Canada's annual aid to Guyana averaged about $4 million), a prohibition on the importation of Guyanese sugar (the Canadian market is least important in order of priority to the Guyanese sugar industry after the United States and Britain), and resistance through the World Bank to Guyanese requests for financial aid (in recent years Guyana has averaged more than $5 million annually in grants and more than $18 million in loans from the World Bank). This package of possible reprisals constituted an ineffectual arsenal of economic levers.

(4) *Canada's sensitivity to Third World aspirations.* The Prime Minister of Guyana, Linden Forbes Burnham, has been pursuing a political strategy of portraying himself as a Third World leader, particularly among members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. A chief objective of the movement, many of whose members are former colonies, is the preservation of its members' sovereignty over their natural resources, like bauxite, which is seen as a non-renewable resource. This theme has been reasserted continually at gatherings of Third World governments and in several resolutions passed at the United Nations since 1960.[16] For example, Guyana, the only representative from the Western Hemisphere to attend the 1970 Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Lusaka, Zambia, supported the 'Lusaka Declaration', which, among other things, called for permanent sovereignty by developing nations over their natural resources.[17]

Between the years 1968 and 1970 Canada undertook a full review of its foreign policy, and attempted to project a fresh international image.

[16] Prime Minister Burnham referred to some of these UN resolutions in his address on November 28, 1970.

[17] *West Indies Chronicle*, 1970, p. 501. (Pub. by The West India Committee, London.) *Latin America*, January 8, 1971, pp. 13–14. (Pub. by Latin American Newsletter Ltd. London.)

based on national interests, distinct from that of the United States and more in sympathy with the problems of the Third World. The Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, hoped to lead Canada into more active service in developing countries, himself assuming a prominent role at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in Singapore in January 1971. The Canadian government, therefore, has tried to avoid irritating Third World governments, and to display sensitivity in its dealings with them.

(5) *The foreign investment debate in Canada.* Since the late 1950s Canada's concern with foreign investment has focused almost exclusively on its domestic effects, with little effort directed towards working out a policy on Canadian investment in other countries. By the time of the nationalisation of Demba, 'inward' investment and its costs and benefits to Canada had been the subject of four major governmental studies, each prescribing ways in which Canada could assert greater control over its economy.[18] All these reports proposed some level of local equity participation in foreign subsidiaries, particularly in those operating in the resources sector. Although the last Gray Report was not released until after the Demba nationalisation, it was initiated in 1969 and made public in 1972. The first draft of this report, which was leaked to the press, addressed itself briefly to the question of government promotion of Canadian multinational firms, and is revealing in its evaluation:

> From the point of view of Canadian interests, experience to date with Canadian multinationals has not been entirely satisfactory. There appears to be a tendency for Canadian companies that become more international during their maturation to become less Canadian to the point where, in some instances, their Canadian identity becomes nominal, *e.g.* Inco and Massey Ferguson. Trying to draw up a list of important Canadian controlled MNEs underscores the problem. For example, are Alcan and Seagrams really Canadian controlled?
>
> . . . Even in the resource industries, where the ore body or cheap power should tie the operation to Canada, there seems to be a tendency for companies to gravitate from Canada, *e.g.* Inco and Alcan.[19]

It was only in the early 1970s that more than 50 per cent. of equity ownership in Alcan was resident in Canada. American equity ownership is approximately 40 per cent. This situation could have provided the

[18] *Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, Final Report*, Ottawa Queen's Printer, 1957, pp. 392–393 (The Gordon Report); *Report of the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry*, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968, pp. 411–413 (The Watkins Report); *Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defense* (The Wahn Report), Second Session, 28th Parliament, 1969–70, No. 33, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970; and *Foreign Direct Investment in Canada* (Gray Report), Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1972.

[19] *The Canadian Forum* (Toronto) December 1971, p. 71 This statement was omitted from the final report published by the government—see footnote 18 above, Gray Report.

Canadian government with some basis for disclaiming any responsibility to represent Alcan in its conflict in Guyana.

Also of relevance is the Senate committee's report 'Respecting Canada-Caribbean Relations'. On the subject of Canadian 'outward' investment, the report concluded that 'it is vital that Canadian investors recognise and accept the growing local interest in ownership of Caribbean resources and industry.'[20]

These reports underline the preoccupation of the Canadian government with finding a proper response to the challenge of 'inward' investment, with little consideration being given to a policy on Canadian 'outward' investment. It was likely that Ottawa would have found it politically embarrassing to have allied itself with Alcan against Guyana.

Because the two countries shared similar experiences with regard to foreign investment, the Guyanese government identified Canada with Guyana; it thought it significant that both countries were trying to deal with problems resulting from 'inward' investment. It attempted to present its policy to secure local 'ownership and control' of the bauxite industry through government participation as part of a global movement in which industrialised countries like Australia, Canada and Japan participated.[21]

(6) *Canada's inexperience in nationalisation.* The Canadian government was further handicapped by finding itself in a relatively new situation, having had few experiences comparable to the Guyana-Alcan conflict to draw on. Canada's practical experience with government takeovers has essentially involved immigrant capital, not capital invested from Canada; thus government officials had had few occasions to define 'fair' treatment in circumstances relevant to Alcan in Guyana.

Canadian policy and the nationalisation of Demba

In the light of the constraints on policy just outlined, what was the Canadian government's position on the nationalisation of Demba? Alcan naturally hoped for strong support from its home government. It was expected that the government would appreciate the regional implications for Alcan of its conflict with Guyana, namely, the need for Alcan to take a tough stand to protect its even greater investment in Jamaican bauxite and aluminium—about $160 million. Other North American aluminium companies with investments in the Caribbean also feared that if Guyana successfully implemented its policy a 'domino theory' might take effect in the region. However, long before negotiations for Guyanese participation in Demba began, signs in Canada

[20] See note 6, p. 26.

[21] Guyana drew attention to Canada blocking the sale of control to foreigners of Denison Mines, a uranium producing company; see Jim Reed interview with Shridath S. Ramphal, Guyanese Minister of State, CBC, June 8, 1971.

indicated to the government of Guyana that Alcan would receive little assistance from the Canadian government.

In October 1970, a Canadian cabinet minister echoed some of the proposals of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs in calling on Canadian companies in the Caribbean to show greater sensitivity to national objectives, and to allow nations to acquire both equity interests and positions of executive responsibility in their subsidiaries.[22]

Then in November 1970 Senator Paul Martin, formerly Minister of External Affairs, visited Guyana and spoke with the Prime Minister, Mr. Burnham. Alcan must have hoped that Martin would present a strong case in support of its investment in Guyana; however, on his return to Canada, Martin gave the Senate this report:

> . . . I did have some discussions with the Government of Guyana. I indicated, of course, that what the Government of Guyana did in the exercise of its sovereign right was a matter for its own decision. Canadians would expect that their corporate nationals would be treated justly and in a nondiscriminatory way . . . I had to recognize, as we insist in Canada that others recognize, that these are decisions which must be taken by the sovereign power.[23]

The 'softness' of this policy stand 'amazed' Mr. Burnham, for even among other Caribbean governments, the Jamaican particularly, his decision to seek control over Demba sparked alarm lest foreign investors should come to view the Caribbean area as less attractive.

A week before negotiations were scheduled to begin in Guyana, a spokesman for the Department of External Affairs told Members of Parliament:

> The Government of Guyana evidently has the right to establish the ways and means of operation in its territory. It is not the intention of the Canadian government to make a direct intervention . . . the Canadian Government will be following the coming negotiations with great interest and keen attention.[24]

At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference held in Singapore in January 1971 Mr. Trudeau reminded Mr. Burnham that countries at Canada's and Guyana's stage of economic development could benefit from foreign investment, and that it would seem best to adopt the kind of policy for the bauxite industry which would not discourage 'inward' investment in the future. This discussion was followed up in mid-February, when Trudeau sent a personal message to Burnham repeating his hope that Guyana would treat Alcan in a 'fair and nondiscriminatory' manner.

This sample of statements shows that, throughout the negotiations, Canadian policy took the following line. First, the Canadian government

[22] See note 6, pp. 65–70.
[23] *Debates*, Senate of Canada, Dec. 8, 1970, p. 297.
[24] *Debates*, Canadian House of Commons, Dec. 1, 1970, p. 1632.

stressed its recognition of the rights of any sovereign state to own and control its natural resources, and therefore acknowledged that Canada had no right to try to dictate policy in Guyana. And second, the Canadian government assumed that it would be sufficient to remind Guyana that Canada looked to it for ' fair and nondiscriminatory ' treatment of Demba, although it failed to define that phrase. Canada refused to follow the American practice of threatening economic sanctions as a lever in support of its corporate investors, nor did it wish to appear to be acting in concert with the United States. This position remained unchanged, even after Guyana's decision to nationalise Demba.

Despite the hope of the Canadian government that a settlement would be negotiated, talks between the Guyanese government and Alcan were terminated by the government on February 23, 1971, Republic Day in Guyana. On that day, Burnham announced his decision to nationalise Demba. That same day the Canadian Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, explained the position of the Canadian government.

> . . . We regret that negotiations between the company and the government of Guyana have not been successful . . . it is not the right of the government of Canada to dictate the conduct of the government of Guyana in these matters. We put the case that we expect Canadian companies not to be discriminated against in these matters. That is about the extent of what we can do in these matters. . . .
>
> . . . I would not like to leave the impression that the Canadian government has not made proper representations to the government of Guyana. Conversations were held to that effect. The point . . . that we expect the Canadian companies to be properly treated was made in these bilateral conversations.[25]

At that stage, Alcan did not contest the legality of the nationalisation decision; its concern was to negotiate proper compensation and ensure that it in fact received payment. Canada's Export Development Corporation was without a programme that would provide insurance for any part of Alcan's existing investment in Guyana. By early March, 1971, the Guyanese government had quickly enacted a Bauxite Nationalisation Bill which amended a clause in the country's constitution to provide for ' reasonable compensation ' in cases of nationalisation, instead of ' the prompt payment of adequate compensation '. The bill also set out a proposed basis for compensation: valuation to be based on book value (about $46 million in Demba's case) and payment to be made out of the future profits of the nationalised company. These terms were very unfavourable to Alcan, which now hoped for any help it could receive in negotiating better terms.

Unlike the government of the United States, which insists that its corporate citizens receive ' prompt, adequate, and effective compensation from the expropriating country ', the Canadian government was

[25] *Ibid.*, February 23, 1971, p. 3658.

without a clearly formulated policy in that regard. It hoped to see Alcan compensated fairly for its investment in Demba, but it left the company to work out for itself a satisfactory compensation agreement with the Guyanese government.

Between March and June 1971 the talks on compensation reached an impasse. Then early in June Mr. Burnham invited his friend Arthur Goldberg, a former United States ambassador to the United Nations, to intervene in his private capacity as a third party. Goldberg, who then acted as legal counsel to the Reynolds Metals Company, accepted Burnham's request after consultation with the US State Department. He upheld Guyana's position on sovereignty over its bauxite resources, but underlined Guyana's interest in preserving its respectability in the eyes of the international business community—hence the incentive to negotiate a settlement with Alcan.

On July 14, 1971, the day before the vesting of Demba was to take place, the Guyanese government and Alcan announced a settlement. Alcan was to receive approximately $54 million in government notes as compensation for Demba, secured on the country's general revenues and not on future profits of the nationalised bauxite industry. Under the circumstances, this was acceptable to Alcan, which believed that without the help of Goldberg the final outcome would have been less satisfactory.

American intervention in the nationalisation of Demba

Both the Canadian government and Alcan communicated with foreign governments and business in an effort to get a favourable hearing for Alcan in Guyana. The Canadian government approved Alcan's decision to seek help outside Canada; in fact, when an Alcan senior executive told a Canadian cabinet minister of his company's intent to request aid from the US State Department, the minister thought it an excellent idea, adding that if he were a corporate lawyer, he would advise likewise.

A number of facts made the United States government an obvious potential ally of Alcan in its conflict with Guyana. The Guyanese government's policy was to 'decolonise' the entire bauxite industry, including the operations of Reynolds, which had invested roughly $25 million in Guyana, of which about $16 million was insured under the United States-Guyana Investment Guarantee Agreement, administered by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). However, more important to the corporate interests of the United States were the possible effects if the Guyanese example were followed by other Caribbean states, like Jamaica, in which OPIC had insured about $300 million in American bauxite-aluminium operations.[26] In addition, the United

[26] Jamaica in fact took action in 1974 with the objective of extracting greater revenue from the North American aluminium companies.

States, which in 1973 looked to foreign sources to supply over 80 per cent. of its bauxite needs, stockpiles aluminium as a strategic commodity. The United States, therefore, was likely to take a more active role than Canada.

Throughout the negotiations on Demba, the United States government remained discreetly silent, publicly at least; however, an incident in the World Bank revealed its real concern for what was happening to Alcan in Guyana. In June 1971, the American Executive Director of the Bank abstained, as a sign of disapproval, from voting on an application for a $5.4 million loan to Guyana for sea defence dikes.[27] The Director pointed out that Guyana's negotiations with Alcan over compensation 'have not proceeded sufficiently' for the United States to approve the loan. The US Under-Secretary of the Treasury warned developing countries to 'tread very lightly' in nationalising foreign companies, and with reference to the Bank's abstention, said there was little indication that Guyana was making a 'reasonable effort' to compensate Alcan. The State Department argued against the abstention on the loan for Guyana, apparently thinking it an inappropriate action in matters affecting Canadian government policy and Canadian companies.[28]

The American aluminium industry also tried through its government to put pressure on Guyana. Late in 1970 it lobbied the State Department, which then sent a statement to the Guyanese government. This had no effect on the outcome of Guyana's negotiations with Alcan, but may have influenced its decision to postpone action against Reynolds. Also, the President of Alcoa personally organised a lobby that argued before the Sugar Committee of the House of Representatives for a repeal of Guyana's sugar quota for 1971–72 to the United States.[29] Given their stake in the Caribbean, American aluminium producers probably undertook this action on their own initiative, although the Guyanese, inclined to look for signs of collusion between Alcan and Alcoa, suspected that the Canadian company was the motivating force behind this lobby.

Implications

The nationalisation of Demba raises the question of why the Canadian government chose to stand on the sidelines during the negotiations for Guyanese participation in Demba, and for compensation after the decision to nationalise had been made. This question is all the more important because of the involvement by the United States government on behalf of a Canadian firm. A number of explanations can be advanced. First, on the company side, Alcan was uncertain about the

[27] *Guyana Graphic*, July 16, 1971: *New York Times*, June 28, 1971, p. 47:3; *Washington Post*, June 23, 1971, p. A20.

[28] *New York Times*, June 28, 1971, p. 47:3.

[29] *New Nation* (Organ of the People's National Congress), Guyana, June 27, 1971.

support it wanted from the Canadian government, partly because it preferred to act on its own and partly because it did not feel that the government would be of assistance. When the government was approached, the negotiations were under way and it was too late for effective assistance to be forthcoming. Alcan's ambivalence was due to a lack of confidence in the government's willingness to assist, a view which is shared by other business executives in Canada. For example, it is known that some government officials did not regard Alcan as primarily a Canadian company, and partly because of the company's resistance to local equity participating did not feel that Alcan was a good corporate citizen in Guyana. In addition, Alcan's assurances that Guyanese bauxite was not vital to its Canadian smelter operations encouraged the Canadian government to take a passive role in the negotiations. What is interesting here is that Alcan knew, as shown by the actions of the American aluminium producers, that nationalisation in Guyana might have a demonstration effect in Jamaica and Surinam, which could well jeopardise the continuity of bauxite supplies to Canada. However, neither Alcan nor the Canadian government appeared to consider this factor in their dealings with each other. The Canadian government may have been unaware of this possibility or knew about it and chose to ignore its implications for the Canadian economy. It is not clear which department of the Canadian government should have been primarily concerned with these events, the Department of External Affairs, the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce or the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources.

On the government's side, reluctance to take an active role in the negotiations may have stemmed from Canada's concern with its image in the Third World and its current poor image in the Caribbean. In addition, unlike the United States and West European governments, Canada never considered aluminium a strategic commodity which would lead the government to act on behalf of one of its aluminium producers. However, within Canada, domestic political factors mitigated against forceful action. The country was in the midst of a public discussion on economic nationalism in Canada and was groping towards a policy on inward foreign investment. It would have been difficult not to recognise similar forces at work in Guyana, a situation which Guyanese politicians were quick to point out. In addition, vocal elements among the spokesmen for Canadian economic nationalism and among the Caribbean student interest groups in Canada could have created an uncomfortable situation if there had been strong government support for Alcan in Guyana.

A number of important implications stem from the Canadian policy. First, because American interests, both government and corporate, involved themselves on behalf of Alcan, Canadian interests are viewed

in the Caribbean as being managed by the United States government and American corporations. It is notable that when he required intervention, Burnham approached Arthur Goldberg rather than any Canadian. In parts of the Caribbean, the large bauxite-aluminium companies are already viewed as North American companies with little distinction made that Alcan is a Canadian company. Canadian policy reinforced the Caribbean view that the Canadian government and Canadian corporate interests are subordinated to those in the United States.

Second, because Alcan felt that it would not receive much assistance from the Canadian government, it did not play up its Canadian identity. In the future, it may well be that Canadian firms that invest abroad may undertake such investment from an American base, knowing that greater support can be expected from the United States government. A perpetuation of the distrust that exists between government and business has resulted from the failure of the Canadian government to voice its concern over the discriminatory treatment of Canadian assets, despite its position on the issue of discrimination at the time Demba was nationalised. Three years after the event, Reynolds in Guyana remains 100 per cent. owned by Reynolds, US.

Third, the Canadian policy did not assist the objectives of the Canadian International Development Corporation and the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce in encouraging Canadian investment in the Third World. And finally, a willingness to accept nationalisation as fair treatment for Canadian firms abroad may reflect a willingness to nationalise foreign investors in Canada. It is not inconceivable that the Demba precedent could be used to justify similar action against firms in Canada. The Canadian government has already established a government-owned enterprise, the Canada Development Corporation, which could be used for this purpose.

The repercussions of the Demba incident were felt in the negotiations taking place in 1974 between the Jamaican government, on the one hand, and Alcan and five American aluminium companies, on the other. The underlying circumstances were different in that Jamaica was spurred to act by the increased cost of energy, and the formation of the International Bauxite Association by the bauxite producing countries in March 1974. However, the passive attitude of the Canadian government, as demonstrated by the Guyanese negotiations, on behalf of one of the largest foreign companies in Jamaica provided assurance that official interference would not be forthcoming from Canada.

At the outset of the discussions, the Jamaican government wanted to negotiate separately with the companies, which in turn insisted on a joint approach, using the argument that the five American companies were similar, since they were all Western hemisphere trading corporations. Alcan, although different, identified itself with the other five,

because it did not feel that the Canadian government's position would help to support its interests. As it happened, it was the only aluminium company to have paid significant corporate income taxes in Jamaica and, in comparison with the other companies, it had an excellent record in terms of its contribution to Jamaican society.

Meanwhile, the United States government had a direct interest in the negotiations for two reasons. First, it had a declared position on expropriation as set out in the Presidential statement of January 19, 1972, entitled, 'Economic Assistance and Investment Security in Developing Nations'; and second, the American companies were insured by OPIC and represented an overwhelming part of OPIC's total insurance commitments, which meant that it involved itself on behalf of the companies. Alcan was thus pulled and pushed into a closer association with the American companies and the US government, because of a lack of Canadian government support.

On this occasion, the Canadian government was further forced on the defensive because of the passage of legislation in 1973 creating a Foreign Investment Screening Agency. Its declared position on inward foreign investment undermined its ability to assist, even assuming it wanted to, Canadian firms with interests abroad. This circumstance points to the failure of the Canadian government to appreciate that its domestic foreign investment policies might frustrate the attempts by Canadian firms to operate in foreign markets. Other countries with both inward and outward investment may face similar difficulties in the future. For example, protectionist sentiment in the United States may create difficulties for American investment abroad.

The United States and British governments are known to liaise informally when both have companies that are possible objects for expropriation. Liaison is felt to lead to agreement that both governments should present a common position on behalf of their companies against the expropriating government. No such liaison exists between the Canadian and US governments. If raw material producing nations should manage to form cartels along the lines of OPEC—and this is the objective of the International Bauxite Association—one countervailing strategy would be for the consuming nations to form coalitions. At the very least they should not act in a way that promotes the producer association. This was seen to have occurred in the case of Canada which, at the time of the Jamaican negotiations, provided a government loan through the Export Development Corporation for the expansion of the Guyana Bauxite Corporation, formerly the Alcan subsidiary, Demba.

Finally, the Jamaican and Guyanese negotiations give rise to the question of the fiscal incidence of nationalisations and increased tax payments to producing countries. It has been shown that the international oil companies have become the tax collection agencies of the

producing countries by raising their prices to the consuming countries enough to meet the increased taxes and raise their profits at the same time. A similar situation may well occur with aluminium as a result of the Jamaican negotiations. Increasing the transfer price for aluminium shipped by Alcan from Jamaica to Canada is estimated to increase Jamaican tax revenues at the expense of Canadian tax revenues,[30] a situation against which Canadian taxpayers might hope that their government would protest. In the case of nationalisations, the question of financial loss because of payment of less than 'fair market value' for the firm's assets raises the question of how the loss is treated for tax purposes. If insured, the loss is covered. OPIC has a clause in its insurance agreement, as yet untested, which makes the insurance void if loss due to expropriation results from 'justifiable provocation' by the company. If not insured, the loss may be treated as a current expense or a capital loss. The former, which occurred in the case of Anaconda in Chile, is much more favourable to the company. Both forms of treatment are at the expense of tax revenue collected in the capital exporting country.

Some of the implications arising out of the Canadian government's position over the nationalisation of Demba in Guyana have been suggested above. It is argued that these implications are not confined to Canada and Canadian firms, nor are they confined to the aluminium industry. Forthcoming attempts to initiate and activate producer country cartels will make it necessary for governments to assess the position which they take towards their multinational companies.

Postscript. On November 20, 1974, the government of Jamaica and Kaiser signed an agreement by which the government acquired a 51 per cent. equity interest in the Kaiser Bauxite Co. in Jamaica.

The Government of Guyana has announced that it will nationalise Reynolds in Guyana as from January 1, 1975.

[30] *Financial Post*, Toronto, May 25, 1974.

BOOKS

THE DIVISION OF GERMANY 1946-1948

Geoffrey Warner

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. *Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office (for USA Department of State). Indexes.* Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers. *1970. 1586 pp. $7.25.* Vol. V: The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe. *1969. 1109 pp. $6.00. (Department of State Publications 8497, 8453.)*

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947. *Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office (for USA Department of State). Indexes.* Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria. *1972. 1251 pp. $6.00.* Vol. III: The British Commonwealth; Europe. *1972. 1131 pp. $5.75. (Department of State Publications 8530, 8625.)*

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948. *Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office (for USA Department of State). Index.* Vol. II: Germany and Austria. *1973. 1575 pp. $8.00. (Department of State Publication 8660.)**

ONE can only sympathise with the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series when they were confronted with the problem of providing an adequate documentary record of United States policy towards Germany during the early postwar period. The sheer bulk of the material available, the fact that responsibility for policy was divided between the State Department and the Army, and the existence of several earlier official and non-official compilations of documents on the subject, must all have made the task of selection and editing even more daunting than usual. In the circumstances, it would not be surprising if they did not altogether succeed. Certainly the present reviewer must confess to a slight sense of disappointment as he put down these volumes.

There are two reasons. First, there is too little documentation emanating from the Office of Military Government of the United States for Germany (OMGUS) and the War Department. The editors seem only to have published documents which ended up in State Department files and while this may appear a reasonable criterion in what is, after all, a State Department series, it was not applied in connection with the volumes on the wartime conferences and it should not have been applied here. Because of the existence of military government in Germany, the War Department and OMGUS were able to take decisions which limited, if they did not dictate, American options in some areas of policy. This was particularly true, of course, in respect of actions inside the American zone, upon which there

* These volumes are subsequently cited as *FRUS*, followed by the year and volume number.

is very little in these documents.[1] In order to appreciate the impact of the military upon United States policy, one must therefore turn to other sources, such as the memoirs of General Lucius D. Clay, the head of OMGUS, and John Gimbel's excellent monograph, which is based upon military records.[2] But these are not a substitute for the original documents and it is gratifying to see that the University of Indiana Press has recently published a two volume collection of General Clay's personal papers.[3] It is to be hoped that there will be more such publications drawn from the files of OMGUS and the War Department to supplement the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series.

The second reason for disappointment is that there seems to be much less 'internal' documentation—inter-office communications, records of discussions among officials, etc.—than usual. This is particularly true in respect of the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers. One can sometimes be quite precise about the gaps. For example, General Clay refers in his memoirs to discussions which he and his political adviser, Robert Murphy, had with the Secretary of State in Paris in April 1946,[4] but no records of these discussions are printed. Similarly, Herbert Feis, in his study of the origins of the cold war, writes that after Molotov's speech to the Council of Foreign Ministers on July 10, 1946, in which he envisaged a 'soft' peace for Germany, 'the American officials went into a huddle and consulted the Senators who were members of the delegation . . . All agreed that the time had arrived to move forward in the consolidation of the economies of the two [British and American] zones to the fullest extent possible.' [5] There is no account of this meeting either. We also know that the Secretary of State and other members of the American delegation to the Moscow meeting of the Council in March and April of 1947 held discussions with Clay and Murphy in Berlin on their way to and from the conference, but we have to rely upon memoir accounts to know what transpired.[6]

What probably happened is that the editors felt obliged to provide as full a coverage as possible of the formal sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers and that, given the limitations of space, this could only be done at the expense of the internal discussions of the American delegation. This would have been fair enough, if, as was the case with the wartime conferences, the tenor of the former had been kept secret. But, as the editors themselves recognise, '[a]lthough the meetings of the Council were held in secret, the world press was kept fully apprised of the substance of the transactions. The principal policy statements made at Council meetings were promptly released to the press and became a part of the public record.' [7] In this situation, the present reviewer would gladly have dis-

[1] A case in point was the veto of the socialisation of industry in Hesse in 1946. OMGUS's opposition to socialisation was stronger than that of the State Department and this had important consequences.

[2] Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (London: Heinemann. 1950); John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1968).

[3] Jean E. Smith (ed.), *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945–49* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1974).

[4] Clay, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

[5] Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (New York: Norton; London: Blond. 1970), p. 135.

[6] John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York: Macmillan; London: Harrap. 1950), p. 102; Clay, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

[7] *FRUS, 1947*, II, p. vii.

pensed with the telegraphic summaries and formal minutes of Council meetings printed here in exchange for more internal policy material.

Despite these shortcomings, the volumes under review do of course provide us with a great deal of new primary source material with which we can reconsider American policy during the period when the present-day division of Germany emerged. What follows is a tentative attempt to look at some of the major issues involved.

* * *

Although the decision to set up a west German state was not taken until 1948, it is clear from the documents that the idea was already germinating in the minds of some policy makers two years earlier. On March 6, 1946, the United States chargé in Moscow, George Kennan, whose views carried considerable weight since his famous analysis of Soviet policy in the previous month had struck a responsive chord in Washington,[8] cast doubt upon the conventional wisdom that the centralised agencies for Germany envisaged in the Postdam agreement and hitherto blocked by the Russians and even more by the French were altogether desirable. 'I think we should guard against undue optimism about central agencies serving to break down exclusive Soviet control in Soviet zone', Kennan cabled. 'I do not think Soviets will really encourage establishment of such agencies, as we envisage them, until such time that they are fairly sure that within this new framework they can contrive not only to preserve in effect their exclusive control in their own zone but also to advance materially their possibilities for influencing course of events elsewhere in Germany.'

Kennan believed that the Potsdam decision 'provisionally' to allocate Germany east of the Oder-Neisse line to Polish and Russian administration was a great mistake. 'This amputation of Germany('s) eastern territories,' he said, 'must surely have left a country seriously crippled and unbalanced economically, and psychologically extensively dependent in first instance on the great land power to the east which controls or holds great food producing areas so necessary to German economy. It seems to me unlikely that such a country once unified under a single administration and left politically to itself and to the Russians would ever adjust itself to its western environment successfully enough to play a positive and useful role in world society as we conceive it. If this is true then we have and have had ever since our acceptance of Oder-Neisse Line only two alternatives: (1) to leave remainder of Germany nominally united but extensively vulnerable to Soviet political penetration and influence or (2) to carry to its logical conclusion the process of partition which was begun in the east and to endeavor to rescue western zones of Germany by walling them off against eastern penetration and integrating them into international pattern of western Europe rather than into a united Germany.'[9]

Although the economic fusion of the British and American zones into 'Bizonia', which was negotiated in the second half of 1946, was motivated by different considerations, it was in fact a step in the direction advocated by Kennan. The fusion arose from the failure to implement the Potsdam conference decision to treat Germany as an economic unit. 'After one year of occupation,' Clay cabled Washington on May 26, 1946, 'zones

[8] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: Vol. I, 1925–1950* (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1967; London: Hutchinson, 1968), pp. 294–95.

[9] Kennan tel., March 6, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, V, pp. 518–19. See also Smith tel., April 2, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 535. General Walter Bedell Smith was the new US ambassador to the Soviet Union.

represent air-tight territories with almost no free exchange of commodities, persons, and ideas. Germany now consists of four small economic units which can deal with each other only through treaties, in spite of the fact that no one unit can be regarded as self-supporting, although British and Russian zones could become so.' [10] The consequences were extremely serious. Since the British and American zones were deficit areas, it was the British and American taxpayer who had to foot the bill for their respective zone's import surpluses, a burden which was particularly hard for the former to support since many of the imports had to be bought with scarce dollars.

The situation was exacerbated by the four-power agreement on reparations. At Potsdam, it had been agreed that the Soviet Union was to receive most of its reparations from its own zone, but it was to receive a portion from the western zones, some in exchange for goods of equivalent value and some without compensation. Britain and the United States argued that the detailed reparations programme, which was settled in March 1946 after laborious negotiations, was based upon the treatment of Germany as an economic unit. Otherwise, it would in fact be they who would be paying the reparations from their zones through the financing of the above-mentioned zonal deficits. They wanted the prompt establishment of a common import-export programme for all Germany which would lead to the abolition, or at any rate the reduction, of these deficits. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, took the view that reparations were quite independent of a common import-export programme and refused to consider the latter until the former were completed. The Russian attitude prompted Clay, on May 3, 1946, to halt the dismantling of machines in the American zone for delivery to the Soviet Union as reparations.[11]

A reading of the Potsdam protocol shows that the Russians were right in maintaining that the delivery of reparations from the western zones did not depend upon settlement of other matters.[12] It was also true that the size of the deficits in the British and American zones was in part due to the incompetence of their military governments. Thus, production seems to have risen faster in the Soviet zone than in the west and the British lost an estimated $200 million in foreign exchange between May 1945 and the end of 1947 by selling their zone's most precious export commodity, Ruhr coal, at well below the world price.[13] Nevertheless, the Russians did not help matters by hindering free trade between their zone and those of their allies, and they were also breaking the Potsdam protocol in doing so. To this extent, they had only themselves to blame if the British and

[10] Clay, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[11] Murphy tels., April 4, 10, May 2, 6, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, V, pp. 536–37, 538, 545–47, 547–48.

[12] People frequently cite the first part of article 19, section II of the Potsdam protocol, which reads: 'Payment of reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports . . . The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports.' They do not always add the concluding sentence, which states: 'The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraph 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the Reparations Agreement.' Those paragraphs relate to reparations deliveries from the western zones to the Soviet Union.

[13] Manuel Gottlieb, *The German Peace Settlement and the Berlin Crisis* (New York: Paine-Whitman, 1960), pp. 74–84; Nicholas Balabkins, *Germany under Direct Controls: Economic Aspects of Industrial Disarmament 1945–1948* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964), p. 124.

Americans banded together in 'Bizonia' in an attempt to create a more viable economic unit.

'Bizonia' was not an unmixed blessing as far as the British were concerned. The Attlee Labour government wanted to nationalise the Ruhr coal mines, but this did not accord with the United States' belief in the virtues of free enterprise. At a meeting in Washington on June 19, 1947, the Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, 'stated that the British program for the socialization of the Ruhr coal mines is certain to interfere with the maximum production of coal at this critical time, and that we must put pressure on the British to stop or postpone these experiments. . . . [T]he decision on socialization should be put up to the German people at a later date after the Germans have succeeded in establishing their own economy on a sound basis.' James Forrestal, the Secretary of the Navy, agreed. He 'said that we can by no means support any socialization program as such would be only an opening wedge for communism. He urged that Secretary [of State] Marshall take the matter up with the British at the highest level.'[14]

Marshall did so. On the following day, he told the Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Will Clayton, 'to make it quite clear to Mr. Bevin that he regarded the British management of the Ruhr coal problem as pathetic . . . [He] added that we could not sit by while the British tried out any ideas which they had of experimenting with socialization of coal mines; time does not permit of experimentation.' Clayton conveyed this message to the British Foreign Secretary and some of his Cabinet colleagues on June 24. Afterwards, Clayton reported that 'the two points of criticism you asked me to make were accepted soberly and without rancor by the British and with only weak rebuttal.'[15] In fact, as later documents indicate, Bevin was far from happy, but nationalisation was shelved. 'Bizonia', and later west Germany, was to be made safe for capitalism.

Meanwhile, four-power negotiations on Germany were getting nowhere. At the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which took place in two sessions in April-May and June-July 1946, there was no meeting of minds. The Secretary of State, then James F. Byrnes, presented a proposal for a four-power treaty to keep Germany disarmed for 25 years,[16] but his Soviet opposite number, Vyacheslav Molotov, seemed to lack the enthusiasm which Stalin had displayed when Byrnes originally unveiled the idea in Moscow the previous December. Indeed, Molotov seemed in no hurry to reach any kind of settlement over Germany. On July 12, the last day of the council meeting, a puzzled Byrnes asked the Soviet Foreign Minister to tell him what his country really wanted. 'The Soviet Union, Molotov replied, wanted what it had asked for at Yalta—10 billions of dollars in reparations, and also participation with the United States, the United Kingdom and France *in a four-power control of the industries of the Ruhr.*'[17]

Molotov later claimed that $10,000 million in reparations was a very modest claim considering that it represented less than a tenth of the damage directly attributable to the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

[14] Minutes of a meeting of the secretaries of state, war and navy, June 19, 1947, *FRUS, 1947*, II, pp. 927–28.

[15] Clayton memo., June 20, 1947; Clayton tel., June 25, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 929, 932.

[16] Draft treaty, April 30, 1946, *ibid., 1946*, II, pp. 190–93.

[17] James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper; London: Heinemann, 1947), p. 194. Emphasis in the original. Unfortunately, there is no record of this conversation in *FRUS*.

He may have been right, but he spoiled his case by trying to suggest that this amount had virtually been agreed upon at the Yalta conference in February 1945. The Americans had indicated agreement at that conference, but the British had strongly disagreed, and by the time of the Potsdam conference a few months later, the Americans had changed their minds and no absolute figures were mentioned in the Potsdam protocol. Given the economic division of Germany and the deficits in the western zones, agreement on $10,000 million reparations to the Soviet Union was even less likely in 1946 than it had been the previous year. Similar considerations affected discussion of four-power control of the Ruhr. As already indicated, the latter was in the British zone and Bevin made it quite clear that he was not prepared to discuss proposals for the Ruhr in the absence of a meaningful discussion of the problems of Germany as a whole.[18]

But this was not the whole story. Britain and the United States were coming to suspect that Russian aims in Germany went much further than reparations and a share in the control of the Ruhr. As early as February 27, 1946, Sir Oliver Harvey, Deputy Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, told the United States chargé in London 'that there is no doubt in his mind that Moscow's ultimate aim was a Communist Germany.'[19] George Kennan took much the same view.[20] What was seen as Soviet expansionism in other parts of Europe and the Middle East can only have reinforced this suspicion, as did the Russian proposals for Germany tabled at the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in March and April of 1947. Reporting to the American people on the failure of the conference, the new Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, said: 'Agreement was made impossible at Moscow because, in our view, the Soviet Union insisted upon proposals which would have established in Germany a centralised government, adapted to the seizure of absolute control of a country which would be doomed economically through inadequate area and excessive population, and would be mortgaged to turn over a large part of its production as reparations, principally to the Soviet Union. . . . Such a plan, in the opinion of the United States Delegation, not only involved indefinite American subsidy, but could result only in a deteriorating economic life in Germany and Europe and the inevitable emergence of dictatorship and strife.[21] Thus, Soviet insistence upon $10,000 million in reparations and the finality of the Oder-Neisse frontier were seen not so much as separate demands, which might have been justified in themselves, but as part of a master-plan for the communisation of Germany.

How valid were these fears? It must be recognised at the outset that Soviet policy towards Germany was composed of several different strands, some of them contradictory.[22] Individual proposals may therefore reflect conflicting aims and can be looked at in this light rather than on the assumption that they necessarily form part of some carefully conceived 'grand design'. In the case of reparations, for example, the State Depart-

[18] US minutes of Council of Foreign Ministers' meetings, May 15, 16, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, II, pp. 393–99, 426–33.

[19] Gallman tel., February 27, 1946, *ibid.*, V, p. 707.

[20] Kennan memo., May 10, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 555–56.

[21] Marshall speech, April 24, 1947, Beate Ruhm von Oppen (ed.), *Documents on Germany Under Occupation 1945–1954* (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1955), pp. 225–26.

[22] See Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik* (Neuwied/Berlin: Luchterhand. 1966) pp. 203–69.

ment adviser on the subject, Edwin Pauley, felt 'sure Stalin, Molotov and other Soviet officials firmly committed internally budgetwise and to their people with regard to obtaining reparations having a monetary value of 10 billion dollars, consequently, [I] do not believe they can be dissuaded from that point, if it involves public exposure of their previous inaccuracies.'[23] The demand thus made sense in terms quite other than of a device to weaken Germany and so render it prone to communism. Indeed, it might well have been counter-productive in that connection. Similarly, the Oder-Neisse frontier was almost certainly designed more with Poland in view than Germany.

Nevertheless, Stalin is reported to have said in the spring of 1946 'that all of Germany must be ours, that is, Soviet, Communist.'[24] The tactics of the German communists, particularly the formation of the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED) with the Social Democrats in the Soviet zone,[25] and the emphasis in 1946 and 1947 upon a separate, German road to socialism were perfectly consistent with this aim. When the Russians put forward proposals for a 'democratic' all-German government at Moscow, they meant something quite different from the western powers, as a perusal of the documents on political developments in the Soviet zone and the revealing memoirs of the ex-German communist *apparatchik*, Wolfgang Leonhard, will amply demonstrate.[26]

In his study of American occupation policy, John Gimbel draws attention to Marshall's apparent readiness to lay all the blame for the German problem at the door of the Soviet Union and to ignore the French contribution.[27] On the face of it, this is indeed strange, for it was France, obsessed with the desire to dismember Germany in order to guarantee its own security, which had originally prevented the establishment of central German administrative agencies and which was still insisting upon separation or a special regime for the Ruhr and the Rhineland. It is clear from the documents under review, however, that the maintenance of France in the western camp outweighed all other considerations.

This emerges with particular force from the American reaction to the French protest concerning the unilateral Anglo-American decision for an upward revision of the permitted level of industry in 'Bizonia'. This decision became known to the French in July 1947, just as the discussions for the formulation of the European economic recovery programme (the Marshall Plan) were getting under way in Paris. In a conversation on July 16 with the United States ambassador and Averell Harriman, then Secretary of Commerce, the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, 'remarked that the Paris conference work was going well but that he was very alarmed about developments in Germany. He said that France was now faced with the following prospects: 1. Measures had been taken to centralise Germany. 2. They have been taken or will be taken to reestab-

[23] Acheson tel., March 21, 1947, *FRUS, 1947*, II, p. 395.

[24] Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (London: Hart-Davis 1962; Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1963), p. 119.

[25] It was hoped to extend the activities of the SED to the western zones, but the western powers would not permit it. They did however license the original German Communist Party.

[26] Wolfgang Leonhard, *Die Revolution entläßt ihre Kinder* (Frankfurt-am-Main/Berlin: Ullstein. 1961). First pub. Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch. 1955. Abbreviated English edition *Child of the Revolution* (trans. C. M. Woodhouse) London: Collins. 1957.

[27] Gimbel, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

lish the Germans in the mines. 3. The immediate raising of the steel production level is contemplated. With reference to this situation, Bidault said: "We have 180 Communists (in the Assembly) who say: 'the Marshall Plan means Germany first.' If something permits them to say this again, whether with ostensible or real reason, I tell you the government will not survive."'[28]

In response to such pressure, the United States government agreed to 'suspend further announcement upon the proposal for the revised bi-zonal level of industry in Germany until the French Government has had a reasonable opportunity to discuss these questions with the United States and United Kingdom Governments.'[29] At a private lunch with Clayton on August 6, 'Bidault said that he did not think there was very much difference between French and US view regarding level of industry in Germany, that they would interpose no objections to any level of industry which we and the British might agree upon provided the French people had assurance that the resources of the Ruhr would not again be employed in war on France.' He then put forward a proposal for the constitution of an international board comprising the United States, Britain, France and the Benelux countries, to which Germany would be added after a peace treaty, which would allocate the output of the Ruhr. 'This seems reasonable to me', Clayton commented in his report to Washington, and he added later on: 'I believe France is the key country of the 16 participating in the Paris Conference, or, at any rate, it can be correctly said that if France should withdraw or if her present government should fall as a consequence of deep dissatisfaction over decisions relating to Germany, the whole Marshall program would probably be gravely jeopardized.'[30] Tripartite discussions between Britain, France and the United States took place in August, and although the French did not obtain all they wanted, they secured enough public and private assurances to avert a crisis.[31]

It has often been remarked that the Marshall Plan was born as a result of the failure of the Moscow conference on Germany.[32] It is no less true that the Marshall Plan, which envisaged the full participation of western Germany in the economic recovery programme,[33] consolidated the division of Germany. In a review of Soviet policy towards Germany written in September 1947, a member of Robert Murphy's staff observed: 'Another interesting and increasingly predominant factor is Soviet condemnation of the Marshall Plan. It is clear that the vast majority of Germans strongly favor the Marshall Plan for Germany, including even numerous Communists as well as former Social Democrats now active in the SED. The Soviets therefore might do well by soft-pedaling this propaganda. Such, however, is not the case. Not only have they used every possible opportunity to themselves attack the Marshall Plan, but have evidently been making great efforts to induce prominent Germans to do likewise. This has been particularly noticeable in recent weeks as regards the CDU [Christian Democrat Party] in the Soviet Zone. . . . [T]he net result is a

[28] Caffery tel., July 20, 1947, *FRUS, 1947*, II, p. 998.

[29] Marshall letter, July 21, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 1004.

[30] Clayton tel., August 7, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 1023–1024.

[31] Douglas tel., August 27, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 1066; Ruhm von Oppen, *op. cit.*, pp. 238–239; Vincent Auriol, *Journal du Septennat 1947–1954*, Vol. I, *1947* (Paris: Armand Colin. 1970), p. 414. Clay was so angry at the efforts to appease the French that he threatened to resign.

[32] *E.g.* Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

[33] Lovett tel., August 26, 1947, *FRUS, 1947*, III, p. 388.

serious intensification of the present split in Germany.' [34] So exercised was the Soviet Union over the Marshall Plan that State Department and British Foreign Office officials feared that the Russians might advance a 'sensational proposal' at the forthcoming London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers involving acceptance of the main points of the Anglo-American position on Germany and a plan for the withdrawal of occupation forces. 'Intention of this maneuver would be to obtain unified Germany in which Soviet participation could sabotage Marshall Plan'.[35]

They need not have worried. The London conference, which took place in November-December 1947, produced no 'sensational' initiatives on either side. It was merely an occasion for the ritual reaffirmation of irreconcilable positions. It is clear from the documents that its failure came as no surprise to the British, the French or the Americans, and we may doubt whether the Russians were altogether unprepared. At the end of the conference, the western delegates conferred among themselves about the future. At a meeting on December 18 between Marshall, Bevin and their advisers '[i]t was agreed that the Military Governments should work out considered plans for a political structure in bizonia but that there should be no unseemly haste. The views of the German population are to be considered and it might be found wise not to name as a government for Western Germany whatever political structure might be developed. . . . It was to be made amply clear that the French were welcome whenever they evinced sufficient interest to participate on a trizonal basis. There was no intention to force this upon the French but rather to allow the initiative to come from the French. . . . MR. MARSHALL mentioned that he had told Mr. Bidault that the Anglo-American fusion could be taken as a basis for discussion with the French regarding their eventual participation.' [36]

In fact, the tripartite discussions envisaged soon developed into a full-scale international conference in London, in which not only Britain, France and the United States participated, but also the Benelux countries, and which lasted, in two separate sessions, from February to June 1948. It concluded with a decision to convene a constituent assembly for west Germany not later than September 1.[37] This may seem to contradict the agreement, cited above, 'that there should be no unseemly haste', but one must recall the atmosphere of early 1948, when the Czech *coup* and increasing Soviet pressure upon west Berlin induced a growing sense of urgency. Indeed, had it not been for the French, who were anxious both not to provoke the Russians and to secure solid guarantees for their own security *vis-à-vis* Germany, the pace would probably have been even quicker. Thus, Clay and the British commander in Germany, General Sir Brian Robertson, tried to impress upon their French opposite number, General Pierre Koenig, on March 31, 1948, that the situation was much more urgent than his government would allow. 'Robertson said if we keep on talking indefinitely we might wake up some fine morning to find Hammer and Sickle already on Rhine. General Koenig did not believe menace was that great.' [38]

Koenig was probably right. George Kennan has convincingly argued that the Czech *coup* was a defensive reaction against the success of the

[34] Undated Morris memo., *ibid.*, II, p. 889.
[35] Beam memo., October 24, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 690–691.
[36] Murphy memo., December 18, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 827–828.
[37] For the six-power discussions, see *FRUS, 1948*, II, pp. 75–145, 191–317.
[38] Murphy tel., April 1, 1948, *ibid.*, p. 159.

Marshall Plan, aimed at consolidating the Soviet hold over eastern Europe, rather than an aggressive move.[39] It was almost certainly the same with the Berlin blockade. Stalin had drawn similar conclusions, from his own point of view, from the failure of the London conference to those of the western powers. 'The West will make Western Germany their own', he is said to have told visiting Bulgarian and Jugoslav communists in early 1948, 'and we shall turn Eastern Germany into our own state.'[40] From this perspective, the Soviet attempt to force the western powers out of Berlin looks more like an attempt to tighten the Russian grip upon eastern Germany than a prelude to a thrust across the Elbe. Indeed the Russians even hinted at an exchange with the Americans of territory originally occupied by the latter in 1945 for west Berlin.[41]

Admittedly, they also tried to use the Berlin crisis as a means of delaying progress towards the formation of a west German government, but it was recognised that this was their maximum objective, the 'minimum being achievement of sole Soviet control in Berlin with west powers occupation apparatus reduced to ineffective appendage in immediate future and eventually removed entirely', and it was felt 'that they realised during early stages of discussion first objective was out of reach for time being' and 'that any further interest they display in this subject will be only for purposes of confusing issues, bargaining or propaganda values to be derived therefrom.'[42] Further support for the hypothesis that the minimum objective was the real one comes from the fact that the Russians allowed the blockade to drag on into 1949, despite the encouragement this gave, not only to the formation of a west German government, but also to the establishment of the north Atlantic alliance. They probably thought, as Clay suggested, that the air lift, which was the only link between west Berlin and the outside world, could not continue through the winter months.[43]

Originally, both Clay and Murphy advocated an attempt to break the blockade on the ground by means of an armed convoy. Murphy subsequently claimed that when he and Clay flew to Washington for a crucial National Security Council meeting on July 22, they hoped to obtain permission for just such a move. But when it came to the point, Clay was bound to admit that a ground convoy would probably provoke an armed confrontation, whereas an air lift would not. President Truman therefore overruled the Chief of Staff of the Air Force's objections to the air lift, which boiled down to a belief that it would dangerously reduce American air strength elsewhere, and 'directed the Air Force to furnish the fullest support possible to the problem of supplying Berlin.' As Truman commented: 'The airlift involved less risks than armed road convoys.'[44]

There was never any hesitation in the President's mind that the United States must remain in Berlin. But that does not seem to have been the view of all his advisers. At a meeting of the State Department's Policy

[39] Kennan, *op. cit.*, pp. 378–379.

[40] Djilas, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

[41] Murphy tel., June 23, 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, II, p. 915. This feeler was not explored.

[42] Smith tel., August 17, 1948, *ibid.*, pp. 1047–1048.

[43] Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, *Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Doubleday, 1956), p. 125. They may also have been gambling upon political pressure in a presidential election year, but this consideration would not have applied after November.

[44] Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (New York: Doubleday, 1964), p. 317; Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 124–126.

Planning Staff on September 28, 1948, the United States ambassador in Moscow, General Bedell Smith, said: 'I regret very much that we are in Berlin at all. I know that some of our people in Berlin do not agree with me, but for what it is worth I have always felt that we should never have let ourselves get into an exposed salient like Berlin under such conditions. From the military point of view it makes no sense whatever to have U.S. forces in an enclave that could be chopped off with ease. From the political point of view, Berlin has become the important symbol it now is largely because we ourselves have made it so. However, that is all water over the dam; my hope for the future is that the U.N. [where the issue was being discussed] will offer a chance for us to get out of Berlin.'[45]

These thoughts coincided to some extent with those of George Kennan, now the head of the Policy Planning Staff. In a series of important papers, Kennan argued that the Berlin problem could not be dealt with in isolation and that the government might find it desirable to put forward a programme for the whole of Germany which would, *inter alia*, solve the Berlin crisis by means of mutual troop withdrawals. It was more than likely that the Russians would reject the programme, but then, Kennan claimed, the onus of responsibility for the division of Germany would fall upon them, just as the onus of responsibility for the division of Europe had fallen upon them when they unilaterally withdrew from the preliminary discussions on the Marshall Plan and compelled their satellites to do likewise. However, as he recognised in the first of his papers, the acceptance of his proposals would mean the abandonment of the London programme for the establishment of a separate west German government, and the more time went on, the more difficult it became even to contemplate such an action. Consideration of Kennan's proposals was deferred—for good, as it later turned out.[46]

Negotiations for the establishment of a west German state were by no means complete at the end of 1948. The French were still holding out for the best possible terms and the west German politicians had their own views, which did not always coincide with those of the allies or indeed with each other's.[47] Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine that there was ever any real prospect of turning back. Meanwhile, in east Germany, the bolshevisation of the SED had begun. This must, to a large extent, have been a reaction to allied moves in the west, but it also undoubtedly reflected a Soviet fear of the repercussions upon the communist world of the dispute with Jugoslavia, which became open in mid-1948. As Stalin had predicted, the western powers and the Soviet Union were fast creating two Germanies, each in their respective images.

[45] Minutes of the 286th Policy Planning Staff Meeting, September 28, 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, II, p. 1194.

[46] Kennan memo., August 12, 1948; Policy Planning Staff Reports, November 2, 15, 1948, *ibid.*, pp. 1287–1297; 1240–1247; 1320–1338. See also Kennan, *op. cit.*, pp. 421-428, 442–446.

[47] For documentation on these developments, see *FRUS, 1948*, II, pp. 375–702

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

The Future of the International Order: An Agenda for Research. Edited by C. Fred Bergsten. Foreword by McGeorge Bundy. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Heath. 1973. 357 pp. Index. $15.00.*

Dying, so Alice Toklas related, Gertrude Stein twice asked, querulously, what was the answer; and then pronounced those famously enigmatic last words, 'If there is no question, then there is no answer.'

Here, applied to the international economic order or system and its future, is a whole book of questions, almost all of them sharply pertinent, some urgent, few with any ready-to-mind answers; also some forcefully argued, radical recommendations that deserve at least careful consideration by a great many people—in business and government as well as academic teaching and research—who are seriously concerned with the development and improvement of international studies. To overlook such a book because it fits into no recognisable publisher's pigeonhole would be a mistake.

It came about when the Ford Foundation decided to commission Dr. Fred Bergsten of the Brookings Institution (until June 1971 on the Kissinger staff at the White House) to advise it on the complexities of international economic issues and on how academic research, financed with Ford money, might deepen our understanding and perhaps help to avoid a breakdown in economic peace as well as contribute to the solution of a host of unfamiliar and knotty problems of international political economy. The result is a collection of nine essays of which the two major contributions are Bergsten's own and the almost equally wide-ranging one by the Harvard team of Nye and Keohane, themselves the editors of a much-quoted special issue of *International Organization* on transnational relations.[1]

Bergsten's thesis is that between 1967 and 1971 the established international economic order collapsed and we do not yet know what will take its place. Fundamental questions, therefore, have to be answered about the goals of international economic relations and how to set about achieving

[1] Vol. 25, No. 3, 1971.

them. A reorientation of international studies on much more interdisciplinary lines is needed, first to help governments avoid breakdown; secondly, to aid in constructing a new economic order; and lastly to develop new forms and modes of international co-operation and policy-making. Bergsten then identifies twelve major issues on which intellectual effort, assisted by Ford Foundation funds, might be expected to yield helpful dividends. In all of them he shows himself acutely aware of the limitations of conventional neo-classical economics to produce solutions that satisfy the clamour for minimum economic justice as well as the demand for maximum global welfare (however that may be defined). He hotly advocates a great extension of interdisciplinary research effort and of interdisciplinary training—'larger numbers of people better trained than at present . . . to fill positions in national (and perhaps subnational) governments, international organisations, multinational (and 'purely' national) firms and banks, other transnational groups, the press and academia itself' (p. 53).

These recommendations are broadly echoed, though from a starting-point on the political rather than the economic side, by Nye and Keohane. They, too, urge the breaking down of conventional academic boundaries, the training of new academic hybrids literate in more than one discipline and the encouragement of inter-professional as well as inter-disciplinary research. Specifically, they direct attention to the much-neglected and sometimes despised field of international organisation (p. 166).

Of special interest to some readers will be Professor Raymond Vernon's shorter essay on research problems of foreign direct investment. Some of it repeats what he has written elsewhere; but it is remarkable (considering the resources, vast beyond the dreams of academic avarice, that he has commanded in analysing the growth of multinational enterprise) that at the end Vernon is so healthily sceptical of the value either of large-scale quantitative surveys or qualitative surveys based on open-ended interviews. He plumps, conservatively, and *faute de mieux*, for case-studies of sources of tension associated with international production and enterprise. Other specialised contributions deal with the resources question, with problems of economic development in poor countries, with East-West economic relations, and with the control of the international environment.

Mostly, the standpoint is very evidently North American. Only on the rather difficult question of internal adjustments to external economic pressures and influences is the attempt made to balance an American with a European viewpoint. Unavoidably, at times, the contributions are inclined to stress the need to resolve those conflicts and problems that loom largest in and for the United States. Unconsciously, they are often much more urgently concerned with the preservation of international economic order than with the distribution of international economic justice and welfare or even with the maintenance of a measure of economic stability. It will also seem to many European readers that some—not all—of the contributors (and no doubt the Foundation itself) are far too sanguine about what can be achieved, certainly in the short run, by spending money on new research lines. Students of politics and history will be painfully aware that though research may illuminate, it may not necessarily much influence the tangled, nitty-gritty processes of political and economic bargaining from which, with a little bit of luck, will evolve new methods of social and economic management transcending the frontiers of the nation-states. For better or

worse, fear and envy will probably play a bigger part than reason in deciding the outcome.

All the same, the effort was well made; Ford money, on this at least, was well spent. Some of us who have been rabbiting on about the limitations of conventional economics and politics in face of the problems of the world in the late 20th century are bound to cheer Dr. Bergsten for his vehemence as much as for his persuasiveness. And some others that were deaf will perhaps begin to listen.

SUSAN STRANGE

The End of the Postwar Era: a new balance of world power. By Alastair Buchan. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1974. 347 pp. Index £4·50.*

THIS is an eminently readable book, packed with wise observations on the recent past and the imminent future. Yet it leaves the reader, and, one senses, the author, oddly dissatisfied and slightly disappointed. Why? One suspects that the author would say that the timing was wrong, that he wrote or perhaps more accurately felt committed to write, at a time when too much was in flux, for the world as he says is in the midst of 'an era of negotiations'. In almost every sphere of international relations—strategic arms control, force reductions and other aspects of East-West relations, money, trade, energy, seabeds—negotiations are in train or in prospect. Moreover the shifts in power relationships and in particular the redefinition of the American role is still incomplete.

If Profesor Buchan's object had been to write current history it might have been prudent to wait until the lines of settlement had become a little clearer, for there are natural pauses in historical development, and we are not in one of them at the moment. But the genesis of the book suggests that its purpose was rather different.

During 1972 and the early months of 1973 the Ditchley Foundation organised five Anglo-American conferences on the general theme of the major factors likely to affect foreign policies during the 1970s. Professor Buchan's book was never envisaged as a conference report but rather as a personal interpretation; he was free to make use of the points of view expressed during the discussions at Ditchley Park, but he was not limited or tied in any way by the form or content of those discussions.

The Ditchley Council in organising this set of interlocked discussions on a single broad theme was reflecting a view that was fairly widespread within the 'foreign policy community' (that network of practitioners and analysts which has become such a conspicuous aspect of the postwar scene) that many of the assumptions that had guided policy, particularly Western policy, in the postwar period were no longer valid. If policy was to be responsive to the demands of the future more understanding was required of how much had changed, what the nature of the new demands were likely to be, and about the right response to these new demands. In short the Ditchley Council was reflecting a prevalent view that the conceptual framework that had served the West well for the first two decades after the war now needed to be replaced, and the discussions were planned as part of the process of rethinking that is now so conspicuously under way on the other side of the Atlantic and, rather less intensively, on this side.

Thus an important part of the background of the book was the recognition that a new fluidity characterised international relations, that, to use the words of the title, we were at 'the end of the post-war era' and at the

start of what was likely to be a rather different period that could not, in the very nature of things, yet be analysed with the assurance of an historian. Therefore, although like anyone else who dares to write about international events as they unfold (or before they occur!) I can understand only too well Professor Buchan's feeling that he had undertaken an impossible task at an impossible time, I doubt whether that is really the reason why, despite the wealth of perceptive analysis, the author so clearly feels, and rather disarmingly conveys to the reader, the sense that somehow this is not quite vintage Buchan.

I suspect the real difficulty arises from the fact that Professor Buchan has an uncomfortable feeling that those areas in international relationships with which he is most familiar and which here, as always, he analyses so impressively—strategic relationships, balances of power, 'high politics'—are likely to be a less dominant part of the future framework than are questions of so-called 'low-politics', the typically economic or technology-related problems which statesmen and strategists have tended to regard as faintly grubby matters that could safely be left to 'the experts'. This is not to say that he ignores the latter: time and again he reminds us that it is these other aspects of international relationships—the management of our growing interdependence, community-building on a regional or global scale, distribution questions—that are likely to be the supremely difficult ones in the years ahead. And it is the importance of generating, somehow, a 'new spirit of internationalism' which he finds himself driven to emphasising in his last few pages. But whereas he writes about the 'new balance of world power' with felicity as well as authority, the gears do not engage so smoothly when he writes about welfare and the need for new forms of 'functional internationalism'. The words are there, but one feels he is now more rapporteur than author.

It would be surprising if a study that ranges so widely were not uneven. He seemed to me to strike a truer balance, and to do so more elegantly, in his Reith lectures. But perhaps that was because he was forced to reconsider, and to distil the essence from, the vast amount of material he has brought together for us in the book.

MIRIAM CAMPS

The Management of Interdependence: A Preliminary View. By Miriam Camps. Preface by Richard H. Ullman. *New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 1974. 104 pp (Council Papers on International Affairs.) $2.50.*

New Forces in World Politics. By Seyom Brown. Foreword by Kermit Gordon. *Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1974. 224 pp. Index. $7.95. Paperback: $2.95.*

TRADITIONALLY, world politics has provided the stage on which the soldier and diplomat have taken the lead, their lines dictated by the interests of their states and their political masters. Bankers, industrialists, scientists, even missionaries have lurked in the side-wings, but have only rarely had more than walk-on parts. All this is changing, if Miriam Camps and Seyom Brown are to be believed. The stage is now far more crowded, with many more state actors and with powerful multinational corporations and other transnational actors vying for the lead, while the soldier and diplomat, deprived of the easy sonorities of the cold war, grope for ways of making sense of the dimly perceived challenges to the traditional state system.

For Miriam Camps ' scientific and technological developments have eroded the traditional insulators of time and space and helped to create new interdependences among states ' (p. 8). Correspondingly, the content of ' high politics ' is expanding from the security realm to include not merely monetary, trade and aid questions, but also the management and conservation of natural resources. New institutions for collective management need to be devised accordingly. There is probably least scope in the security field where the ' essential safeguard will continue to be the maintenance of the central balance of powers, supplemented by regional balances ' (p. 32); here the need is for more communication and co-operation between the principal adversaries (e.g. ' space-docking, cancer research, developing power from nuclear fusion ' p.24); more disengagement from local conflicts; and a ' better global capability for the insulation of conflicts, for fact-finding and for peace-keeping ' (p.41).

By contrast, the increasing politicisation of formerly ' technical ' issues calls for more radical forms of collective management which can overcome three problems which ' underlie many of the inadequacies of our existing institutions: the first might be called the efficiency-participation dilemma [the need to combine efficiency in the handling of specific tasks with the right to a voice in the decision-making process]; the second, the problem of leadership [now that the capacity and will of the United States to ' steer ' has been eroded]; and the third, the closely related problem of central guidance and planning [a ' brain ' to see that the system ' works ']' (pp. 92-97). Miriam Camps argues for more decentralisation in aid activities; against trying to universalise the new and closer relationships to be sought at both the international and domestic levels between the industrialised market economies in the trade and monetary fields; and for ' some real shift in the locus of power from national governments to international staffs ' (p. 100).

This ' Agenda for Survival ' is skilfully and persuasively argued and offers a valuable basis for further discussion. Yet Miriam Camps acknowledges that the radical institutional reforms contemplated are useless—will indeed not come about at all—without ' changes in attitudes ' at both the governmental and public levels. ' Aye, there's the rub '. Indeed, the interdependencies which she sees as producing the impetus for collective management could equally well induce a renewed mood of *sauve qui peut.*

Seyom Brown presents much the same thesis, though at greater length and from a more obviously American standpoint. He has particularly interesting accounts of economic ties between Russia and America; of the differing forms of economic transnationalism; and of the pressures of the affluent counterculture within the Western world. Nevertheless, his reading of the sources of weakness in existing political structures may cause a few raised eyebrows and his general gloom about their resulting incoherence seems an odd basis for his hopes in a renascence of American internationalism and for forms of ' global management ' which can ' assure the healthy survival of the human species ' (p. 3).

G. L. GOODWIN

Secrecy and Foreign Policy. Edited by Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband. Foreword by Maxwell Cohen. *New York, London, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1974. 453 pp. Index. (New York University, Center for International Studies: Studies in Peaceful Change.) £8·75.*

Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies. Vol. 1. Edited by Patrick J. McGowan. *Beverly Hills, Calif., London: Sage. 1974. 336 pp. Bibliog. £5·00.*

In their quite different ways, the two books under review show the possibility of advance in the analysis of foreign policy. The Franck/Weisband volume is an outstanding specimen of the advantages of the traditional historical analysis, when well done. It has a clearly defined topic which it covers in real depth; at the same time, while bringing out the full relevance of the issue of 'secrecy', it sheds much light on the basic issue of the relations between government and people in the making of foreign policy. The twenty-four essays neatly divide into the executive and legislature points of view, the media and the individuals. The methodology of the volume is loose —there is little attempt to define with any degree of precision the key issues of 'secrecy' and 'security', or to present a comparative analysis of the three democracies studied beyond the fairly obvious spectrum between the United States with its written constitution, the United Kingdom without one and Canada somewhere in between. The strength of the volume lies in the deliberate limitation of each essay to one country alone and to the authority of the new contributors, all of whom participated in some way in politics, as politicians, officials, media-men or academics. Even in the long concluding essay the editors attempt no more than to summarise—partly diagrammatically—the findings of the individual essays.

The main issue is found in the search for an acceptable equation between incompatible governmental demands for secrecy and the popular demand for participation, expressed in the American phrase 'the right to know'. The issue was precipitated in the United States by the Vietnam involvement and accentuated, after the publication of this volume, by the Watergate affair; in Britain we have not yet implemented the Franks Report and, in Canada, the Trudeau reforms of foreign policy have not been completed. As the individual papers state and the editors summarise, there are important considerations both for and against secrecy, and any solution must take account of both as well as of the individual national traditions and constitutional practices.

Owing to their widespread publicity, British readers may, paradoxically, find themselves most familiar with the American issues; among the papers on these, the authoritative analyses of Senator Mathias and of Dr. Ellsberg's lawyer, Leonard Boudin, are likely to be most illuminating. The many facets of the relatively little known Canadian foreign policy and of its recent reform are of great interest, but the hitherto unavailable and authoritative presentation of the main aspects of the British situation is likely to attract most attention. Cabinet secrecy is discussed from different angles—by Patrick Gordon Walker, who asserts the ministers' right to leak; by William Clark, who analyses Eden's failure to inform and consult the public on Suez in 1956 but questions whether any blame attaches to Attlee for taking Britain out of India or to Heath for taking it into Europe (as the editors comment, the people can be wrong—for example, about appeasement); while Anthony Sampson attacks the 'old secrecy' in its impact upon the press. Kenneth Lamb analyses the BBC's recent successful defence of its impartiality on Ulster. Finally, on the more strictly legal level, Stanley de Smith makes a reasoned and moderate case for a degree of secrecy while Harry Street makes the opposite one for freedom of information.

The first volume of the *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy*

Studies follows a diametrically opposed approach—it aims at the development and application of theory, and the authors of its ten papers are theory-oriented academics. It does not constitute nearly so important a contribution to our understanding of foreign policy as the Franck/Weisband volume but, in all justice, it cannot be directly compared with it and it is successful within its stated purpose. It is likely to be useful to academic specialists in this country because its format allows them to follow the methodological developments in the much more intensive study of the field in the United States. Each paper contains a thorough survey of the recent work on its individual subject and an extensive bibliography.

All the papers are clearly and sensibly presented and most of them include some quantitative analysis of correlations, some with telling results. In the last respect, the paper by J. W. Eley and J. H. Petersen on 'Economic Interests and American Foreign Policy Allocations' can be singled out. It uses the data on three central American economic interests—exports, imports and investment—and three important foreign policy activities—the allocation of economic assistance, military assistance and diplomatic personnel—to test the two major conflicting theories of American foreign policy—that of the neo-marxists who regard this policy as dependent upon private economic interests, and that of the power political school. The neatly arranged findings are plausible and demonstrate that neither theory is of general validity and that each provides better answers to individual aspects of American foreign policy. With the help of empirical material, the two conflicting theories are thus usefully reduced to complementary models, each with its fairly clearly defined uses and limitations.

J. FRANKEL

Power and Community in World Politics. By Bruce M. Russett. *San Francisco. Reading: Freeman. 1974. 372 pp. Index. $10.95. £5·20. Paperback: $4.95. £2·40.*

International Politics: Foundations of the System. By Werner Levi. *Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press; London, Delhi: Oxford University Press; Toronto: Copp Clark. 1974. 285 pp. Bibliog. Index. £6·25.*

THE books under review, in spite of their different approaches and purposes, are nonetheless united not only in that each is written by an American professor but also in that they are clearly written for a readership happy in the belief that international relations is a fit subject for scholarly discourse. As such, we may be sure, they were not primarily intended for the British market.

Mr. Russett's book is, in effect, a collection of previously published articles he has written over the years, and there is nothing in it that will come as news to readers of scholarly periodicals in the international relations field. Seen between one pair of covers, what does emerge with some reinforcement is Mr. Russett's faintly old-fashioned picture of the scientific method, whereby—and I do not mean to oversimplify—close observation and careful accumulation of data bring into being good theories to displace the bad. Leaving aside the deeper question of whether the subject matter of international relations is fit material for 'scientific' investiga-

tion (as Mr. Russett himself does, in his disarming way), it is far from clear that the natural sciences or even economic science progress in this manner at all. There was nothing at the time, in terms of observable data, to favour Galilean astronomy over its predecessor; the advance was more subtle and involved questions of economy of presentation and aesthetics. And the splendid 'laws' of supply and demand were not only derived intuitively but they are by their nature almost impossible to derive in any other way.

Thus we may doubt for all kinds of reasons whether the data collection approach of the school Mr. Russett represents will prove the high road to a theory of international relations and we may even doubt if it will be much help along the low road, given that twenty years of assiduous data gathering has unearthed nothing of sufficient moment to enable one to swear, hand on heart, that an ignorance of these findings really disqualifies a man from talking sense about international relations. But data are information and information can sometimes be transmitted into knowledge.

Mr. Levi's book is quite different, although he plainly believes, along with Mr. Russett, that modern and traditional approaches to the study of international relations have something to offer each other. Mr. Levi, in a style which some may find rather rambling, attempts a fairly grand synthesis of all that seems to him worthwhile (which is a great deal) in postwar academic writings on the subject addressed to his theme, and dream, of how the international system has developed, is developing and could develop in the future. The book, while not unsound in any way and by no means to be locked away from undergraduates, is an odd but far from naive mixture of interesting analysis and quiet, personal statement: not the sort of book a young man would write.

Broadly, Mr. Levi's case is that the existing scheme of international relationships is inadequate, wanting in order—which he comes close to identifying with a relative absence of unpredictability—and that improvement will come about through the growth of over-arching relationships between small, sub-state interest groups and the growth of short-range sub-national relationships based on community, thereby leaving the state as we now know it somewhat bereft of external and internal rationales. He may be right (who can tell?) but it is possible to quarrel with the details of his analysis. I was rather uneasy about his insistence that these over-arching connections were (and are) not essentially regional; his claim that there is an increasing tendency towards a global division of labour seems quite unjustified; and his divorce of war from politics, the former to be seen as a disease or at least a disorder on the body of the latter, is a strong temptation for a systems theoriser like Mr. Levi, but it is only the over-enthusiastic that succumb to it and close their eyes to the force of Clausewitz's famous dictum.

Mr. Levi, like a great many students of international relations, studies his subject matter not only to understand it but also in the belief that it should be changed in a particular way. Better than most he manages to overcome the handicaps this sort of scholarship always carries with it; there is no moralising, no arrogance and only the occasional overruling of the head by the heart. I can think of worse testimonies of (what I take to be) a long career teaching international relations to unforgiving students.

IAN BELLANY

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

Nuclear Proliferation Problems. Edited by Bhupendra Jasani. Preface by Frank Barnaby. *Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell for SIPRI; Cambridge, Mass., London: The MIT Press. 1974. 312 pp. Sw.kr. 58.00. $13.00. £5·50.*

SIPRI's publication of this compendium of conference papers is unquestionably timely. The review conference to reconsider the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is due to be convened in May 1975, and the problems with which it would, in any case, have been faced are now compounded by India's defiance of the treaty's principles in setting off its first nuclear explosion. In these circumstances, it is especially valuable to be reminded of the technical and political background to the issue of international nuclear proliferation.

The sad thing is to find that this particular book does not play that important role in a more satisfactory way. It consists of the 22 papers presented to a SIPRI conference in June 1973 and here arranged in four sections, dealing respectively with nuclear technology, international safeguards, civil nuclear co-operation and the security problems of some of the non-nuclear weapon states. The delay in the publication of the papers imposes one limitation on the volume's utility—not only because the Indian explosion has intervened but also because the technical and statistical data used is drawn from sources available in 1972 or even earlier and has not been brought up-to-date. Another limitation is imposed by the unselective editing of the volume. It is understandable that papers for a single conference by a wide range of authors should overlap considerably in their coverage, but it is hard that readers should be asked, when they are published, to pay for such a large measure of duplication of data and descriptive material. Part I, for example, which contains no less than nine papers on 'Nuclear Technology' and covers over 40 per cent. of the book, might well have been compressed, without loss, into not more than half the length. In the process it might have become possible to eliminate not only repetitions, but also some errors and inconsistencies: for example, the case of the tables on pp. 65, 66 and 108, which deal with uranium enrichment plants but which, although they occur in two papers by the same author, are in apparent conflict.

The absence of critical editing emphasises the naturally uneven quality of the papers themselves. Some are to be read with real profit. Professor Bernard Spinrad's opening projection of nuclear energy growth to 2020 is, for example, an interesting short essay in extrapolation. Professor Wolf Häfele provides a useful historical survey of international safeguards. Professor Mason Willrich summarises his known—and substantially argued—fears about 'private' proliferation. Professor V. S. Emlyanov offers an intriguing Soviet assessment of the actual and prospective utility of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the sceptical conclusions of which help, incidentally, to put into perspective the Indian government's unpersuasive claims to have initiated an exclusively peaceful programme by exploding a pure fission device. A number of the other papers are, however, too slight or too familiar to merit either reproduction or re-reading. Inevitably, the impact of the dozen good papers is diminished by their interlarding with the trivial.

We are promised a second volume, concentrating upon specific problems relevant to the 1975 Review Conference. Judgment on that must,

of course, be reserved, but it is clear from this first volume that much will depend upon a recognition that uncontrolled dissemination is a danger which applies not only to nuclear weapons.

IAN SMART

Rebel Leadership: Commitment and Charisma in the Revolutionary Process. By James V. Downton, Jr. *New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan. 1973. 306 pp. Index. £5·50.*

War Without Weapons: Non-Violence in National Defence. By Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack. *London: Frances Pinter. 1974. 194 pp. Index. £4·50. Paperback: £1·80.*

BOTH books are curiously topical: neither east nor west has produced strong leadership, the revolutionary (rebel) included; and in our nuclear age 'wars without arms' seem to be the only answer to conflict.

Professor Downton, using the sociological method in his approach and analysis, distinguishes between three types of leadership: (1) transactional, where there is recognised social reciprocity between a leader and follower; (2) charismatic, where the follower attributes mysterious and heroic qualities to a leader; and (3) inspirational, where a leader provides meaning to the life and purpose to the action and suffering of his follower. Then, he applies his theoretical framework to three movements, the Bolshevik, the Nazi and the Black Muslim. This is interesting and pertinent to contemporary problems of leadership. However, the author goes further and conceptualises rebel leadership in the complex social and psychological conditions of today. In this functional analysis Professor Downton is probably much less realistic than in his analysis of the nature of leadership.

The authors of the second book are professional conflict researchers and concentrate their attention on the unarmed conflicts of the contemporary world. Whilst there are in the military sphere two classical points of war defence: deterrence and dissuasion, in the civilian sphere there is a large variety of means of defence against wars waged by an armed invader-combatant. The authors give examples of some types of defence in detailed analyses of the Ruhr occupation in 1923 and the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (resistance against occupation without weapons); the Kapp putsch in 1920 and the revolt of the French generals in Algeria in 1961 (resistance against military coups). This is a stimulating little book and since the problems it examines rightly deserve greater attention, volumes of empirical research should follow this conceptual introduction.

J. BRADLEY

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Multinational Corporations and National Government: A case study of the United Kingdom's experience 1964–1970. By Michael Hodges. *London: Saxon House; Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1974. 307 pp. Index. (Saxon House Studies.) £5·75.*

European Technology: The Politics of Collaboration. By Roger Williams. *London: Croom Helm. 1973. 214 pp. Indexes. £3·95.*

American Labor and the Multinational Corporation. Edited by Duane Kujawa. Foreword by Robert G. Hawkins. *New York, Washington: Praeger. 1973. London: Pall Mall. 1974. 285 pp. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £8·00.*

European Trade Unionism. By Eric Jacobs. *London: Croom Helm. 1973. 180 pp. Index. Bibliog. Hardback: £3·95. Paperback: £1·95.*

International Control of Investment: The Dusseldorf Conference on Multinational Corporations. Edited by Don Wallace, Jr. assisted by Helga Ruof-Koch. Foreword by Kurt Biedenkopf. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger in cooperation with the Institute for International and Foreign Trade Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 1974. (Distrib. in UK by Pall Mall.) 281 pp. Index. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £8·50.*

Multinational Corporations in World Development. By the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1974. 200 pp. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £6·50.*

THE seven years since the publication of *Le Défi Américain* [1] seem almost a life-time. Overseas private investment has moved from being the subject of somewhat hysterical, semi-journalistic outpourings (of which this reviewer has himself been guilty) to the status of a political issue which is being debated at all levels of the international arena. In so far as the topic is now politically respectable, it is possible to reflect on the speed with which events have moved and to analyse how the study of multinational companies has now engaged no less a body than the United Nations itself.

The original source of concern came from Europe's belief that its high technology industries were doomed to total extinction before the aggression of American multinationals. This preoccupation with transatlantic technology gaps was caught in Servan-Schreiber's ringing declarations that Europe would cease to be included in the advanced areas of civilisation if it continued to lag behind in areas like computers, electronics and aircraft manufacture. This was fine rhetorical bombast, but to what extent did his runaway best-seller actually reflect the thinking of European policy-makers?

Michael Hodges's carefully researched study of Britain's experience between 1964 and 1970 suggests that the Civil Service was generally not too worried. The Labour government tended to see inward investment as a useful source of capital and skills while the Treasury made decisions on specific investment proposals too fast for any depth analysis of the wider implications to be made. Although some effort went into creating countervailing forces in certain industries, such as electrical engineering, computers and cars, Hodges suggests that the Ministry of Technology was only just starting to get to grips with all the issues when the 1970 election swept the Labour government from office. One useful aspect of this study is that he has included hitherto unpublished survey material on elite attitudes toward foreign investment which reinforces the picture of general unconcern amongst senior civil servants and businessmen in the late 1960s. The book as a whole is a good case study.

[1] By Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. Paris: Editions Denoël. 1967. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1968, p. 540.

Even if most European officials thought like the British, the 1960s saw an increase in the number of collaborative projects aimed at establishing European presences in the more research-intensive industries. Roger Williams has written a densely constructed introduction to the jungle of acronymic ventures out of which (if integration theorists are to be believed) European political unity will emerge. He looks at the reasons for disasters like ELDO and successes like CERN, but remains sceptical about the extent to which these kinds of ventures have a political spill-over. Indeed he leaves one with the heretical thought that the Swedish brand of limited, but commercially shrewd, involvement in international projects may ultimately be the most viable strategy for any government. This is an important book, although it is a pity the author did not have another fifty pages in which to develop his analysis.

While Europeans have been concerned about technological enthralment, however, an independent source of concern about overseas private investment has stemmed from the growing belief by American trade unionists that the multinationals have been exporting jobs to cheap-wage economies. Their claims have often been excessive, but their fears have given new respectability to the ever-present strand of isolationism in American political life, and the book which Duane Kujawa has edited is a valuable introduction to the arguments for and against them. Leading trade unionists like Heribert Maier and Nat Goldfinger expound their arguments that the international division of labour is now a meaningless concept, and that runaway industries are destroying the livelihood of American workers. Senator Hartke supports them while introducing the provisions of his restrictive Foreign Trade and Investment Act. The balance is provided by a series of chapters summarising the counter-evidence, two of which (by Robert Stobaugh, Jose de la Torre Jr., and Piero Telesio) present the sophisticated case that foreign investment is an inevitable part of the strategies of multinationals and that, for the normal economy, it contributes to the gradual upgrading of the general employment skills of the parent economy. One is left with some methodological queries, but the authors' approach is the one which trade unionists are going to have to demolish if the labour case is to continue to have some intellectual validity. All-in-all, Kujawa has produced a remarkably comprehensive and essential volume.

One cannot, unfortunately, say the same for Eric Jacobs's book. There is indeed room for a good introduction to the full complexities of the European trade union movement, but this is really not it. Granted that his judgments are generally quite sound and that some chapters (like one on the growing range of pressures on the collective bargaining process round Europe) have a good deal of useful information, but his approach remains historically and analytically weak.

Increasingly, however, one is aware that the multinationals are really not a major problem for industrialised countries. Certainly, some will move towards forms of 'screening' mechanisms (as in Canada) or standardised controls on activities like transfer pricing (through the OECD?), but, on the whole, one is left with the feeling that it is primarily Third World governments which are faced with real problems. The growing involvement of the United Nations thus becomes logical.

This shift in the main locus of concern over multinationals is well illustrated in the conference proceedings edited by Don Wallace. Held in January 1973 (i.e. after the revelations of ITT's activities in Chile, but

before the UN study got fully into its stride), it brings together a wide range of influential delegates to consider whether there was a need for a GATT-type body to control international private investment. These included academics like Charles Kindleberger and Jack Behrman, politicians like William Rogers and Nicholas Katzenbach, and international functionaries (past and present) like Philippe de Seynes and Raul Prebisch. This volume's value lies less in the fact that there are any outstandingly original contributions, and more in one's ability to follow the cut and thrust of the arguments amongst highly-placed representatives of both the rich and poor worlds in the aftermath of the ITT affair, which had obviously convinced all but the most rabid supporter of multinationals that some form of intervention in their activities was now inevitable. The discussion is imbued with an awareness of the realities of the international balance of power which makes it a valuable guide to the thoughts of leading internationalists as they became aware that action had to be taken somewhere within the world system. It is thus illuminating to find that they were virtually unanimous in deciding that the problems caused by multinationals in the industrialised world were relatively minimal, while the less developed countries might well need some form of investigative or regulatory body which was not in the hands of the former (thus ruling out the World Bank and the OECD). As we now know, the United Nations has taken up the challenge, and *Multinational Corporations in World Development* is the intermediate report prepared for the Group of Eminent Persons charged with reporting on ways of controlling these companies. Although its analysis of the multinational phenomenon is not particularly deep, it is a useful source of statistics, with some 43 tables, scattered over 60 pages. It is worth buying for these alone.

LOUIS TURNER

Rich Nations and Poor in Peace and War. By Henry Barbera. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath. 1973. 213 pp. Bibliog. Index. $13.00.*

THIS book considers the impact of war on economic development during the period 1913 to 1952 with development defined as mastery over the environment, health, education and welfare for the average man (p. 1). Chapter 2 specifies that the development level of a nation can be measured by an index of telephones per capita. The author feels that: 'At any time the development hierarchy can be known and objectified; through its social scientists each nation knows its relative place' (p. 118).

Earlier writers argue by illustration, and variously find war productive, destructive, unpredictable, or irrelevant with respect to development. But 'a methodology which adheres to the accepted canons of measurement testing, presentation of deviant cases and above the board analysis' (p. 122) produces findings which support the 'irrelevant' hypothesis for the period under study.

The discussion of the central issue and some subsidiary hypotheses is interesting, but the hard science approach is not sustained. There are weaknesses in the equating of telephones with development and although the author's clarity is a point in his favour, the reader cannot be sanguine about the conclusions which are said to follow from some odd collections of data. There is no mention of East Germany but figures for West Ger-

many are given for the whole period since 1913. It is not clear exactly how these figures were put together.

This book is not carefully written or balanced. On page 99, for instance, the quotation comes from chapter 12 of *The Prince* not from the *Discorsi*. On page 133 we read this assertion: 'not a single Russian owes anything to his "political system" because in comparative terms his nation has not "stage skipped"'. The author has tried in 192 pages to define something as protean as 'development', then to measure it and finally to tell us in some detail what the effects of war have been upon the development of nations since 1913, but he has not been entirely successful.

FRANK GARDNER

Agricultural Policy in Developing Countries: Proceedings of a Conference held by the International Economic Association at Bad Godesberg, West Germany. Edited by Nurul Islam. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1974. 565 pp. Index. £10·00.*

THE meeting of the International Economic Association in 1972 was held at a time when enthusiasm for the 'green revolution' was still in circulation, and therefore the scientific, technological and institutional aspects of agricultural change were central to the structure of the programme and the scope of the papers. The twenty contributions are most useful in providing comment on agricultural development and development policies in many environments and within a variety of political and institutional frameworks, and especially because they draw attention to the 'unsolved problems associated with the extension of new technologies' (p. 135). Equally interesting is the conclusion, at this time when the participants were under the shadow of the 'green revolution' (Robinson, p. 549), that the prevailing sentiment was one of guarded optimism (Barker and Winkelmann, p. 135). By 1972, however, there had been a shift of emphasis from a general concern with the need for increases in agricultural production to an awareness of the acute problems of bringing about economic development in countries with a measure of food shortage, a considerable labour surplus and in which the benefits of such development were supposed to be equally distributed. The discussions gave proper attention to these important changes in emphasis.

The book will be of value to those who wish to have a general view of such subjects as agricultural growth in relation to national growth, the impact of new farming practices and 'land-augmenting technological change' (p. 3) or agricultural production and food supply; and the relevance of these to the generally disadvantageous position of developing countries with regard to world trade in agricultural commodities. The treatment of rural employment is somewhat more regional, with case studies from Japan, Punjab and Ghana, but the theoretical aspects of rural employment and under-employment are fully discussed in an introductory paper by Byerlee and Eicher, which proves to be a useful review of much recent related literature. This last function is also a mark of many, but regrettably not all, of the papers introducing sessions. Especially useful are the discussions by Mellor concerning models of economic growth and technological change, and by Barker and Winkelmann on technological change and cereal grains; they also distil their own valuable experience in the introduction of the new technology in agriculture. A similarly useful

review of the rôle of credit and marketing in agricultural development is contributed by Lele, and these competent contributions contrast with a disappointing treatment of the important subject of world trade in agricultural commodities.

By dealing with subjects at the national scale, or at least at that of the major region, it is not surprising that many assumptions have to be made concerning the quality of the basic data upon which the discussions are based. Few papers grapple with detailed topics, and it is interesting that one of the few which does, that by Hanumantha Rao on labour and mechanisation in Punjab, is criticised in discussion for its static approach; what should have attracted more adverse comment is the paper's failure to make even the briefest mention of how the data were assembled in what must have been extremely complex and difficult circumstances.

This collection of papers leaves one with the impression that it records the research and opinions of practitioners generally very intimate with the problems of development. The discussions range widely, as is permitted at a conference, but the disjointed character and variable quality which might have been expected are not evident in this well edited contribution.

J. A. ALLAN

LAW

Canadian Perspectives on International Law and Organization. Edited by R. St. J. Macdonald, Gerald L. Morris and Douglas M. Johnston. Foreword by John E. Read. *Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press. 1974. (Distrib. in UK by Books Canada Ltd.) 972 pp. Indexes. $35.00. £15·60.*

THE editors of *Canadian Perspectives on International Law and Organization* are to be commended for planning and producing such a comprehensive and useful book. Although its price unfortunately places it beyond the reach of most individual students and teachers, it undoubtedly constitutes a major contribution to the small but growing stock of scholarly literature which deals with issues of foreign policy and international law from a Canadian standpoint. As the title indicates, the focus is on Canadian approaches, both intellectual and practical, to the development of international law and to problems which require, at least, recognition of the interests of other states and, in many cases, active intergovernmental co-operation through the medium of international institutions. While the book obviously has prime utility for Canadian students of international law and politics, it contains much to interest the wider group of scholars who are concerned with the strengthening of international law as the basis for an equitable system of world order.

Faced with a compendium of 38 essays, a reviewer cannot make detailed individual comments, or even list them all. The book is divided into five parts, of which the first offers six general essays on Perspectives. Among these, should be noted the 'Inside Perspective' contributed by Professor Maxwell Cohen and the 'Outside Perspective' contributed by the late Professor Friedmann, which together sum up with perspicacity and wisdom the essence of the Canadian historical experience and the complexities of Canadian political and economic life which have combined to produce both will and talent for active participation in international organisations.

In the same section, Professor Macdonald's scholarly exposition of 'the relationship between International and Domestic Law in Canada' will be required reading for Canadian students of international law. Part II contains five essays on Canadian law and practice in such areas as recognition, treaty-making and immigration; Part III, three essays on air, communications and weather law; Part IV, nine on territorial considerations. In this section, concern with jurisdiction over coastal and internal waters reflects Canadian preoccupations with resources and (more recently) environmental conservation. Repetition of material is noticeable here but was perhaps inevitable as each contributor felt it necessary to provide legislative and factual background to his subject. Part V, under the broad heading 'Canadian Participation in International Organization', contains fifteen essays which range very widely over topics such as human rights, peacekeeping, international trade, arbitration and US-Canadian co-operation on defence. A particularly timely essay by Professor Johnston presents a closely woven picture of recent developments in international environmental law, linked to Canadian perspectives and positions.

There is implicit recognition in the design of the book of the need for close links between theory and practice. Contributors were drawn from academic and official circles and many have had experience in both. The clarity, good documentation and direct policy relevance of the essays is refreshing when so much current 'theoretical' international relations literature is jargon-ridden and of doubtful applicability; it is also somewhat ironic when one considers that international law is often regarded as obsolete or irrelevant to the mainstream of international studies.

In a final chapter ('Canadian Approaches to International Law') Professor Macdonald and his fellow editors make a number of eminently sensible suggestions for improving the quality of international law studies in Canada, particularly by relating them more closely to the social sciences. At the same time they express a concern, which has been more widely felt, that the Canadian government in recent years has tended to narrow its view of Canada's role and interests in the world. It is true that the tone of the 1970 White Paper *Foreign Policy for Canadians* would support this interpretation, as would the exclusion of ICJ jurisdiction from questions arising from the proclamation of the 100-mile pollution control zone in the Arctic. To cite comparable trends to unilateralism in Western Europe and elsewhere, and to concede that the dangers of ecological disaster in the Arctic are particularly serious, may make the Canadian position understandable even if the orientation is to be regretted. Many problems can only be exacerbated by individual national assertions of 'sovereignty' and it is important for Canada to retain and develop extra-continental relationships. Happily, 'internationalism' has not been abandoned: Canadian participation in peacekeeping has continued, and overall, the Canadian contribution to international organisation is impressive. For instance, Canadian diplomacy and Canadian personnel have been significant in moulding and supporting the new postwar Commonwealth, with its emphasis on egalitarianism and functional co-operation.

The commitment to international organisation reflected in these essays is welcome evidence that Canadian international lawyers are as reluctant to relinquish a 'world view' as they are aware that the special interests of Canada must be given due weight in policy-making.

MARGARET DOXEY

The Modern Law of Treaties. By T. O. Elias. *Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana; Leiden: Sijthoff. 1974. 272 pp. Bibliog. Index. Fl. 49.00.*

THE author of this excellent book has outstanding qualifications for the task. First, as a member of the International Law Commission from 1962 Chief Justice Elias has been actively engaged in the drafting of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, an association which culminated in his being chairman at both sessions of the United Nations Conference at Vienna in 1969 when the final text was adopted. Second, as Chief Justice of Nigeria and Chairman of the Afro-Asian Group at the Vienna Conference, he represents the viewpoint of developing nations on a branch of international law which owes much to the Roman law of obligations and European diplomatic practice. Further, as a lawyer trained in Anglo-American common law and a teacher, he handles adeptly legal arguments and international authorities, including the *Fisheries Jurisdiction Case*, 1973, and the dispute in 1961 relating to Nigeria's prohibition of the landing of French aircraft (pp. 62–4). Finally, his qualities as a judge enable him not merely to survey the whole field but to state with compelling authority the rule best suited to the modern international community's needs.

In the surprisingly short compass of two hundred pages with the text of the Convention appended, an account is given of the content and purpose of each article with the substance of all major amendments, successful or unsuccessful, and the voting figures thereon. Indeed, the work can be relied on as an up-to-date, and certainly more readable, commentary on the Vienna Convention than the International Law Commission's own official Commentary. It may be criticised as a piece of propaganda to further the Law Commission's work. Despite the author's assertion that 'since it was duly signed there can hardly be any Foreign Ministry . . . that has not been using the Convention as the most authoritative source for its guidance in the conduct of inter-State relations' (p. 5), the Convention remains unratified by all but a handful of states. There is a tendency to gloss over the draft's failure to cover federal states, regional treaties, international institutions, use of treaties as law-making machinery, and to rely on the phrases 'Unless the treaty otherwise provides' or 'where the parties otherwise agree' and the principle of good faith to iron out all problems.

The book is, however, more than a persuasive mouthpiece for the Law Commission. It reflects the tensions to which the modern law of treaties is subject and to which the author with his many occupations is peculiarly sensitive. In commenting on certain sections, for example Parts III and IV relating to third party rights, Chief Justice Elias adopts a legalistic approach based on priority in time of engagements and a contracting party's duty to honour his obligations. But on reaching Part V he sheds the mantle of the lawyer and wields the pen of the legislator, freely admitting that progressive development of the law is necessary if the 'treaty on treaties' is to be logically complete on matters such as error, fraud, coercion and *jus cogens*, 'although certain of them will scarcely arise in practice or may elude precise definition' (p. 138). To reconcile the lawyer and the legislator is difficult, but when the writer waves the banner of newly independent states as justifying the rejection of rules of customary law 'in the formulation of which new states have taken no part and some of which have their origins in treaties designed to safeguard the vital interests of older states' (p. 68), one waits to see the whole

pack of lawyers' cards tumble about his ears. It is a measure of the skill of the distinguished author that he escapes this disaster and his book is the livelier for these contradictory elements. It can be wholeheartedly recommended.

HAZEL FOX

The World Court. What it is and how it Works. By Shabtai Rosenne. 3rd rev. ed. *Leiden: Sijthoff; Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana. 1973. 252 pp. Illus. Indexes. Fl. 50.00.*

ALTHOUGH this is a book about a legal institution, it is intended for a much wider audience than lawyers—'the politician, the diplomat, the member of parliament, and the enquiring members of the public at large'. It sets the International Court in the historical context of the movement towards judicial settlement and in the contemporary one of its relationship with the United Nations. It serves equally well to disabuse those who see judicial settlement as the guarantee of international peace as well as those who regard it as an irrelevant exercise in a world where only power relationships matter.

The book goes on to a chapter on the judges and takes one case, the Rights of Passage case, through all its stages. This and the intervening chapter on the jurisdiction of the Court go a long way towards showing that recourse to judicial settlement means not only the settlement of disputes according to the law but also according to the law's procedures. This is perhaps the most mysterious aspect of the work of the Court to non-lawyers (and, in its technical aspects, to lawyers themselves). It is the most telling indication of the attitude of even states apparently well-disposed towards the Court, that, with very few exceptions, such as the Minquiers and Ecrehos case, litigant states have used every jurisdictional objection to prevent a decision, every procedural device to delay one.

And if that has caused public disquiet, the recent performances of the Court have exaggerated criticism of it. One needs only to think of the tortuous progress and reasoning of the South-West Africa cases or of the virtual absence of a decision at the end of the North Sea continental shelf cases. The last part of Ambassador Rosenne's book is an account of the cases and requests for advisory opinions that have come before the International Court of Justice. It is a relation of their facts (sometimes usefully taking them on beyond the decision of the Court to the eventual outcome of the dispute) rather than a summary of the legal content of the decisions and opinions. Not only does the author's purpose demand this, but it is not easy to digest briefly the Court's reasoning. On the other hand, it is hardly revealing, for instance, to be told only that the judgment in US Nationals in Morocco case was 'long and complicated'.

It is easy to see that all those who are the objects of Dr. Rosenne's attention will gain from familiarity with his book, which, in its third revised edition, takes account of the 1972 rules of procedure, and is amply supported by documentary and statistical appendices (one of which has the curious transformation of Judge Lachs into a Nigerian national and Judge Onyeama as a Pole).

COLIN WARBRICK

The New Law of the Sea: Influence of the Latin American States on Recent Developments of the Law of the Sea. A study of the law on coastal jurisdiction as it has emerged in Latin America and its impact on present and future law. By Karin Hjertonsson. *Leyden: Sijthoff; Stockholm: Norstedt and Söners. 1973. 187 pp. Bibliog. Fl. 33.00.*

THIS is a timely and useful monograph on the Latin American approach to and influence on, the law of the sea, and in particular on that part of it which deals with coastal state jurisdiction. It is divided into two parts: the first part describes the evolution of coastal state jurisdiction in Latin America and examines the juridical nature of the claims. In the second part, the Latin American claims to extensive maritime areas are assessed within the wider perspective of present international law and the current maritime practice of states. In this part, too, the author deals with the diverse practices of the major ' actors ' and brings out quite clearly their predominant maritime interests. Here she also examines the formation of customary international law norms. Having found no ' general practice accepted as law ' in relation to coastal state maritime jurisdiction, the author nevertheless concludes that on grounds of equity (as exemplified in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries and the North Sea Continental Shelf cases), reasonableness and a dynamic approach to international law, the Latin American patrimonial sea and exclusive economic zone claims are compatible with present international law—a conclusion which the recent Fisheries Jurisdiction case (1974) does not support.

This reviewer cannot agree with the author that Article V of the Declaration of Santiago of 1952, preserving the right of innocent and inoffensive passage in a 200-mile zone for vessels of all nations, was formulated ' because of unfamiliarity with these concepts among the drafters of this text ' (p. 26). Peru's constant reliance on this Declaration in order to curtail the freedom of navigation and overflight in the 200-mile zone, and the 1973 draft articles submitted by Peru and Ecuador (and Panama) to the Sea-bed Committee certainly do not give support to that proposition.

In this reviewer's opinion, the author is quite justified in treating unilateral claims and proposals made by states as evidence of state practice, if only because of their ' expectation value ' for the purpose of the formation of customary law, with the proviso, as the author herself has pointed out, that statements influenced by a spirit of compromise should be treated with caution. In this sense the transactions of the Sea-bed Committee and the recent Caracas Conference on the Law of the Sea offer good evidence of state practice and are thus themselves formative of customary law. Having adopted this point of view, the author ought to have ascribed more importance to the interests of the geographically disadvantaged states, the shelf-locked and land-locked states, as there can be no doubt that the interests of these states have and will continue to have an inhibiting effect on the type of claims being made by the advantaged coastal states. The importance of this monograph lies in the fact that it traces the evolution of maritime international law in an area of the world which for some years now has been in the vanguard in the creation of the new law of the sea. It is a pity that the author has confined her attention only to the national maritime area and hence disregarded the international seabed area.

L. D. M. NELSON

WESTERN EUROPE

Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France. By Edward L. Morse. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. 1973. 336 pp. Index. £6·80. $14.50.*

THIS book is dedicated to the illustration of a truism. It divides into two parts, the first dealing with the truism and the second providing the illustration. If one believes that the concoction of deductive systems can illuminate aspects of international relations, then this book may have an initial appeal. At least, one will not be put off by the fact that nothing surprising emerges, for Aristotle warned that what mattered about the conclusions of deductive reasoning is that they should receive proof, not that they should be novel. The strength of the proof depends of course, partly, on the strength of the alleged truism from which it is derived.

There is not much wrong with Mr. Morse's truism, which has it that national autonomy is inversely proportional to international dependence. What is very wrong is the opaque prose through which the truism struggles to emerge over more than a third of the book, with relentless repetitiveness and no significant amplification. Countries, for Mr. Morse, do not sometimes use their reserves to buy food, they suffer 'a depletion of monetary reserves for purposes of importing foodstuffs' (p. 81). Nor is there yet an adequate institutional framework for the growing co-operation between industrialised countries, but 'the levels of systemic interdependence among modernised societies have increased at rates far in advance of the available instrumentalities that may be invoked to contain them' (p. 65). One suspects that only a conscientious reviewer will bore his way through such stuff. What is worse, the 'theoretical' first part gives the impression of a degree of timidity rarely encountered in even such an earnest, humourless exercise. The most banal statements are often attributed to other writers, not all of incontestable eminence; but the assurance that 'Modernised societies are extremely complex' (p. 105) appears to be all the author's own.

The case studies, which comprise the second part of the book, are on the whole good summaries of the more obvious aspects of Gaullist foreign policy and of their fate. They exhibit many of the ways in which France's inevitable involvement with other industrialised countries thwarted Gaullist international ambitions. One could quarrel with a number of the author's interpretations of recent French history and its background. For example, he repeats the extraordinary assertion that the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community was for France a *renversement des alliances* (p. 127); he says that the 1958 constitution was devised to give the president a free hand in foreign affairs, which is a gross overstatement (p. 107); he turns Clemenceau, the arch-enemy of French imperialism, into an advocate of 'grandeur' (p. 133); and he thinks that the Liberals of 1815 were republicans (p. 137). But, though the author's touch is not always sure in the relatively readable second part, the book at least adequately illustrates the truism with which it starts

HERBERT TINT

Government in the Federal Republic of Germany: the Executive at Work. By Nevil Johnson. *Oxford, New York, Toronto, Sydney, Braunschweig: Pergamon Press. 1973. 232 pp. (Governments of Western Europe. Series Ed.: Nevil Johnson.) £3·50.*

GOOD, comprehensive and stimulating surveys of German politics and government are in short supply in English; although much excellent work both of a general and monographic kind has been published in German, unfortunately little of this has so far been translated. Gerhard Loewenberg's interesting and detailed analysis of the German parliament [1] and Lewis Edinger's socio-political approach to German politics [2] are essential reading for any course on the subject, while Arnold Heidenheimer's textbook [3] (now revised) provides an obvious introduction for any student. There is however an absence of studies on many essential aspects of German politics in English, notably on the institution of the Chancellorship, while comprehensive research-based works on the party system and on the main political parties (apart from Schellenger on the SPD in the 1950s [4] and Heidenheimer on the CDU in the late 1940s [5]) are also lacking. There is no English equivalent, for instance, to Arnulf Baring's excellent analysis of foreign-policy decision-making under Adenauer's Chancellorship,[6] Thomas Ellwein's comprehensive volume on the political system of the Federal Republic [7] or Heino Kaack's encyclopaedic survey of the party system.[8]

Nevil Johnson's superb book contributes much to lessening this bibliographical gap. It is not a conventional textbook, for instead of attempting to cover all aspects of the West German political system it examines it from a particular standpoint—the executive structure and institutions of the system. This approach is important because West German politics are notably executive-orientated both in terms of the balance of the institutional structure as well as in political attitudes. Johnson's volume provides a most useful survey with chapters on the Federal government, the Federal ministries, the civil service, the methods of political and judicial control and the operation of the Federal system. The result is not merely institutional description, a still snapshot of the various organs of government, but also a sense of political change. This well-integrated study is economical and polished in style as well as stimulating to read. One is given a taste of the depth and complexity of German politics, while the empirical evidence is neatly controlled by the conceptual structure of the book. It is furthermore a helpful introduction to the subject for students, although it does assume some familiarity with German politics.

This study is based on the theory that 'a political system is instrumental, and executive competence in it influences its prospects of survival as well

[1] *Parliament in the German Political System.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1967. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1968, p. 113.

[2] *Politics in Germany: Attitudes and Processes.* Boston: Little, Brown. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1971, p. 412.

[3] *The Governments of Germany.* 3rd edition. New York: Crowell. 1971.

[4] *The SDP in the Bonn Republic: a Socialist Party Modernizes.* The Hague: Nijhoff. 1968. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1969, p. 727.

[5] *Adenauer and the CDU: the rise of the leader and the integration of the party.* The Hague: Nijhoff. 1960.

[6] *Aussenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie: Bonns Beitrag zur Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft.* Munich, Vienna: Oldenbourg. (Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik.) 1969. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1970, p. 816.

[7] *Das Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.* 2nd edition. Cologne, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 1965. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1966, p. 517.

[8] *Geschichte und Struktur des deutschen Parteiensystems.* Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 1971.

as the evolution of political habits in it ' (p. xi). This assumption accounts for Nevil Johnson's favourable view of the development of postwar politics in the Federal Republic in contrast to historical precedents, although he rightly emphasises the combination of traditional tendencies (especially in relation to governmental institutions) and changes which derive mainly from the stability of the party system. He is particularly informative on individual Federal ministries, taking the examples of the Ministry of the Interior under the Grand Coalition and, more recently, the Ministry of Finance. An important balance is introduced by his discussion of the operation of government at the *Land* level, an aspect too often omitted in general studies of West German government. One would like to read more about the relationship between the parties and the executive institutions, although it is perhaps wise, as in this case, to exclude further detailed coverage of this aspect since that would involve extending the discussion too much beyond the scope of the book. The student would enjoy more case studies than those provided and would be grateful for more footnote references to further reading. The only major reservation is the unavoidable one that the empirical data do not bring the reader up to date. Nevil Johnson does however give one some foretaste of possible future developments by leaving open the prospects concerning such questions as the changing balance in West German federalism arising from increasing Federal intervention, the more critical political attitudes evident since the later 1960s and the consequences of the sharper government-opposition dichotomy since the formation of the first SPD-FDP coalition in 1969.

GEOFFREY PRIDHAM

Berlin im geteilten Deutschland. By Dieter Mahncke. *Munich, Vienna: Oldenbourg. 1973. 325 pp. Bibliogs. Index. (Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V. Band 34.) DM 42.00.*

DIETER MAHNCKE'S study provides a sober and objective appraisal of one particular development of importance to Brandt's Ostpolitik—the four-power Berlin Agreement of September 1971. It is a factual, well-structured and well-researched analysis of the problem of the divided city of Berlin, and of West Berlin in particular, in relation to the two German states and is set in the context of East-West policies since the Second World War. His survey of political and economic developments during the postwar period is orientated towards the Berlin Agreement, the effect of which is examined from a variety of standpoints.

One of the principal questions posed is whether the 1971 Agreement represents a change in the political interests and policies of the main powers concerned, or whether it results from different political tactics but with the same purpose. Mahncke's answer is that this remains essentially an open question, for the Agreement has not structurally solved the Berlin problem. What it has achieved is a modus vivendi based on the readiness of both sides to withdraw from the rigid positions they upheld from the late 1940s. The key to the whole issue, which for a quarter of a century remained a focal point of international tension and crisis, is the fact that the situation regarding Berlin has since 1945 ' not been a question of rights but one of power and interests ' (p. 88).

This book is largely a synthesis of much that has already been written on the subject, but its value lies in its clear and thorough discussion of all aspects of the Berlin problem and its balanced judgment of the significance of the 1971 Agreement seen in historical perspective. Mahncke looks methodically at political events over the period 1944–72, including the different Berlin crises, the separate integration of both parts of the city into the political and economic systems of East Germany and the Federal Republic, the interests which have motivated both Soviet and Western policies, the economic situation of West Berlin and other aspects of the problem such as the question of access to West Berlin, methods of communication between the now two separate cities and the attitudes of the West Berlin population. In each instance, Mahncke refers to the relevance of the Berlin Agreement and in most cases comes to the conclusion that it has had positive though limited consequences. He emphasises, for example in chapter 6, that the special characteristics of West Berlin's economy—in short, that it is an economic island—derive from political factors such as its loss of capital city status and continuing political uncertainty. The more settled position created by the Agreement will have beneficial effects on the economy of the city.

Although the Berlin Agreement confirms the rights of the Western powers in West Berlin and acknowledges the political links between the city and the Federal Republic, the author emphasises that it is no secure guarantee against possible future tension. The reason for this caution is the consistency of Soviet and East German aims with regard to West Berlin. He defines three stages in their attack on the status of the city—the blockade 1948–49, the crisis from 1958–62 and their concentration since the mid-1960s on objections to the Federal German presence in the city. Mahncke underlines several valid and interesting points: differences of attitude between Russia and East Germany, although these relate more to tactics than basic aims; the reasons behind the policies of the communist powers, especially their concern over the security and legitimacy of the German Democratic Republic; and the opposition of the Western powers to the efforts of the Federal Republic to acquire full sovereignty in West Berlin. Mahncke completes his study with a documentary appendix, including the text of the 1971 Agreement and its supplementary protocols, the Transport Treaty between the two German states and other official statements. This book offers a useful reference on the Berlin problem, for it combines a factual approach with a balanced viewpoint and many interesting observations.

GEOFFREY PRIDHAM

Hitler. By Joachim C. Fest. Trans. from the German by Richard and Clara Winston. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1974. 844 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £5·25.*

IN the flood of biographies of Hitler, some of which were recently reviewed in this journal[1], this bulky volume stands out partly through the original light it often throws on Hitler's sinister, dynamic and complex personality, and partly through its analysis of a variety of German attitudes, some of which went back to the last century. Hitler's skilful exploitation of them

[1] April 1974, pp. 302–304.

enabled Hitler to play a key role in German and European affairs for twelve years. In his prologue the author finds it 'challenging to imagine what Hitler's fate would have been had history not produced the circumstances that first awakened him and made him the mouthpiece of millions of defense complexes' (p. 8). Different from other attempts, the book deals with Hitler as well as with the masses caught in his web.

Herr Fest sees Hitler's 'patchwork career' divided into the first dull and obscure thirty years, followed by a 'suddenly electrified political half' made up of 'three distinct segments'. A decisive event during the first ten years of preparation, ideological orientation and tactical experiments was the abortive Munich *Putsch* of November 1923. For it taught Hitler that his struggle for power could not succeed by violence, but only by proceeding by legal means within the constitution. During the next ten years, from 1929 onwards, Hitler 'riveted the attention of the age and in retrospect seems to stand before a film of flashing scenes of mass jubilation and crowd hysteria' (p. 511).

The economic achievements of the regime between 1934 and 1938, and the lessening of class barriers are duly recognised. Had assassination or an accident removed the Führer at the end of 1938 'few would hesitate to call him one of the greatest of German statesmen, the consummator of German history' (p. 9). But the man who despised Bismarck's maxim, 'politics is the art of the possible', was by nature bent towards destruction. The descent began in 1939 when his Macchiavellian calculations no longer restrained his sense of historical mission, 'when he himself succumbed to the notion that he was indeed superhuman' (p. 522). Herr Fest has no doubt about Hitler's guilt for the Second World War. His desire to plunge into catastrophe 'so shaped events that any wish to compromise on the part of the Western powers was to come to nothing' (p. 607). Thus the Führer's final span of 5½ years was full of 'grotesque errors, mistake piled upon mistake, crimes, convulsion, destructive mania and death' (p. 511).

Valuable are the reflections on the unpolitical attitude of so many Germans both under the Second Empire and during the Weimar Republic. Stressing the influence of Richard Wagner on the National Socialist agitator and semi-artist, the author adds to Adorno's *bon mot* that 'Wagner made music for the unmusical' the words 'and Hitler politics for the unpolitical'. 'On the whole the people, restricted to marching, raising hands, or applauding, felt that Hitler had not so much excluded them from politics as liberated them from politics' (p. 761).

There are some weak spots in this comprehensive survey. Only two of them can be mentioned here. The strength of anti-semitism in Germany before 1933 is underrated. The disappointment of an obscure Romanian Fascist leader who did not detect any 'visceral and consistent anti-semitism' when visiting Germany during the early 1920s is poor evidence. In fact since 1919 an undercurrent of anti-semitism was present in all strata of German society with the exception perhaps of the workers. Good biography does not automatically make good history. Too little attention has been paid to Hitler's lieutenants and collaborators, to Göring, Goebbels and Himmler, not to mention Ribbentrop and the generals. Opinions about their influence on the course of the Third Reich may differ, but they can hardly be largely ignored. Although we are given some apt comments on the lavish display of propaganda, especially at the party congresses, the tireless and by no means unsuccessful efforts of Joseph Goebbels over more

than fifteen years to build up the Führer as a charismatic figure, both superman and yet very human, have not been considered.

It is a pity that the translation of this important work is not more felicitous.

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

Hitler's Free City: A History of the Nazi Party in Danzig, 1925–1939. By H. S. Levine. *Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1973. 223 pp. Index. £3·40.*

MR. LEVINE starts his book—a Yale doctoral dissertation—by quoting the famous article 'Mourir pour Dantzig' published in *L'Oeuvre* on May 4, 1939, and signed by Marcel Déat, a Socialist deputy who became a German propagandist even before the Second World War. He rightly states that Déat raised 'a false issue': 'The war against Nazism', he says 'was not a war for Danzig, not even a war for Poland. It was a struggle made necessary by the growth of an aggressive evil in the heart of Europe.' In disagreement with Professor A. J. P. Taylor, Mr. Levine has no doubt that Hitler was 'bent on unlimited expansion beyond the remotest dreams of more conventional German patriots.' Summarising the Danzig debate at the Paris Peace Conference, Mr. Levine remarks that by opposing the unanimous proposal of Allied experts (including the two Britons, Sir William Tyrrell and Lt. Col. F. H. Kisch) to return this important port to Poland, Lloyd George pretended to defend the principle of national self-determination—a principle already 'hopelessly compromised' in such important matters as Italy's northern frontiers (p. 9). Unfortunately for Poland and for Europe, Lloyd George's stand prevailed, and Danzig became a Free City under the fallacious protection of the League of Nations; it was within the limits of the customs frontier of Poland, but had an independent German government which constantly—under both Stresemann and Hitler—co-ordinated its policy towards Poland with that of the Wilhelmstrasse.

Mr. Levine's well-researched book is not, however, a history of Danzig's role in European politics: it is primarily concerned with the history of the local Nazi movement and the final *Gleichschaltung* of the 'Free' City. Mr. Levine explains this regrettable evolution by the weakness of the League of Nations and the unwillingness of Poland to protect the anti-Nazi opposition in Danzig. 'Poland', he writes,' was interested only in the international status of the Free City.' Not only, but mainly. As to Danzig's internal affairs, Poland's influence was scotched by the constitution of the Free City.

When on September 1, 1939, Schleswig-Holstein turned its guns against the fortified Polish munitions dump on the Westerplatte, Danzig 'returned' to the Reich, but the Second World War began. On March 30, 1945, Gdansk was taken by Soviet and Polish units and the Polish flag was hoisted on the half-destroyed town hall. Mr. Levine's final remark is bizarre: 'The Free City', he writes, 'may continue a shadowy existence in international law, although recent agreements between West Germany and Poland make that possibility more doubtful than ever' (p. 161). The Free City, created in 1919 by Lloyd George, was killed by Hitler twenty years later. In 1939 about 95 per cent (360,000) of the population of Danzig was German; today Gdansk has a Polish population of 400,000. It is now an

integral part of Poland. There is nothing 'shadowy' about that. One correction of fact is necessary: Mgr. Edward O'Rourke, bishop of Danzig until 1938, was not 'a Russian aristocrat' (p. 71) but a member of a polonised Irish family.

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

Das Regierungssystem der Schweiz. By Klaus Schumann. Introd. by F. A. Hermens. *Cologne, Berlin, Bonn, Munich: Heymanns Verlag. 1971. 369 pp. Bibliog. Indexes. (Veröffentlichungen des Forschungsinstituts für Politische Wissenschaft und Europäische Fragen der Universität Köln; Series Ed.: F. A. Hermens.)*

The Death of Communal Liberty. A History of Freedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton. By Benjamin R. Barber. *Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1974. 302 pp. Bibliog. Index. $12.50.*

Government by Community. By Ioan Bowen Rees. Introd. by Professor Max Beloff. *London: Knight. 1971. 238 pp. Index. £2·75.*

Governing the Commune of Veyrier: Politics in Swiss Local Government. By George A. Codding, Jr. *Boulder, Col.: University of Colorado, Bureau of Governmental Research. 1967. 98 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·00.*

Communes Suisses et Autonomie Communale. By Jean Meylan, Martial Gottraux and Philippe Dahinden. *Lausanne: Imprimeries Populaires for the Groupe d'étude de l'autonomie communale en Suisse. 1972. 387 pp. Bibliogs. Index. £6·75.*

Föderalismus Hearings: Le fédéralisme réexaminé. Les procès-verbaux des dix consultations publiques à Soleure sur l'état du fédéralisme suisse. 3 vols. *Zurich: Benziger for the Fondation pour la Collaboration Confédérale, Soleure. 1973. 1194 pp. Index. Sw. frs 80.00.*

DR. SCHUMANN'S book is now the best guide to the governmental structure and practice of Switzerland. It is up-to-date, critical, thorough, and with a good bibliography. The centre of the book is an examination of the structure and method of working of the federal legislative and executive councils. In addition to this, there is an examination of the various referendum devices, and chapters on the working of federalism. The book takes full account of the Swiss investigations of these subjects up to its date of publication, and of modern developments: political science in Switzerland has made great progress in the last fifteen years, and the older interpretations are now superseded. This is a book which should be on the shelves of serious libraries in Britain.

The student of international affairs must also take some note of local government systems, since these pacify minorities and to some extent cope with regional problems. A well governed and contented country plays a different part in international affairs to a country which is discontented and preyed upon by inflation. There may also be some correlation between decentralisation and efficiency.

Switzerland, usually thought of as a well-governed country, is extremely decentralised. Some of its cantons would be reckoned by recent reformers of the British system to qualify only to be considered as districts of a county, yet they have powers larger than Scotland, and equivalent to those of Northern Ireland until the province's assembly was suspended by

Westminster. Furthermore, some of the cantons have themselves an extreme decentralisation, so that a parish of one hundred citizens may have powers equivalent to those of an English pre-Maud county, and provide (it might be alleged) rather better services.

Two of these books (Barber and Rees) concern Grisons (Graubünden), the large canton in the extreme east, which is an extreme example of decentralisation. Dr. Barber is a student of Rousseau, and interested in the political theory of communal self-government. The style might lead one to expect just one more over-enthusiastic impression, but the footnotes make it clear that the book is based on a wide reading of the primary and secondary sources. All except two of his chapters deal with the remoter history of Grisons, i.e., before 1848, but even these have a wide interest as this small republic had for three centuries a regime of almost unrestricted sovereignty of the three dozen-odd ' jurisdictional communes ', a warning and a model for democrats. The study ends on a note of pessimism and nostalgia, which the reader will share. Mr. Rees's book chiefly concerns English and Welsh local government, but has two chapters based on Grisons, of which he has made a special study. The interest of the book comes from the fact that the author is himself an eminent and very experienced local government civil servant, and has been able to speak with his Swiss equivalents ' as officer to officer '. It is a book which will come to be read again if the decision is ever taken to reverse the ' Maud reforms ' in Britain.

Professor Codding is already the author of a good and accurate introduction to Swiss federal government. The book noted here is a study of local government at the extreme other end of the country to Grisons, of a rural (commuter) commune of canton Geneva, on the French border.

The work by Jean Meylan and others is a highly professional compilation, intended primarily for those actually engaged in formulating policy with regard to Swiss communes. The first chapter is of general interest, concerning the position of the communes in Swiss (chiefly cantonal) law. The second chapter contains statistics of the communes, population, size, property, financial resources and so on. The remainder of the book is based on a closer investigation of a sample of 400 communes, arranged in a dozen types. The bibliographies contain the names of those books actually useful (including mimeographed sources) rather than all the books on the subject, and include none of the books here reviewed but a fair number of titles from the United States. This is strictly a book for the dedicated: the only smile is an exclamation mark after noting that the communal accounts submitted in evidence had sometimes been added up wrong!

The three fat volumes called *Föderalismus Hearings* are the minutes of evidence taken before a voluntary association (supported largely by money paid by the cantons) concerned with the reform of Swiss federalism, and deserve to be noticed because of the eminence in public and academic life of those who have volunteered to answer a highly intelligent interrogation by Dr. Max Fraenkel, director of the institute. The subjects examined are (vol. 1) finance, education, social services; (vol. 2), regionalism, transport, economic policy, popular rights, defence; (vol. 3) local self-government, European integration, and cantonalism. One may single out the contributions of Fleiner, Neidhardt, Saladin and Ruffieux as being specially interesting. The contributions from Protestant German Switzerland, as usual, dominate: the memoranda and the *procès-verbaux* are in the language of the person interrogated (German or French). The third

volume, and the section on the army in the second volume, are of primary interest for the readers of this journal. Volume 3 also contains the most convenient and up-to-date description of the *Zones franches* around Geneva. But there is an extraordinary amount of exceptionally frank talking on a great variety of subjects, and scattered throughout the three volumes is information that has never been in print before and corrects much that is in print. It is therefore a work to be referred to by anyone writing on many aspects of contemporary Switzerland.

C. J. HUGHES

The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy 1919–1929. By Adrian Lyttelton. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1973. 544 pp. Map. Bibliog. Index. £6·50.*

Fascism in Italy. Society and Culture 1922–1945. By Edward R. Tannenbaum. *New York: Basic Books. 1972. London: Allen Lane. 1973. 411 pp. Illus. Index. £5·75.*

The Ax Within: Italian Fascism in Action. Edited and with an Introduction by Roland Sarti. *New York: New Viewpoints; London: Croom Helm. 1974. 278 pp. Index. (Modern Scholarship on European History; Gen. Ed.: Henry A. Turner, Jr.) $12.50. £6·25. Paperback: £2·50.*

A NUMBER of books by English or American authors have dealt with Fascism in Italy, some in the form of biographies of Mussolini, some covering particular aspects of it or considering Italian Fascism in relation to Nazism and Fascist totalitarianism in other countries. But until now there has been no detailed study in English of the formative ten years, the years in which, after the establishment of the Fascist nucleus, Mussolini by stages extended its power to embrace the state as a whole. The corresponding work in Italian is Renzo De Felice's monumental biography of Mussolini, the first three volumes of which cover this period; and De Felice himself, reviewing Lyttelton's volume,[1] says that that work is the first book by a new generation of historians who do not necessarily regard Fascism as 'un fatto demoniaco' and therefore give a more comprehensive picture of it.

Mr. Lyttelton (who is a Fellow of All Souls and since 1968 a Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford) is indeed above all dispassionate and scientific in his approach. He has drawn extensively on unpublished Italian archive sources and on the Italian collection at St. Antony's College, as well as on the vast Italian literature on the subject (see the very full bibliography). In tracing the stages in which Fascism came into being against a background of postwar discontent, he emphasises that it was an agrarian, as well as urban, revolutionary movement in which the agrarian was the more ruthless element. Out of this arose the recurrent disputes of the early years between the extremist provincial *ras*, personified in particular by Farinacci, and the more moderate members at the centre, led by Mussolini himself, who until the watershed of 1925 strove to retain a semblance of parliamentary legality by permitting other parties to survive. He describes the insidious process whereby Mussolini aimed to absorb individuals of influence or talent (Federzoni, Gentile, Volpi) and at the same time to destroy the autonomy of the organised parties. Mr. Lyttelton agrees with De Felice in pointing to the large amount of financial support

[1] *Corriere della Sera*, March 23, 1974.

for the movement coming from modest contributions from individual, relatively humble, sympathisers among the petty-bourgeoisie—this, he says, is 'a valuable corrective to the old and oversimplified idea that it was created by a handful of powerful industrial magnates' (p. 210). But he also mentions the important subsidies of numerous northern industries to their local *fasci.*

In the South it was a different matter. Fascism was essentially a reaction, primarily against the artificially-fostered fear of communism and hence of socialism, and thus in the early stages taking root in particular where there was a strong Socialist party. In the South socialism was weak and *clientelismo* strong, and it proved an uphill task to arouse Southerners from their traditional scepticism about any form of government, of whatever hue. But it was in the South, Mr. Lyttelton says, that 'the model for some features of the later regime can be found: the transformation of Fascism from an aggressive ideology, powered by *ressentiment,* into a tranquil official cult, the bureaucratisation of the movement, and its subordination to the State' (p. 201).

Mr. Lyttelton describes in detail how that eventual subordination of the party to the state came about. He also discusses the development of the corporate state and the impact of Fascism on the economy. His interesting chapter on propaganda and education leads on to a brief consideration of the Lateran Pacts of 1929, the crowning achievement with which this period ends.

This serious critical appraisal will take an outstanding place in the historiography of Fascism's formative years. It is not an easy book to read, but the concentration it demands is fully rewarded. One drawback is that among the welter of names mentioned almost no one emerges—except Mussolini himself—as a graspable personality.

Professor Tannenbaum's book inevitably attracts comparison between his treatment of Fascism and that of Mr. Lyttelton. He covers a longer period—the whole Fascist era, including the Salò Republic—but does so in much less depth. His aim is to show how far Fascism penetrated into the lives of ordinary Italians by means of the party, the corporate state, education and propaganda, and its impact on Catholicism and in cultural life. Croce was eventually to describe Fascism as a 'parenthesis' in Italy's history, and Professor Tannenbaum's survey would seem to support that view in suggesting its relatively slight impact on congenital Italian characteristics and way of life, or on the family, big business, or even on education. As always under such regimes, it was the rebels who suffered. But although, as Professor Tannenbaum points out (p. 323), far fewer intellectual and cultural leaders emigrated from Italy than from Nazi Germany or Communist Russia, some of those who remained—De Ruggiero, Omodeo, Luigi Russo, Calogero—were able to keep alive among their students the critical spirit which eventually found expression in the Resistance.

Professor Tannenbaum, who is Professor of History at New York University, is plainly familiar with the vast Italian literature on his period and also bases his account on personal interviews during lengthy visits to Italy with several hundred Italians from all walks of life. He found that 'the desire to belittle the impact of Fascism was strong among all but a few diehard Fascists'. This attitude may perhaps imperceptibly have coloured his own views as an outside observer.

The Ax Within is a useful anthology, intended primarily for students,

of texts, both Italian in translation and English, taken from the works of several well-known authorities on various aspects of Fascism. The selection, which is carefully chosen, includes a piece on 'The Second Wave' by Adrian Lyttelton as well as extracts from such writers as De Felice, Aquarone, and Luigi Preti, each prefaced by an explanatory introduction by Professor Sarti himself.

MURIEL GRINDROD

Social Stratification and Development in the Mediterranean Basin. Edited by Mübeccel B. Kiray. Foreword by C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze. *The Hague, Paris: Mouton for the Institute of Social Studies and the Mediterranean Social Sciences Research Council. 1973. 290 pp. (Publications of the Institute of Social Studies Paperback Series IX.) Fl. 32.00.*

Emigration and Agriculture in the Mediterranean Basin. Edited by C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze. *The Hague, Paris: Mouton for the Mediterranean Social Sciences Research Council and the Institute of Social Studies. 1972. 188 pp. Index. (Publications of the Institute of Social Studies Paperback Series VIII.) Fl. 30.00.*

The Western Mediterranean: Its Political, Economic and Strategic Importance. Edited by Alvin J. Cottrell and James D. Theberge. *New York, Washington: Praeger in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University. London: Pall Mall. 1974. 256 pp. Index. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government.) £7·75.*

THERE has been increasing interest in the whole Mediterranean as an area of study during the past decade. This has been reflected in the creation of a number of Mediterranean Institutes and study groups in the countries bordering the sea, and even further north in Europe and the United States. In Britain a Mediterranean Studies Journal is published and in the Hague the Institute of Social Studies has funds from the Mediterranean Social Studies Research Council for comparative sociological studies on the area. The two books discussed at the end of this review come from the latter.

The third book, *The Western Mediterranean: its political, economic and strategic importance,* is a collection of papers from a seminar held in Majorca in 1972 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University. Its editors, Alvin J. Cottrell and James D. Theberge, stress the growing importance of the Western Mediterranean and put the dramatic problems of the Eastern Mediterranean in the context of international interests in the whole area. The publication is worthwhile while even though this brief time lag has brought so many new problems that the book already appears somewhat dated. The main emphasis is on United States concern in the Mediterranean, but P. J. Vatikiotis, for example, has a perceptive article on 'East West Arab Relations' and Michael Wall a similar discussion of 'Politics in the Maghreb'.

The strategic policies of the United States and the Soviet Union provide the framework of the book. One of the editors puts the American point of view in a concluding article. 'The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, first established in 1964 and markedly expanded after the June 1967 war, has radically changed the constellation of power in the

Mediterranean and its surrounding. . . . The presence of the super powers in the relatively confined, but highly volatile area carries with it some risk of confrontation' (p. 227). This laconic statement opens up one of the major gaps in the book, a consideration of local reactions to the foreign presence and the growing demand for neutralism.

The extent and value of oil and natural gas deposits are assessed by K. S. McLachlan and R. M. Burrell, and Philip H. Trezise explores the developing relations of the EEC with the Mediterranean countries, particularly those of North Africa. These chapters, together with surveys of the 'Mediterranean policies' of France, Italy and Spain, provide the most stimulating sections of the book in that they force the reader to look at much discussed issues from a new angle.

But the volumes from the Institute of Social Studies at The Hague attempt to look at contemporary social problems in the Mediterranean region in a comparative way and try to open up the questions they discuss rather than provide answers. The large-scale emigration from the land and the variety of forms it may take are forcefully illustrated, as is the rapid change of social groupings in the Mediterranean countries. The most important task at this stage in Mediterranean studies is the identification of problems, and all three books touch on many issues which deserve further research.

ANN WILLIAMS

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Soviet-Type Economies: Performance and Evolution. By Robert W. Campbell. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: Houghton Mifflin. 1974. 259 pp. Index. £4·50. Paperback: £2·25.*[1]

Economic Development in the Soviet Union. By Stanley H. Cohn. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Heath. 1970. 135 pp. Index.*

THE first of the two authors is Professor of Economics at Indiana University, the second is Chairman of the Economics Department, State University of New York at Binghampton. Professor Campbell's longer study allows him to deal at length with the experience of the countries of Eastern Europe, of China and Cuba, which have all, in varying degrees, followed the development strategy adopted by the Soviet Union to achieve rapid industrialisation. Professor Cohn is more closely concerned with developments inside the country itself.

They both firmly conclude that the methods used in the Soviet Union to transform at breakneck speed a predominantly agricultural economy into an industrial super-power, arose out of historical conditions peculiar to that country at the time of transition. The Soviet leaders had at their command not only enormous natural resources, but in addition a vast unutilised, or under-utilised, pool of labour in the countryside, which could be drawn into the cities to work in the new factories. A country like China, with a rapidly growing population pressing upon available food supplies, could never have taken the risk of the severe drop in agricultural production brought about in the Soviet Union by forced collectivisation.

[1] First pub. as *Soviet Economic Power: Its Organization, Growth and Challenge.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1960. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan. 1967.

It follows that neither writer subscribes to the Russians' claim that their system is universally applicable to all socialist countries. Wherever it has been adopted, subsequent modifications have had to be made to meet differing national needs. Poland has done without collectivisation altogether, while Yugoslavia has developed a system which has much more in common with the market economies of Western Europe than with the socialist economies of the East.

The books add further evidence to the contention advanced in other recent academic studies of the Soviet economy, viz., that the Stalinist system of rigid centralised planning and control, with the line of command running from the top downward, has outlived its usefulness. It operated successfully in mobilising resources to accomplish the stupendous task of industrialisation, but not in making effective use of the results of that effort. The slowdown in growth rates in the 1950s, the accompanying failure to innovate, to raise labour productivity after the fierce repression of the consumption and agricultural sectors, are only a few of the obstacles to progress discussed by the authors.

Professor Campbell's remarks on the rediscovery of economics, after the domination of politics in the Stalin era (Chapter 7), are of particular interest, and both writers welcome the new opportunities for economists in the Soviet Union and in the West to talk to each other in mutually understandable terms. The first author reveals the Achilles heel of the Soviet economy in his statement that the Soviet Union still has to employ eight times as many agricultural workers as the United States to secure only half as much production of grains, and even lower proportions of meat, milk and cotton (pp. 111–112). Professor Cohn is optimistic about the Soviet leaders' regional policy which aims at bringing the backward areas of the country, as in Central Asia, up to the standards prevailing in western regions (Chapter 5). He does not mention the strength of nationalist feeling, which considers the policy to be not so much altruistic as oriented towards the objectives of maximising national output as a whole, and retaining central control over decision-making in the sphere of production.

Neither writer is sanguine as to the success of the economic reforms inaugurated in 1962 under Khrushchev and carried forward under his successors. So far there has been much talk and little effective action, and many of the Stalinist-induced inefficiencies in the working of the economy remain to plague the reformers. This failure is attributed by the authors mainly to the resistance of powerful vested interests, and to the fear of politicians that they may be stripped of their authority by the growing strength of economic ministries. Professor Campbell envisages the prospects of just such a development in the United States, with powerful industrial corporations posing a threat to political guidance in the affairs of the nation.

Wisely, however, neither author tries to peer too closely into a future the lineaments of which are particularly hard to discern in a closed society like the Soviet Union. Their books should be useful additions to the Russian departments of universities, providing students with a clear picture of why, and with what results, Russia's 'economic miracle' was achieved, set forth with lucidity, academic objectivity, and a welcome freedom from economic jargon.

MARGARET MILLER

Planning Problems in the U.S.S.R.: The Contribution of Mathematical Economics to their Solution 1960–1971. By Michael Ellman. *Cambridge, London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1973. 222 pp. Bibliog. Index. (University of Cambridge, Dept. of Applied Economics, Monographs: 24.) £4·80. $14.95.*

THE subject of this monograph is the shortcomings of the Soviet economic mechanism and ways of strengthening its efficiency. The *pièce de résistance* is the sixty-five page section entitled 'What kind of economic reform does the Soviet Union need?' It is the author's tenable proposition that to achieve its aim Russia would have to make a profound change in its production relations—a change comparable in intensity to the transition during 1921–23 from war communism to the New Economic Policy (NEP) and to the transition from NEP to the 'administrative economy' at the end of the 1920s. It is the author's contention that, to assume the required scale and intensity, the reform would have to have sufficient political support, and that such political will has failed to materialise.

Economically, the reform would mean a drastic change in the model of allocation of resources. Its major elements, as envisaged by Dr. Ellman, would include the substitution of enterprises's production plans based on orders received from customers for plans imposed from above. Experiments in this direction started about ten years ago, but the measures taken have proved insufficient to establish the principle. This relates to the issue of a buyers' versus a sellers' market; as is well known it is the sellers' market that is a permanent feature of the Soviet economy and, as the author perceptively remarks, one of its effects is to handicap technological progress. To establish a buyers' market it would be necessary to run industry with a reserve capacity and to encourage competition between enterprises. Next comes the question of performance checks. It has been generally agreed that what is required is a synthetic value indicator; two such indices have been widely discussed—profit and value added; 'optimal' planners are divided over the question of the appropriate local criterion, some supporting profit in general, some supporting profit in certain cases and different criteria—such as the sum of consumers' or producers' surplus in other cases. But, clearly, the dependability of the profit criterion is strongly conditioned by the kind of prices on which the profit is calculated; and the problem of securing prices leading to efficient choices is still awaiting a solution on both theoretical and methodological-technical planes. Dr. Ellman agrees that the allocating function is very important, but with the proviso that exaggerated emphasis on the importance of prices (relative to other parts of the economic mechanism) should be avoided. This reviewer shares the author's stand but his proviso would require very careful elaboration—theoretical and empirical.

Once again we may note that in the context of the author's treatment of the subject it is the social-political aspect rather than the economic, theoretical and empirical, that has caused the Soviet reform to fail. Dr. Ellman believes that '. . . the challenge mounted to political economy by the theory of optimal planning in the 1960s . . . appears as an ideological expression of . . . social change;' [and that] 'it was an attempt to replace one doctrine, political economy, which provides the ideological legitimation for rule by the bosses, by another doctrine, optimal planning, which legitimates the rule of the white-collar intelligentsia' (p. 141); and that the challenge can now be seen as abortive. It is a thought-provoking

(and original) tenet, but one on which a sociologist and political scientist, rather than an economist-reviewer should pass judgment.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN

The Development of Sociology in the Soviet Union. By Elizabeth Ann Weinberg. *London, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1974. 173 pp. Bibliog. Index. (International Library of Sociology; Ed.: John Rex.) £4·50.*

OVER recent years, Soviet sociology has become one of the most active fields of scientific enquiry in the Soviet Union. So rapid is the evolution that any judgment on the 'current' situation is in danger of being overtaken by events. Today, there is scarcely any branch of sociology not being investigated and, as the American sociologist Zev Katz has attested, Soviet social scientists have attained a professional standing as high as that reached anywhere else in the world. Even so, Soviet sociology is very much an under-investigated field—among both Western sociologists and Sovietologists. Dr. Weinberg's book will help to redress the balance. Her ten-page summary of Russian and Soviet sociological history is followed by an exposition of the theoretical premises underlying Soviet Marxist social science. Of particular value here is an explanation of Soviet attitudes to bourgeois sociology—in many ways the key or, at least, the stimulus to much of Soviet research. The most illuminating part of the book is an analysis of the institutional framework within which sociologists work, their education, regional ties, age, journals and their areas of research. The last part of the volume is devoted to public opinion polls, two appendices of questionnaires, and a twenty-page bibliography.

Altogether, this is an admirable pioneering effort that purports to encompass the entire field of Soviet sociology. It is much needed. It suffers, perhaps inevitably in such an ambitious project, from deficiencies in both description (public opinion polls and appendices apart, the body of the book is only 80 pages long) and analysis: it surely requires deeper insight, for example, to explain the resurgence of sociology after 1956 than to put it down to a reorientation of the Party line (p. 11). Such obsession with Party fiat also gives the impression of there being a single, or *the*, Soviet sociological approach—which obfuscates a very complex and fluid situation. Despite the apparent monolithic front, many schools of thought do contend within the garden of Soviet Marxism, as any Soviet colleague or recently published work will testify.

Both the style and content of the book could be enhanced by more skilful editing, removing the many inconsistencies, mistakes and eccentricities of translation. No doubt a future edition will iron these out. In any case, they do not detract from the value of an interesting and welcome book.

JAMES RIORDAN

Church, State and Opposition in the U.S.S.R. By Gerhard Simon. Trans. by Kathleen Matchett in collaboration with the Centre for the Study of Religion and Communism. *London: Hurst. 1973. 248 pp. Index. £4·20.*

THIS valuable study of a subject which is now seen to have increasing importance is the fruit of long and careful study. The evidence is presented

objectively and the conclusions are careful and conservative. Learned German books do not always make easy reading for Anglo-Saxons, but Dr. Simon thinks and writes clearly, and Kathleen Matchett has made an excellent translation. Occasionally I would change the emphasis but it is rarely that I disagree.

On page 88, however, Dr. Simon accuses the Russian Church of naiveté in appealing to the Soviet Constitution and Lenin, failing to understand 'that a self-ruling Church in a Communist state is completely alien to Lenin's total concept'. My impression is that the Church knows exactly what it is doing and sometimes gains concessions by such appeals. Again on page 142 he says that 'there are about 500,000 members of the officially recognised [Baptist] Union, who have gone through adult baptism'. This is the figure that has been given officially for at least twenty years, but there is reason to think that it is an arbitrary figure, bearing no relation to reality.

The book starts with two chapters on the Russian Orthodox Church before the Revolution. This gives a dreadful picture of the fetters which the Tsars put upon the Church. It is all true, but it is not the whole truth. Pierre Pascal's recent book *La Réligion du Peuple Russe* [1] gives the other side and helps to explain why, in spite of its apparent weakness, the Russian Church showed such amazing strength under persecution. The final chapter consists of a devastating critique of Richard Wurmbrand's picture of the 'underground church'. It is followed by fifty pages of original documents which are admirably chosen and will be an eye-opener to most readers. Through its part in *samizdat* 'the Christian community is participating in the formation of a new self awareness within Soviet society that resists arbitrary action by the authorities' (p. 188).

In the Soviet Union the churches 'are the only institutions that are able to express publicly their rejection of large parts of Marxism-Leninism, and they thereby represent an intellectual and cultural opposition which offers no political alternative, but rather an intellectual one' (p. 101). Hence the tension, which is well described in the body of the book.

JOHN LAWRENCE

KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents. By John Barron. Introduction by Robert Conquest. *London, Sydney, Auckland, Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton. 1974. 462 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·25.*

THIS popular work by a *Reader's Digest* journalist concentrates on one facet of the KGB, its foreign operations. The author received the co-operation of the FBI and, apparently to a lesser extent, of the CIA. The original material can be treated as coming from the files of those organisations; they evidently also facilitated the author's contacts with Soviet agents who had defected. The chief interest of the work is therefore in the narrative accounts of selected Soviet agents' activities, mainly in the United States. On this it is instructive, even if couched in terms reminiscent of 'mirror image' books designed to exhort the Soviet public to greater 'watchfulness' against foreign agents.

As an account of the KGB, however, it will not do. Robert Conquest's preface points out, correctly, that: '. . . . it is worth remembering that

[1] Editions L'Age d'homme. 1973.

the major part of the KGB's effort, the greater number of its employees, are used in the massive and continuous work against its own populations' (p. ix). On this Mr. Barron has little to say. Even on the relatively narrow sector of KGB activity that he surveys, one would like more evidence for his opinion that the GRU functions essentially as an appendage to the KGB. The anecdotal approach means that material has been selected more for readability than for serious overall assessment of the effectiveness of Soviet espionage. Nevertheless, Mr. Barron does add to the amount of material available on Soviet espionage and his work can be used to supplement the now dated but far more analytical account given by David Dallin in *Soviet Espionage*.[1]

DAVID SHAPIRO

Economic Reforms in Polish Industry. By Janusz G. Zielinski. *London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, University of Glasgow. 1973. 333 pp. Maps. Index. (Economic Reforms in East European Industry; Gen.Eds.: Alec Nove and J. G. Zielinski.) £6·50.*

DR. ZIELINSKI'S monograph is one of a series produced at the University of Glasgow on the economic reforms in Central-Eastern Europe. As in all the other countries of the region, an awareness of the economic machinery's inadequacy to cope with the needs of an increasingly complex economy, and a drive towards some adjustment of this machinery, have been 'chronic' in Poland since about the mid-1950s. But, again as elsewhere in the area, in about 1965 it became an accepted tenet that only a very major reform could serve the purpose: at about that time a set of 'reformist' measures was embarked upon, and by now one has a sufficient perspective for appraising them. This, with a special focus on changes in Polish industry, is the subject of Dr. Zielinski's study: it analyses their background and their substance, and appraises their outcome.

One of the author's interesting generalisations is that economic reforms very often suffer from a vicious circle: without pressure no far-reaching work on a new system is carried out, and under pressure, reforms must be initiated without waiting for a detailed blueprint. This, he contends, is also true of the Polish effort at reform: hence for him the important question is whether the vicious circle, which existed in Poland before 1956 and reappeared in the mid-1960s and again in 1969–70, can be broken.

Whatever the answer to this question, it is to this vicious circle that Dr. Zielinski appears to ascribe what he sees as the principal characteristic of the Polish reforms: their strikingly eclectic character. It is indeed fair to say that the last reform was, like its predecessors, hesitant, patchy and built up of incompatible components. To be more specific, in Dr. Zielinski's diagnosis, five basic groups of mutually irreconcilable assumptions are responsible for the Polish reforms' lack of success. One is the attempt to establish an economic model essentially controlled by administrative orders combined with a wider use of economic instruments—an attempt which ignores the intrinsic clash of administrative command with economic parameters. The second is, the retention of the basic principles of the traditional system, including rigid yearly 'targeting', while at the same time trying

[1] New York: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1955. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1956, p. 381.

to change economic behaviour—the behaviour of the enterprise managers —which is rooted in these principles. A third inconsistency is the effort to combine yearly planning with stable, longer term financial norms intended to give the managers a broader horizon and thereby a greater area of manoeuvre. Next comes the attempt to carry out decentralisation at both the enterprise and the supervisory level. And finally, the inconsistency of trying to change the mechanism while sticking to the policy of very taut planning.

This is a credible analysis, supported by rich and well-organised factual material and by admirable theoretical reasoning. Dr. Zielinski's excellent work deserves to be recommended to the attention of all students of the economics of the region.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN

Economic Reform in Rumanian Industry. By Iancu Spigler. Foreword by Michael Kaser. *London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, University of Glasgow. 1973. 176 pp. Maps. Index. (Economic Reforms in East European Industry; Gen. Eds.: Alec Nove and J. G. Zielinksi.) £3·90.*

ROMANIA was the last of the countries in the Central-East European area of command planning to embark on the path of change in economic mechanism. It was also one of the most hesitant. This is quite well known to students and is now confirmed by Iancu Spigler's inquiry.

The 'model' of Romania's economic system was borrowed from the Soviet Union and it closely conforms to the latter prototype. Its essence is highly centralist planning of the economy, basically in quantitative (physical) terms. As it appears from Spigler's account, the main features of the re-adjustments carried out over the last few years is that, in what was essentially a 'non-parametric' system, some parameters have been introduced. What is important is not so much the mere fact of their introduction, as that nearly all of them are centrally shaped. The problem of prices, their nature, processes of gestation and role, is crucial. In the reformed Romanian system price-formation is still overwhelmingly centralised and—as the author tells us—prices still do not reflect scarcities. It stands to reason then that profit, being based on prices insensitive to scarcities, can hardly be a reliable guide to efficiency. This is the lesson which, I think, all the reformers throughout the Central East European planning region have now learnt.

To judge from the author's presentation, in the Romanian adjustment the main emphasis is on an innovation. No longer is decision-making confined to central agencies; a second tier—the industrial association—has been built into the hierarchy to take operational decisions in matters of production, marketing and other current activities. It is not easy to see why yet another level in the administrative machinery should make the decision-making more flexible.

In a word, just as the fundamentals of the Romanian economic system were assimilated from the Soviet Union, so are its present re-adjustments. The interesting question is: Why have the Romanians confined themselves to such a *quasi*-reform? One can find a clue to the answer in Spigler's remark: 'The Rumanian economic reform has taken place in a country, which, save for Albania, is the least industrialised in Eastern Europe, but which,

having the richest natural resources proportionate to its size, has a sure base for further economic growth. The reform has its own limits because the central authorities consider that economic growth in the years ahead may still be achieved by the same instruments of planning as in the past' (p. 164). The proposition is, in my opinion, highly debatable, but it is worth recording.

The Romanian *quasi*-reform does not provide an author with much scope for fundamental analysis. But Mr. Spigler has taken the opportunity to give the reader a vast amount of information on the country's economy—information largely unknown. In this he is helped by a review of the historical background in Michael Kaser's illuminating preface.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN

MIDDLE EAST

Palestine and International Law. The Legal Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. By Henry Cattan. Foreword by Dr. W. T. Mallison, Jr. *London: Longman. 1973. 242 pp. Index. £4·00.*

Inter arma leges silent is not a notion to confound Mr. Henry Cattan. A well-equipped international lawyer, he has, through a quarter of a century of hostilities over Palestine, actual or latent, regular, guerrilla or terrorist, argued the cause of the dispossessed Arab inhabitants. In this book he develops their legal case in greater detail than has hitherto been done. His main aim is to prove the invalidity of Israel's legal title. Finding the Balfour Declaration without value as a root of title, he argues that on this and other grounds the Mandate for Palestine, incorporating the Declaration, was invalid both in inception and implementation. From that position he appraises the UN Assembly's partition resolution of 1947, and considers that this too was valueless for a number of reasons, the first being that since the United Nations did not have sovereignty over Palestine, or even power to administer it, the Assembly did not have competence to dispose of it. He then examines the question of whether the defect he finds in Israel's title has been cured by recognition, admission to the United Nations, or prescription, with negative results. Sovereignty over Palestine, he concludes, has remained in the pre-Mandate inhabitants, Jews as well as Arabs. He deals separately with the position of Israel in the territories occupied since the 1967 war.

In a closely argued presentation the author draws upon authoritative textbooks as well as upon the determinations of international bodies. The book tends, however, to blend the political with the legal. Arthur Balfour's Declaration, for instance, conceived not in ignorance—notwithstanding Dean Inge's 'I am credibly informed that he did not know there were Arabs in the country'—but in indifference, was a political act. The Mandate stands on its own feet; and whatever may be said about the bizarre fate awaiting a people acknowledged by Article 22 of the League Covenant as one of the communities that had 'reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised' (a prime exception, here, to *C'est le provisoire qui dure*), it is going far to pronounce the Mandate wholly invalid. In discussing resolutions of the Assembly the author may be thought to be on firmer ground, though on the question of competence he seems to overlook one effect of the decisions of the International Court in the South-West Africa cases.

Nevertheless we have here an extensive and fully documented analysis of the legal case of the Palestine Arabs, which case has never been put to the test; a request to refer it to the International Court, made to the Assembly in 1947, was rejected. Writing before the splash of *arma* of October 1973, Mr. Cattan looks, with logic, to the United Nations for a remedy. Had he written later he might, with more realism, have set his sights many degrees east of New York.

WILLIAM DALE

The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement: 1918–1929. By Yehoshua Porath. *London: Cass. 1974. 406 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·50.*

THE title of this book, which is an examination of opposition to the British Mandate and its rather hesitant commitment to Zionism, down to the Wailing Wall disturbances, seems too definitive. After finishing it the reader may well doubt whether the activities and intrigues surveyed had enough cohesion and direction to be usefully thought of as a national movement, despite the existence of the Arab Executive Committee and the efforts of seven ' Palestinian Congresses '. The picture is one of internecine rivalries and mistrust, confused and shifting objectives, and a consequent lack of continuity. Admittedly, in 1929 Muslim Arab feeling was incited to violence against Jews on a scale that led the British government, in the following year, to propose the first significant revision of its pro-Zionist policies. But MacDonald's rapid about-face under the moral and political pressures that the Zionists were able to apply demonstrated that in Whitehall, halfway between Balfour's notorious memorandum of August 1919 and the 1939 White Paper, Arab feelings about Palestine were still of relatively little account. Dr. Porath's researches do reveal that once or twice before this a modification of policy in favour of the Arabs was at least considered, most notably by a cabinet committee in July 1923.

The book provides a comprehensive and rather sympathetic analysis of the circumstances that made an effective national resistance unattainable. Few communities of comparable size can have been criss-crossed by so many boundaries—social, religious, economic and occupational—as were the Palestine Arabs. Their natural leaders were the local notables, Islamic or municipal, left over from the Ottoman regime, some of whom had inevitably lost much of their status and authority. Few of them, at first, were able to think of Palestine as an entity. Their horizons were either larger—' Southern Syria ' until the establishment of the French mandates to the north effectively destroyed that concept—or smaller; the book often reveals how sharp were the differences between Jerusalem, Haifa and Nablus. To these handicaps were added uncertainties about the most promising aims, tactics and possible allies of the nascent movement. Should British rule be opposed uncompromisingly, or was it better to enlist British anti-Zionist sympathies, sometimes clear enough in Palestine itself, sometimes hoped-for or half-detected behind cabinet changes in London? Should the support of the Hashemite rulers be sought, given their deep involvement with the British elsewhere, and Feisal's conditional commitment to Zionism in 1919? Was the sending of delegations to Geneva likely to achieve anything when the Mandate, formally at least, issued from the League of Nations and had certainly been blessed by it? Was anything

useful to be got from the French, who were certainly not thought to favour Zionism? Could any basis for joint activity with some Jewish elements be found?

Dr. Porath surveys such questions at length; his answers are interesting and at times surprising. It is remarkable, for instance, how little concern there was, through most of the decade, to maintain close contacts with the Syrians. He has been able to draw on the British Administration's records, the knowledgeable reports about Arab political activity made for the Zionist Executive, and contemporary Arab journalism; the book is very fully documented. Some may find it overloaded with rather inconclusive detail; it seems a pity, since almost all the politicking proved to be fruitless, that more space was not given to the social impact of Jewish settlement, and the ways in which this sharpened resentments and opposition amongst various strata of the Arab community, thus assisting in the formulation of that 'well-argued ideology' which, the author asserts, had emerged by 1930. The translation from Hebrew reads clearly, though it is rather flat.

J. S. F. PARKER

The U.S.S.R. and The Middle East. Edited by Michael Confino and Shimon Shamir. *Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press 1973. (Distrib. in UK by John Wiley & Sons, Chichester.) 441 pp.*

The U.S.S.R. and the Arabs: The Ideological Dimension 1917–1972. By Jaan Pennar. *London: Hurst. 1973. 180 pp. Index. £3·25.*

The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under Kruschev. By Oles M. Smolansky. *Lewisburg, Penn., Cranbury, N. J.: Bucknell University Press for The Middle East Institute, Columbia University, N.Y. 1974. 326 pp. Indexes. (The Modern Middle East Series, Vol. 6.) $15.00.*

The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East contains the papers presented at a conference in Jerusalem in December 1971, the end of a year when it appeared to some of the participating experts that Soviet influence was expanding so rapidly that Russia was fast becoming the dominant power in the region. And yet, only seven months later, the Russian military advisers had been asked to leave Egypt, while in another year and a half Sadat's wooing of Washington was well under way while Moscow was being virtually excluded from any active participation in Kissinger's efforts to negotiate a Middle East ceasefire.

In these circumstances, when expert analysis is so quickly overtaken by events, there are useful lessons to be learned from the instant diagnosis to be found in conference papers, particularly those which exhibit a method sufficiently supple to accommodate such sharp reversals in existing trends. As usual, the efforts to explain Soviet foreign policy contained here and to predict its future course encompass a wide variety of different approaches—ideological, historical, strategic, geo-political, etc.; as usual, the most fruitful is that which focuses on Russia as a super-power with world-wide interests. Seen in these terms, further expansion in the Middle East was not very high on Moscow's list of priorities, while anything attempted there was subject to the over-riding importance attached to maintaining good relations with America. From this it follows that by 1971–72 the Russians may well have been worried that their role as Egypt's military protector was rapidly getting out of all proportion to their more

modest Middle Eastern aims, and it may even be that they were quite pleased to be given an opportunity to withdraw.

But if the logic of a number of conference participants (for example Walter Laqueur) was of this type none of them went on to examine the other side of the question: the relative strength of the American position. Clearly, in the struggle with the Soviet Union for power and influence in the Middle East the Americans derived special advantages from the superior disposition of their armed forces, and from the fact that, at one and the same time, they not only supported the strongest military power in the area (Israel) but also—unlike the Russians—had good relations with parties on both sides of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In addition, in the long run, the Americans were at least as well placed as the Russians to secure the co-operation of members of the class which ruled the majority of Arab countries. If Moscow could establish an apparent community of interests on the basis of anti-colonialism and a developing local nationalism, it was open to Washington to do exactly the same on the basis of capitalism, of links with Western financial institutions, and of the importing into the Middle East of Western consumption goods and Western technical know-how.

This unwillingness to look at possible areas of local support for the great powers in the Middle East in socio-economic terms also extends to the final section of the book which contains accounts of the history of the Communist parties in various Arab countries. Useful though these are in terms of the information presented, they are all marred by the assumption that the Arab allies of the Soviet Union must be restricted to people publically identified as Marxists or Communists, organised in parties. Among other shortcomings this aproach leaves no room for a discussion of other types of organisation, particularly those involving workers and peasants. More important, it has nothing to say about the socio-economic conditions in which Marxism might flourish, for example the existence of a growing industrial working class.

Other aspects of Russia's relations with the Middle East are discussed in the works of Smolensky and Pennar. Both contain much useful material from Russian and Arab sources; but taken as a whole Smolensky's work is much the more interesting in that, unlike Pennar, he does not confine himself simply to the ideological dimension, which he sees as only one aspect of a more complex reality. As he points out, quite rightly, for all the attention focused on the dispute between Khrushchev and Nasser about the nature of Arab socialism, the important fact to note is that this disagreement never produced even a hint that Russian aid might be reduced or withdrawn. Only after 1967—a period not covered by Smolensky's study—do the Soviet leaders seem to have attempted directly to influence the policy of an Arab state by actually withholding (military) assistance.

ROGER OWEN

Survival or Hegemony? The Foundations of Israel's Foreign Policy. By Samuel J. Roberts. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University. 1974 162 pp. Bibliog. (Studies in International Affairs No. 20.) $2.95. £1·40*

Israel's Political-Military Doctrine. By Michael I. Handel. Cambridge, Mass.: *Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. 1973. 101 pp. (Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 30, July 1973.) $3.00.*

EACH of these works is a short monograph on a particular aspect of the State of Israel. Dr. Roberts sub-titles his work 'The Foundations of Israeli Foreign Policy' while Mr. Handel's title is a little misleading since, as he himself explains in his introduction, his work 'is mainly devoted to the military aspects of the Israeli doctrine rather than the political ones'. His title derives however from the fact that 'no military doctrine can be studied in a political vacuum'.

These monographs were published before the war between Israel and its Arab neighbours in October 1973 and it is therefore interesting, especially in the case of Dr. Roberts's work, to test the speculations made in them against this recent event. A factor of central importance to Dr. Roberts's thesis would appear to be the constant soliciting, first by the Zionists and after 1948 by the state of Israel, of support from the premier power in the international system. Herzl made overtures to the German Emperor; Balfour by his Declaration suggested British support, which, however, diminished in the light of an increasingly pro-Arab policy; and finally America was called upon to supply political and military aid. Why does Dr. Roberts stress repeatedly an assertion which is self-evident in a world where the dominance of two (or perhaps three) powers makes inevitable the dependence of small states? The clue, in my view, lies in the last paragraph of the description of the work on the back cover, 'The highly unusual, and in certain respects unique, experiences of the Jewish people, both over the past two millenia and during the last thirty years, have not rendered Israeli foreign policy substantively different from that which could reasonably have been expected of any state in Israel's position'.

Dr. Roberts's assertion is therefore one of implied criticism. The Zionists and the state of Israel should have acted differently so—the argument must go—as to achieve survival without the moral opprobrium of hegemony. However unrealistic a thesis this may appear to some readers, it fails, here, *in limine* because the alternative to such a foreign policy and the question why it would have been reasonable for the Zionists and the state of Israel to have acted differently are not argued. Dr. Roberts, in fact, in his introduction accepts as inevitable the impossibility of peace between the Jews and Arabs. He does, however, at the end of his thesis speculate how beneficial to both Israel and Egypt it would be if there was a settlement between them. This, too, is a trite message, but as recent events have shown this alone would hardly bring peace to the Middle East. Libya, Syria and above all the Palestinians have decisive cards to play and are now even less likely than before the war of October 1973 to submit gracefully to the achievement by Egypt of "her ambitions for supremacy within the Arab world" (p. 135) especially if, as Dr. Roberts suggests, these ambitions were achieved 'under the aegis of an Israeli suzerain' (*ibid.*)

Mr. Handel's paper is less ambitious than Dr. Roberts's. It collects some interesting data concerning the Israeli Defence Force but its lack of a political perspective combined with the fact that little of the data is unavailable elsewhere make it of marginal importance.

HARRY RAJAK

AFRICA

Land-locked Countries of Africa. Edited by Zdenek Červanka. *Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. 1973. 369 pp. Map.*

THE condition of being 'land-locked' has not always, and under all circumstances, been a disadvantage. For example, until its federation with Eritrea, Ethiopia survived for hundreds of years as an inland state; and while a lack of a sea-coast undoubtedly contributed to the isolation of the empire, it is arguable that it also contributed to its security against Muslim Arab incursions. But in a period in which the governments of all developing countries claim to be primarily concerned with economic development and modernisation, and in which, for many of them, the most pressing threat is not military invasion, land-locked states, without direct access to the sea for their bulk exports and imports of manufactured goods, are peculiarly vulnerable. This is a general problem; but since half of the 28 land-locked countries in the world are in Africa, and since, as Dr. Červanka points out in his introduction, 'trade is still orientated externally rather than internally', it is particularly pressing for Africa.

The volume originated in the 1972 seminar organised by the Scandinavian Institute of African Affairs, and is a worthy successor to an an earlier one in the same series on *African Boundary Problems.*[1] Most of the papers are well worth reading, and taken together they represent a useful introduction to an important and relatively unworked area of African politics and diplomacy. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the perspective from which the problem is approached is more predictable. Indeed, with sections on patterns of dependence in French-speaking Africa, confrontation or survival in southern Africa, and the search for new policies for African land-locked countries within the OAU, the organisation of the book follows a fairly familiar pattern.

Given the nature of the problem and its importance for the economic development of the states concerned, it is also, probably, inevitable that structural and economic arguments should dominate. Most of the writers who deal with the development problems of African land-locked states, echo the view of Tames Szentes that their problems derive from the 'colonial style internal division of labour' which involved them in international trade 'on even less favourable conditions and with less infrastructural development' than in the case of coastal states. Since the problem is one of structure, the solution, he suggests, is to be found in restructuring, *i.e.* 'an investment policy for internal and regional integration' (p. 275). If the problem was simply one of economic policy, in which territorial boundaries could be largely ignored, this kind of argument would be more convincing. For it is certainly true, as Yashpal Tandon suggests in an interesting essay on the transit problems of Uganda within the EAC, that, in economic terms alone, the transport problems of some inland parts of coastal states, for example, eastern Zaire, are often more onerous than those of some land-locked states (p. 80). The particular problems of being land-locked, however, are in the last analysis always associated with vulnerability to political pressure. As a practical matter there are two ways of approaching this problem: bilaterally by the detailed analysis of individual cases and negotiations between the states concerned, and multilaterally through the search for a legal continental regime codified within an OAU convention. Here,

[1] Uppsala, May 1968.

since Africa remains divided into sovereign states, it seems likely, as Professor Rubin argues against Dr. Szentes, that European and North American experience may after all provide a guide to future African practice, notwithstanding the differences. How successful such efforts to achieve a continental approach will be partly depends on the evolving historical relations between the coast and the interior. It is a pity, therefore, that the emphasis on structural arguments has led many of the authors away from this important area of analysis. With the exception of Tandon, it is left to Pierre Alexandre to introduce the sociological dimension and, for example, to draw attention to the historical legacy of relations between the Muslim Savannah and the coastal states (p. 138).

So much has now been written on the political and diplomatic problems of the southern African states that it is, perhaps, not surprising that the papers on this subject, while useful (and indeed necessary since six of the fourteen land-locked states are in southern Africa) also seem more familiar. Mention should be made, however, of a thorough essay by Douglas Anglin on the politics of transit routes in southern Africa which brings together in a concise and manageable form a great deal of information on a crucial and highly ambiguous aspect of the confrontation across the Zambezi. Like other volumes in this series, this one has both a bibliography and an excellent documentary appendix, which contains not only the relevant African inter-state agreements but also those international conventions to which some but not all African states are parties.

JAMES MAYALL

An Economic History of West Africa. By A. G. Hopkins. *London: Longman. 1973. 337 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £2·25.*

IGNORANCE and prejudice have long been the principal bases for our perception of the African past. The myths of underdevelopment have strengthened the idea that the 19th and 20th centuries saw in Africa the penetration of a dynamic European capitalism into a stagnant African society. Our view of this society was determined by our prejudice. 'On the one hand' says Dr. Hopkins, 'there is the myth of Primitive Africa, which pictures the inhabitants . . . as living like Alfred Marshall's savages, ... According to this interpretation, Africa's release from barbarism waited until . . . the Europeans came like cavalry over the hill to confer the benefits of Western civilisation. . . . On the other hand, there is the now more fashionable myth of 'Merrie Africa' . . . a Golden Age . . . in which generations of Africans enjoyed congenial lives in well integrated and smoothly functioning societies' (p. 10).

In the last fifteen years or so, there has been a great deal of research in the history of the West African economy to which Dr. Hopkins has made his own contribution. In this book, which has already become a standard text, Hopkins presents a brilliant synthesis of this work and, as a result, there is no longer any excuse for us to live in ignorance.

Before the American slave trade reached its peak in the 18th century, West Africa's main link with the rest of the world was across the desert; the slave trade changed this orientation and established patterns of power and wealth which were challenged in the period of legitimate commerce after abolition. Control of production of the new staple export crops was much more competitive and linkages with the domestic economy much

stronger. Thus there was a shift in the distribution of income which enlarged the market for the new low cost mass-produced goods imported from Europe. The adjustment to the supply and demand characteristics of the African market entailed a transformation which formed the basis of the modern 'open' economy. This required considerable adaptation in the local economy and the domestic power structure shifted accordingly, but the process was brought to a crisis in the depression of the last quarter of the century when the conjuncture of internal and external disputes and tensions provoked the European powers to pursue imperialist policies in Africa. The economic policies of the colonial governments in the 20th century were essentially passive and it is argued that most of the development and change of the last hundred and fifty years resulted from African initiatives and reactions. Again the depression of the 1930s set the scene for further change. The negative and ineffectual policies of the local administration were instrumental in radicalising West African politics so that much of postwar nationalist economic thinking was rooted in the performance of the prewar economy.

Dr. Hopkins carries the story up to the 1960s. The argument is dense but well presented: each chapter begins with a run down of the argument to be pursued so that the reader need not be lost. The approach is interdisciplinary and draws on economic and sociological theory. In particular, Hopkins shows that the neo-Weberian categorisation of traditional and modern economies, each with their distinctive value systems, is inappropriate, at least in West Africa.

Admittedly, there are still large gaps in our knowledge of West African history and Dr. Hopkins's style is so lucid that there is a danger that the reader may feel that we know more than we do. However, we are everywhere given pointers to where further research is needed. This is a very excellent book and really ought to be read by everyone interested in development economics, the study of imperialism and colonialism or anything to do with Africa.

E. HORESH

Labour and Politics in Nigeria 1945–71. By Robin Cohen. *London, Ibadan, Nairobi, Lusaka: Heinemann. 1974. 302 pp. Bibliog. Index. £6·00.*

ROBIN COHEN has written the definitive work on Nigerian trade unions, their history, their political role, their economic power. It will be a standard reference work, and scholars doing similar studies in other countries could do worse than take it as a model. Certainly it is the best survey of the role of the labour movement written for any African country.

With a book of this quality, the reviewer is struck by deficiencies, for they stand out so much more than in a work of lesser quality. Chapters 3 and 4 suffer from a tendency to tell the reader more than he ever wanted to know about the splits, fusions, and in-fighting in the Nigerian trade union movement. Cohen correctly sees this history as rich and complicated, but by his meticulous attention to detail, he often tends to lose the reader in a jungle of anagrams. The loss is serious, for the reader may get the impression that the analysis is mired in the pedestrian bog of a psychologistic explanation of the divisions in the movement, while, in fact, the author has a firm grasp of the material bases of these splits, which transcend personalities. The second major deficiency is that Cohen flirts with, but does not come to grips with, the 'labour aristocracy' issue. It appears

here and there, like a mysterious character in a play, and one almost anticipates that it will make a dramatic entrance at the conclusion, revealing the obscure, unmasking the imposters. I suspect that like many of us who have worked in this field, Robin Cohen is ambivalent about the significance and relevance of this actor for the drama of the class struggle in black Africa.

Chapter 6, which considers in detail the effect of trade unions on wage determination in Africa, is excellent. The author provides a clear summary and analysis of an extensive debate over the importance of 'labour market' versus 'political' factors. He comes down, on balance, in favour of the latter position, contrary to that argued by this reviewer in several articles which Cohen cites. He makes his case carefully and is, I think, substantially correct, though most of his argument is over the 1950–55 period. Certainly his position is the one subsequent researchers must take as 'established'.

JOHN WEEKS

Malawi—Foreign Policy and Development. By Carolyn McMaster. *London: Friedmann. 1974. 246 pp. Maps endpapers. Bibliog. Index. £4·25.*

Zambia: Security and Conflict. By Jan Pettman. *London: Friedmann. 1974. 284 pp. Maps endpapers. Bibliog. Index. £4·25.*

THESE are two excellent studies of the policies followed by neighbouring states, each with a population of about four million people, both land-locked, and neither particularly rich or powerful.

The most scrupulous neutrality is no guarantee of security and Miss McMaster points out that a land-locked state must generally ally itself with a powerful neighbour (p. 163). Although both countries regard themselves as non-aligned, this is true only to a limited extent. Dr. Banda has said he would be prepared to sup with the Devil if it were in the interests of Malawi; Dr. Kaunda has always declared himself to be on the side of the Angels.

Each state started its political independence with shackles which tied it to Rhodesia and the port of Beira. There is no reason to believe that Dr. Banda would have hesitated to take any line he fancied for ideological reasons. Miss McMaster however quotes him as saying that he does not idealise the world, but takes it as it is. She considers that he has evidently accepted the concept of an economic community of some form in southern Africa, encompassing Malawi, and by deliberate action he has strengthened the economic links between Malawi and the south and forged others. He has denounced the OAU for its diplomacy of 'bluff and bluster'.

He may prove to have narrowed his future options, particularly as he has stated that the boundaries between Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia are purely imaginary, created by colonialism and having no meaning for ordinary people. But he is an adroit politician and so far his policies have paid off. For several years he balanced his budget with the help of grants-in-aid from Britain and has received help from many other countries, which Miss McMaster lists in chapter iv. In eight years Malawi's gross domestic product has more than doubled. The common man, the ordinary villager, has benefited considerably, and the book's sub-title 'Foreign Policy and Development', is appropriate.

The sub-title of Dr. Pettman's rather longer book, 'Security and Conflict', stresses President Kaunda's different priorities and the formidable problems involved. Although richer than Malawi, Zambia is less densely populated and, in spite of many improvements, communication between different parts of the country is still difficult, so that a conscious effort has to be made to keep regionalism under control. Even the establishment of a 'One Party Participatory Democracy' has not fully integrated the nation.

The doctrine of Zambian humanism, proclaiming the value of the Common Man, has entailed far-reaching reforms, bringing all major sections of the economy under government control, but it has also revealed a lack of skilled manpower, resulting in faulty planning and mismanagement in many ambitious projects (p. 136). Too often the influence of agricultural experimental schemes has not spread outside the stations themselves, with the result that the ordinary villager is neither better off financially, nor does he enjoy a more varied diet. Meanwhile the urban population has grown and may be a possible threat to internal security.

Idealism has played its part in Zambia's foreign policy too, and the search for security and for an alternative outlet to the sea has proved costly. Dar es Salaam is far from being an economical substitute for the port of Beira; the OAU has been neither a steady nor a powerful ally. Although President Kaunda has been willing to pay what another author, Richard Hall, has described as the 'High Price of Principles',[1] there remains a wide gap between his aspirations and his country's capacity to influence events outside its own borders.

The contrasting policies followed by each state have been largely the personal choice of their leaders, who are not hampered by the checks and balances of a rigid constitution or by parliamentary debate. Both books are in the nature of enlarged Ph.D. theses, with fair and objective research, and neither author is concerned to speculate on the future. Since both countries are sensitive to criticism, and since the next few years may be a time of flux, perhaps they are wise.

JAMES MURRAY

From Village to State in Tanzania: The Politics of Rural Development. By Clyde R. Ingle. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1973. 279 pp. Index. (Africa in the Modern World; Gen. Ed.: Gwendolen M. Carter.) £6·25.*

THE creation of a sense of nationhood has been one of the undeniable achievements of Tanzania's leadership since independence, but to translate a national ideology of self-reliance, formulated at the centre, into tangible advances on the periphery has proved problematic. President Nyerere's affirmation that 'while other countries aim to reach the moon, we must aim for the time being, at any rate, to reach the village' promised some hope that this part of Africa had not made a false start, that from unequivocal commitment to rural development a genuine social contract might be forged.

Professor Ingle has made a timely assessment of the effectiveness of the new national political system in promoting modernisation throughout

[1] *The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South.* Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books. 1973. First edition Hodder and Stoughton. 1969. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1970, p. 395.

Tanzania, examining in depth the functioning and linkages of the hierarchy of political systems erected to connect the parts with the whole, the village with the state. Although the study is much concerned with human resources and responses, it attempts no review of Tanzania's achievements to date or of the dissemination of innovations. Instead, Ingle takes 1967 and the Arusha Declaration ('a potentially revolutionary break with previous policy') as his datum point; for him it marks the real independence, and he seeks to relate the ideas of the Declaration to the behaviour of the peasants in selected villages in the Handeni and Tanga Districts. The author first outlines the nature of rural development from the German period onwards and describes the developmental environments, both physical and cultural. The main analysis is found in a series of chapters dealing with the formal structures, institutions and participants involved at varying levels of the administrative and settlement hierarchy, their interaction and their effects on the modernisation process. Thus the *boma* is examined as a national outpost through which the national system—administration having been politicised—reaches into every village; the interaction of village and state systems is then evaluated, and this leads to a final discussion of the process by which political sub-systems, erected by the government to promote rural development, may react to external pressure not by adjustment but by resistance to change. In deciding to decentralise the authority for planning and the enforcement of rural development to the villages in 1968, Tanzania's leaders appear to have defused a threat to development within its political sub-systems. But as is shown by Ingle's comments on the role of force and compulsion in securing change, on the problem of high turn-over rates among officials or on the non-existence of such 'achievements' as certain *ujamaa* villages, modern Tanzania faces organisational dilemmas not unlike those of colonial times. TANU's initiatives will clearly depend as much for their success on pragmatic judgments as on ideological constraints if nation building is to be succeeded by state building in the 1970s. The study is a useful reminder that a developing country's political system is as vulnerable as its ecosystems to structural or functional imbalance.

J. A. HELLEN

Accelerated Development in Southern Africa. Edited by John Barratt, Simon Brand, David S. Collier and Kurt Glaser. Foreword by Leif Egeland. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan for the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Inc., the Rand Afrikaans University and the South African Institute of International Affairs. 1974. 706 pp. Index. £7·00.*

THIS book is the result of a conference that was held in Johannesburg in 1972 under the auspices of the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, the Rand Afrikaans University and the South African Institute of International Affairs. It is a substantial volume of over 700 pages containing some 35 papers presented at the conference, topped and tailed by a foreword, preface, rapporteurs' report, and an epilogue. It deals with a wide range of subject matter: basic concepts and goals of development, economic factors, agriculture, social, cultural and religious factors, education and training, planning, problems of multi-ethnic societies, aid and investment, politics and government.

The contributors are scholars and practitioners of considerable distinction and experience. The book includes the observations of many Southern Africans, black and white, people whose views tend to be poorly represented

at many discussions on African affairs. As G. M. Leistner comments, ' For South Africa the Third World does not—reassuringly—lie across the ocean, on the other side of the globe. It is right here, within and immediately beyond our borders ' (p. 560).

Parts of the book tread very familiar ground. For example, the arguments for and against bilateral and multilateral aid; whether or not industrialisation promotes or retards real economic growth; the role and place of planning departments in development; the importance of education. But there are other sections which examine issues that are frequently inadequately dealt with. Of special interest are the sections concerned with the problems of multi-ethnic societies. As we are realising very forcefully now in Europe, and not least in the United Kingdom, these matters strike at the heart of political, social and economic change. Professor Stefan Possony in his contribution, argues the right of people to ethnic integrity and to self-preservation in the pursuit of culture. And in the epilogue, Professor G. Van N. Viljoen claims that those who proclaim multi-racism are propagating a ' final solution '; whereas separate development to him is ' an open-ended method, a road towards an eventual solution and not a dogma or an end in itself ' (page 692).

The historical comparisons with Central Europe made by Dr. Kurt Glaser in his paper on ' Development Problems of Multi-ethnic Societies ' are especially interesting in this context. He reminds us that Czechoslovakia attempted to solve its problems at the end of the Second World War by expelling the Germans. General Amin, more recently, has followed a similar line by expelling the Asians from Uganda. All of this doubtless appeals to emotional aspirations and fears but whether it is a contribution to accelerated development and the enrichment of life in the round is doubtful indeed. Professor Bauer's paper on ' Some Economic Aspects and Implications ' adds some very forcefully argued home truths on the nature of growth and the unique contributions made by groups of persons who for one reason or another are able to play a leading part in the process of development. His paper also underlines the politicisation of much of Africa today.

There are some fascinating observations too on the role of language, again an issue which is by no means confined to Africa. Professor Glaser writes of the old aristocracy in Europe who were multi-lingual but who regarded language very much as a means of communication and not in any sense as the trade mark of a cultural identity. Now all this is changing, with language assuming a cultural and political importance that has wide ramifications and not least in the area of economic development.

It is perhaps not surprising that many of the contributors to the conference were professors of political science and they make their points tellingly. But in a book which claims to exhibit so much interaction between disciplines, between scholars and men of affairs, between one part of Africa and another, perhaps more could have been said about the physical environment of Africa and its resources. And it would have been helpful too to have had more contributions from the business participants. For universities, the very full notes and bibliographies will be especially valuable; and the book has been handsomely produced.

TOM SOPER

General Elections in South Africa: 1943–1970. By Kenneth A. Heard. *London, Cape Town, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1974. 269 pp. Index. £7·00.*

PROFESSOR HEARD has written an immensely detailed account of seven general elections, the most thorough account yet produced of the formal competitions for power in white society. He shows that there is a connection between the levels of electoral participation and the growth of support for the Nationalist Party. Levels of participation rose from 1948, when the Nationalists gained an 'indecisive victory', until 1960. From 1960 to 1966, voting turnout fell, though the Nationalist share of the vote continued to rise. In 1970, both levels of participation and support for the Nationalists fell. This rough connection can be shown (though he does not show it) to go back to 1915, when the Nationalist Party first contested elections.

The Nationalist Party was invariably the beneficiary of elections which served to mobilise support for parties competing for power. The United Party (like its predecessor the South African Party) came to office after an election which was manifestly *not* competitive, but rather a ritual confirming a coalition between the Nationalist government and its parliamentary opposition.

The connection between levels of participation and Nationalist support suggests that Professor Heard's assumptions that elections decide the 'struggle for power within the formal political structures' should be explored with great care. The substantive rules of the electoral game in South Africa are a kind of 'Catch-22' for non-Nationalist parties. Once elections became real contests for power, Afrikaner support for the United Party evaporated alarmingly. This can be seen as early as 1938, when Malan's Nationalists got their first chance to test their electoral support after withdrawing from the coalition between Smuts and Hertzog in 1934. The 1943 election was a 'United Party triumph' (as Professor Heard calls it) only insofar as it was able to marshal an anti-Nationalist alliance. Its majorities in Afrikaner constituencies were by then, as he shows, remarkably slender. These factors suggest that there is little chance of the Nationalists being ousted from power in direct electoral contests. The more likely probability is that an alliance will develop between elements in the government and parliamentary opposition.

My main criticism is that Professor Heard does not systematically explore the orientations of parties to elections. Had he done so, the reasons for the parliamentary opposition's failures to regain office might have become more apparent. But the study is clearly a preliminary part of an on-going programme to clarify an important problem in South African politics.

A. W. STADLER

African Aims and Attitudes: selected documents. Edited by Martin Minogue and Judith Molloy. *London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1974. 400 pp. Bibliog. £6·20. $19.50.*

THIS collection contains extracts from the writings, speeches and manifestos of African political leaders, theorists and organisations dealing with political thought in Africa south of the Sahara. They are grouped by subject and the editors have contributed a preliminary chapter on the characteristics and significance of African political ideology and short introductions to each

section. The volume concludes with brief biographies of the authors quoted and a bibliography.

Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1973–1974. Vol. 6. Edited by Colin Legum, Elizabeth Clements and Richard Synge. *London: Rex Collings. 1974. 1232 pp. Maps. Index. £15·50.*

ALL those concerned with the study of contemporary African affairs will welcome the publication of the sixth volume in this series. A particularly useful feature is the collection of articles in part one, which survey the relations of the major powers to Africa during the year. Part two is a country-by-country review and part three contains the texts of documents, many of which emanate from international organisations. It is a pity that the name index continues to list its entries by nationality or organisation represented and not in straight alphabetical order.

ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

Agricultural Colonization in India Since Independence. By B. H. Farmer. *London, New York, Delhi: Oxford University Press for The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1974. 372 pp. Maps. Indexes. £7·50.*

A DECADE and a half ago, B. H. Farmer wrote his classic on the human geography of the dry zone of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and its colonisation.[1] He has now completed his long awaited companion volume on the problems as they are being encountered in the much larger and more varied territory of the Union of India, where the settlement in 'colonies' is no new phenomenon. As the Director of the Centre of South Asian Studies at Cambridge, the author has had the unique opportunity of following India's development at close range. Wisely he has set his study, which he describes modestly as a reconnaissance, against the background of India's historical and geographical peculiarities. His knowledge of the literature related to the many facets of his subject adds to the value of this study. Only within the wide setting which the author has chosen can the agricultural policies of the Congress Party and the economic and social implications of its attempts to colonise wasteland be fully understood.

The author is, of course, fully aware of the fact that his special concern is with only one of the various forms of agricultural expansion, which reaches beyond the traditional boundaries set by the 'forest line' and by the 'desert frontier' (p. 6).

Some of India's present colonisation policies draw on British experience, as in the extensive Canal Colonies in the Punjab where the colonial administration was particularly successful. These achievements have not yet been matched in size or effectiveness by India's post-colonial settlements, though the Rajasthan Canal project, when completed, will be of a similar dimension (almost 2 million acres). On the whole, colonisation in India is 'a relatively sporadic process' (p. 75). Neither is the contribution made by colonisation very impressive. From the time of independence to the end of 1971 about

[1] *Pioneer Peasant Colonization in Ceylon: A Study in Asian Agrarian Problems.* London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the RIIA. 1957. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1958, p. 257.

1½ million acres, or ½ per cent. of the present net sown area, were brought into cultivation as a result of colonisation. During this period some 160,000 families or 800,000 people were settled. This is a mere trifle when compared with an annual increase in population of 12½ million, most of whom have no alternative to staying on the land. Colonisation is thus a rather minor addition to, rather than a substitute for, other measures designed to increase food production and to give the landless access to farm land.

The uncultivated land chosen rarely possesses either the fertility or the water resources desirable for settlement schemes. Thus the cost of reclamation, irrigation, drainage and road construction can be exorbitant. It often exceeds the likely long-term economic return. The social benefit to short-term tenants and refugees as well as to the landless, harijans and tribal castes may, nevertheless, justify the effort and expense. The principal areas of colonisation lie in Rajasthan and Haryana (Rajasthan Canal Project), Madhya Pradesh and Orissa (Dandakaranya Development Authority), Uttar Pradesh (Tarai), Assam, Kerala, Mysore and Tamil Nadu. Colonisation, like agriculture, is a prerogative of the state governments, though the central government issues guide lines from time to time. The result is a confusing variety of organisational and tenurial patterns, which are not necessarily due to the local constraints of climate, soil, caste or farm practice. Whilst there is thus much room for administrative and financial improvement, at the same time it clearly emerges from Farmer's study that 'there is no one remedy, no one prescription of colonization or any other remedy, to be uniformly applied' (p. 277). Colonisation is, nonetheless, one of the ways in which to meet the Indian government's intention to combine an increase in production with an improvement in the distribution of resources. Those concerned with these goals will find a great deal of practical guidance in the book under review.

W. KLATT

Documents on Political Thought in Modern India. Vol. 1. Edited by A. Appadorai. *Bombay, London, New York: Oxford University Press. 1973. 547 pp. Bibliog. Index. £6·80.*

THIS is the first of two companion volumes to Dr. Appadorai's introductory survey *Indian Political Thinking in the Twentieth Century from Naoroji to Nehru.*[1] The survey in effect summarises the documents; it includes one feature which might well have been given with them—brief biographies of the authors. Perhaps the biographies will appear in volume II.

To judge from the contents of volume I and the table of contents for volume II (which is included), Dr. Appadorai's anthology will be a rich source and a useful work of reference for students of modern India. This volume covers the late 19th century when the main Indian demand was for social reform on Western lines, and for a greater share in the administration of the country; the discovery of the need for self-rule; discussion of political methods; and the rise of nationalism. Volume II will deal with 'The Individual, Society, and the State', 'Democracy, Freedom, and Equality', 'Socialism, Communism, and Sarvodaya', 'Religion, Politics, and Social Progress', and 'Internationalism and Universalism'.

The anthology is welcome, both because of the intrinsic interest of the contents and because the sources they are extracted from are often hard to

[1] Bombay: Oxford University Press. 1971.

get at. Yet its whole conception is open to fundamental criticism. First, it defines political thinking in full-dress academic terms as thinking about 'the conception of the State and the relations between the State and the individual . . . liberty, equality, the rule of law, democracy, socialism and nationalism' (p. xi); Dr. Appadorai goes so far as to say that there was 'broadly' no political thinking in India before the 1880s, because such thinking presupposes 'a developed civic life' (ibid.). Secondly, the anthology, with at most one or two exceptions, consists wholly of documents written in English or—here and there—already available in English translation. Finally, for Dr. Appadorai the central tradition of modern Indian political thought appears to lie in the Congress and, within Congress, in the Gandhi-Nehru succession.

No doubt a broader definition of political thought would have raised awkward problems of choice (though it might have avoided some banality and repetition). No doubt too it is a lot to ask of an anthologist that he should draw on works in four or five languages (say Bengali, Marathi, Urdu, Tamil, perhaps Gujarati) besides English. There can be no denying the importance of the Congress-Gandhian heritage Yet the self-set limitations on Dr. Appadorai's choice reinforce each other; their total effect is to edge out or, at best, tolerate as marginal all that lies outside the Congress tradition. Thus we hear very little from the Bengal terrorists and not at all from their spiritual ancestor Bankim Chandra Chatterjee (a far more original thinker than most of the Victorian worthies quoted); the Congress Extremist leader Tilak and the dissident Congress leader Subhas Chandra Bose both get short commons; Muslim political thought seems scarcely to exist before the demand for Pakistan; Hindu communalism gets only a brief look in; in volume II Indian Marxists will get even less (on the grounds that they are unoriginal—a test which Dr. Appadorai has scarcely applied to Indian Liberal epigoni of John Stuart Mill).

This anthology, then, with all its riches helps us to understand the Congress elite to which Britain handed over power in India in 1947. As a help to understanding the forces at work in the subcontinent of today and their historical background it shows serious gaps.

JOHN ROSSELLI

Indira: A Biography of Prime Minister Gandhi. By Krishan Bhatia. *London, Sydney, Singapore, Manila: Angus & Robertson. 1974. 290 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £4·25.*

MR. BHATIA'S biography of the Prime Minister of India is excellent. It includes just enough background for non-specialists to understand the development of Mrs. Gandhi's personality.

During her childhood she was often left with servants or relatives, not all of whom she liked, while her parents courted arrest and stayed in gaol. Thus, from a tender age, Indira learnt to be self-reliant. As a young girl her life was often grim—she watched a mother she loved and admired die of tuberculosis and she was ill herself. It was then that she learnt the importance of discipline and of keeping fit. There can have been little fun and happiness in her life. Her honeymoon was spent in gaol—separated from her husband. Her marriage was a failure, partly because she put her duty to her father before her duty to her husband. For many years she remained at Pandit Nehru's side, as his hostess, his confidante and at the end as his nurse. It was during those long years when she stood, unnoticed, in the

wings, that she studied the complexities of politics, learnt to keep her own counsel, to listen rather than to speak and, above all, to make up her mind and to use people like pawns in a game of chess.

Indira is quite unlike her father; she is a realist, her mind is pragmatic and she is very decisive and very ruthless. Unlike Nehru she does not lecture, pontificate, preach or mind other people's business—she enjoys politics as a game in which the purpose is to win, by any means. 'I am not a gentleman' she is reported to have told a critic of the way in which she outwitted the Old Congress Guard in 1969 when they tried to get rid of her.

Indira Gandhi's record as Prime Minister, during the first eight years she has been in office, is impressive. She has taken many courageous decisions which her father had kept putting off—more out of weakness and inability to decide than anything else. And her record in the field of foreign affairs has, so far, been brilliant. She has shown impeccable skill in handling the war with Pakistan, the government of Bangladesh, the refugee problem that resulted from the war and the negotiations following it. Perhaps her greatest achievement has been to get all the refugees—even the Hindus—to return to Bangladesh.

However, on the economic front her record is negative. Mr. Bhatia thinks that this is largely due to her ignorance of economics, to her listening to bad advice over food policies, and to her indifference to the spiralling corruption which is not yet matched by inflation. According to the author, Mrs. Gandhi does not mind the black market because she needs money to win elections. This, it seems to me, is not true; after the war with Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi's popularity was such that she would have won hands down, even without black market support. Moreover, as Mr. Bhatia points out, the support she gives to an undeserving son with industrial ambitions is setting a bad example and 'causing Indira Gandhi greater harm than she seems to realise'.

What is so interesting is the way Mr. Bhatia describes how his heroine was sucked into politics. But why should that once reluctant Prime Minister make use of unattainable economic promises to woo a willing electorate? Nothing in his portrait suggests she is the kind of woman who deliberately decides to ride a tiger.

TAYA ZINKIN

China, the Struggle for Power 1917-1972. By Richard C. Thornton. *Bloomington, Indiana, London: Indiana University Press. 1974. 403 pp. Index. £6·60.*

As the title implies, this is a blow-by-blow account of the 'struggle for power' in China, on both the international and internal levels. Thus in addition to describing the fights and disputes within the Chinese Communist Party, and the battles between the Communists and the Nationalists, it also deals with the struggle for influence over and in China between the Soviet Union and the United States. The book is divided into three parts, dealing with the origins and development of Chinese communism up to 1941, the American experience in China from 1941 to 1949, and finally the evolving Sino-Soviet relationship after 1949. As is evident from this brief survey of the contents, by far the greatest emphasis is laid on relationships between the Chinese and Russian Communist Parties, both in terms of relations within the world communist movement and the whole set of relationships between Chinese domestic and foreign affairs.

Despite its sheer weight of detail, this book makes compelling reading and is rarely tedious or dull. However, its conclusions and the premises upon which the entire work is based are dubious and will undoubtedly prove controversial. It must surely remain questionable whether, as Thornton argues, China's international relations, especially with the Soviet Union, are *the* major determinant of China's politics. Although it is conceivable that such a case could be advanced, it has not been argued here, for there is simply no mention of other factors. Thornton attempts to argue his case so strongly because of the integrative framework he is proposing for analysing Chinese politics. For him the overwhelming characteristic of contemporary China is the fact that it is communist. As a consequence he implies that the Chinese Communists were little more than Moscow's puppets until relatively recently and that internal party politics are a matter of cut-throat competition for power. The major problem facing China is therefore seen as 'the absence of an institutionalized leadership selection mechanism' (p. 339), rather than economic or social development. For Thornton the Chinese Communist Party is clearly the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Chinese dress and Mao becomes more like Stalin every day. If only communist studies were really that simple! Whilst comparison can be extremely revealing, equation surely obscures the very real differences between politics and the paths to power in the Soviet Union and China.

Furthermore, whilst this book makes exciting reading, accuracy often takes second place to style. In assessing such a book this is an important consideration, for most of the so-called 'power-relations' are obscured. Thus when speculation is presented as fact, as it invariably must be, the reader must be convinced of the author's relative objectivity. Small errors, such as Thornton's assertion that only Chou and Mao of the 1945 Politburo remain in the current one (footnote 25, p. 170; there are in fact two others, Chu Te and K'ang Sheng), tend to shake this confidence. Whilst larger controversial interpretations, such as the author's comments on Mao's resignation from the Chairmanship of the People's Republic, which he sees as taking place against Mao's wishes, seem to throw balanced consideration to the winds, for there is not even a mention of Article 60 of the Sixty Work Articles of January 1958, where Mao discusses his views on such a possibility.

DAVID S. G. GOODMAN

The Damned Inheritance: The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Crises 1924–1935. By George Alexander Lensen. *Tallahassee, Florida: The Diplomatic Press. 1974. 533 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. $19.80.*

IN its outline, the tale which Professor Lensen has to tell is familiar enough. Its antecedents lie in the great power and railway politics of Manchuria in the 1890s and 1900s; its aftermath is to be found in the Sino-Soviet agreement of August 1945 for the joint ownership and running of the main railway system of Manchuria, and the final Soviet withdrawal from the area at the end of 1952. For when the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia, the dictates of commerce and strategy produced a continuation of Tsarist policies for the domination of Northern Manchuria through the Chinese Eastern Railway—a domination sustained despite the nominal concession of Chinese co-managership in 1924, and upheld by force of arms in 1929 when Chinese Nationalist manoeuvrings became intolerable.

Even so, as 1952 was again to show, there was a limit to the price the Soviet Union was willing to pay for this stake in Northern Manchuria, especially as threats to its Western borders grew in the 1930s. Despite all the talk by foreign observers of an 'inevitable' war between the Soviet Union and Japan as the latter seized the whole of Manchuria between 1931 and 1933, negotiations between Moscow and the new, puppet 'Manchukuo' regime for the sale of the CER were opened in June 1933, and after a period of stalemate were concluded in March 1935. With the disposing of the line, the Soviet Union had removed a potential source of immediate friction in the East; it had failed, however, to obtain the non-aggression pact which it proposed to Tokyo in the same period, and which the Imperial Way faction within the Japanese army regarded as unacceptable in view of its own desire to attack northwards at a suitable moment. Meanwhile the other powers had been reduced to ineffectual and at times humiliated spectators of these developments: Stimson's legalistic attempt to invoke the Kellogg Pact during the 1929 skirmish was curtly rebuffed; his own moralising and the League's exhorting during the 1931–33 conflict were virtually ignored.

Professor Lensen brings to this scene a special strength which he has already displayed for other periods: that is, a knowledge of both Russian and Japanese. The result, of course, is a useful record for those who lack these particular skills. Professor Lensen has also used Foreign Office material in the Public Record Office, although strangely enough he appears to have ignored the volumes of Documents on British Foreign Policy, quite apart from such relevant records as those of the Cabinet, Committee of Imperial Defence and Defence Requirements Committee. Similarly, he appears to have made little use of the unpublished State Department papers, and none at all of the diary of Henry Stimson. Where secondary sources are concerned, he has left aside, for example, Robert Ferrell's *Peace in Their Time*,[1] Akira Iriye's *After Imperialism*,[2] and David Carlton's *MacDonald Versus Henderson*.[3]

More disappointing still than these strange gaps and the occasional small error is Professor Lensen's failure to hold his story in a strong analytical grasp. The narrative plods on—its length could have been reduced by at least a quarter with no significant loss—with such matters as economic relations, the issue of communism, and the role of the United States reduced to appendices. It is impossible to avoid the impression that the outcome is a work of useful translation and compilation, but scarcely a historical analysis.

CHRISTOPHER THORNE

Modern Australia in Documents: 1901–1970. By F. K. Crowley. Vol. 1: 1901–1939. *625 pp.* Vol. 2: 1939–1970. *620 pp. Melbourne: Wren. 1974. (Distrib. in UK by David and Charles.) Indexes. £5·25 per volume.*

These two substantial volumes contain much material on Australia's relations with the world in the fields of foreign policy, defence, tariffs, immigration and

[1] Hamden, Conn., London: Archon Books. 2nd ed. 1968. (Yale Historical Publications, Miscellany LV.) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1969, p. 497.

[2] Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1965. (Harvard East Asian Series, 22.) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1967, p. 197.

[3] London: Macmillan. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, October 1970, p. 744.

public attitudes to these. The lack of document volumes in this field will ensure a welcome for this work.

It is designed to illustrate, according to Professor Crowley, the major events of Australian history since Federation in the words of those who made it or commented on it at the time. The emphasis, as can be imagined, is greater on the post-1939 years. By concentrating on newspapers and journals with a fair sprinkling of parliamentary debates, official records, books and pamphlets, the editor has captured the authentic flavour of Australian public opinion and the way it has become less insular but still essentially Australian.

Modern Australia in Documents can be read on several levels with reward and pleasure, its examples are ample, pertinent and well chosen and the editor's comments are admirable. Many will enjoy dipping into it by referring to the copious index.

NORTH AMERICA

Elites in the Policy Process. By Robert Presthus. *London: Cambridge University Press. 1974. 525 pp. Indexes. £8·00. $19.50.*

ROBERT PRESTHUS has issued a companion volume to his previous book, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics,*[1] by putting together a compilation based on the administration of a questionnaire, funded by the Canada Council in order to provide him with a means of comparing Canada with the United States. The focus of interest is on the structure and political role of interest groups, not as the title might imply, on politicians and civil servants. His cross-national sample included 1,404 'interest group directors' selected at random from telephone directories, as well as 518 legislators and 471 bureaucrats. The questionnaire, which graduate students helped him to administer between 1968 and 1972, was deliberately designed to measure the pattern of interaction between governmental elites and interest group agents.

He interprets interaction theory primarily in terms of the exchange of valued currencies between the principal political actors, and in this context, information is of high political value. Although he pays tribute to the theory of elite accommodation formulated by Lijphart, he abandons the latter's stress on conscious nation-saving incentives derived from Dutch politics, which he thought made sense in the context of Canada, but which he admits cannot be used in the United States. He therefore starts with an assumption that elite accommodation, 'the operational political process' and its policy outcomes appear highly similar in Canada and the United States (p. 47). For a statistical analysis, he uses three major components—interaction, legitimacy, and influence—and submits them to an extensive empirical survey. The principal motive for measuring interaction seems to be to see what influence and authority interest groups can displace (p. 46).

A third of the book is devoted to an analysis of the structural properties and political role of interest groups in the two countries. It is chiefly concerned with 'effectiveness'. He ascribes the different perceptions of American and Canadian interest group leaders to deep-seated theoretical differences about the role of the state (pp. 210–211). The remainder is devoted to the measurement of interaction. He uses regression analysis to establish the relative explanatory power of certain properties and dispositions which he assumes are shared by political leaders in order to enable them

[1] Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press: Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada. 1973. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1974, p. 173.

to interact productively. He goes on into multiple regression analysis in order to test whether properties derived from shared behaviour are more important.

The results of his survey are presented in a large number of statistical tables, and are formulated as statistical explanations, although he frequently uses the phrase 'it may be . . .'. In testing the 'effectiveness' of interest groups, he thinks that the independent variables tend to explain considerably more variants than the interaction dimension. In comparing the 'political cultures' of Canada and the United States, he thinks that the less competitive and diversified system of interest group politics in Canada reflects a low degree of political interest and awareness.

Presthus describes his study as 'empirical, exploratory, and tentative' (p. 457), hoping that his data and theoretical frame may prove useful to others. But it is doubtful whether he will find many followers. The whole book, although heavily professional in its use of statistical techniques, in my opinion lacks the sharpness needed to clarify some of the differences between Canada and the United States. In his hands, functional theory looks very platitudinous. He does not consider what he means by a phrase he often uses, 'functionally requisite'; for example, 'interest groups are a functional requisite of any complex society in which . . . specialisation exists' (p. 459). He seems to wish to reduce all distinctions to some kind of elite accommodation framework, even to the extent of using quotes around the terms 'private' and 'governmental' in order to bring them under one rubric (p. 334). He talks of the 'functional' need for some process of integrating discrete social interests, and sees this process as being achieved through elite accommodation (p. 332). It is easy to see why metaphors of this kind arouse the interest of Canadian political scientists, but doubtful whether they should be used for an analysis of pressure groups in North America.

J. M. LEE

Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism. By Alonzo L. Hamby. *New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1973. 635 pp. Index. (Contemporary American History Series; Gen. Ed.: William E. Leuchtenburg.) $12.95. £6·25.*

'AMERICAN Liberalism' is a phrase that cries out for definition. In Professor Hamby's context, it is that set of beliefs—concern to aid labour, to reduce poverty and advance civil rights, anxiety to maintain democratic government at home and abroad—commonly attributed to the New Deal. His subjects of study are those intellectual journalists and academics who wrote for and read such journals as the *Nation* and the *New Republic*, men who had given, in crude terms, critical support to Roosevelt, and who found themselves in 1945 faced with the Truman administration. He traces, in great detail, their reactions to Truman himself and to his policies at home and abroad. It makes an interesting story, qualified only by the reflection that these people were by no means so important politically as the noise they made suggested. Since, for Truman even more than for Roosevelt, the really dangerous opposition came from the right, the scrupulous reservations of Professor Hamby's liberals may not perhaps have merited treatment at such length.

Truman did not inspire great confidence. He was, at the beginning of

his presidency, inexpert and fumbling, surrounded by old cronies appointed to offices beyond their competence, and marked, in liberal eyes, by inferiority to Roosevelt's men. Two of the New Deal's most inspiring leaders, Harold Ickes and Henry Wallace, found it impossible to stay with Truman. Ickes, resigning, became an acid critic through his newspaper column; Wallace, dismissed from the Cabinet, became the leader of the third-party Progressive movement, and a challenger to the President's inherited claim to liberal support. For a long time, liberals felt that Truman was half-hearted in espousing the causes dear to their creed, and deficient in the flamboyant political skills and crusading liberalism which they associated, not always correctly, with Roosevelt. Above all, there was the deep ambivalence of liberal response to Truman's foreign policy. Critical though they were of the Soviet Union, many liberals continued to hope that amiable discourse and suitable concessions might serve to prevent the development of the cold war. The Truman doctrine, the refusal to share atomic secrets with the Russians, and even the continuance of the Marshall Plan after its rejection by the communist governments, were seen by some critics as deliberate attempts to escalate the cold war.

The President persevered, and won increasing support from the liberals as they came to accept the sincerity of his endeavours, the courage of his fighting spirit, and the unattractiveness of those who opposed him. The Republicans in Congress and the Russians in Czechoslovakia, combined with the inane generalities of Wallace, and the brutal effectiveness of McCarthy, left Truman, for all his faults and crudities, as the liberal hope. Of course, the 'vital center', to use Professor Hamby's fashionable and ponderous phrase, much preferred Adlai Stevenson in 1952 and after, especially as he was never given the chance to disappoint it as President. But liberal historiography today is more than anxious to make amends to Truman for any doubts and grievances harboured by his liberal contemporaries.

GERARD EVANS

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequences and Perspectives. Edited by Philippe C. Schmitter. *Beverly Hills, Calif., London: Sage in cooperation with The Center for Policy Study at the University of Chicago. 1973. 332 pp. (Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping, Vol. III; Series Eds.: Charles C. Moskos, Jr. and Sam C. Sarkesian. Sponsored by the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.) £6·00.*

Sinners and Heretics: The Politics of Military Intervention in Latin America. By Mauricio Solaún and Michael A. Quinn. *Urbana, Ill., Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press. 1973. 228 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. 58; Eds.: Robert E. Scott, Royall Brandis, Robert M. Sutton.) £4·20. $8.95.*

Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia. By Richard Maullin. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Heath. 1973. 164 pp. Bibliog. Index. $10.00. £4·50.*

SCHMITTER says in his preface that 'the publication of yet another volume on the military in Latin America . . . requires some special justification'

and, while this may apply to all three books, it is especially pertinent to his book, which is shoddily produced, but expensive. So we must turn to the contents for justification. In compiling the book Schmitter has evidently assumed an intimate acquaintance with what he calls the 'first generation' studies of the military, of the 1950s and 1960s, which were 'broadly speculative and more descriptive' (preface). The obvious implication is that this collection forms the vanguard of the 'second generation', which employs more sophisticated techniques, and analyses at a greater level of abstraction. And this is what the book pretends to do. But too much of the discussion centres on the accuracy of existing data, the applicability of various techniques, the reliability and significance of the results. We feel as far as ever we were from an *understanding* of military rule in Latin America. If the point of this new sophistication is to verify, statistically, previous intuitions and interpretations, then is it not reasonable to expect one or two clear conclusions? These are conspicuously lacking, save in Schmitter's own article, 'Foreign Military Assistance, National Military Spending, and Military Rule in Latin America'. Schmitter himself appears more 'numerate' than his collaborators, but even his conclusions are marred by the weight of jargon that overlays these articles. Almost predictably, the one clear exception to these failings of style is Alain Rouquié's article 'Military Revolutions and National Independence in Latin America: 1968-71', translated, as it is, from the French. On the other hand this article has been severely abridged, and misses precisely those parts which are the most interesting—the analyses of coups at the level of a specific social reality. Such analysis would appear incongruous in such an abstract setting. Specific social and political worlds are only alluded to in passing, lest a longer look prove discordant with the prevailing heuristic harmony.

Solaún and Quinn's *Sinners and Heretics* suffers a similar absence of specific situations and of any historical presentation of events. Their intention is to review the principal secondary sources which attempt to explain the Latin American coup, and then, by a careful combination of indicators and variables, to construct an analytical paradigm, which will be more theoretically comprehensive than anything produced previously. As the paradigm contains potentially contradictory elements, it is then 'purified' by the usual coup-counting and 'statistical techniques', which are suspect for being exercised on data of dubious accuracy and completeness (more research needs to be carried out on individual countries). One thing must be said. The execution of this *pièce de résistance* is painstaking and elaborate. And the study does have the virtue of condensing tens of previous 'theories' on the Latin American coup d'état. But, finally, we are killed with kindness. The method becomes merely repetitive. The jargon (this time easily recognisable in the structural-functional tradition) reverberates through each new paragraph, punctuated by the staccato of quick-fire references to coups, countries, and dates—which leaves us dazed and confused. We are left with the impression that it could have all been said in a much shorter space, and with a lot less fuss.

Richard Maullin's book is not in the same league. On the cover we are told that 'he probes the nature of political and bandit violence in Colombia, and the missions, strategy, and certain institutional characteristics of the Colombian military under the impact of prolonged guerrilla warfare'. In fact, he attempts nothing so ambitious. He offers a sketchy history of the Colombian army since the beginning of this century (and especially its 'professionalization'); a doubtful interpretation of the causes of *la violen-*

cia; and some interesting information on the careers of the principal guerrilla groups in Colombia during the 1960s. The nature of the influence of these groups on the ideological and organisational development of the armed forces is a subject Maullin broaches on several occasions, but never establishes satisfactorily. The concluding 'comparative' statement on 'the impact of Counterinsurgent Warfare on the Military as an Institution' seems to have little to do with what has gone before. In short, the book is lightweight, but, for all that, far more readable than the other books reviewed here.

JOSEPH W. FOWERAKER

American Corporations and Peruvian Politics. By Charles T. Goodsell. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1974. 272 pp. Bibliog. Index. £7·00*

PROFESSOR GOODSELL has written this book with the aim of providing some much-needed factual material for the debate on the political effects of multinational corporations in developing countries. He prefers to examine the theories of others rather than putting forward his own, and consequently tries out rival models of 'economic imperialism' and 'corporate good citizenship' on Peru. He finds that both work partially, but neither fully. American companies are politically active, but far from completely successful in the face of strong nationalist feeling and (since 1968) strong nationalist government. The book also contains chapters on 'politics in company towns' and on the role of American companies in increasing political integration. These are interesting enough, but seem somewhat set aside from the main concerns of the book.

After an introductory chapter, on the course of Peruvian politics, the author considers in turn the internal structure of the companies, their behaviour, the sanctions open to them and their success in achieving their aims. He focuses mostly on the fairly recent past—but does include a number of historical contrasts. While stressing that different companies act differently, he shows that—generally—American companies have been politically active in a variety of ways. Of these, the building up of personal contacts and bargaining over investments tended to be the most effective—while large-scale public relations and belligerent statements from the United States the least. Companies are happiest in a quiet environment but quietness is by no means the same as inactivity. The power of any company, however, is limited. The International Petroleum Company tried nearly everything, but could not overcome a deteriorating legal and political situation, and was eventually nationalised without compensation. Further, company influence is very sensitive to the prevailing politics and government, and in Peru has been very much reduced since the military took over in October 1968 (although 1971 saw some recovery in company fortunes).

There is much to recommend this book. It is clearly written, and contains many interesting facts (which the author has clearly worked very hard to collect). The empirical tone of the book is welcome—as is the open-mindedness of the author's approach to what is an important and controversial topic. The book may be sound rather than spectacular, but it is a considerable contribution nevertheless.

GEORGE PHILIP

The United States and the Caribbean Republics 1921–1933. By Dana Gardner Munro. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1974. 394 pp. Map. Index. $17.50. £8·40.*

THIS book is both a continuation and a contrast to Professor Munro's earlier study of the first years of the century *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–21.*[1] It is a continuation in the sense that its author, now Emeritus Professor of History of Princeton University, applies to it the same standards of research and documentation which has made the earlier work a fundamental requirement to any serious historical study of the area. Like it, too, it is written in an easy, lucid style which is a pleasure to read, and it is without excessive footnoting.

It is however a contrast to the earlier work in that it draws upon and makes use of the author's own experience as a diplomat, as, successively, a regional economist in the US Department of State, a member of its Latin American division, Secretary of Legation in Panama, Secretary in Nicaragua, chief of the Latin American division and finally American Minister to Haiti from 1930 to 1932. Consequently the author, in his own words, 'knew most of the people who are mentioned' in the pages of his book 'and took part in discussion and negotiations with them'. Thus when discussing, for example, the rise and fall of Sandino's insurrection in Nicaragua in 1928–30, Professor Munro is able to clarify from his own experience the relative weights which the State Department and the Legation attached to the presence of US marines there. At the same time he well conveys the awkwardness felt by the Department when their information about the role of President Calles and his government in initiating the revolt in order to obtain a Mexican protectorate over Central America could not, for security reasons, be revealed to a Latin American public instinctively anti-American and hostile to the re-emergence (as they saw it) of intervention.

Particularly interesting, too, is his argument for the unimportance of the Clark Memorandum as a turning point in United States diplomatic policy. But the dominant theme is the idealistic motivation of United States Caribbean policy in this, as in the preceding period. Consistently, Professor Munro shows, the State Department intervened in negotiations between bankers and states, to get a better deal for the states, not for the bankers. No doubt this was seen as being in the best long-term interests of the United States itself. But it made the reality of the Caribbean much more complicated than the mythology.

PETER CALVERT

No Peaceful Way: Chile's Struggle For Dignity. By Gary MacEoin. *New York: Sheed and Ward. 1974. 230 pp. Bibliog. Index. $6.95.*

Gary MacEoin's account of recent Chilean events adds little to our understanding of that tragedy. It is probably unwise to attempt such complete coverage so close to the coup.

Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Chile: a dossier on workers' participation in the revolutionary process. By Michel Raptis. Trans. by Joan Simmonds. *London: Allison and Busby. 1974. 174 pp. (Motive; Gen. Ed.: Chris Goodey.) £3·50. Paperback: £1·50.*

[1] Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1964.

Michel Raptis's account of worker participation is episodic and hurried. But it opens up an important area for study.

The Allende Victory: An Analysis of the 1970 Chilean Presidential Election. By Michael J. Francis. Foreword by Clifton E. Wilson. *Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press. 1973. 76 pp. (The Institute of Government Research; Comparative Government Studies No. 4.) Paperback: $1.50.*

Michael Francis's account of the 1970 Presidential election is clear and useful, if not very searching. It provides a useful background study.

GENERAL HISTORY AND MEMOIRS

War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century: A comparative study of Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States. By Arthur Marwick. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1974. 258 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £5·00. Paperback: £2·50.*

ARTHUR MARWICK, Professor of History at the Open University, is justly admired for his studies of the effects of war, especially total war, on modern society. Two of his earlier works, *The Deluge: British Society and the First World War* [1] and *Britain in the Century of Total War* [2] are well-known examples of this intellectual concern. In the present book he widens his scope and considers the consequences of the two world wars for Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States. This raises the preliminary question whether the enormously wide-ranging effects of the two wars on all the various aspects of the five states concerned can be meaningfully dealt with in a book of not much more than 200 pages; there is bound to be a good deal of rather breathless and superficial writing. Moreover, a fair amount of space in this book is taken up with doubtfully relevant matters which do not much advance the main theme: this applies, for instance, to the account of the 'essential features' of the five countries in 1914 (pp. 14–22), the discussion of German military strategy in Russia after the invasion in 1941 (pp. 124–27), raising such questions as 'why did the Germans not completely crush and destroy Leningrad?' and the lengthy digression on the organisation of the Resistance in France during the Second World War (pp. 190–92).

One effect of this tendency of Marwick's book to decline into mere narrative accounts of happenings in the five countries during and after the two wars is that many basic questions about the meaning of war in history, though raised, are not very fully discussed. One, for instance, is the old controversy whether big events like wars merely accelerate trends already developing in society, rather than initiate them. It is possible to argue, for example, that the women's vote in Britain and the impact of self-determination in the British Empire would have occurred anyway, or perhaps that war even delayed their advent. And was the remarkable contrast in economic experience after 1945 of Britain, on the one side, and Germany and Japan, on the other, an after effect of the war, or did the war temporarily deflect into unsuccessful military adventures the inevitable economic superiority of those two countries over Britain? Professor Marwick has in this book given us a tasty *aperitif* without going far to satisfy our appetites.

[1] London: Bodley Head. 1965.
[2] London: Bodley Head. 1968.

As a historian, however, apart from amassing an impressive array of social, economic and political data, to say nothing of national literatures, he brings to his work that indispensable tool of the social scientist, the *model*. His model has five faces: the destructive and the disruptive effects of war, war as a test of challenge of social institutions, war as involving participation by the different sections of society, especially the less privileged, and war as having certain psychological consequences. The model does not perhaps throw much new light on the subject, but it serves as a clothes-peg on which to hang the heterogeneous and wide-ranging data in which this book abounds.

F. S. NORTHEDGE

Winston Churchill. By Henry Pelling. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1974. 724 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £4·95.*

THE special claim that can be made for Dr. Henry Pelling's life of Winston Churchill is that, among all the Churchillian literature of recent years, especially of the centenary year of 1974, it is the first single-volume assessment of this extraordinary man's entire career which has been written since his death. Dr. Pelling has tapped all the main documentary sources, including writings by Churchill which have not previously been assembled for publication, memoirs by contemporaries and official papers up to 1945. He has not, however, had access to Churchill's family papers, nor has he sought oral evidence from the numerous people who knew and worked with the great man.

The result is a lucid straightforward narrative of half-a-century of British politics, as illuminated by the varied and unremitting activities of Britain's most astonishing politician. Although the whole book is centred around the person of Churchill, and Churchill was, as Mr. Pelling insists, a very human statesman, this biography is largely a chronicle of public affairs, in which the hero's more intimate life and motivation remain elusive. That he had a family life and, at various stages of his career, close personal friends, is clear; but one's impression is strong that it was his role as a public figure, whether as a writer or as a politician, that absorbed his thoughts. Mr. Pelling does not manage, and perhaps does not seriously try, to take us inside the closed circle of Churchill's inner life, if indeed there was one.

The book is very readable even though there is some over-compression, dictated, for instance, by the need to cover the whole war-time premiership in some 130 pages. The justification for bringing the whole vast story into one book is that the narrative, read as a whole, helps to bring into perspective, and partly to reconcile, the often conflicting elements in Churchill's make-up and record. The story reads like a series of novels. His parentage, youth and entry into politics are very close to Trollope. Then there is an interlude of pure G. A. Henty, with the young soldier dashing around the world in search of military adventure, glory and, quite unashamedly, decorations. Later, much later, one is for three crowded years almost in the atmosphere of Tolstoy's *War and Peace*. The semi-absurdity of the Henty period is worth recalling, because its boyish romanticism accompanied Churchill to the end and helps to explain such ludicrous incidents as his seeking a high field command for himself in the First World War and offering an even higher military command in 1942 to Eden—who wisely declined.

Dr. Pelling's continuous narrative brings out very clearly one of the anomalies of Churchill's long career. In retrospect he is of course seen primarily as the great war leader of 1940–45; and even as early as 1916 Admiral Jackie Fisher had described him as 'a War Man'. Yet Dr. Pelling shows that when he was a young Liberal minister before 1914 he was, despite his military background, genuinely concerned about many aspects of social reform at home. In 1908 he had even preferred a domestic post to the Admiralty and had become friendly with such seemingly unlikely associates as Sidney and Beatrice Webb. Much of what he then said about social affairs gave evidence of quite advanced thinking, yet from 1918 onwards he seems to have dropped out of sympathy with the underlying social trends of his time, increasingly applying crude concepts of military conflict to social problems, as in the General Strike of 1926. Despite occasional traces of his earlier thinking, he came more and more to justify Fisher's verdict, and this gap in his equipment as a statesman accounts for many of the failures in his career.

I do not think that Dr. Pelling quite manages to explain how the perceptive reformer of 1908 became so quickly indifferent to social questions and so fallible in judgment. Perhaps the simple explanation lies in the remark of H. G. Wells, 'Before all things he desires a dramatic world with villains —and one hero'.

Dr. Pelling is understandably indulgent in his estimate of Churchill's achievements after 1945. It is true that Churchill continued to steal the international limelight with his speeches at Fulton, Zurich and the Hague. But these utterances made their impact not because of any special originality, but rather because Churchill in opposition was willing to say things that statesmen carrying responsibility felt to be either premature, as in the Fulton case, or misleadingly simple as in the Zurich. Dr. Pelling rightly says that Churchill's administration after 1951 was not a failure. But Churchill's part in it, especially his nostalgic attempt to resuscitate his war-time team, was a hindrance rather than an inspiration; while his own clinging to office was deeply unfair to his successor. His advocacy of a summit conference after Stalin's death, though sound enough in principle, was even more premature than the forebodings he had earlier expressed at Fulton.

The highlight of any biography of Churchill has to be 1940, and here Dr. Pelling, without any hyperbole or purple patches, brings out movingly the decisive effect of Churchill's combined activism and eloquence. In a few weeks, which might well have seen a crumbling of the will to fight on after the fall of France, he made any kind of defeatism or even half-heartedness absolutely unthinkable. He remained the unquestioned symbol of national determination through many bad months until the tide turned at the end of 1942. In the face of this achievement, criticism of particular decisions, in which he may have been mistaken, can scarcely affect the verdict of history.

From 1943 his role became less central as, to use his own wellknown words, '. . . the New World, with all its power and might, [stepped] forth to the rescue and liberation of the old.' It was one of Churchill's services to his country that he was among the first to recognise what was happening and, for perhaps the only time in his career, consciously began to accept second place for the sake of the war-winning American partnership.

KENNETH YOUNGER

Churchill at War. Vol. I: Alone 1939–40. By Patrick Cosgrave. *London: Collins. 1974. 379 pp. Index. £4·95.*

Dr. Cosgrave would have been wise not to write so self-complacent an introduction, for his book is not as good as he thinks it is—' the first work of a historian of my generation based on a *thorough* knowledge of the public archive and such private papers as are available to me '. The private papers to which he refers are of no very great scope, and there are other historians —Roger Parkinson springs to mind—who are not precisely strangers in the Public Record Office. The new practice of listing authorities, initiated by Michael Howard in his *Grand Strategy* volume, shows that the official historians themselves are no tyros in this field. Moreover, Dr. Cosgrave is often perilously close to being caught by the man-traps which await documentary researchers, (a) of believing that Cabinet minutes reflect the true *va-et-vient* of argument across the table, and (b) of assuming that such papers mirror fully and accurately the actual conduct of war. Neither assumption bears examination.

Yet this is a genuine addition to *Churchilliana*. In other contexts Dr. Cosgrave has the character of a cavalier and a controversialist, but here he has kept his head down and concentrated thoughtfully on a fundamental quality of the War Lord to which proper acknowledgment is only beginning to be paid as the detailed records emerge. Throughout his account of 1939–40 the author maintains, as a steady centre-line, the image of Churchill not simply as the Great Inspirer, the Bloody but Unbowed Head, but also as an interrogative and creative intellect perpetually at work, a mind which—for all its gross errors—was uniquely capable of understanding, analysing and coping with the realities of war. We see Churchill in these months learning how to stand up to, and sometimes justifiably defeat on their own ground, the trio of Chiefs of Staff who in the latter part of the war were the best team Britain has ever produced. Learning . . . this is a point Dr. Cosgrave strongly emphasises, for, although by 1939 Churchill was crammed with prejudices, he taught himself how to be supple and how to adjust. The author writes of the Prime Minister with a cool respect not born of adulation. It is worth examining, in this light, his account of the critical and formative part Churchill played in the *fainéant* Chamberlain cabinet.

The trouble is that Dr. Cosgrave emerges so rarely from the coverts of the Record Office. His case would actually be strengthened if he touched more explicitly on Churchill's notorious acts of misjudgment—the wild folly, for example, of the ' hunting groups ' of destroyers he demanded for wild-goose-chasing submarines in the Western Approaches, ' like a cavalry division '; the unpardonable way he tried to falsify the figures of the early U-boat sinkings; his disastrous attempt to force Gort into accepting the fantasy of the Weygand Plan. Churchill's part in the Dakar disaster was a good deal more dubious than Dr. Cosgrave records, and the subsequent disgraceful treatment of Admiral North, like his vilification of Leopold of the Belgians, is a deep stain on Churchill's record. The book has other minor blemishes. Bomber Harris is put at the head of Bomber Command in 1940, whereas he did not arrive there till 1942. And throughout the book we meet with the solecism of von Runstedt.

None of these matters diminish Churchill's true stature, or the lucid and sensible way in which Dr. Cosgrave interprets some of its essential features. But because Churchill was a multitude it is important to see him whole. So much that he did, for good as well as for ill, fell outside the ambit of the Public Record Office, and for all his knowledge of the *paperasserie* it is

doubtful whether Dr. Cosgrave has fully described the phenomenon who, of all his countrymen, did most to win the war.

RONALD LEWIN

A Day's March Nearer Home: The War History from Alamein to VE Day based on the War Cabinet papers of 1942 to 1945. By Roger Parkinson. *St. Alban's, Herts., London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon. 1974. 551 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £5·95.*

MR. PARKINSON'S final volume in his trilogy on the Second World War follows the pattern well-established in his earlier two books. Events are treated chronologically, not thematically, and the reader is substantially left to make his own way. Major figures in this phase of the story are again identified in an introductory list and the accompanying maps are useful. The narrative starts with the lighting of 'Torch' and follows the war through the invasion of Italy and France to the final defeat of Germany. The problems of the Far East, however, are not neglected, and the connections between the various theatres of the war do emerge, though necessarily, given the author's chosen method, not in a systematic fashion. The important conferences—Casablanca, Tehran, Quebec, Moscow, Yalta and Potsdam—are all adequately covered, though the diplomatic historian may well feel that some of the complexities of the international situation are oversimplified. On the whole, the narrative carries the reader along, though occasionally the scene-setting sentences seem rather banal.

The writer's main theme, on the British side, is the exhausting burden which the conduct of the war placed on the great men. While Churchill, Brooke and their colleagues did not collapse under the strain, their judgment was inevitably at times impaired. Understandably, on occasion, Churchill and Brooke lost patience with each other, but on the whole Parkinson rightly feels that their relationship was a remarkable and war-winning one. It is difficult, however, at the end of the trilogy, to avoid the feeling that the British suffered a debilitating triumph in 1945. The author rightly stresses the tensions in Anglo-American relations and the growing awareness that Britain no longer called the tune. It is, nevertheless, a defect in his method that, like the figures in his story, he has to rush on to other matters, scarcely stopping to assess the deeper significance of the events he describes.

KEITH ROBBINS

Hankey: Man of Secrets. Vol. III. 1931–1963. By Stephen Roskill. *London: Collins. 1974. 688 pp. Illus. Index. £6·50.*

THE present reviewer, in a notice of a previous volume of this outstanding biography, drew attention to Admiral Lord Fisher's statement in 1916 that Sir Maurice Hankey was 'extravagantly loyal to his immediate chief'.[1] One of the fascinating features of the present volume is that it enables the reader to see how far this judgment was borne out in the last phase of Hankey's career as Secretary to the Cabinet and subsequently as a member of the government itself.

First, towards Ramsay MacDonald Hankey showed less than blind devotion. Needless to say, he warmly approved of the Prime Minister's conduct in forming a National Government in August 1931 and found himself in

[1] Vol. II. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1972, p. 639. (Vol. I was reveiwed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1971, p. 109.)

agreement with many of MacDonald's subsequent attitudes, not least in foreign policy. Yet he had never quite trusted MacDonald ' since his attempt to tamper with the Cabinet minutes on the Campbell case in 1924 ' (p. 174). And he was not oblivious of the senility which increasingly afflicted MacDonald. He accordingly did not hesitate to tell the Prime Minister, when his opinion was sought, that ' on the whole I thought he would be well-advised ' to resign after the Silver Jubilee of King George V—advice which MacDonald accepted (p. 162).

Hankey's relations with Stanley Baldwin, while always correct, were likewise not strikingly warm—certainly less so than those between Baldwin and Thomas Jones, Hankey's former deputy. The fact was that Hankey was a severe private critic of Baldwin's ' failure to give the nation a strong and clear statement on the condition of Britain's defence services in the middle 1930s and the reasons why a substantial rearmament programme was essential ' (p. 264).

Towards Neville Chamberlain, however, Hankey showed loyalty and devotion far beyond the call of duty. He believed, evidently with much justification, that Chamberlain was far sounder than his predecessors in appreciating the essential priorities in defence spending. But, above all, he welcomed the clarity and decisiveness which Chamberlain brought to the conduct of foreign policy. The admiration was apparently mutual, for Chamberlain invited Hankey to join the War Cabinet in September 1939 just over a year after his retirement as a civil servant.

Hankey was to be no less loyal to Chamberlain in war than he had been in peace. In May 1940, after the fatal Narvik debate, he even opposed the creation of a National Government and told Chamberlain that he believed him to be ' well nigh indispensable as Prime Minister ' and he hoped that he would ' not let the Labour Party and the " Fifth Column " bomb you out of it ' (p. 463).

Hankey's final period of office was spent in Winston Churchill's government as a minister outside the Cabinet. Now at last Hankey finally showed unambiguously that Fisher's jibe had no permanent validity. For Hankey was anything but loyal to the Prime Minister who ironically towers above all others in the history of this century. He had long regarded Churchill as an untrustworthy rogue elephant. Now he strongly objected to his conduct of the war and, in particular, to his alleged failure to pay due attention to the views of the Chiefs of Staff. Finally in 1942 he was ignominiously dismissed and he soon became an unpopular public critic of the government in the House of Lords.

Captain Roskill's account of these events confirms that, whatever the merits of his views, Hankey was unwise to become a minister. He may have been no less opinionated than his contemporary, Sir Robert Vansittart, whose attitude, according to Lord Avon, made him ' more like a Secretary of State than a permanent official '. But the possession of strong convictions based on unrivalled expertise is not usually sufficient to justify a metamorphosis from Whitehall to the Palace of Westminster. Hankey was to prove no exception.

Captain Roskill's third volume is no less masterly and enthralling than its predecessors. And, like them, it is much more than a satisfying biography: it is a major contribution to the study of British history. Some will wonder, however, whether Captain Roskill does not at times become a little partisan about events on which he doubtless had no less strong feelings than his subject. His treatment of what he calls the ' notorious " Peace

Ballot " ' of 1935 is a case in point (p. 175). He states baldly that the replies revealed ' very strong pacifist sentiment ' but fails to reveal that more than 70 per cent favoured even military sanctions against aggression and that people like Lord Beaverbrook, far from seeing this as ' pacifist sentiment ', denounced what they called the ' Blood Ballot '. Again, Captain Roskill's treatment of Munich, though a useful antidote for any general readers who have never previously been exposed to anything other than polemics of the ' Guilty Men ' school, does not strike an altogether dispassionate note. But these are minor reservations. For the fact is that no serious student of British policy in the 1930s, particularly in the fields of foreign affairs and defence, will read this volume without admiration and profit.

DAVID CARLTON

The Baltic States: The Years of Independence. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 1917–1940. By Georg von Rauch. Trans. by Gerald Onn. *London: Hurst. 1974. 265 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·20.*

Problems of Mininations: Baltic Perspectives. Edited by Arvids Ziedonis, Jr., Rein Taagepera and Mardi Valgemäe. *San José, Calif.: Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, California State University. 1973. 214 pp. Index. (Publications of the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies.) $8.50. Paperback: $3.95.*

GEORG VON RAUCH'S *The Baltic States* provides a history of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during the period of independence from 1917 to 1940. The author is a Baltic-German and thus at the same time personally involved with his subject, yet not identified with any of the three Baltic nationalisms, and further he is a conscientious professional historian, aware of the dangers of bias. Writing the history of this kind of subject raises a formidable initial problem: it has to be assumed that most readers lack the most elementary background knowledge, and the author has to provide an introductory chapter to put them in the picture. Von Rauch is frank about the difficulties of doing this within the framework of a single volume, and the result is a highly compressed first chapter which leaves a lot of unanswered questions, particularly about the socio-economic background to political and cultural developments. The author then faced a second problem—whether to write three separate histories and then try to bring out the common factors between them, or use an integrated approach which treats the three republics as a unit, despite their striking differences in language, culture, historical background and international position. Lithuania especially is in many respects unlike the other two; as the author says, ' the Lithuanians undoubtedly followed a very different line of development, and formed very different political associations during the major part of their history ' (p. ix). However, the course of events drove the three republics into ever closer relations until they suffered their common catastrophe in 1940. The fact that Lithuania's ' special relationship ' with the Soviet Union spared it nothing when the time came serves to illustrate the fact that the similarities between these countries were more significant than the differences, and this justifies the author's decision to adopt an integrated approach—the first serious attempt to do so, since nearly all previous work has had a strong nationalist inspiration. Students of the Baltic area will welcome von Rauch's book as fulfilling a long felt need for a general historical study of the Baltic states. Those already familiar with the subject will find some interesting new

insights arising out of the integrated approach, and a lay reader will also find much on which to reflect.

The broad interest of the history of the Baltic republics arises because they are extreme cases of the consequences of European romantic-linguistic nationalism: nationalism was the only reason for their existing at all. Yet because the essence of this nationalism was a concentration on their unique differences from the rest of mankind, it inhibited them from seeking rational solutions, even to the most basic problems of survival. For survival depended on a readiness to sink differences and co-operate either among themselves, or with their neighbours, but nationalistic feelings always stood in the way—thus the very force which had brought them into existence made them unfit to survive. This book also brings out clearly the other basic truth about the tragedy of the Baltic states—that they came into existence only through the temporary collapse of both the Baltic great powers, Russia and Germany, in 1918. Once these powers had recovered, the Baltic republics had no future as independent states unless Germany and Russia could be balanced against one another indefinitely. August 1939 showed that they could not, and the consequences for the Baltic republics were immediate and fatal—in terms of *realpolitik* their independence had always been a nonsense.

Problems of Mininations: Baltic Perspectives consists of a selection of the papers delivered to the interdisciplinary Third Conference on Baltic Studies at the University of Toronto in 1972. Most of the contributors are social scientists—economists and political scientists predominate. Some attempt has been made to group the papers round central themes, but in fact the book is a rag-bag of unrelated pieces of widely differing quality. The basic concept that ' mininations ' are an identifiable phenomenon deserving serious study because of their peculiar common problems is potentially a fruitful one. The papers in this book do little to realise this potential, and some seem to have no useful content at all, although the polysyllabic terminology and the use of mathematical formulae seek to conceal this. A careful reading of the book will yield some interesting bits of information and some worthwhile ideas, but none of them developed in a serious way, and the sour undertones which spoil so much émigré scholarship are present in several contributions. The book is a monument to everything that is wrong with the contemporary scholarly publications industry.

A. F. UPTON

Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Vol. III. Dag Hammarskjöld, 1956–57. Selected, edited and with a commentary by Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote. *New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1973. 729 pp. Index. £10·13.*

THE third volume of this handsomely produced and printed series [1] is the second devoted to the Secretary-Generalship of Dag Hammarskjöld. It covers the period from the spring of 1956 to the end of 1957. With it we are transported into the heroic age of the United Nations. The continuous and dominating theme is the crisis in the Middle East, culminating in Suez, levelling out in the gradual consolidation of UNEF and the re-opening of the Canal. The moment and the place created a perilous deadlock of forces

[1] Vol. I. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1970, p. 753. Vol. II. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1973, p. 524.

such as only action by the UN could resolve without world catastrophe, and which thus made both possible and necessary a hitherto unexampled deployment of all the resources available to the office of the Secretary-General. These were days when it really did seem as if the fate, not only of the Middle East, but of the frail fabric of international order itself depended upon the skill, devotion and intrepidity of Dag Hammarskjöld.

It is no part of the intention of this series to take the reader behind the scenes of these events. Its aim is merely to make available the official statements of the central figure. Thus there is little or nothing in this volume which is not to be found either in the UN's available official records, or in such semi-public documents as the releases of the Secretary-General's press conferences or other public appearances. We are not given access, for example, to the records of the Advisory Committee on UNEF, still less to Hammarskjöld's unpublished correspondence. Fortunately, to make the bald official record more comprehensible and rewarding, the editors have interpreted their role generously, giving connecting and background information on a scale as extensive as that of the documents themselves. Sometimes indeed they may be judged to have indulged their editorial licence with more zest than impartiality. There is little here by way of criticism for one principal actor in the tragedy, Mr. Dulles, but it is not uncommon to encounter descriptions of British behaviour (for example, 'one more reflex from the old imperial days') which, however much one may privately agree with them, accord oddly with the ostensible objectivity of this collection.

H. G. NICHOLAS

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PROFESSOR STAAR in his introduction to the seventh edition of this annual, analyses the main trends in the communist world during 1972, but the greater part of the volume consists of signed country by country surveys of communist parties. There is also a useful section on international communist front organisations, a twenty-three page bibliography of books published in 1971 and 1972 and an index of persons.

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CORRESPONDENCE

From Gordon Waterfield.
To the Editor, *International Affairs.*

Madam,

In the review you published of *Professional Diplomat* by F. S. Northedge in your July issue the late Sir Percy Loraine is quoted as writing that it was more important for him to have bred the successful race-horse *Darius* ' than to have been in a dozen posts abroad '. Loraine was, in fact, much too proud of his achievements as an ambassador for that to have been his opinion, and it should, I think, be made clear that he was referring to the views of the general public; he found it amazing and a little shocking that he was better known as an owner of successful race-horses than for his work as ambassador. I regret that my text was not as clear as it should have been.

On his mission to Italy, May 1939 to June 1940, was that really a failure as is stated by the reviewer? I do not believe that any ambassador could have kept Italy out of the war after the collapse of France and in view of Mussolini's character. The British Chiefs of Staff considered it, rightly or wrongly, to have been a great advantage that Italy had remained neutral for over nine months after her Axis partner had invaded Poland and the second European war had begun. To that extent Loraine had succeeded.

Yours sincerely,
GORDON WATERFIELD

From Professor L. F. Rushbrook Williams.
To the Editor, *International Affairs.*

Madam,

On page 546 of the October issue of *International Affairs* Michael Harbottle does some injustice to the past attitude of the Pakistan Government towards the peacekeeping function of the United Nations. In the course of the conflict which resulted in the breakaway of East Pakistan, President Yahya Khan thrice sought the good offices of the United Nations in face of the escalating intervention of India. It was India's refusal of these good offices, along with the Soviet veto in the Security Council which prevented the United Nations from acting—not the absence of ' any inclination ' (to employ Michael Harbottle's phrase) on the part of the then Pakistan Government.

Yours sincerely,
L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS

Brigadier Harbottle writes:

Professor Rushbrook Williams is correct in his statement that after India's intervention the Pakistan government sought the good offices of the United Nations, but by then India was involved and would not permit such an initiative. However, before India's entry into the dispute, Pakistan refused to accept any idea of the United Nations playing a peacekeeping role in the dispute.

BOOKS REVIEWED, JANUARY 1975

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOL. 51 APRIL 1975 No. 2

RENEGOTIATION: BRITAIN'S COSTLY LESSON?

John Pinder

THE results of the renegotiation of Britain's terms of entry to the European Economic Community are bound to be the subject of heated controversy in the period up to the referendum. It will be difficult, in such an atmosphere, to judge the significance of what has been done. What did the renegotiation achieve? How will this affect the referendum? What further consequences may there be? It may be useful, in the calm before the storm,[1] to try to give some answers to these questions.

The renegotiation was formally defined in Mr. Callaghan's statement to the Council of Ministers of the European Communities in Luxembourg on April 1, 1974.[2] This repeated, word for word, the text of the Labour party's manifesto for the February election.[3] After stating that the Labour party opposed 'British membership of the European Communities on the terms negotiated by the Conservative Government', it expressed readiness to 'renegotiate the entry terms', with seven main objectives:

1. 'major changes in the Common Agricultural Policy, so that it ceases to be a threat to world trade in food products, and so that low-cost producers outside Europe can continue to have access to the British food market';
2. 'new and fairer methods of financing the Community budget';
3. no economic and monetary union such as would compel Britain to 'accept increased unemployment for the sake of maintaining a fixed parity';
4. 'the retention by Parliament of those powers over the British economy needed to pursue effective regional, industrial and fiscal policies';
5. 'an agreement on capital movements which protects our balance of payments and full employment policies';
6. better safeguarding of 'the economic interests of the Commonwealth and the developing countries';
7. 'no harmonisation of value-added tax which would require us to tax necessities'.

[1] This article was written in mid-February.

[2] *Renegotiation of the Terms of Entry into the European Economic Community*, Cmnd. 5593, HMSO, Apr. 1974.

[3] *The Labour Party Manifesto 1974*. (The manifesto for the October election was entitled *Labour Party Manifesto: October 1974*.)

In his speech at the Council of Ministers on June 4, Mr. Callaghan assured the Ministers that this list represented 'the limits of the problem'; and he went on to define the objectives in terms that were clearly intended as a serious basis for negotiation. He adhered to the approach of seeking 'improvements by way of changes in the Community's policies and decisions in preference to proposing changes in the Treaties themselves'; and, consistently with this, he suggested that the subjects for renegotiation should generally be dealt with by the normal institutions of Community policy-making: by the 'Agricultural Council' (the Ministers of Agriculture) for the CAP and by the 'Development Council' for relations with developing countries (though it was left open whether the budgetary problems would be dealt with by the Foreign Ministers or the Finance Ministers; and trade, regional and industrial issues—for which the British Ministers responsible were notoriously anti-Market—would be dealt with in the Foreign Ministers' Council). But for all the change of tone, the fact remained that the British government would 'not regard the Treaty obligations as binding upon us'[4] unless it was satisfied that the renegotiation was successful; and if it was satisfied, the issue would then be decided 'through a General Election or a Consultative Referendum'.

While the diplomatic scope of the renegotiation was defined in the statements of April 1 and June 4, then, its political significance was that the Labour government intended to abrogate the Treaty of Accession and take Britain out of the Community unless the government was persuaded, after the renegotiation, that Britain should remain a member, and unless the British electorate should decide in favour at the time of a subsequent referendum.

What part the results of the renegotiation will play in these momentous political decisions will be considered later. First, we need to evaluate what has been achieved in the renegotiation itself.

Problems solved before the renegotiation began

Two of the seven items in the Labour manifesto, which Mr. Callaghan read to the Ministers on April 1, were omitted from his statement of June 4. They did not appear in the detailed negotiating position because, quite simply, there was nothing to negotiate about. Where capital movements threaten the payments position of a member state, the imposition of controls was already permitted; and the Community's directive of April 11, 1967, on value-added tax allowed member states to zero-rate items for social purposes.[5] Doubtless for

[4] Mr. Callaghan's statement of April 1, *op. cit.*
[5] These facts were quite well known before the manifesto was written. See, for

similar reasons, fiscal policies were dropped from the list of policies (regional, industrial) for which it was thought necessary to negotiate the retention of powers by Parliament.

The issue of economic and monetary union was also fairly summarily dismissed from the agenda on June 4, because Mr. Callaghan had discovered, at the meeting of the Community's Foreign Ministers at Schloss Gymnich not long before, that ' a great deal of further work and discussion will be required before any further decisions can be taken in pursuit of these general aims '. That is to say, the permanent locking of parities, and even their temporary enclosure in the ' snake in the tunnel ', was not a realistic prospect for as long as member governments judged that it would harm their external balance and domestic employment positions. This, too, had been fairly clear for at least two years before the manifesto was written.[6] Successive floatings of Community currencies had underlined the point; and if clinching evidence was needed, it had been provided by the French, who responded to the oil and monetary crisis by floating the franc in January 1974. It was, therefore, thanks not to the renegotiation but to the events of 1973 and early 1974, that Mr. Wilson was able to report to the House of Commons, after the meeting of the nine Heads of Government in December 1974, that he ' did not find anyone in Paris who believed that there was the remotest possibility of economic and monetary union by 1980 '.[7]

This proof that member governments valued employment more than the locking of parities was important, because fears that the British economy would be ground down by a remorselessly deflationist Community had played a large part in the economic case against British entry. Thus Professor Kaldor, whose views carried much weight in the Labour party, had forecast that Britain in the Community would become ' the "Northern Ireland" (or the Sicily) of Europe—an increasingly depressed industrial area, with mass emigration the only escape ',[8] because of the ' critical assumptions ' that it would not be possible to adjust an external deficit by devaluation, and that the relation of EEC agricultural prices to world prices would remain much the same as in 1971.

Events had also disproved Professor Kaldor's second critical assumption by the time the renegotiation began, for world agricultural prices had risen in 1973 to levels broadly similar to those of the CAP.

example, S. Yassukovitch and D. Dosser in J. Pinder (ed.), *The Economics of Europe: What the Common Market Means for Britain*. London: Charles Knight for the Federal Trust. 1971, pp. 167, 190, 191.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[7] *Hansard*, Dec. 16, 1974, Col. 1127.

[8] N. Kaldor in D. Evans (ed.), *Destiny or Delusion: Britain and the Common Market*. London: Gollancz. 1971, p. 74.

There was no reflection of this in the manifesto, with its reference to the CAP as a ' threat to world trade in food products '. But Mr. Callaghan recognised, in his statement on June 4, that world prices were much higher than they had been ' since our earlier criticisms were made three years ago ', and that ' it is likely (but not absolutely certain) that there will be a closer relationship between Community and world prices than in the past '. Not only was the average level of world agricultural prices around the Community level in 1974, but world prices of leading commodities such as sugar and wheat rose well above Community prices. This changed the task of the renegotiators in two ways. The effect of the CAP on the cost of living, the balance of payments and the contribution to the Community budget, which had been, along with the locking of parities, central to the economic case against membership and to the line taken in the manifesto, was moderated and in some respects reversed; and the new relationship between supply and demand had altered the balance of interest between producers and consumers, and between access to markets and security of supply, in a way that greatly facilitated negotiations on specific aspects of the CAP.

Normal negotiations

What might have been a rocky path for the agricultural renegotiators had, then, been made much smoother by events in the world commodity markets. But there remained a number of substantial British demands for changes in the Community's agricultural policies, which were elaborated by Mr. Peart in the Council of Ministers on June 18.[9] The discouragement of surpluses and improvement of marketing regimes were listed, with particular reference to beef. Access for certain commodities from outside the Community was to be improved, with particular regard for the interests of Commonwealth producers and of the consumer. More generally, there should be firm criteria for pricing policy, greater flexibility (with measures to deal with special circumstances in different parts of the Community), and better financial control.

For beef, the British government aimed to get a deficiency payments scheme, and it was agreed, at the Council of Ministers on February 13, 1975, that deficiency payments could be paid during the coming year on top of a relatively low intervention price. Although the agreement applies only to the coming year, the government can argue that, as a member of the Community, Britain can secure its continuation by not agreeing to any other proposal.

For commodities from outside the Community, the government

[9] The demands are summarised in *Developments in the European Communities March–October 1974*, Cmnd. 5790, HMSO, Nov. 1974.

seems fairly satisfied with the position taken up by the Community for the Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations; and the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries) negotiations and measures taken to liberalise the GSP (generalised scheme of preferences) have improved the position for particular countries and products. The major issues are, however, sugar and butter. Negotiations on butter had not been completed by the time this article was written. For sugar, the access for 1·4 million tons from the developing countries of the Commonwealth was confirmed, a long-term contract at a price related to the Community price was offered by the Community and accepted by the Commonwealth countries, and the Community agreed to pay a subsidy of £90 million to keep down the price of imported sugar in Britain.

A general review, or stock-taking, of the CAP is being undertaken; but although the Germans' insistence on the need for reform has improved the prospect that something will be done, major results do not seem likely before the referendum. Meanwhile, the CAP has had some flexibility thrust upon it by the floating of currencies and the compensating levies and subsidies which have consequently been imposed at the frontiers between member states, thus in effect allowing the member countries' price levels to differ; and the policy of providing special subsidies for hill farmers has been accepted by the Community.

Britain's chief general aim must, however, be to get the Community's agricultural price level down when, as is likely, world prices are below Community ones. The principal means of reducing Community prices in real terms has been to allow annual increases in CAP price levels that are less than the annual rate of inflation. Through most of the 1960s, the prices received by Community farmers were compressed in this way by about 2 per cent. a year in real terms.[10] Since inflation has accelerated, the rate of compression of real prices for farm products has risen too. In 1974 and 1975 taken together, the average rise in CAP prices totalled about 15 per cent., or some 10 per cent. less than the average rate of inflation in member countries in the last two years.

In advance of stock-taking or of the establishment of firm criteria for pricing policy, then, much progress has been made towards the general British aim of reducing prices in real terms. But it is open to question whether renegotiation, in the sense of demands backed by the threat of withdrawal, did not hinder more than it helped this process. For in a period of inflation, the right of a member government to refuse to sanction CAP price increases is Britain's most powerful bargaining counter. Taken to the limit, it is hard to imagine a more potent inducement to other member governments to agree to changes in policy,

[10] T. Josling, in *The Economics of Europe, op. cit.*, p. 72.

than a refusal, during years when inflation exceeds 10 per cent., to countenance any price increase unless they do agree. But this inducement loses its credibility if you threaten to remove yourself, and hence your veto too, from the Community. Arguably, therefore, Britain has been worse placed to secure changes in the CAP under conditions of renegotiation than it would be if it could make more credible use of its right to put a brake on price increases.

Even if this argument is not accepted, it is hard to establish that the renegotiation of agricultural policies has secured better terms for Britain, or for the overseas suppliers, than would have been achieved by what Mr. Heath has called ' using the normal machinery of the Community to make the necessary adjustments as we go along '.[11] The aims of the agricultural renegotiation are the aims that any British government would pursue. It is possible that other member governments will have conceded more and sooner on these points than they would have done if the British government had not presented a heptalogue of demands and threatened to withdraw if they were not met. But the contrary seems at least as likely to be the case.

As in agriculture, the British government has achieved considerable successes in relation to the Commonwealth and developing countries, but without any evident assistance from the fact that these negotiations were a part of the renegotiation. The conclusion, at the beginning of February, of the ACP negotiations in the form of the Lomé Convention, with free access to the Community for the Commonwealth countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, a common aid budget of £1·7 billion for the five-year period with up to £200 million for the new ' Stabex ' commodity scheme, and with no requirement to reciprocate tariff preferences, together with the agreement on sugar, leaves most of these countries much better placed than they were before Britain joined the Community. Substantial advances have also been made in the Community's ' global ' policies, for countries that are not party to the Lomé Convention. The GSP was improved in 1974, with British proposals in large measure accepted. A trade agreement has been negotiated with India, including concessions for jute and coir products; negotiations with Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have begun; and the Community has begun to develop its relations with the South-east Asian countries. The British proposal to establish a Community aid fund for non-associated countries has been accepted; food aid for such countries has continued; and the Community has agreed to contribute $500 million to the UN fund for developing countries hit by the rise in prices of oil and other primary products.

The Lomé Convention is an important achievement, which was far

[11] *Hansard*, Dec. 16, 1974, Col. 1138.

from a certainty when the renegotiation began. Progress towards the global policies, of interest to Asian countries in particular, and also towards better access for imports from Australia, Canada and New Zealand, have also been faster than might have been expected. As regards the global policies, the orientation of the Labour government may well have put more weight behind this shift in Community policy than a Conservative government would have done. But that stems from a different view of what are the ' necessary adjustments ' to be made ' as we go along ', not from the decision to call for a renegotiation followed by a referendum. Nor had the success of the ACP negotiations anything to do with that decision. They stemmed from Protocol 22 to the Treaty of Accession, and there is no reason to believe that, with a different British government, they would have followed a significantly different course.

Renegotiation proper

There remain two items from the manifesto's heptalogue, which did raise issues that were not likely to have been dealt with in the normal course of Community business: an explicit agreement regarding the retention by Parliament of powers over regional and industrial policies; and an adjustment of the Community budget.

The issue of regional and industrial policies is one of those that can be fairly readily resolved by a formula if there is goodwill, but is insoluble if there is not. Mr. Wilson has recognised the need for such policies not to ' offend against the Community rules of fair competition nor create difficulties for our partners ' [12] and Mr. Callaghan ' the value of rules within the Community to ensure that one country, in attempting to solve its own problems, does not create problems for the others '.[13] The problem of finding words to strike an agreed balance between autonomy and solidarity ' should be capable of a solution ' [14] as Mr. Wilson has put it; and such words will doubtless be found in the negotiations. But any such formula will certainly be hotly contested, on grounds of parliamentary sovereignty, in the campaign leading up to the referendum.

The issue of the budget is very different. It concerns money, not words, and it is here, if anywhere, that renegotiation as such can be convincingly argued to have turned the Community system significantly to Britain's advantage. Estimates of the costs of entry to Britain, made at the time of the 1970–71 negotiations, had all attributed the bulk of

[12] Speech to the London Labour Mayors' Association, Dec. 7, 1974.
[13] Speech at the Council of Ministers, June 4, 1974.
[14] Speech to the London Labour Mayors' Association, Dec. 7, 1974.

the cost to Britain's net budgetary contribution.[15] By the opening of renegotiation in 1974, the estimated cost was less, because Britain's receipts from the budget were proving to be higher than had been expected.[16] But the Treasury's new estimate of a net cost to Britain of 300–350 million units of account in 1975, rising to 700–800 mua in 1980, still gave Mr. Callaghan a substantial reason to single out the budget, in his speech to the Council on June 4, as requiring 'special consideration for it is a most important matter for all of us'.

The outcome of negotiations on the budget is not known at the time of writing; but it looks as if agreement will be reached on a scheme not much different from that put forward by the Commission in its paper on *The Unacceptable Situation and the Correcting Mechanism*.[17] The result will be—unless the performance of the British economy sharply improves or the Treasury's estimates of Britain's net contribution prove to be grossly exaggerated—that Britain's net contribution to the Community budget will be reduced by perhaps £100 million a year by 1980. In defence of the terms under which Britain entered the Community, it can be argued that the Treasury figures still underestimate the receipts from the budget, for example through the Regional Fund, which Britain, as a member influencing Community policies, will secure; that tariffs and import levies can likewise be reduced over time so as to lower the British contribution; that if this did not happen, Britain could then renegotiate the budget terms, using, as Mr. Callaghan did in the Council on June 4, the promise exacted from the Community during the entry negotiations that the Community institutions would find 'equitable solutions' should 'unacceptable situations' arise; and that any net contribution that remains to be paid is worth paying because of the benefits that Britain will derive from membership. But agreement on the new mechanism for the budget will nevertheless make these gains certain and bring them forward to the immediate future.

What renegotiation achieved

On each of the seven items listed for renegotiation, it seems likely that the government will be able to claim that its objectives have been fulfilled.

1. The effect of the CAP on world trade and on the British consumer has changed radically since world food prices rose in 1973. Com-

[15] The different estimates are compared by Marcus Miller in *The Economics of Europe* (*op. cit.*), p. 120.

[16] The 1974 estimates are given alongside the earlier ones in J. R. Dodsworth, *Notes on the UK Contribution to the EC Budget*. London: Federal Trust, Dec. 1974. The UK official estimate had declined by 14 per cent. in 1974 prices; and the average of the 1974 estimates was not much more than half the average of the 1970–71 estimates.

[17] Commission Communication to the Council, COM (75) 40, Jan. 30, 1975.

munity policies have also been improved, according to the British government's criteria. There is a deficiency payments scheme for beef. Imports of sugar from the Commonwealth have been assured and subsidised. The compensatory levies and subsidies, together with the policy of subsidies for hill farmers, offer elements of flexibility to deal with special circumstances in different parts of the Community. The Community price level has been squeezed, in real terms, at the annual price-fixing for both 1974 and 1975. The general review of the CAP promises, with German support, to result in significant further changes.

2. The burden to Britain of the Community budget will have been substantially reduced, both by changes in the pattern of Community expenditure and by the formula for adjusting net contributions.
3. The Community does not compel any member to maintain a fixed parity and thus accept increased unemployment.
4. The relationship between the rights of the British Parliament and of the Community institutions with respect to regional, industrial and fiscal policies will probably be defined in an agreed formula.
5. Member governments can control capital movements when they threaten external balance or domestic employment.
6. The interests of developing countries, in particular the developing countries in the Commonwealth, have been better safeguarded by the Lomé Convention, the agreement on sugar, and the turn towards global policies. The situation of the other Commonwealth countries has been improved by the new balance in world food markets; and the Community's negotiating position for the Tokyo round appears to be satisfactory. The Australian Prime Minister has said that it is not in Australia's interest for Britain to leave the Community.[18]
7. There will be no compulsion to levy value-added tax on necessities.

Measured against the demands in Mr. Callaghan's speech to the Council on June 4, and even against the imprecise and somewhat intemperate language of the manifesto, this represents a remarkably full house of objectives fulfilled. A rejection of the renegotiated terms by the British government would hardly be consistent with the claim, in Mr. Callaghan's statement of April 1, that the government was negotiating in good faith. Given government approval of the renegotiated terms, however, two questions remain. How is the result of the renegotiation likely to affect the vote in the referendum? And what further consequences may ensue?

The effect of the renegotiation on the referendum

Mr. Wilson said, in his speech to the London Labour Mayors' Association on December 7, that, provided we get the right terms, 'I

[18] 'I can say that there is no possible advantage, in the Australian Government's view, in Britain leaving the Community.' Mr. Gough Whitlam, at a press conference at The Hague, Jan. 6, 1975.

shall commend them to the British people, and recommend that we should stay in and play our full part in the development of the Community'. The negotiated terms as such, however, do not seem likely to play a major part in determining the opinions of the voters.

On food prices, which have long been shown by the opinion polls to be far the most salient issue for the public, the question whether the renegotiated arrangements for beef and sugar make a deeper impression than the levies on imports from the Commonwealth is likely to be much less important than whether people believe that the rise in food prices and accelerated inflation since 1973 have been due to British membership of the Community or to other causes.

On jobs, investment and prosperity, the formula arrived at for regional and industrial policies, together with the Community's Regional Fund, will be less important than whether people believe that current unemployment, low investment and high external deficit are caused by the Community, or that these difficulties have other causes and that membership of the Community will encourage investment and the creation of jobs in Britain, and help economic growth over the longer run.

As regards the budget contribution, the government should justly be able to claim a considerable success for the renegotiation, but the public have never shown much interest in this aspect of British membership.

Many of the Commonwealth countries have been well served by the Lomé Convention; but here, too, the negotiating success concerns an aspect that is of lesser interest to the public, who are more likely to be influenced on the one hand by the imposition of tariffs and levies on imports from Australia, Canada and New Zealand, or on the other hand by assurances, including that of the Australian Prime Minister, that Commonwealth interests are better served by British membership of the Community.

On sovereignty, the technicalities of parliamentary control over regional and industrial policies will certainly carry less weight than, on the one side, a desire not to be further entangled with foreigners and, on the other, a belief that Britain will have more influence as a member of this group, that the Community is a useful port in an economic storm, and that it would be better, particularly in such stormy times, not to rock the boat by leaving the Community shortly after joining it.

It may seem to the writer that reason is on the side of staying in. This may also be the proper conclusion to draw from a successful renegotiation by the Labour government on the Labour manifesto's points, which presumably represented such rational criticisms of the terms of British membership of the Community as our political system was able to articulate. But against this, the tendency to believe that a

new institution, the enlarged Community, is responsible for our new troubles, such as inflation and deficit, will be very strong, as will the reluctance to accept what is seen as a major change in the status of our country and in the relationship with our friends overseas. It is not surprising, if reflexes are pulling one way and apparently reasonable arguments the other, that a majority of the public are found, by the opinion polls, ready to be guided by the recommendation of the government. So it is here, rather than in its specific results, that the influence of the renegotiation will lie: if the government is seen to commend British membership to the people, this is likely to have a decisive effect on the way they vote.

Likely, but not certain. For if prominent Ministers campaign against the decision of the majority of the Cabinet, and if a Labour party conference also appears to oppose the government, the commendation may seem to the public ambiguous; and even if the commendation is clear, it is unwise to rely too heavily on opinion polls, especially in a time of trouble when public opinion is likely to be volatile.

It remains possible, therefore, that the outcome of the referendum will cause Britain to leave the Community. If this happens, the authority of a government and Parliament which had recommended membership would be seriously weakened, and the balance of power would shift towards those who had opposed membership. Internationally, Britain's credibility as a negotiating partner would take a long time to restore. With the precedent of a centrifugal referendum, the future of the United Kingdom itself would be uncertain. Economically, the danger of a collapse of sterling and of relapse into a siege economy, following a massive run on the pound, would be far from negligible.

If Britain remains inside, the process of renegotiation and referendum may nevertheless be found to have involved substantial costs. It will have occupied a great deal of time and attention in a period when there are extremely urgent problems to be solved. The display of uncertainty and the sheer nuisance value of requiring to have our negotiation twice over will have contributed to a loss, for the time being at least, of British influence in the Community, and hence of opportunities to advance British interests which could well prove to be more important than the gain secured by renegotiating the net contribution to the budget. The idea of putting party before treaty may prove infectious and could, if adopted by other countries, rebound against Britain, which depends more than most on stable international arrangements. Politically, there will be the continuing danger that referenda will be used to break up the United Kingdom; and the

extremes of right and left may well, as in Norway, retain their increased support.

Since the renegotiation and referendum may well be seen to have damaged British interests, and will certainly have exposed us to serious risks, it is pertinent to ask whether the process will have served any necessary purpose that could not have been served in other ways.

A costly learning process?

It may be concluded from this analysis, that the only substantial achievement of the renegotiation as such, which would not have occurred under the normal working of the Community, is the mechanism for adjusting contributions to the budget. The other objectives were fulfilled largely because the situation was already different from what the drafters of the manifesto believed, or because of the normal making of Community policies. Thus economic and monetary union ceased to be an issue because of the floating of currencies in 1973 and January 1974; and agreement upon agricultural policies was made relatively easy by the rise in world commodity prices after 1973. The negotiations on agricultural policies and on relations with developing countries do not appear to have been particularly affected by their status as part of the renegotiation; and the issues of capital movements, valued-added tax on necessities and parliamentary powers over regional, industrial and fiscal policies were either non-issues because Community policies already allowed what the British government wanted, or occasions for the writing down of formulae which reflected what would have been the situation, renegotiation or not. The Labour government set its mark on some of these policies: more global (in relation to developing countries), more egalitarian (greater stress on food subsidies and on the rejection of added-value tax on necessities) and more Gaullist (insistent on maintaining sovereignty) than the Conservative government would have been. But policies that satisfied the government were made, less because of the fact of renegotiation or the threat of withdrawal, than because the Community's way of working usually ensures satisfaction for the major member countries.

Apart from the budget, then, it seems unlikely that much was gained by calling Community policy-making renegotiation and holding the referendum as a sword of Damocles over British membership, beyond demonstrating that certain events had taken place and enabling Ministers to find out for themselves that the Community's policy-making is a satisfactory process. Given this knowledge in advance, moreover, it seems unlikely that it would have been thought necessary to threaten abrogation of the Treaty in order to secure changes in the budget, rather than to make such changes a major aim of British

policy in the Community, and use the lever of agricultural prices, without the threats of referendum and withdrawal.

The Labour government had as its starting point for renegotiation the manifesto, on which it had just fought the election, so that the responsibility for the decision to regard the Treaty as not binding was that of the Labour party as a whole as much as of the leading Ministers. When the manifesto was written, however, the rise in world food prices and the decline of economic and monetary union were already widely known; nor was the nature of policy-making in the Community exactly a state secret, divulged only to Ministers and top civil servants. Yet the points elaborated in the manifesto give the strong impression of fighting the previous political battle, that is to say the battle with Mr. Heath over the 1970–71 negotiations, and of the belief that the EEC was a Community of rigid rules, without regard for the welfare of the member countries.

This leads to the conclusion that the Labour party, including some of its leading figures, decided on the renegotiation and the referendum because they were ill-informed about the current monetary and commodity situation and about the nature of the European Community; and that, if the referendum decides in favour of Britain staying in, this will be because Ministers, having become better informed in the course of renegotiation, decided to recommend this course to the people. There will be cause to rejoice that they had the good sense to learn from their experience. But it is hard to believe that less costly and less risky methods cannot be found for ensuring a better level of information among opposition parties and their leaders.

Postscript

The meeting of the European Council in Dublin on March 10 and 11 did reach agreement on the issues of the budget contribution and access for New Zealand butter, and thus brought the renegotiation to a successful conclusion. It is now, therefore, a matter for the British government, Parliament and people.

WESTERN EUROPE'S COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

Lord Gladwyn

ALWAYS assuming that the sovereign people do not order the Labour government to take this country into political isolation, the question of the collective defence of the Western European democracies now forming the European Community will be bound to come up before very long. For if we continue to be a member, the procedures for harmonising the foreign policies of the Nine must become more elaborate, and if there is a serious intention to harmonise foreign policies, there must be an intention to harmonise defence policies as well.

Apart from this, once the EEC begins, as it were, to coagulate, the Americans will no doubt insist that it should be *primarily* responsible for the 'conventional' defence of the Western European land mass, concentrating for their part chiefly on the two 'flanks' and, of course, providing the ultimate strategic nuclear deterrent. Many experts argue that the European democracies ought to combine their research and development and rationalise their production of the latest 'conventional' arms—chiefly anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air and ground-to-ground missiles, specialised aircraft and so on—the whole being backed up by a 'tactical' nuclear weapon screen for employment (except no doubt as a last resort) only on a 'second strike.' If only the Europeans will do all this, it will be perfectly possible for them, during the next decade and with American help, to construct, at no vast expense, a 'credible' defence system in Western Europe—maybe under a French Supreme Commander—thus maintaining the vital balance of power.

It is further maintained that such a flexible and purely defensive system—involving the deployment of helicopter-borne anti-tank units, mobile anti-aircraft weapons, special provision for sowing mines in the path of advancing armoured vehicles and so on—far from militating against the East-West detente, or prejudicing the results of the Conference on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, would have the reverse effect. For it would at the same time remove any temptation on the part of the Soviet government to throw its weight about politically in Western Europe, and result in a more effective defence with fewer men and fewer out-dated military weapons.[1]

[1] See in this connection 'Tactical Nuclear Strategy and European Defence' by Michael Brenner, *International Affairs*, Jan. 1975, pp. 23–42.

Generals normally plan for the last war, so maybe official thinking has not as yet arrived at this point, though it is to be hoped that it will. But—unless the Community breaks up after a British withdrawal —there really must be an attempt, in the fairly near future, to arrive at a common defence policy of some sort for the Western European democracies. Even if Britain should by some evil chance leave the EEC, it is possible that a European defence organisation of some sort could still be formed, though it would obviously be much more difficult. Apart from anything else, the whole future of conscription must be reconsidered, to say nothing of the desirability of creating some kind of militia, or homeguard, for protecting cities from seizure by paratroops or even by organised internal insurrection. The great question, therefore, is, how can such a common policy best be set on foot? Or, at the least, how can a start be made? Considerable thought has been devoted to this vital point over the last few years and the present position is as follows:

Both the General Affairs Committee of the Assembly of Western European Union and the Political Committee of the European Parliament have drafted resolutions on the defence of Western Europe 'within the framework' of the North Atlantic Alliance. The first was not approved in plenary session and referred back to the committee. The second, however, is now before the Bureau of the Assembly and is likely to be discussed in plenary session before the end of the summer. There are certain points of resemblance in both resolutions, and though they are without validity at the moment, it may be useful to compare them and to draw certain conclusions. Let us consider first the WEU draft resolution which has tended, up to now, to be favoured by the French.

This starts from the assumption that the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954, only binding, of course, on the Seven of WEU,[2] is 'the basis of European political union in defence matters.' Immediately thereafter, however, it expresses 'the wish that the efforts of the Nine[3] to achieve such a Union, will allow rapid progress to be made in this direction,' by which is presumably meant progress towards some kind of defence organisation. From the start, therefore, we are brought up against the difficulty that two members of the EEC—Denmark and Ireland—are not members of WEU and (as M. Krieg's accompanying report freely admits) show no desire to join it.

After noting that the governments of the Nine will, in any case, examine during the present year a report on European Union, the draft resolution next asserts that the members of WEU want 'Europe'

[2] Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom.

[3] The same, plus Denmark and Ireland.

to become 'a true partner of the U.S.A. in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.' The use of 'Europe' in this context suggests that the intention would be, if possible, to transform not the Seven but the Nine, or even the Nine plus their European associates, into a 'true partner' of the United States. However, the point is not entirely clear.

Still, the assumption that 'Europe' for practical purposes is the Europe of the Nine of the EEC is borne out by the first recommendation, which is that they should meet at the highest level to consider a possible 'European defence policy' in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. Such a conference would also discuss the whole nuclear problem in relation to European security and should further 'ensure' that WEU is maintained with its present responsibilities and that it 'takes effective action' in all matters of concern to it. It is likewise proposed that the Council of the WEU (the Seven) should regularly discuss at ministerial and official level and 'in the context of a European defence policy' (*i.e.* one presumably agreed by the Nine) all matters relating to European-American relations: foreign policy affecting the defence of Western Europe: and defence policies in so far as these affect industrial and budgetary factors, as they necessarily must do to a very large extent. It is finally recommended that the WEU Standing Armaments Committee—which hardly functions at the present time, all the effective powers of the WEU in respect of defence having long ago been transferred to Nato—should be 're-activated.'

The approach of the Political Committee of the European Parliament (the text of whose draft resolution is printed at the end of this article since it is the one which is likely soon to be debated) is different. It is based not on the modified Treaty of Brussels—the important engagements of which respecting the *casus foederis,* that is to say the conditions under which it would come into operation, no one would wish to minimise since they are much more binding on the signatories than the similar provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty—but rather on the undoubted fact that the Nine have already devised a rather rudimentary system of political co-operation outside the EEC—known as the 'Davignon Procedure'—for the purpose of harmonising their foreign policies, and on the equally indisputable fact that, as recognised by the European Parliament in April 1973, foreign policy cannot in practice be separated from defence policy.

From these premises the Political Committee argues that, given the great economies and the much more effective defence arising from the rationalisation of the production of armaments in Europe, the Nine, or those among them who may wish to take part in such a programme, should initiate at once, within the 'Davignon' procedure, a study of the best means of attaining the desired objectives and thereafter

establish an Armaments Procurement Agency in order to achieve the highest possible degree of armaments standardisation. No mention is made of the existing, but non-functioning, Standing Armaments Committee of WEU or of the 'Eurogroup,'[4] which consists of ten European members of the North Atlantic Treaty, with the exception of France; but the clear intention is to suggest that, as part of any system for organising European defence within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, there can be only one such agency: any idea of making use of both the existing ones is excluded for the simple reason that no such system could possibly work.

It will be seen that points of resemblance are that the Nine should shortly consider the defence of Western Europe 'within the framework' of the North Atlantic Alliance; that if the two members of the EEC who are not members of WEU should not wish to join the latter or to take part in talks on defence outside it, such talks should nevertheless proceed without them; and that every effort should be made to streamline and rationalise European defence (the European Parliament resolution does not mention nuclear defence, but this can hardly be ignored by the Ministers once they begin considering European defence seriously).

Points of divergence are that, in the opinion of the WEU Committee, it should be the WEU Ministers, acting in accordance with the modified Treaty of Brussels, who should not only supervise a great defensive effort, but also co-ordinate much of the common foreign and, indeed, industrial policy of the states concerned. The European Parliament draft resolution, on the other hand, contemplates (implicitly) an enlargement of the present Conference of Foreign Ministers so as to include the ministers of defence, the whole apparatus coming under the jurisdiction of the supreme 'European Council' of heads of states and governments established at the recent Paris 'summit' meeting. Nor is it contemplated by the Political Committee that states associated with the EEC, such as Turkey and Greece, should play an equal part with members of the Community in the formulation of European foreign and defence policy—a possibility expressly favoured by the WEU Committee, which points out that these countries, in spite of the fact that they are not situated in Western Europe, could actually qualify for membership of that organisation should they so desire.

What, then, are the advantages and disadvantages of the two theses? It must be recognised in the first place that (unless Turkey and Greece

[4] This unofficial body, created in 1968, has, with its various sub-committees, done much admirable work, notably as regards a common infrastructure; but it has not resulted in any great standardisation of European armaments and it can hardly be said to be the ideal nucleus of any new European defence system, if only because of the absence of France.

are admitted) the effect of both would be to place primary responsibility for the organisation of Western European defence in the hands of the seven countries of WEU, naturally in consultation with the Americans. Both schemes, if adopted, would no doubt also result in a welcome harmonisation and rationalisation of European armaments. And, seeing that the Ministers primarily concerned (foreign affairs and defence) would in practice be the same people under both projects, it might, in theory, be no less difficult for the one system than for the other to be eventually merged in the European Political Union which is still the declared objective of all the governments concerned. In other words, WEU could become, for many years, as it were, a separate 'wing' of the EEC. It must also be admitted that the extended Treaty of Brussels, with its important provisions relating to the *casus foederis* would become fully operative. Indeed this treaty, rather than the existing 'parallel' organisation of the Nine for co-ordinating foreign policy, would become the basis of some European construction that might be considered a valid 'partner' of the United States. This might be logical, but there are certain very real difficulties in the way of the WEU proposals, as follows:—

(a) There can hardly be two separate European organisations for handling foreign affairs and (if the European Parliament's thesis regarding the inseparability of the two spheres is correct) defence matters as well. If, therefore, the WEU conception is preferred, the Conference of Foreign Ministers and the so-called 'Davignon Procedure' would have to be scrapped, or rather become a revivified Council of Ministers of the WEU assisted by an enlarged WEU secretariat.

(b) If, under this scheme, there were to be an Armaments Procurement Agency (which would surely be necessary, if could only be an enlargement of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee, situated in Paris. This would necessarily involve the disappearance of the Eurogroup and its dependent committees in Brussels, in which case the link of the new, revivified WEU with the North Atlantic Council, if not with Nato, would be tenuous, if indeed it were to exist at all.

(c) At the moment, quite a large section of 'European' foreign affairs is conducted by the Brussels Commission. Even if the Commission were to carry on with these activities, and thus have certain links with the reformed WEU, there would still be a tendency away from the eventual merging of organs dealing with (i) economic matters and (ii) foreign affairs and defence in the projected European Political Union.

(d) The European Community is, in principle, a supra-national body. It is still a long way from becoming some kind of confederation, if it ever does; but it is moving in that direction. There is no such

element in the WEU. For instance, not only would the strict rule of unanimity apply in the meeting of WEU ministers and in all their subordinate sub-committees, but the Assembly would, presumably, go on being nominated, whereas the European Parliament may well be directly elected in 1978, even if Britain is no longer a member of the Community. Only, therefore, in the event of a collapse of the EEC would it be possible for Western European defence, foreign affairs and a good deal of common activity in other spheres as well, to be handled by a totally different type of organisation.

Conclusions

(1) Until recently some, if not all, the nine EEC governments seem to have thought that the existing (Nato) system for the defence of Western Europe, though clearly unsatisfactory if only by reason of the absence of France, was at least tolerable. If, in the last resort, America will intervene, why worry about European defence integration, to say nothing of the creation of a valid 'partner' for the United States? But the European members of the alliance cannot any longer be certain that by, say, 1980, they will enjoy the same sense of relative security as at present. It is not that they doubt the support of America in the last resort: it is a question of how far the Soviet Union would regard any European defence structure in, say, 1980 as 'credible,' in the sense of a reliable bulwark against political pressure.

(2) The nine EEC Ministers, in their at present separate capacity as members of the Conference of Foreign Ministers, have nevertheless taken no decision regarding the organisation of any specifically Western European defence system 'within the framework' of the North Atlantic Alliance. Seven of them are members of an inoperative WEU. Seven take part in the (informal) Eurogroup in Brussels, but two do not. All save one are members of the North Atlantic Alliance, but another, while a member of the alliance, is not a member of Nato. For the reasons already advanced, however, the inevitable question now is, how can they best come together in some kind of new defence grouping? United they may still stand: divided they are only too likely to fall.

(3) Under both projects it is likely that, for some time at any rate, the new defensive system would consist of only seven countries, in the one case because neither Denmark nor Ireland will join WEU: in the other because they may well also, for reasons of their own, decline to participate in any specifically European defence organisation. But such a refusal would not necessarily prevent the seven members of the Conference of Foreign Ministers from setting up such an organisation if they should wish to do so, its decisions not being

necessarily binding on the two non-participating partners. There is no legal objection to seven members of the Conference of Foreign Ministers proceeding to do just this if they think it is politically necessary.

(4) It is true that if France refuses to join the Eurogroup, or at least its approximation to an Armaments Procurement Agency known as 'Euronad,'[5] any 'specifically European' defence organisation, within the alliance, will be difficult to achieve. But Germany and Britain, to say nothing of others, may well decline to abandon the Eurogroup in favour of the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU with all that that would entail in the way of political consequences. If so, it will be the first task of the Ministers of the Nine, in the discussions proposed by both the Political Committee of the European Parliament and the General Affairs Committee of WEU, to consider how the proposed new machine can best be established and, in particular, where and how the essential Arms Procurement Agency can best be set up. Necessity is the mother of invention, and it really should not, given the necessary goodwill, be beyond the capacity of ministers to arrive at some compromise. The guiding principle must be (a) to do nothing which would weaken either the North Atlantic Alliance or the EEC and (b) to create, nevertheless, a valid 'partner' for America which might, in, say, five to ten years' time, possess 'conventional' armaments, backed up by a modest so-called 'tactical' second-strike nuclear element, which would suffice by themselves to 'deter' any potential pressure from the East, anyhow in Germany. The great continuing strength of America, on sea and in the air, would remain as a final guarantee of the independence of the Western European democracies and as a primary factor in support of the two vulnerable 'flanks.'

(5) If they can devise a common defence policy and pool both their research and development and their industrial resources, the Seven can certainly achieve this end without any excessive financial effort. But first they must unite. It is suggested that the best way of doing so lies in an adaptation of the so-called 'Davignon' procedure which, though still separate, is now linked, thanks to the establishment of the European Council, with the gradual development of the European Community. Nor would the highly important operative clause of the extended Treaty of Brussels be called in question if this general line were favoured. For the seven among the Nine who would, in any case, have to take the lead, would still be legally bound to honour this crucial obligation.

(6) Finally, as I have already said, it is a grave error to maintain

[5] A sub-committee consisting of the directors of armaments of the states concerned.

as some do, more especially in Britain, that a collective effort of the type proposed would in any way prejudice the so-called detente in East-West relations. Indeed, if anything could increase tension between the East and the West it would be the virtual self-disarmament of the European members of the North Atlantic Alliance owing to their inability, for financial reasons, to provide themselves with the new defence weapons that are urgently required—SAMS, anti-tank weapons of all sorts, laser-guided missiles and so on—on the basis of separate (national) production of individual (national) weapons with separate (national) research and development.

It must consequently be hoped that all the Ministers will become conscious of the need to develop some kind of specifically European defence within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance. The immediate focus of their attention should be the defence of the North German plain. An essential feature is a preliminary meeting of minds between at least the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and France, and then discussions with the Americans and other members on the reorganisation of Nato. Perhaps no progress can be made until it is seen that Britain is going to continue to be a member of the EEC, but as soon as this hurdle is surmounted the consultations will have to take place without further delay. It is later than we think.

The resolution of the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament on Western Europe's defence, January 13, 1975

The European Parliament,

—recalling

(a) its Resolution of 6 April 1973 in which it expressed its view 'that co-operation in the foreign policy sphere must eventually take into account defence and security policy';

(b) its Report on the Sixth General Report of the Commission of the European Communities in which it expressed its view: 'that a veritable "European Union" (as foreseen in Paragraph 16 of the Paris Declaration) which should achieve the transformation into a European identity of all relations between its Member States cannot be restricted solely to the economic and social fields but must include measures of political co-operation and cannot leave out of account measures of defence co-operation';

(c) the statement in the European Identity Paper agreed at the Copenhagen Summit meeting of 14 December 1973 that: 'The Nine, one of whose essential aims is to maintain peace, will never succeed in doing so if they neglect their own security';

(d) the Declaration on Atlantic Relations approved by the North Atlantic Council at Ottawa on 19 June 1974 which stated: 'The further progress towards unity which the Member States of the European Community are determined to make should, in due course, have a beneficial effect on the contribution to the common defence of the Alliance of those of them who belong to it';

—observing nevertheless that while some welcome progress has been made during the last 18 months in harmonising the foreign policies of all the Members of the

Enlarged Community, there has been no corresponding progress towards the harmonisation of the defence policies of the Nine;

—stressing the need to avoid a strategic imbalance capable of prejudicing both European security and the prospect of a genuine East/West détente;

—drawing attention to the consequent need for Members of the Community to strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance by developing their own specifically European effort;

—believing, especially in view of the human and social aspects of defence problems, in the need to make the optimum use of the manpower resources available for defence purposes;

—convinced, therefore, of the evident and urgent need to achieve the most effective form of defence by rationalising both the production of armaments, and logistics and infrastructure in the Community, thus permitting great economies in the individual expenditure on defence of the states concerned, and, also, of the need to demonstrate that Community Members are making an appropriate contribution to the common defence;

—persuaded that, if such action resulted, as it might well, in the better deployment of available resources in Western Europe it could have no unfavourable effect on current or future East/West negotiations;

1. Urges those governments of the Nine which may wish to take part in such a programme:

   (a) to initiate immediately, as part of the existing procedure for harmonising the foreign policy of Member States, a technical study of the best means of achieving the objectives set out above;

   (b) to set up, as a result of the study, an Armaments Procurement Agency in order to achieve the highest possible degree of armament standardisation;

   (c) to draw up and adopt as soon as possible a general plan embodying the above proposals; and

2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and Council of the European Communities and to the parliaments and governments of the Member States of the Community.

RETHINKING NON-PROLIFERATION

Hedley Bull

THE Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) provides that five years after its coming into force a conference shall be held to review its operations. This conference will be held in Geneva in May 1975 in circumstances of growing scepticism not only about the Treaty but also about the wider endeavour to control the spread of nuclear weapons, of which it is part.

The most dramatic blow struck at the NPT was the Indian nuclear explosion of May 18, 1974. First, the Indian explosion demonstrates the 'failure' of the Treaty, if we take its central objective to have been to restrict the circle of states that had conducted nuclear explosions at the point it had reached in 1970. Secondly, the Indian explosion provides new incentives for other states to acquire nuclear weapons: Pakistan, for example, perceives the Indian explosion as a threat to its security, Japan views it as diminishing its relative status, and everywhere it is taken to confirm the idea that the spread of nuclear explosive technology is inevitable. Thirdly, India's action has indicated a new route to nuclear proliferation—that of conducting an explosion, and issuing a declaration that it is for peaceful purposes only, while resisting requests for international inspection to authenticate the declaration. Whether or not one takes seriously Indian assurances that no Indian nuclear weapons programme is being planned, this route has been opened up for other states. Fourthly, the Indian action confronts arms control planners with the problem of how to deal with peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) conducted by non-nuclear weapon states—a problem that the NPT sought to avoid by laying down, in effect, that nuclear explosions can be peaceful only if they are conducted by nuclear weapon states. Fifthly, by identifying the NPT as part of the system of super-power domination, and successfully defying it in the name of the rights of the underprivileged, India has helped to diminish the legitimacy of the Treaty and to make more respectable further acts of defiance by itself and others.

However, the most important factors working against the NPT would be having their effect even if the Indian nuclear explosion had not taken place. The capacity to make nuclear weapons, which the NPT does little to restrict, is spreading at an accelerating rate as a consequence of the rapid rise in the number of plutonium power

reactors, expected to increase fourfold in the next few years, and in the number of countries possessing operable reactors, expected to reach 30 by 1980; the decline of the nuclear weapon states' monopoly of uranium enrichment processes; the development of new methods of uranium enrichment, especially gas centrifuge; the availability of reactors of heavy water design, that consume natural rather than enriched, uranium which is widely available; the intensive development in a number of countries of fast breeder reactors that produce more fissionable fuel than they consume; and the declining effectiveness of controls imposed by the exporters of nuclear technology and materials.

The spread of the capacity to make nuclear weapons does not necessarily imply the spread of the will to do so, but a number of recent developments encourage it. The policies of the five nuclear weapon states continue to provide confirmation of the idea—from which the will to proliferate derives—that nuclear weapons are a vital strategic instrument, a vital source of great power status or prestige, or both: one may cite, for example, the 'Schlesinger doctrine' which has given a new lease of life to the idea of resort to nuclear war as an instrument of policy; the development by both the United States and the Soviet Union of missiles accurate enough to give some credence to the latter idea; the failure of the SALT negotiations so far to issue in any actual disarmament, or even—with the possible exception of the 1972 ABM Treaty—any restrictions on Soviet-American arms competition of a truly vital nature; and the continued nuclear testing programmes not only of the United States and the Soviet Union but also of China, France and Britain.

For many potential nuclear weapon states the alternative to a nuclear weapons system of their own is reliance upon guarantees of nuclear support from the United States or the Soviet Union. But these guarantees are at present eroding. The multilateral guarantee which the nuclear weapon state sponsors of the NPT sought to provide through UN Security Council Resolution 255 of June 19, 1968, was of the most feeble kind imaginable, and whatever meaning it had was destroyed when China became a permanent member of the Security Council. The bilateral guarantees of nuclear support, given explicitly or implicitly by the two super-powers not only to their respective allies but also to other clients or associates—one thinks, for example, of the United States implicit guarantees to Israel and Sweden, and Russia's implicit guarantees to India and certain Arab countries—are still an important factor working against proliferation. But confidence in these guarantees is declining as a consequence of the decay of the American and Soviet alliance systems, the consolidation of Soviet-American detente, and the development of a relationship of mutual

nuclear deterrence between China and the Soviet Union, if not yet between China and the United States.

Moreover, the NPT bears the marks of its origins in the mid-1960s when the ability of the United States and the Soviet Union, while working together, to mobilise support for their policies throughout the international political system as a whole was greater than it is now. The principal weakness of the NPT, as a means of controlling nuclear proliferation, is that it is not based upon a consensus of international society as a whole but is perceived by a very substantial segment of international society, especially in the Third World, as an instrument of super-power domination.

It is true that at the end of 1974, 106 states had signed the Treaty and 84 had ratified it. But three of the six states that have conducted nuclear explosions are outside the system. So also are some of the most crucial of the potential nuclear weapon states; the list of non-signatories includes, in addition to India, Israel, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Spain and Pakistan, while the list of states that have signed but not ratified includes Japan, Egypt and Indonesia. If the chief test of a country's attitude towards the NPT is to be whether it accepts, or is willing to protest against, the hegemony of the super-powers, the Treaty is bound to go into decline, for antagonism to this hegemony is one of the most powerful emotions in the world today. An NPT which is regarded by the representatives of half the world's population as simply the instrument of the nuclear weapon Haves in their struggle to maintain their ascendancy over the Have Nots will have as little to contribute to the control of nuclear proliferation as the League of Nations had to contribute to the maintenance of international security when, in the 1930s, it became simply the instrument of Britain and France.

Critics of the anti-proliferationist doctrine

In rethinking this subject one must begin by asking again the fundamental questions. Is the spread of nuclear weapons undesirable—in terms of the interests not of any particular section of international society, but of the world as a whole? And in what sense is control of the spread of nuclear weapons a feasible objective?

The case that may be stated by critics of the anti-proliferationist conventional wisdom is a powerful one.[1] It focuses first of all on the idea that an increase in the number of nuclear weapon decision-makers endangers international peace and security. The ' statistical argument ' —that the more such decision-makers there are, the more likely

[1] See especially K. Subrahmanyam: *The Indian Nuclear Test in a Global Perspective*. New Delhi: India International Centre, 1974.

nuclear war will be—ignores differences in the political nature of the decision-makers and the strategic situation in which they find themselves: the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a country that does not threaten others but is itself threatened by a nuclear weapon state may make war less likely, not more. Arguments to the effect that new nuclear weapon states would prove less 'responsible' custodians of the weapons than the existing five (because they would be incapable of adequate safety measures, or because their political conflicts are more impassioned, or because their weapons would be vulnerable) are unproven and when applied to the countries of the Third World, it has been said, are 'modern versions of the doctrines of the white man's burden'.[2]

If the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides in the Soviet-American conflict has helped to preserve peace between the super-powers for a quarter of a century may this not also be true of other conflicts? Are not the protagonists of anti-proliferationist doctrine the same persons who in relation to the conflict between the super-powers have insisted on the positive role played by the nuclear 'balance of terror'?

The critics focus their attention not only on considerations of international peace and security, which lie at the heart of the anti-proliferationist doctrine, but also on considerations of international justice or equity, which this doctrine leaves out of account. Even if one accepts that the spread of nuclear weapons is likely to endanger peace and security rather than enhance them, the argument for halting it is an argument for consolidating the existing distribution of power.

This is, of course, why the argument appeals to the three original nuclear weapon states and their allies and clients, who provide the bulk of the supporters of the NPT. Behind the doctrine propounded by the super-powers about the general dangers of proliferation to the world, there lurks an awareness of the special dangers to themselves of a shift in the distribution of power. Implicit in their choice of proliferation as the danger to peace and security that must be curbed now—rather than, say, the danger inherent in the growth of their own weapons stockpiles—is the perception that curbs in this area will restrict others and not themselves.

For those who feel that the issues should be assessed in terms of international justice or equity as well as of international peace and security, and who recognise that the former calls for a redistribution not simply of wealth or resources but also of power, as between the

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

main sections of the world community, the anti-proliferationist doctrine will carry no conviction.

All the arguments of the critics may be accepted and yet there is a sense in which the control of nuclear proliferation is desirable in the interests not simply of the existing nuclear weapon states and their clients but of international society as a whole. If selective nuclear proliferation may in some cases serve to enhance international security, this does not mean that the process of proliferation as a whole does so—the process that began with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the United States and would logically culminate in a world of 150 or so nuclear weapon powers. If the control of nuclear proliferation is not the only or the most important objective of arms control, and the propaganda of the super-powers has exaggerated its urgency, this does not mean that it is not an important objective at all.

The idea that the more states acquire nuclear weapons, the more international security will be strengthened, exaggerates the stability of the Soviet-American relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence, which can in principle be upset and which even while it lasts does not make nuclear war impossible but simply makes it irrational. The idea also wrongly assumes that proliferation would result in the duplication, in other international conflicts, of the kind of relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence that now exists between the two super-powers, rather than relationships in which one party has a nuclear monopoly or superiority over the others.

If the nuclear weapons club in its present membership perpetuates an unjust distribution of power, it has also to be recognised that so also would a club whose membership had been expanded. Perfect international justice with regard to the possession of nuclear weapons can be achieved only by complete nuclear disarmament, or by an international system in which nuclear weapons are available to every state. Since neither of these alternatives can be expected to come about, the world has to accept a situation in which some states have nuclear weapons and some do not. This does not mean that the present line of division is the only possible one, or that some other line of division could not be held to be at least relatively more just.[3] But whatever expansion of the nuclear weapons club takes place, the argument that it is unjust can always be used by those who are left outside.

That nuclear proliferation in general is undesirable is in fact recognised—in their actions if not always in their words—even by those powers that have been the strongest opponents of anti-proliferationist

[3] It may be argued, for example, that nuclear weapons would be more justly distributed if all countries in the world enjoyed the protection of one or another nuclear power.

doctrine. China has taken the position that whether acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state is good or bad depends on the purposes for which it wants to use them, but this is not a position that sanctions indiscriminate proliferation, and so far it has been used to sanction proliferation only in the case of China itself. France has stated that it will act consistently with the purposes of the NPT, even while remaining outside the Treaty itself, and India—while rejecting the Treaty and resisting any obstacle that might stand in the way of its own weapons option—continues to speak of proliferation as undesirable and of its own policies as serving to check it. None of them has done anything directly to disseminate nuclear explosive technology or material.

The recalcitrant or dissenting states, in other words, do not challenge the doctrine that the spread of nuclear weapons is undesirable, but rather—like the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain before them—seek to show that an exception should be made in their own case. The argument between supporters and opponents of the NPT is not about the desirability or otherwise of non-proliferation but about where the line should be drawn.

In considering how far non-proliferation is feasible it is necessary to distinguish between stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and controlling it. It has never seemed likely at any point in the nuclear era, and it does not seem likely now, that all further proliferation will be stopped. It is simply not credible that one of the most vital strategic and political instrumentalities of the time, which is technically within reach of many states, will remain permanently the monopoly of the few that first developed it. If nuclear weapons should cease to be vital political and strategic instrumentalities—either because arms control understandings have gradually pushed them into the background of international politics, or because new weapons have emerged to displace them—then we may imagine that nuclear proliferation may cease altogether.

But until they do the control of proliferation should include other objectives besides that of stopping it at a given point. It should include attempts to inhibit or discourage proliferation—to ensure that it cannot take place without the surmounting of certain obstacles; to slow the pace of proliferation—so as to gain time in which the limitation of existing nuclear weapons may develop; to absorb the effects of proliferation—to ensure that if it does take place, it does so with the minimum adverse consequences for international security (for example, by seeking to ensure that if two antagonistic powers are acquiring nuclear weapons, a balance is preserved between them, and by seeking to ensure that new nuclear weapon states are incorporated into the

structure of arms control agreements); and to set ultimate limits to the process of proliferation. If the argument is correct which leads us to prefer five nuclear weapon states to six, it should also lead us to prefer six to 20 or 50 or more. It may also be important to ensure that nuclear weapons remain the monopoly of the sovereign state, and do not proliferate beyond it to fall into the hands of sub-national or trans-national political groups.

How, then, can the control of proliferation be advanced at present? First, it is desirable to base whatever policies are pursued on a wider consensus that can be mustered in support of the NPT in its present form.

The NPT has made an important contribution to the control of proliferation by advertising the fact that the spread of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, and so strengthening the hand of anti-nuclear weapon forces in many countries; by enabling countries which wish to remain without nuclear weapons to reassure each other by an exchange of pledges; by contributing to the emergence of detente, especially in Europe; and by the encouragement it has given to the development of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The Treaty is not simply the instrument of the nuclear weapon states that are parties to it but also reflects the desire of many non-nuclear weapon parties to impose limitations on each other.

But the attempt to cajole non-nuclear weapon states into signing or ratifying the Treaty, to have Treaty parties cease all exchange of nuclear materials and technology with non-parties, or—as recently suggested by Mr. Fred Iklé—to have Treaty parties agree to give each other preferential treatment in nuclear assistance—might encourage the polarisation of pro-and anti-NPT forces.[4] The need is not for the NPT parties to band together as a league of the virtuous, but to enlist the co-operation of the three recalcitrant nuclear powers and the larger number of non-nuclear weapon states that are sceptical about the Treaty or hostile to it, in a wider system.

One approach to this objective is to seek revision of the Treaty so as to reduce the elements of discrimination in it—for example, by imposing more serious obligations on the nuclear weapon states to pursue disarmament than are contained in Article VI; to require them to subject their peaceful nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards, on the same basis as that accepted by the non-nuclear weapon parties in Article III; to prohibit assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons by one nuclear weapon state to another, as is permitted under the present phrasing of Article I (the outstanding case is American assistance to

[4] See speech of Mr. Fred Iklé, the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Oct. 3, 1974.

Britain); and to strengthen those sections of the Treaty (Articles IV 2 and V) which provide for assistance to non-nuclear weapon states in peaceful nuclear matters in general and peaceful nuclear explosives in particular, but have not so far been acted upon.

Revisions of the Treaty along these lines could not be pursued at present without endangering the whole structure of agreement on which the NPT is built. Moreover, even if they were brought about, they would be unlikely to satisfy the more important dissenting states. Revision of the Treaty should best be pursued not at a conference of the parties to it, such as the Review Conference, but in a wider negotiation embracing non-parties at a later stage.

Rather than seek revision of the Treaty it might be advisable at this stage to play it down while seeking to involve the non-parties in a wider system of co-operation. The NPT would remain as an instrument available to those who wished to subscribe to it, but pending a revision conference that might ultimately take place the emphasis, in policies concerned to control proliferation, would shift to other areas.

The search for safeguards

One field in which a wider system of co-operation may be sought is that of IAEA safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities. The IAEA is a global body of over one hundred members, both parties and non-parties to the NPT, including China, at least nominally, France and India. It has provided a system of safeguards against diversion of peaceful nuclear activities to military purposes in connection with the NPT, which requires non-nuclear weapon parties to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, and to conclude agreements with the Agency to this effect, and requires all parties not to export certain nuclear materials or equipment to non-nuclear weapon states, except subject to safeguards. However, the Agency had earlier developed safeguards for voluntary application, and its safeguard system may work independently of the NPT.

The ideal safeguards system, no doubt, would be one which was applied to all the peaceful nuclear activities of all states without distinction. This system, however, will not be realised so long as some states engage in nuclear activities that are not peaceful, and the question now is how to extend the role of safeguards while taking account of the political reality.

First, an effort may be made through the IAEA to promote international co-operation with respect to the physical protection of nuclear materials. The growth of peaceful nuclear materials and equipment in many parts of the world, and the growing traffic in these materials from one part of the world to another, create the danger that

items of potential military significance will be seized or stolen by non-governmental groups. A comparable and perhaps greater danger is that arising from the growth of the military nuclear programmes and stockpiles of the nuclear weapon states, which are also vulnerable to seizure or theft of this kind.

To ensure proper accounting of all peaceful nuclear equipment and materials and proper physical security over them is a national responsibility, which no state will be prepared to turn over to an international body; even more obviously is this the case with respect to the security of weapons programmes and stockpiles. Nevertheless, agreement might be sought to establish the principle that all nations controlling nuclear materials or equipment are responsible to the international community for proper accounting and safe custody of them; to co-ordinate national policies and establish guidelines; and to establish some direct role in this area for the IAEA itself.

In 1972 the IAEA did approve a set of recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material, and the United States has proposed that it draft a convention which would make physical security at nuclear plants obligatory. Such a convention, if it is to serve any useful purpose, must cover the peaceful nuclear activities of the nuclear weapon states as well as of the non-nuclear weapon states. Moreover, the latter states will be within their rights if they insist that any obligations they undertake with respect to the physical security of their peaceful nuclear programmes should be balanced by obligations assumed by the nuclear weapon states in relation to their military programmes. A comprehensive scheme for international accountability for the physical protection of nuclear materials does not presuppose support for the NPT or agreement about any particular line of division between those states which are entitled to have nuclear weapons and those which are not. It is rather founded upon the solidarity of all states in seeking to preserve their position in world politics against challenges from non-governmental groups.

Secondly, agreement should be pursued among all states that are exporters of nuclear materials and technology to require all recipients to accept IAEA safeguards on the materials or technology that they receive. At present most nuclear exporters, including the nuclear weapon states that are outside the NPT, do impose safeguards requirements of some kind on their exports. But it is only those exporters that are parties to the NPT that are obliged to impose safeguards, and then only on non-nuclear weapon states. Moreover, the safeguards applied by exporters at present are in many cases bilateral ones, not involving the IAEA, which—although in some cases they are more stringent than the Agency's safeguards and in other cases less so—

cannot provide a sense of assurance in international society at large, since no international authority is involved in them and, in many cases, little is known about them. Furthermore, as nuclear activities grow throughout the world the number of significant nuclear exporters will grow also, and if a system is not devised into which they can be incorporated, the whole attempt to control nuclear exports may break down.

The aim should be a common obligation, accepted by all exporters, and not only parties to the NPT, to require Agency safeguards on all their nuclear exports. These safeguards should apply to nuclear-weapon state recipients as well as others. There is a need also to strengthen the Agency safeguards system, especially by providing for physical controls against diversion from peaceful to military purposes, as distinct from mere detection of it.

Safeguards should be required, not on all the peaceful nuclear activities of recipients (as is required in the case of non-nuclear weapon state parties under Article III 1 of the NPT), which would be unrealistic, but only on the source material and equipment that is transferred (as is required in the case of non-nuclear weapon states, whether they are parties or not, by Article III 2 of the NPT).

Some exporters or potential exporters of nuclear materials, including China, France and India, are unlikely to accept such an obligation at present, because to do so would be a formal admission that having conducted nuclear explosions themselves, they are now seeking to place obstacles in the path of others who might wish to follow in their footsteps. This is in fact what they are doing, but a decent interval may have to be observed before they are able to acknowledge it. In the meantime it may be possible to explore more informal means through which they might be involved in common export controls.

Thirdly, the ultimate goal should not be lost sight of: it is a system of IAEA safeguards that would apply not merely to international nuclear transactions, as advocated above, but to all peaceful nuclear activities of states. The only states which are at present obliged to accept Agency safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities are the non-nuclear weapon parties to the NPT. While the safeguards accepted by these states cannot be universalised at present, it is desirable to preserve the idea that they should be. If comprehensive safeguards of this sort are to be extended, this will surely require their application, on the same basis, to nuclear weapon states as well as non-nuclear weapon states. Perhaps Britain could make a contribution here by becoming the first nuclear weapon state to submit all its peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards.

Peaceful nuclear explosions

The control of proliferation requires—again, outside the framework of the NPT—a common approach to the question of PNEs. Broadly, three approaches are possible.

The first is to reject the idea that any valid distinction can be drawn between military and peaceful nuclear explosions, and to seek to restrict or even prohibit the latter. This was the approach followed in the NPT, although only in relation to PNEs conducted by non-nuclear weapon states. Those who favour continuing with this approach sometimes couple with it the idea that PNEs conducted by the nuclear weapon states should be discontinued, and a moratorium declared on all PNEs, at least pending a study of their economic and safety aspects.

This approach rests upon the correct perception that whatever the economic promise of PNEs might be (it is, of course, widely disputed) it is their security, or arms control, implications that are paramount. The NPT regime is objectionable from this point of view, not only because it allows nuclear weapon states freely to conduct PNEs on their own behalf, but also because in the provision it makes for ' nuclear explosive services ' provided by the nuclear-weapon states to the non-nuclear weapon states it confirms the ideas that PNEs are different from military explosions and are economically significant. If this regime were to be abandoned in favour of a general understanding that all states must forgo PNEs in the interests of the control of proliferation, this is an approach for which there is a lot to be said.

But while, in retrospect, it may be argued that this is the approach that should have been followed from the beginning, it is too late to adopt it now. A unilateral abandonment of PNE programmes by the nuclear weapon states, supposing it were possible, might help to discourage interest in them by others. But a general prohibition of PNEs could not be made viable, given the appeal the Indian explosion now has as a symbol of defiance of the super-powers, and the record of heavy involvement in PNE programmes which the super-powers have had up to this point, and which was recently reaffirmed in the exemption of PNEs from the limitations imposed in July 1974 by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

The second approach is to accept the Indian contention that PNEs conducted by non-nuclear weapon states do not involve proliferation, that any state has the right to conduct PNEs without international authentication or supervision, and that efforts to control proliferation should be restricted towards the control of the spread of weapons systems, defined in some different way. A nuclear explosion is, after all, only one particular stage in the route towards acquiring a nuclear weapons system. To choose—as the NPT did—the conduct of a nuclear

explosion as the essential test of nuclear weapon status, rather than possession of a chemical separation plant, or of weapons-grade fissionable material, or of a bomb or warhead stockpile, or an effective delivery system, is to a degree arbitrary. Why not lay the curse on some later stage in the process, while leaving states free to explore the economic potential of PNEs?

But while the conduct of a nuclear explosion is only one stage in the process, it is the particular stage which, politically and psychologically, is the crucial one in marking the emergence of a nuclear weapon state. In this respect the NPT did not create the identification of nuclear weapon status with conduct of a nuclear explosion, but reflected an identification that was already present in the international public mind. If every state is to be free to conduct a nuclear explosion, and to establish its peaceful nature merely by issuing a declaration to this effect, this is tantamount to abandoning the control of proliferation.

The third approach is to accept the idea that PNEs may be conducted, but to insist that they should take place only under international auspices and with safeguards to establish their peaceful nature. It is in this area that a solution to the problem should be sought, although no solution that is generally acceptable will be found in the near future.

Such an approach would imply observation of all PNEs by the IAEA, whose Board of Governors has already approved guidelines and procedures for such observation. Nuclear weapon states would relinquish the right to conduct PNEs unilaterally and without safeguards. The idea of nuclear explosive services provided by nuclear weapon to non-nuclear weapon states, enshrined in Article V of the NPT, might be preserved, but these services would be made available to all states and not only to parties to the NPT. The IAEA might be given a role not merely in safeguarding the PNEs but also in determining whether or not they should take place. It would still be important to discourage even safeguarded PNEs by non-nuclear weapon states, since they would have a proliferating effect whether they were safeguarded or not, while encouraging any non-nuclear weapon state that is determined to conduct PNEs to submit them to safeguards.

Serious obstacles stand in the way of this approach. The nuclear weapon states, and especially the Soviet Union, will not readily relinquish the right to conduct PNEs unilaterally. For some non-nuclear weapon states the attraction of PNEs is precisely that they are a symbol of nuclear weapon status and of defiance of the super-powers, and PNEs under international auspices hold no attractions. India could be induced to accept safeguards on its PNEs, if at all, only in the context of a comprehensive test ban. The motives that have led India, and may lead other non-nuclear weapon states, to conduct unilateral

PNEs, are much less economic than they are political and strategic, and the attempt to discourage unilateral PNEs must rest, in the last resort, not on international procedures for spreading the economic benefits of nuclear explosives technology, but on policies and arrangements that will dampen these political and strategic motives.

The control of proliferation might also be assisted by a re-examination of the question of security assurances provided by nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states. These can be of two kinds: positive assurances, in which the nuclear weapon states make undertakings of support to non-nuclear weapon states if they should be threatened by a nuclear weapon power; and negative assurances, in which they undertake not to use their nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state.

It has already been noted that the positive assurances afforded by the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain through a UN Security Council resolution in 1968 are virtually meaningless, and that those provided by the two super-powers to their allies and various other states, while still important, have declined somewhat in effectiveness. To this it may be added that positive assurances, even when they are effective in providing for the security of a non-nuclear weapon state, suffer from two grave defects from the point of view of the control of proliferation. First, positive assurances are an attempt to exploit and dramatise the political and strategic influence conferred by possession of nuclear weapons, and thus work counter to the long-term need, for purposes of the control of proliferation, to reduce this influence to a minimum. Secondly, positive assurances invite the non-nuclear weapon majority of states in the world to accept a position of dependence on others, at a time when a major theme of world politics is the revolt against dependence of this kind.

There are therefore strong reasons for preferring negative assurances. No assurances that the nuclear weapon states can give to others by way of verbal undertakings can be as effective in promoting their sense of security as the continued actual abstention of the nuclear weapon states from using these weapons, as the United States did against Japan, or from threatening to use them, as the United States did against China when it was non-nuclear. Nevertheless, verbal undertakings, whether unilateral or expressed in some multilateral declaration by the non-nuclear weapon states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, could be of some help. They would serve to reinforce the expectation that nuclear weapons in the hands of certain states serve only to neutralise threats of nuclear war by other states, and not as instruments of wider political and strategic purposes. They would also serve to weaken the force of the argument that is sometimes advanced,

for example, in Israel, South Africa, and Australia, that acquisition of nuclear weapons is desirable so as to be able to deter threats from non-nuclear weapon neighbours.

Again, it is important that negative assurances of this sort be offered not merely to NPT parties as a reward for joining the Treaty, but to non-nuclear weapon countries at large. Because of the situation in central Europe, where super-power nuclear weapons are stationed in the territories of allied countries, it is sometimes suggested that the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states be subject to some qualifications, such as that it does not apply if the country concerned has nuclear weapons on its soil, or is engaged in an armed attack in concert with a nuclear weapon power, or is allied with a nuclear weapon power. It might be best to aim at a simple declaration, to which particular nuclear weapon states can attach whatever qualifications they consider suitable.

What the nuclear weapon states should do

Finally, the control of proliferation depends, more than it depends on anything else, on the practice of restraint by the nuclear weapon states. What is important is not so much whether the nuclear weapon parties to the NPT make sufficient progress towards disarmament to satisfy the non-nuclear weapon parties, but whether the nuclear weapon states as a whole are able to demonstrate to international society at large that nuclear weapons are of limited and declining utility.

To some degree the nuclear weapon states have already been successful in doing this. If nuclear weapons had been used in any of the post-1945 conflicts, on however limited a scale—or if explicit threats of the use of nuclear weapons had been made frequently, rather than rarely, as they have been—the impulse to proliferation in the world today would be very much stronger than it is. The first requirement of the nuclear weapon states' contribution to the control of proliferation is that they should continue to display at least as much restraint as they have done in the past. But can they move beyond this to create a sense that the role of nuclear weapons is diminishing? While they retain their nuclear weapons at all they can go only a certain distance. But three objectives suggest themselves, at least as policies which the nuclear weapon Have Nots should be urging upon the Haves, as a matter of priority.

The first is a comprehensive test ban treaty. This is the longest discussed of any arms control issue of the post-1945 era, yet it is still one of the steps most likely to advance the objective of removing nuclear weapons from the foreground to the background of international

politics, while it may also make possible an agreed solution to the problem of PNEs.

A second objective is an undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to refrain from the first use of nuclear weapons. Among the nuclear weapon Haves, China alone today embraces this policy, which reflects its position as a fledgling nuclear weapon state. The idea that the first use of nuclear weapons should be threatened to provide security against superior conventional forces to the east is one to which the United States, Britain and France are committed in Western Europe and which now also dominates Soviet thinking in relation to China. No first use declarations and policies, while no one will place any reliance upon them, will help to remove the immediacy of present feelings that nuclear weapons are a vital instrumentality. General acceptance of no first use of nuclear weapons is an objective which runs counter to some powerfully entrenched policies and thinking, but so did some of the arms control limitations that we now have, when they were first proposed.

A third objective is that an agreement be pursued in the SALT negotiations which, unlike the Vladivostok understandings, serves to stabilise the Soviet-American balance, to reduce the dynamic of the super-power arms competition and to produce some substantial actual reductions. Appeals to the nuclear weapon states to abandon their nuclear weapons will fall on deaf ears; indeed such appeals express not the belief or even the hope that nuclear disarmament will take place so much as the desire to rationalise the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But demands that the nuclear weapon states take some of these tangible measures of restraint will be heeded by some, and the nuclear weapon Have Nots, by refusing to co-operate in the control of proliferation if these steps are not taken, will be making a constructive contribution.

THE PRESTIGE FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS *

R. P. Dore

WHEN Sir Daniel Stevenson made his endowments for chairs in international relations, he did so with a purpose wider than that of simply promoting scholarship. He also wanted scholarship to improve the world. It therefore behoves those who lecture in his honour to deliver something in the nature of an improving message. I myself have never been averse to moralising, but it so happened that when I began to think about this lecture I was not exactly burning with a message that had to be delivered. I had only puzzles, questions, and a certain expectation that if one could only explore one's way through those questions, something important in the way of a message would be discovered.

Let me begin by saying what those puzzles were. Most of my life has been spent in the study of Japanese society. One thing that has frequently impressed me is the importance, for explaining a variety of internal developments in Japanese society as well as the direction of Japanese foreign policy over the last hundred years, of a shared national concern with Japan's standing in the international community. The origins of this concern are clear enough in that period of the late 19th century when the dominant objective of Japan's policy was to force revision of what were universally called the 'unequal treaties,' to remove the humiliation of foreign extra-territorial rights in Japanese ports. But why should the Japanese still be so particularly concerned about their country's external image? Why should it be, for instance, that even a government official attending an international expert group meeting supposedly in his individual expert capacity, is not only obliged to submit a position paper to an interdepartmental group chaired by the foreign office, but may well expect to have to redraft it four or five times before he is allowed to go? And what, really, is meant by 'standing in' or 'a position of equality in' the international community? Why is it that most Japanese still feel that despite their great economic power they somehow have not achieved a 'standing' commensurate with it? And why should they appear to be

* The text of the 23rd Stevenson Lecture, given at the London School of Economics on November 19, 1974.

so much more concerned than, say, the Swedes or Yugoslavs, about whether they have it or not?

There is a second sort of puzzle. In recent years I have been intermittently engaged in studying wage and employment systems and industrial relations in a number of countries, and one of the things I have been interested in is the idea of a 'right' to a career. In Britain the tradition has generally been that only middle-class people have careers; manual workers have jobs. In most sectors of industry even a skilled craftsman has reached his top rate at the age of 21, and unless he is promoted to be a foreman he is likely to stay at that rate. Different arrangements, which give workers the prospect of career promotion through job grades, are now becoming more common and have always been more common in the United States: they are even more clearly institutionalised in Japan in the form of personal increments which, as in British universities, do not require any change of job—much less any proof of enhanced capacity. But what is more surprising is to find such institutional forms widespread in the modern sector industries of a number of latecomers to industrialisation, countries as diverse as Mexico, Senegal and Sri Lanka. In all three countries a man who has been stuck in category 2 for nine or ten years without promotion to category 3 is liable to feel hard done by, and as like as not union officials would consider that he has a right to feel aggrieved, and will take up his case.

So how is it that this sense of a right to a career, which is not yet fully established in the British working class, should already be established in other widely scattered parts of the globe—and established even in some countries where the whole concept of 'rights' which subordinates can justly assert *vis-à-vis* their superiors is not, as in England, the product of eight centuries of steady development, but an implantation of the last few decades?

A large part in the answer to that question appears to be played by the law. Take Mexico for instance. The Constitution of 1917 was the first in the world ever to embody provisions guaranteeing the rights of workers and trade unions. Those rights included a curiously unqualified 'right to promotion,' later spelled out in the Labour Code. The subsequent pressure of unions to regularise and expand promotion chances increased the objective opportunities. This raised expectations; thence the sense of a right. The point to be stressed is that those Mexican events are not intelligible in Mexican terms alone, without reference to the outside world. That the Mexican constitution embodied workers' rights can hardly be explained in terms of the real strength of workers' organisation within Mexico in 1917. The ideals, derived from foreign sources, of the intellectuals who drafted the

constitution played a large part; so did their determination to put Mexico ahead, to lead the world in new advances towards the ideals of social justice.

Here, then, is the point of intersection of my two questions. Both the Japanese concern with international standing and the international spread of ideas about the right to a career involve a presumption that there exists a prestige hierarchy of nations. It is the nature of that prestige hierarchy, and the extent to which a concern for it—to put Mexico ahead, to improve Japan's standing—explains the policies of nations, which are the central themes of this lecture.

One important aspect of the problem is the nature of the processes by which, as in the Mexican example, ideas are diffused and institutions transplanted—what economists call demonstration effects when they refer to the transfer of consumption patterns. By and large the diffusion flow goes one way: down rather than up the pecking order. Actually, pecking order is the wrong metaphor for the prestige hierarchy of nations, except in so far as it does indicate a certain consensus, shared by those at all levels of the hierarchy, as to what the order is. That consensus, of course, is an elementary precondition for the third concept in my catch-all title,[1] the existence of a community. How far that consensus in fact exists is an empirical matter. So is it an empirical matter to establish what are the shared value criteria which underlie the consensual ranking if there is one. Pecking order is the wrong word because it over-emphasises the power element. There are other elements too. Because for several centuries power has been associated with European culture and white skins, the possession of European culture and white skins in themselves can now corfer national prestige. And this suggests ranking in terms of status groups rather than the linear A pecks B who pecks C ordering of my metaphor. So, for example, there can be distressed gentlefolk nations—what, in another system of classification, may be referred to as being a mangy toothless lion.

But another element enters into the ranking criteria, an element implicit in some of the phrases already used here: I said that the notion of a worker's right to a career is *already* established in Senegal, but *not yet* fully established in Britain. The Mexican constitutional fathers prided themselves on having the most *advanced* constitution. From the vertical image of the pecking order, we move here to the horizontal image of the marathon race. The runners are strung out along a line which represents the track of social and economic development. Some

[1] The original title of this lecture was ' Demonstration effects, pecking orders, and the notion of community in international affairs '.

are more advanced than others and it is the front runners who provide the models; others, the backward countries, follow behind.

That was certainly the way the world looked to the Japanese of the 19th century, and to most of their European contemporaries who accepted with little question Victorian doctrines of evolutionary progress. 'The industrially more developed country shows the less developed only the image of its own future,' said Marx in the Preface to *Capital.* Marx, Spencer, Comte, Durkheim, Hobhouse; all had different ways of defining the marathon course, and proposed different mechanisms to explain why the runners were pre-programmed to run along it: the dialectic, the division of labour, structural differentiation and so on. But they were agreed in seeing the development of societies as like the process of maturation in human beings, a working out of immanent tendencies.

But clearly that is not the way it is, as Trotsky pointed out, *à propos* of Marx's dictum, after the Russian Revolution sought to transform Russian society in accordance with an ideology born out of the infrastructure, out of the class struggles, not so much of Russia as of Britain and France and Germany.

There is by now a vast literature, mostly produced over the last two decades, on the 'modernisation' of the developing countries—or to use the new incoming euphemism from which the original challenging Bandung Conference overtones have gradually faded—of the Third World. Much of it is written on 'pre-programmed runners on the white line' assumptions: 'modernisation' is an intransitive concept: it is something that happens to societies. Used in that way, however, it is not a very useful concept: the runners are not pre-programmed and there is no single white line, let alone a finishing line called a state of modernity. But 'modernisation' becomes a useful word if it is derived from the transitive verb 'to modernise' in the sense of 'seeking to transform one's society, or segments of it, in imitation of models, and under the influence of ideas, drawn from other countries which are seen as more advanced in some implicit scale of progress.'

Modernisation, in that sense, is quite clearly what the political leaders of Meiji Japan were about. The small group of young samurai who seized power in 1868 and began the drive to create a modern centralised state, clearly acknowledged that they had to learn from the West if they were to match the Western powers' military might and escape the threat of colonisation. One of the five articles of the Foundation Oath of the new regime declared its intention to 'seek knowledge throughout the world in order to strengthen the Foundations of the Imperial Throne.' Within a few years they had several hundred European technical assistants hired to bring that knowledge, some of them paid larger

salaries than the prime minister, and with no United Nations to pay for it. Within a few decades, Japan had acquired a new school system, a new judiciary, a new system of local government, a new army and navy, a new banking system, a new commercial code and criminal code, and a political constitution—all devised after exhaustive study of foreign models. And the opposition, as well as the government, were 'modernising' too. They read Rousseau and Mill when the government bureaucrats read Stein and Gneist—and they both read, but read different things into, Herbert Spencer. The opposition demanded popular rights and the chance to participate in government, urging the American, French and British models of modernity on a government increasingly attracted to the Prussian.

But modernisation involves a psychic cost, precisely because it is a process set in the framework of an international pecking order. In a world of competitive nation states the moderniser's modernising zeal is likely to be highly correlated with patriotism. 'In the past others have looked down on us. . . . Now let us do something for them to see.' [2] Chairman Mao's words in 1958 echo the words of countless others. Yet 'doing something' may require an open admission of backwardness, an overt acceptance of the demeaning status of pupil to the more advanced nations which is hard to reconcile with the patriot's pride.

The dilemma of pride and pupillage

There are ways out of this dilemma—what one might call the dilemma of pride and pupillage. One is to compartmentalise. 'Western techniques but an Eastern morality' was the common slogan of both Japanese and Chinese reformers in the 19th century. American machine tools, yes, say a modern Russia or China or Algeria, but for decadent permissive American pop culture we have healthy, morally superior, home-grown alternatives. As one writer has put it rather nicely, 'if the intellectual is to lead the masses of an industrially backward country in great endeavours he must provide them with incitement balanced by comfort, with self-criticism balanced by self-justification.' [3]

The balancing is not easy. In part it depends on how much history offers by ways of comfort and self-justification—how much plausible material there is to make up, in Commager's phrase, a 'usable past.' [4] Japan's history was eminently suitable. So is China's. If a Confucius has for some obscure reason to be discredited there is always the first

[2] Quoted in J. Gittings, 'China between the super-powers', *New Society*, Oct. 10, 1967.

[3] M. Matossian: 'Ideologies of delayed industrialization', *Economic development and cultural change*, 6, iii, April 1958, p. 218.

[4] H. S. Commager, *The search for a usable past*. New York: Knopf, 1967.

Ch'in Emperor, that great anti-Confucionist, to be elevated in turn. For other new nations the search for a usable past is less easy. It is hardest of all for the new meritocratic elites of sub-Saharan Africa whose original claim to legitimacy as rulers rested precisely on their mastery of an admired, but wholly alien, Western culture. Senghore's philosophy of negritude offers a somewhat nebulous solution perhaps most suitable for a President who spends his summer holidays on his Normandy estate rather than at home. President Nyerere does better in finding in *Ujamaa* a pattern of communitarian social relations which both embodies the ideals of the future and can be claimed to be rooted in the past, to be homegrown, specially and uniquely ' ours.' The danger with such symbols is that they can be discredited with over use, or misuse. Sukarno's *gotong-royang* became a symbol not of glorious Indonesian-ness, but of the self-enrichment of local political bosses. Another danger is that the symbols can be captured by the anti-modernisers. Prince Ito, by 1890 the senior survivor of the Meiji Restoration leaders, was rationalist enough to have misgivings about the resanctification of the Emperor and the ethic of loyalty and filial piety which his colleagues wanted to accelerate. His misgivings would have been greater if he had foreseen just how easily such symbols can be captured by soldiers who claim to be the true guardians of the national essence, and just where Japan would be taken in the 1940s by the tiger his civilian successors failed to ride.

Another way out of the dilemma is to insist that one's modernisation drive is not a matter of slavish imitation of foreign models, but an application of ideas and principles which are the common property of all mankind. The Japanese bureaucrats who introduced Japan's first Factory Act used this line of reply to the factory owners and other self-interested opponents who scornfully charged them with slavish imitation of the West, with legislation by translation. ' It is,' they would say, ' the universal opinion of scholars . . . that a reduction in the hours of work has beneficial consequences: that the State has a duty to protect women and children who cannot protect themselves, etc.' [5] The debate was taken out of a simple Japan = pupil: Western nations = teachers context and moved to a different frame of reference. Japan was one of a number of countries which were faced with certain common problems. It could solve them by reference to principles evolved by scholars, members of an international community, evolving doctrines of universal validity to which no nation had a proprietary claim. In the modern world Marxism, or scientific socialism, plays a

[5] For a summary of these debates, see Dore, ' The modernizer as a special case: Japanese Factory legislation, 1882–1911 ', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, II, IV, Oct. 1969, pp. 433–450.

similar justifying role, sometimes made even more acceptable by the claims to indigenous adaptation—African socialism, Indian socialism.

Moreover, of course—and this represents another answer to the dilemma—by application of the latest principles, the most advanced ideas, one can actually get ahead. The Mexican school child learns with pride that his constitution was the first in the Americas to guarantee the rights of workers—'preceding,' as one text book says, 'even the Russian revolution despite the Russian claim to be the foremost champions of the rights of workers.'[6] Again, to go back to the Japanese debates on their Factory Act, we find the claim that Japan could avoid the mistakes of the more advanced countries. The banking system was held up as an example. The Americans are still unable, said one official, to establish a proper central bank. We Japanese, by studying the latest opinions of scholars, have solved that problem ahead of them. 'And now, again, [in the matter of industry] we are faced with an academic problem which gives us an opportunity for work which will redound to the honour of our capitalists and of our country.'[7]

This is one of the secrets of the success of the ILO in influencing labour legislation throughout the world. For a minister of labour from a new nation low down in the international pecking order, attending the councils of the ILO in Geneva, it must be a source of some satisfaction to be able to declare that his government has already legislated for equal pay for women when other more powerful, so-called more advanced, nations are dragging their feet. It may be a relatively cost-free form of satisfaction if in his country social legislation belongs more to the dignified than to the effective parts of the political system. Nevertheless, the law gets on to the statute books and, as the Mexicans found, once it is there, and pressure groups develop demanding its enforcement, it does affect the reality of the situation.

Clearly the pride and pupillage dilemma appears to be more acute in some times and places than in others. Is it just a matter of cultural traditions, of the extent to which a people are sensitive about their honour, concerned, as Orientals were supposed to be, about 'face'? I think there is something a little more generalisable in the matter than that. In the first instance, the dilemma is the more acute the greater the cultural distance between the advanced country models and the moderniser who falls behind: greater, that is, for a 19th century Japan *vis-à-vis* Britain, or for a 1950s China *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union, than for a Venezuela *vis-à-vis* the United States. The reason

[6] H. García Rivas (ed.), *Constitución política de los estados unidos mexicanos*, Mexico: Fernandes. 1969, p. 71

[7] Dore, *op. cit.*, p. 446.

is fairly clear. I have spoken in a shorthand way about 'Japan' or 'the Japanese,' only occasionally referring to the particular circumstances of individual ministers of labour sitting in ILO conferences at Geneva. But it is of course in the minds and hearts of individuals that the tension, if any, exists. And it exists in its most poignant form for the elite members of the modernising country who are in constant touch with foreigners: the politicians and foreign ministry officials; nowadays also the academics and treasury officials and managers, who go to international conferences. They are affected because their own personal standing in the real concrete community of international individuals is affected by the status ranking of their nation in the metaphorical community of nations. Their self-respect hinges in part on the respect accorded their nation. *How much* it does so is likely to depend on how far they are in fact treated in category fashion, as a Togolese or an Indonesian, and how far they can establish themselves as individuals. A Paraguayan ambassador, full of courteous charm, an amusing cocktail guest, is less likely to be made as constantly aware of his Paraguayanness than an African or Indonesian delegate who has travelled a much greater cultural distance, and for whom the culture of the international community, the basically European conventions of greeting and gesture and conference chairmanship and party small talk and what constitutes wit and what flirtatiousness, have to be painfully learned at a later stage in life. And he is less likely, too, when on the streets and in the hotels of the foreign capital, to be forcibly reminded of his Paraguayanness and of the low rank of Paraguay in the international pecking order, by overt acts of discrimination against him. In the memoirs of Japanese over the last century one can find many descriptions of just such experiences of exclusion, of failing to belong; experiences which force them back on their sense of Japaneseness, and often, when the experience is a humiliating one of overt discrimination, strengthens their determination to make sure that Japan shall be made to count for something in the world. Sōseki, the distinguished Japanese novelist, passed a miserable two years in Britain at the turn of the century. He felt, he wrote later, like an ink blot on the white shirt of British society. 'How long will it take,' he wrote in his diary, for 'Japan to be able to make the Europeans respect her?'[8]

One defence for the representatives of low-status countries on the international scene is to opt out: to make it abundantly clear that they are not going to allow their self respect to depend on the degree to which they are accepted in such circles. The Mao Tse-tung tunics of

[8] G. A. de Vos, *Socialization for Achievement: essays on the cultural psychology of the Japanese*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1973, pp. 502–3. See also for other examples, K. B. Pyle, *The New Generation in Meiji Japan: problems of cultural identity*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1969.

the Chinese representatives, serve, I take it, just such a distancing function: the badge of one's nationhood is worn firmly and defiantly; in breaking the conventions of dress one declares symbolically one's non-concern with any of the conventions of the international culture in which one might get a low ranking. Though this may not inhibit conformity in matters where one can earn a high rating—such as throwing lavish UN receptions.

A second point about the pride and pupillage dilemma is that it gets worse all the time. In some ways it is more acute for nations which began their modernising drive in recent years than for, say, a Japan which got its main burst of institutional borrowing over in the last century. I will not elaborate here on all the disadvantages, or indeed the advantages, of 'late' later development, most of which relate to the greater size of the gap between indigenous and imported technology and organisation leading to a dualism between an imported modern sector and the traditional society which was far less sharp and had far less divisive consequences in 1890s Japan than it has in 1970s Nigeria or Thailand. Here, I will only discuss the way the last century has made a difference to the forms of the pride and pupillage dilemma.

Let me go back for a moment to the notion of a 'right to a career' and the suggestion that to establish such rights is somehow more advanced than not to have them established. Underlying that sly assertion of the idea of progress is the Tocquevillean notion that a major axis of social development is a trend to what he called ever greater 'equality of social condition.' Tocqueville was impressed by the inexorable manner in which aristocracy was giving way to what he called in his special sense 'democracy'—a state of affairs in which no man was considered for any reason inherently superior to another; in which all relations of hierarchy and authority were for specific purposes, freely entered into, for convenience, by contract and consent.[9] The recognition of an expanding range of rights of citizenship, economic rights being gradually added to the original bundle of political rights, is an exemplification of this trend. Tocqueville was not very good at explaining the trend—except as 'an unquestionable sign of God's will.' Nor are we much better at explaining it today, though the evidence of its progress in the last few decades seems pretty clear in the gradual erosion of the automatic authority inhering in superior status positions—of officers in the army, or managers in industry, or fathers in families or professors in universities: authority is being stripped down

[9] For a recent survey of Tocqueville's ideas, see M. Burrage, 'On Tocqueville's notion of the irresistibility of democracy', *European Journal of Sociology*, 13, 1972, pp. 151–168.

closer and closer to the bare functionally necessary minimum if not beyond.

New egalitarian ideals

But for the present argument, the relevant point is not so much that these new advances of egalitarianism by and large take place first in the most technologically developed industrial countries as that they then spread rapidly to the countries which are lower down the pecking order. Among the ideas diffused to the modernising countries from today's top nations are radical egalitarian ideals of a kind hardly contemplated a century ago when hierarchy was more secure. 'In the history of man,' said a British missionary to Nigeria in the 1880s, explaining why it was his object to create a Christian middle class, 'there has been no civilisation which has not been cemented and sustained in existence by a division of the people into higher, lower and middle classes.'[10] And just as there was an accepted stable order of higher, lower and middle classes within countries, so there were higher, lower and middle classes of countries. Within Europe, the Congress of Vienna had actually tried to systematise a new three-tier grading of states to replace the old aristocratic community of European princes in which hierachy had been determined by the antiquity of the princely line. But in a Europe which had experienced the French Revolution it found the task impossible. The sub-committee charged with the matter admitted defeat after two months. Thenceforth the assumption of a basic equality of states was to rule. The accident of seniority became the only acceptable principle for regulating relations of precedence between diplomats.

But outside Europe it was somewhat different. Sir Harry Parkes, British Minister in Tokyo between 1865 and 1883, declared himself, and indeed was generally believed to be, basically well disposed towards the Japanese. But his behaviour was hardly of a kind he would have thought appropriate in Lisbon or in Rome. He was given to lecturing the Japanese—on subjects, as Beasley records, 'as far removed from his diplomatic duties, strictly defined, as lighthouses, railways, currency, agricultural rents, samurai stipends, factories and education.'[11] Parkes wrote on one occasion to his wife, about his protest to the Japanese government over their plans to debase the currency; 'fortunately I scolded them so severely that they became alarmed for the consequences and took the proper steps of stopping the coinage

[10] J. F. A. Ajayi, *Christian missions in Nigeria, 1941–1891; the making of a new elite.* Evanston, Ill : Northwestern University Press. 1965.

[11] W. G. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration*, Stanford, Calif.; Stanford University Press. 1972, p. 310.

altogether.'[12] It was not uncommon, when he wished to deliver such scoldings, for him to summon the Japanese foreign minister to come to him and keep him standing during the scolding while he sat behind his desk.

Of course such behaviour rankled. But it did not rankle quite so much as it would now because then hierarchy was the order of the day. 'Parkes treats us as if we were children,' wrote a Japanese leader in a memorandum of 1869; but his argument was not that they should somehow avenge the insult, but that they should remould the structure of government, become more efficient and less deserving of Parkes's rebukes.[13] In their subsequent efforts to secure revision of the treaties, to prove Japan 'civilised,' the government was willing to accept the Western powers' definition of civilisation.

That deferential world has, perhaps, not entirely passed away. General Maxwell Taylor, a century after Parkes, could still, apparently, line the Vietnamese generals against the wall and tell them off for their irresponsibility in carrying out an unauthorised coup; and one of the generals could still feel it a matter for pride that he had answered back.[14] It has often seemed to me, too, that the usual explanations of why it should be the Japanese prime minister and not Americans who evoke student demonstrations in Thailand and Indonesia are hardly sufficient to explain the facts. Japanese business methods are not so sharply different; Japanese residents and tourists are not notably more ostentatious in their wealth. In Bangkok it is the Americans, not the Japanese, who own a hotel exclusively for American guests. It is the Americans who flaunt their Thai girl friends in the hotel swimming pools, not the Japanese, who take them discreetly to their rooms. One cannot help suspecting that the Thai people are accustomed to white people assuming that the world belongs to them, but react differently when the Japanese do so: 'what right have they got to give themselves airs: "they are only Asians like us."'

But the deferential world *is* fast disappearing and perhaps its disappearance is most painful to those who have directly experienced the period of most rapid transition. The transformation of Sergeant Amin, loyally proud of the patronising commendations of his British officers, into General Amin, keen to show his brotherly equality with other heads of state by cabling them good advice, is a tragedy of personal unhingement, quite apart from its disastrous consequences for the peoples of Uganda.

In sum, the spread of egalitarian ideas from the rich world to the

[12] S. L. Poole and F. V. Dickins, *The Life of Sir Harry Parkes*. Vol. 2. 1894, p. 117.
[13] Beasley, *ibid.*, p. 333.
[14] D. Halberstam, *The best and the brightest*. New York: Random House, 1972, p. 618.

poor world, from inter-personal relations to international relations, has eroded the viability of deferential world orders irreversibly. It has, probably permanently, altered the permissible bases of both personal and national self-respect. The high-status countries have to some extent adjusted their responses. Compare Sir Harry Parkes's lecturing manner of a century ago with this statement from a recent World Bank *Sector Working Paper* (Dec. 1974): a hand-on-the-heart, some would say sanctimonious, renunciation of all intention of exercising anything as indelicate as leverage in its dealings with developing countries:

> Recognition of the sovereign prerogatives and the practical necessity for a country to determine its own affairs, does not, however, preclude the possibility of a useful and constructive dialogue between it and the Bank. If there is no substitute for the borrower's own judgments regarding political and social issues, it *may* also be true that with its broad awareness of technical alternatives and their outcomes in other countries, the Bank may *help to illuminate* the choices a country faces and *help it* to make better decisions.

But it is questionable whether this adjustment is enough, can ever be enough; whether the increased need for low-status countries' leaders to claim and assert equality of status has not so much exacerbated the pride versus pupillage dilemma, as compared, say, with Japan's situation a century ago—particularly when it is compounded by such symbolically overt forms of dependence as relying on supplementary gifts of American wheat to feed one's population—that no degree of adjustment by the high-status countries can make any form of pupillage acceptable. An adviser on educational television recently returned from Brazil writes that the Brazilians nowadays love to have technical experts around, but chiefly for the pleasure of ostentatiously ignoring their advice and showing that they can manage very nicely thank you. How far this will genuinely impede Brazil's progress is one question. In a country with the intellectual and organisational resources of a China—and the oil—the advantages of self-reliance probably greatly outweigh the psychic and other costs of accepting large numbers of Russian advisers. And one only has to look at, say, the disastrous consequences in South Asia of adopting our school structures and our mythologies about the way university training prepares people for vocations to see excellent reasons why developing countries should reject an emulative pattern of development. The problem is that the emulation which reason would discourage and that which pride cannot bear do not necessarily coincide, and many countries may condemn themselves, metaphorically, to inventing the steam engine all over again—though admittedly the steam engine metaphor is a bad one: it is precisely the often inappropriate, most modern, technology which pride permits, even demands, to be imported; the subtler and more

useful achievements of the rich countries in, say, methods of organisation or social analysis are the ones which pride is likely to reject.

That is one consequence of the change in the world community, of the increasing unviability of deferential world orders—it is a harder, more agonising experience, nowadays, to be a moderniser. But there are other consequences, too, for the sphere of activities known conventionally as international affairs. And that brings me to the question: what is the point of all this indelicate probing into other people's inferiority complexes? The point is that these status relationships of superiority and inferiority do very much count as determinants of action.

Let me summarise the model of the world community implicit in all I have been saying. It is of a normatively ranked hierarchy of nations in which a major preoccupation of its members is to raise, or to maintain, their existing position. It deserves the term 'community' precisely because one can use the term 'normative'—because there is a rough consensus, which even peripheral members such as the Chinese half-share, concerning which are top-rank nations and which are lower-rank nations. There is also—it is logically implicit in such an analysis—a rough consensus on the criteria which determine rank, and those criteria include not only power—the ability to coerce and deter, by the implicit or explicit threat of material damage—and conspicuous wealth, but also such things as 'being ahead' in matters of equality and justice; not torturing one's citizens, and having that sort of national cohesion which comes from a Scandinavian confidence in the quality of one's social, artistic and intellectual life, rather than from anxious preoccupation with external power and prestige—in short, having some claims to exercise moral leadership.

One of the most telling passages in Halberstam's account of the Vietnam war is a reported discussion on the stopping of missile tests. Adlai Stevenson expressed himself in favour of taking some small risks in the interest of seizing moral leadership. 'I would not', retorted Dean Rusk, 'make the smallest concession for moral leadership. It's much overrated'.[15]

That remark will serve as well as any other to typify the alternative view of the international community as a power structure. In this view, it is not really much of a community at all, since the only normative consensus is in a few beliefs such as that it is better to gain territory than lose it, and a supposedly shared set of expectations about the likely rational responses of other nations to attempts to pursue one's own advantage at their expense. Prestige counts, in such a view of the world, but only instrumentally; prestige is the way you gain the coercive

[15] Halberstam, *op. cit.*, p. 378.

or deterrent advantages of power without actually having to use it; it is that which can be maintained only by avoiding weakness or any suspicion of a 'failure of will,' by displaying one's resolute willingness to use one's power if necessary. Prestige, then, is not an end in itself, but only a means to economy in the use of power. It was, presumably, in that sense that John McNaughton, catching his master McNamara's penchant for quantification, is supposed once to have said that the reasons for going on in Vietnam were ten per cent. to save Vietnamese democracy, twenty per cent. to preserve the power balance against China and seventy per cent. prestige—to avoid the humiliation of defeat.[16] It is not so clear that President Johnson's remark that he did not propose to go down in history as the first American President to lose a war was equally about hard-nosed instrumental prestige, rather than personal machismo and end-in-itself prestige.

But it is not my primary intention to argue that the status model is a better guide than the power model for the explanation of the foreign policies of nation states in general, or the big powers in particular. Most people would agree in principle that power, the pursuit of security and economic advantage, and prestige status are all *in some measure* sought as ends in themselves and not just as means to each other. But what is striking is, first, a general tendency among students of international affairs to play down the importance of prestige factors more than seems to me plausible; secondly, a particular tendency among *both* policy makers and academic analysts in the top-ranking countries to underrate the importance of such factors in low-ranking nations.

As for the policy makers, the last decade has given us a disastrous demonstration of the consequences. The consistent failure either of Rusk's insight or of McNamara's computers to predict the responses of Hanoi stemmed in large part from their failure to empathise and to get a feel of the strength of nationalist sentiment among North Vietnam's leaders, or to grasp the extent to which those considerations of pride, which in one form go into status aspirations, will override calculations of material loss and gain when it is elementary autonomy itself which is at stake.

Let me give a final Japanese example. It is possible to interpret the trends of Japan's foreign policy from 1870 to the 1940s as motivated by a dominant concern with Japan's international status. The drive to remove the unequal treaties, goes this argument, really was about inequality and pride and not about tariff autonomy; it was as much for glory as for territory, indemnities and colonies that the wars were fought against China and Russia; it was the refusal of the Western powers to accord Japan full great power status—the humiliating

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 624.

rejection of its racial equality clause from the League of Nations' Convention, or the exclusion acts in California, for example—which in the 1920s finally tipped the balance away from the policies of sweet reasonableness and international correctness, and in the 1930s allowed the army to impose its own recipe for achieving the national goal; if, they seemed to be saying, we cannot gain the esteem of the West by our conformity to *their* rules and norms, then we shall do so by the only means they seem to understand; the use of military force.

The importance of status aspirations

If one has seen how even internal debates on the Japanese Factory Act were suffused by an awareness of Japan's ' standing ' *vis-à-vis* the Western powers, it is impossible to believe that these were not extremely important factors in the determination of Japan's policy. And yet it is surprising how reluctant either contemporaries or subsequent diplomatic historians have been to give these factors much weight compared to the drive for territory, markets and raw materials. Take one of the crucial incidents: Japan's failure to get its racial equality clause inserted in the League Convention. There can be little doubt of the importance the Japanese attached to it: it was the foremost item in the foreign minister's speeches to the Diet about the Versailles conference; it dominated the press interviews given by the Japanese representatives on their way to the conference.[17] Yet a contemporary writer, living in Japan as editor of the leading English language newspaper, could blandly suggest, in his summary history of the period, that the Japanese probably only used the amendment as a bargaining ploy: they hoped that defeat on that issue would gain sympathy for their claim to territorial concessions in Shantung.[18]

One subsequent historian does, to be sure, have a different perspective. In his two-volume work on the diplomatic war in the Far East in the interwar period Mario Toscano speaks of the ' extraordinarily profound ' consequences of the rejection of Japan's amendment, which ' irremediably wounded Japanese pride.' ' Japan's leaders,' he said, ' never forgot the humiliation they had experienced at Paris and that explains a good part of the subsequent direction of Japanese foreign policy '.[19] And yet that remark appears in a tiny footnote to a short textual reference to the decision on Japan's amendment, embedded in a lengthy chapter which analyses in great detail the dispute over Japan's

[17] See, for example, *The Times*, April 1, 4, 30, 1919.

[18] Morgan Young, *Japan under Taisho Tenno, 1912–26*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1928, pp. 160–167.

[19] M. Toscano, *Guerra diplomatica in Estremo Oriente, 1914–31; i trattati delle ventun domande*. Vol. 2. Turin: Guilio Einaudi. 1950, p. 235.

claim to German bases in Shantung. The conventions of the profession determine that these are real, hard, analysable issues; but status aspirations, pride, humiliations: these are for passing reference in a footnote.

Students of international affairs are not alone in their tendency to play down status aspirations as a motivating factor in human affairs. Among sociologists studying social stratification in Britain the dominant tendency is to reject the importance of prestige rankings as compared with inequalities of income and of power.[20] More generally, there is a rather curious alliance between neo-classical economists within the economics profession and Marxists in all the social sciences, to discount all so-called cultural factors in social explanation in favour of overwhelming emphasis on the rational pursuit of material self-interest. This is particularly marked in my own field of development studies. A decade ago much of the emphasis was on the internal preconditions for economic development in the poor countries; the lack of entrepreneurial spirit, the need to replace particularistic ascriptive norms of behaviour by universalistic achievement-oriented norms and so on. As well as saving, borrowing and investing in things, the developing countries had to invest in human resources, in removal of the cultural obstacles to development represented by ignorance and inappropriate values.

According to the new orthodoxy, by contrast, one is hardly allowed to question the rationality of the Indian peasant's attachment to his cow; given his life circumstances he is in fact maximising his material advantages. The causes of stagnation lie not in his deficiencies but in the social system which denies him access to adequate resources, notably in the world economic system which allows the rich countries to exploit the poor countries, and to do so in such a way that internal exploitation within the poor countries inevitably follows. The rise of the dependency theory, as this perspective has come to be called, is a product of some very special features; it is in part, I think, one means of resolving what I have called the pride versus pupillage dilemma on the part of intellectuals in the developing countries, particularly of Latin America. It is compounded by its mirror image in the rich countries—what one might call the modesty versus teacherage dilemma. As one of those middle-aged academics who has had many stimulating foreign trips and even earned a little extra income in the name of development consultancy, I know how much that dilemma can be sharpened when one is confronted with a sense of one's own bourgeois complacency under the onslaughts of the radical young.

[20] See, for a recent review, Colin Crouch, 'What's happening to class', *Times Higher Educational Supplement*, Nov. 7, 1974.

But I digress somewhat from my concern with one particular cultural factor, the role of prestige, of status aspirations in international affairs. I find myself, after all, with a message; or rather with three messages, not one.

The first is the plea that students of international affairs should give more attention to these factors. To be sure they are not entirely unstudied, but mostly by scholars whom one might call peripheral to the international relations field, Gustavo Lagos Matus, Peter Nettl, Roland Robertson, and Johan Galtung [21]; all sociologists or political scientists. They have already probed a good deal more deeply into the subject than I have in this rough survey; notably in elaborating the thesis that it is status inconsistency—wide discrepancies in the country's standing by different ranking criteria—which can lead to dangerous disequilibrium and aggressive policies. But there is a lot more to be done in this field, particularly regarding the interconnections between the metaphorical community of nations and the more concrete community of the representatives of nations. Let me offer a minor hypothesis by way of example. Foreign offices which place great emphasis on personal self-confidence in their recruitment tests are less likely to allow national status considerations to enter into policy-making than foreign offices which recruit primarily by written examinations. I do not know whether that is true; there are reasons for believing that it might be; but it might be worth trying to find out.

My second plea, of course, is easily anticipated from what I said about Vietnam. It is that our policy makers should make due allowance for, and indeed try to show some sympathy for, the status aspirations of low—nowadays an Englishman has to say lower—ranking nations. The Middle East is one area in particular where we might be in danger of not doing so. No analysis of Middle East affairs would be complete or safe if it did not take into account the status gap as well as the power gap between Israel and its Arab neighbours. And if anyone doubts its existence he might try doing a sociometric study of the interaction patterns respectively of the Israeli and Syrian ambassadors at some representative diplomatic functions. In contrast to the comfortable optimism of those who have told us that of course the Arab countries have nothing to gain by deliberately causing a recession in the capitalist world, it seems to me an advance that a few months ago Kissinger

[21] See Gustavo Lagos Matus, *International stratification and underdeveloped countries*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1963; M. Shimbori *et al.*, 'Measuring a nation's prestige', *The American Journal of Sociology*, 69. July 1963, pp. 63–68; J. P. Nettl and R. Robertson, *International systems and the modernization of societies: the normation of national goods and attitudes*. New York: Basic Books 1968; J. Galtung, 'International relations and international conflicts: a sociological approach' in International Sociological Association, Sixth World Congress of Sociology *Transactions*, Vol. 1.

acknowledged what the effect of a strong sense of status deprivation might be on Arab conceptions of loss and gain. 'They are not moved by our alarms about the health of the Western world, which never included and has even exploited them.' It is not clear, however, that our only response to that situation should be defensive measures and a continuation of this exclusion.

My final plea is in a sense just a reinforcement of the first. There is an important interaction between international relations experts and diplomatic practitioners. Greater emphasis on status factors by the academic experts in their analysis of what happens may have a self-fulfilling prophecy effect by making policy makers more willing to allow such motives to enter consciously into their policies: the normative and the descriptive aspects of the policy sciences can never be disentangled. And that I would count as a good thing because as long as we continue to operate a world of nation states whose representatives see their prime duty as loyalty to their state rather than to mankind, the only way a moral concern for the collective interest of mankind can be insinuated into their motivations is through the sensitivities of their status aspirations. In the Morgenthau power world there are no points of leverage which permit considerations of morality to be pressed against considerations of expediency. Only nations susceptible to the attractions of prestige-as-an-end-in-itself are likely to be constrained to obey whatever norms of international conduct the subterranean movements of world opinion may gradually bring forth—those subterranean movements which have brought the concept of a right to a career to Senegal and Sri Lanka and made unviable a deferential world order. A government less concerned about its international standing than the Japanese, to take a minor recent example, would hardly have been forced by the pressure of world opinion to abandon as substantial an economic stake as Japan has in the catching of whales. In short, I hope that our hard-nosed analysts will not join Falstaff in his belief that honour is a mere scutcheon. That way, I think, we have a better chance of survival: a better chance of creating a world in which it is less likely that any of the great powers will have a secretary of state or a foreign minister who could say, with Dean Rusk: 'I would not make the smallest concession for moral leadership. It's much over-rated.'

THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY—SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

Colin Legum

ALTHOUGH pan-continental aspirations have inspired movements down the centuries, Africa is the first continent in which this idea has become anything like a reality. But how effective a reality? This kind of question has been asked about the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) from its inception. It is asked sometimes for ulterior reasons by those—in Europe as well as in Africa itself—who dislike the ideal of a Black Conscious Pan-Africanist movement, and especially of its earlier champions, exemplified by Ghana's first President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. To these the question is posed not critically but negatively, they are amazed, and usually disappointed, that an organisation, whose early demise they had so confidently and so often foretold, should still be in active business after nearly twelve years. But others inquire about the OAU as they would about the Commonwealth of Nations, the United Nations or the European Economic Community—in a spirit less hostile but informed by deep doubts about the likely efficacy of any international organisations of sovereign states, whose achievements must necessarily be limited by the constraints of broad consensus based on mutual interests. Since their achievements will always fall far short of the idealism that inspired their creation, the inherent weaknesses in all international associations often breeds cynicism and leads the cynics to deny any value to them at all. But the cynics are wrong about the value of the Commonwealth, the United Nations, the EEC and the OAU: each in its different way has made, and can be expected to continue to make, important contributions towards creating a more stable world order. It is difficult to imagine what might have been the fate of Africa if, at the point of its emancipation from colonial rule in the early 1960s, its leaders had failed to provide the deeply balkanised and politically divided continent with a political centre.

The OAU was born on May 25, 1963, out of historic necessity and a welter of conflicting political ideas and interests. It was mainly inspired by Kwame Nkrumah, who was on bad terms with many of his contemporaries, but was nevertheless a man of destiny; his romantic idealism and dynamic ambitions provided the kind of challenge which

compelled the entire continent's attention (excepting that of the white-ruled states) to the need for an organisation that would seek to harmonise relations between the young states emerging from their colonial experience, to defend their newly-won sovereignty, and to extend the emanicipation movement into the still 'unliberated' areas of the continent.

The institutional framework of the OAU was entirely different from the one that Nkrumah had set himself to achieve. His ambition had been the political unification of Africa as the prerequisite for effective unity; but, with few exceptions, his contemporaries saw the ideal as an association of sovereign governments (institutionalised in the annual summit meeting of heads of state)—not very different, in fact, from the United Nations. Nkrumah's supporters chose to describe this as a 'trade union of African presidents', and it is not an entirely erroneous characterisation of the organisation. Nevertheless, trade unions—even one designed primarily for presidents—have an important function. While Nkrumah's aspiration for 'political unification' still exists (notably in the ideas of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Sékou Touré of Guinea), it has ceased, for the present at least, to be a seriously divisive factor in the affairs of the OAU. The constraints inhibiting its effectiveness—apart from the jealous guarding of sovereign prerogatives (*pace* Peter Shore and Enoch Powell in their rooted objections to the European Community)—are still largely those which divided the continent in the angry controversies that were the prelude to the OAU's formation during the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Allowing for some oversimplification, there were three main geo-political currents running through the continent at the time, all of them the residue of the colonial experience: 'Francophone', 'Anglophone' and Arab. The French-speaking African states—whose policies are exemplified by President Felix Houphouet Boigny of the Ivory Coast and President Leopold Senghor of Senegal—desired to retain their close links—and especially their economic relations—with Paris. They determinedly developed these special interests through the Organisation for the Community of African and Malagasy States (OCAM), which later came to include Mauritius—as well as through a multitude of regional and functional groupings (for example, the Yaoundé Associate States of the EEC). Although OCAM has begun to decay rapidly in the last few years, and the 'special relationship treaties' with Paris have mostly been radically revised, the hard core of a Francophone community still exists.

The 'Anglophones'—nearly all belonging to the Commonwealth—were mostly motivated in an almost entirely opposite direction to that of the Francophones: their thrust was towards total political and

economic disengagement from any type of dependency relationship on Europe. They were wholly Africa-centred, and they thought they saw in the Francophone African leaders' policies the continuing ' hand of Paris ', wishing to keep intact France's economic sphere of interest in the continent, with the consequent danger of keeping Africa permanently divided along the lines of the old colonial empires. The view that France was seeking to establish a ' neo-colonialist ' policy was held not only by radicals like Nkrumah and Nyerere: Nigeria—potentially the most powerful economic and political state in black Africa—has been in the forefront of the challenge to its Francophone neighbours. Its aspirations are for the formation of a West African Economic Community which would straddle Anglophones and Francophones to create a strong economic bloc stretching from Senegal to the Cameroons. Nigeria's championship of such ideas has not only kept alive the tensions between the two groups, but has made them even sharper as a result of the growing support from among its smaller Francophone neighbours (notably Togo and Niger) for its stand. (Another dimension of this desire to create a strong African regional economic community is provided by the policies of Zaïre's President, General Mobutu Seso Seko, who originally joined OCAM, then quarrelled with it, and now seeks to play in equatorial Africa the role that Nigeria sees for itself in West Africa. Although not directly competitive, Lagos and Kinshasa are not well disposed to each other.)

The Arab position has been more confused for three reasons. First, the Arabs are more sharply differentiated from each other; the Maghrib prefers not to align itself too closely with Egypt, while being itself divided by the different policies pursued by Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and, especially, Libya under Colonel Qadhaffy. Second, the Arabs' close involvement with the Middle East has tended to make their priorities different from those of most of the rest of Africa. Third, the colonial experience in Africa had kept the Arab states separated from black Africa, which had produced a psychological barrier. Black Africa, by and large, while refusing to accept the Sahara as ' a political barrier ' in an independent Africa, was nevertheless anxious not to become too closely associated with particularist Arab interests. For example, at independence every single state in black Africa chose to establish diplomatic and economic ties with Israel. They sought, at first successfully, to avoid becoming entangled in Middle East affairs, particularly over the issue of Israel and the Palestinians. For their part, the Arabs were understandably upset by black Africa's refusal to identify itself with their stand on Israel. The tensions produced by these conflicting interests within the OAU were partly resolved after the 1967 war in the Middle East when African states moved closer to the Egyptian position over the demand for the restoration of the

occupied Arab territories. (President Sadat's new policies also found more favour in African eyes than had Nasser's.) By 1972—at the OAU summit meeting in Rabat—the Arab position had become virtually dominant. The emotions produced by the October 1973 war, plus the possible denial of oil supplies to those African states which refused to break off their close relation with Israel, led to all but one African state (Malawi) severing their diplomatic ties with Jerusalem. Even such stalwart pro-Israelis as President Houphouet Boigny, Jomo Kenyatta and the Emperor of Ethiopia found that they could not afford, politically, to stand out against the 'consensus' of African opinion.

Development of an African foreign policy

Here it is important to note the constraints on African leaders over issues on which a great majority of their colleagues feel strongly. There is a very real sense in which it is possible to speak of the OAU having developed an 'African foreign policy'. Although it is obvious that not all 42 OAU member-states adopt an identical foreign policy, their policies nevertheless have sufficient points of common interest over a sufficient number of crucial questions to constitute a continental approach to international affairs. This continental approach is determined, in part, by African states voluntarily subscribing to certain policies; and, in part, by majority pressures on unwilling states to make them accept the dominant view. In this way, positive and negative forces operate to produce either voluntary or reluctant support for policies on issues considered to be of vital concern to the continent as a whole. Apart from the example of Africa's diplomatic break with Israel in 1973, other examples are: the growing acceptance of the policies of the nonaligned movement, the African stand adopted in 1972 against dialogue with South Africa; and the African stand over relations with the EEC.

The OAU provides the arena within which common African policies are forged, or disputed, and where the tensions of inter-African relations can be released. These are the reasons why each year's annual summit meeting of heads of state have become such critical events. They are frequently wrongly portrayed to the outside world as evidence of the imminent breakup of the OAU—rather in the way in which every Commonwealth prime ministers' meeting since the fateful controversy over South Africa in 1959–60 has been presented as 'the last'. Such judgments are facile. There have been issues enough on which the OAU could have broken apart over the past twelve years; but the fact remains that not a single member of the organisation has resigned and that, on the contrary, its original membership has gone up from 30 to 42 with at least another two states—Mozambique and

Angola—due to join this year. Though the King of Morocco, Dr. Banda of Malawi, or M. Houphouet Boigny of the Ivory Coast might choose to stay away from OAU summit meetings for long periods, they cannot afford to take the political risk of leaving its circle altogether. This is a remarkable aspect of the constraints imposed on them by the urge for African unity and by the disadvantages that possible isolation within the continent might bring to their regimes. It is also worth remarking that the OAU has never considered expelling any of its members—not even when Dr. Banda chose to establish diplomatic and economic links with South Africa in direct contravention of the organisation's decisions. There is room in the African ark for Qadaffy and King Hassan, despite the former's commitment to destroying Morocco's monarchy; for General Amin and Julius Nyerere, despite their countries having come to the brink of war; and for Ethiopia and Somalia, who have engaged in military conflict over their borders.

Thus the OAU has come to play the role of mediator, conciliator and arbitrator—all three roles being institutionalised in an OAU convention. As with the United Nations, the OAU's ability and power to act decisively in settling disputes is extremely limited. It has nevertheless played an important role in stopping the brief military conflict between Algeria and Morocco in 1963, between Tanzania and Uganda in 1972, and between Ethiopia and Somalia on several occasions. Its good offices have been used on a number of occasions either to reduce tensions or to promote settlements in the periodic disputes between Guinea, on the one hand, and Ivory Coast and Senegal on the other; or, currently, between Mali and Upper Volta. The usefulness of this role is difficult to exaggerate, but its effectiveness should not be overrated. For example, despite ten years of trying, the potentially dangerous conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden remains as far from being settled as ever; nor has the OAU succeeded in stopping a member-state like Libya from playing an actively subversive role in Chad or Morocco; nor has it even tried to stop Somalia and Libya from supporting the Eritrean Liberation Front in Ethiopia.

The OAU is, as one might expect, weakest and at its most disappointing when it comes to dealing with serious internal problems of its member-states. Thus there has never been any question of the OAU expressing even mild criticism of the 'double genocide' that has scarred the life of Burundi; or of seeking to ameliorate the conditions in the Sudan caused by the long rebellion of the Southern Sudanese before, happily, they were able to find an amicable settlement of their differences. And when ex-President Milton Obote of Uganda—a founder-member of the OAU—sought to have his accusations of mass murder

against General Amin discussed, his offending document was hastily withdrawn from circulation among delegates. The OAU's greatest failure, perhaps, was its inability to make a positive contribution during the nightmare years of civil war in Nigeria.

These failures are undoubtedly serious; but the reality is that no organisation like the OAU can hope to survive once it attempts to intervene—however good the reasons—in the internal conflicts of one of its members. This essential constraint is inherent in any international organisation; this may be a pity, but no such organisation should be condemned for failing in an area which it cannot, realistically, touch.

There are enormous difficulties in maintaining the OAU in business and in ensuring that its executive machinery is not disrupted by the differences between its members—especially when issues touching on Francophone-Anglophone-Arab relations become central to decision-making. This difficulty was sharply illustrated by the controversial election of a new administrative Secretary-General for the OAU—the top executive post—caused by the resignation in 1974 of its last incumbent, the Cameroonian, Nzo Ekangaki. His resignation was caused by a controversy over his decision to engage the British-based multinational, Lonrho, as the OAU's adviser on how to assist African states hit by the oil crisis. According to him the appointment was made with the full approval of the Committee of Seven, the OAU body appointed to negotiate with the Arab League over the maintenance of oil supplies and to seek the aid of the Arab oil producers in minimising the effects of higher oil prices on the economies of the weaker African states. (The work of this committee is, incidentally, another example of the role played by the OAU.) Two candidates were presented to succeed Ekangaki at the Mogadishu summit meeting of the OAU in 1974—Somalia's foreign minister, Mr. Omer Arteh, and Zambia's foreign minister, Mr. Vernon Mwaanga. Although Somalia's nominee came to within one vote of the required two-thirds majority, his selection was blocked by the obdurate opposition of the minority.

The line-up of the two sides was significant. The Arabs and the Francophones (usually divided on crucial issues) on this occasion voted almost solidly for Mr. Arteh; the Anglophones (including all the Commonwealth countries except Uganda and Sierra Leone), joined by Zaïre, voted almost solidly for Mr. Mwaanga. There were two main reasons for this line-up. The more important was that Mwaanga's supporters felt that it would seriously damage the successful working of the OAU secretariat (and possibly be disastrous to the OAU itself) if the top executive post were to be filled by Somalia's foreign minister in view of the intractable dispute between his country and Ethiopia,

as well as with Kenya. So Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere (always close partners in these matters) took the lead in heading off what they felt was a recipe for disaster. Their opponents argued that with the OAU headquarters located in Addis Ababa something would be done to restore the balance if the top executive job were to be held by a Somalian who, in any case, was bound not to misuse his office to the advantage of his own country. The second reason was that a number of African countries had become increasingly concerned about the growing predominance of Arab influence in the OAU. While willing to support the Arab case over the Palestinians, they resent the possibility of the OAU being turned into an adjunct of the Arab League. The supporters of Arteh (whose Muslim, but non-Arab, country recently decided, with Mauritania, to join the Arab League) made the mistake of claiming as an additional reason for his choice the fact that he would be able to use Somalia's influence with the Arab League to promote African interests. This argument did not go down well—not even among his Francophone African supporters. So why did they persist in their support for him? Because they did not want to see the Anglophones strengthen *their* position; they preferred a Haman above a Mordechai. But their real interest was in getting the top executive post retained in the hands of a French-speaking African. After 20 separate votes, and an all night session, the two sides failed to break the deadlock; in the end a compromise was found; another Cameroonian, Mr. William Aurelian Eteke Mboumoua was unanimously chosen—and so the Francophones came away with the bone. (Mboumoua happens to be an excellent choice.)

This spectacular internal struggle illustrates two further interesting aspects of the working of African diplomacy. The first is a desire to achieve agreement by consensus; consensus politics is, in fact, a crucial aspect of the 'African way of doing things', and finds its highest expression in the way the OAU conducts its business. And the second is that there are certain issues over which opinions are so strongly held that this natural desire for consensus becomes suppressed. For Nyerere, Kaunda and their supporters the choice of the right candidate for the top executive post of the OAU was such an issue: they saw the whole future of the OAU as being possibly at stake, hence their 'obduracy'. Those who have tried to interpret their stand as reflecting anti-Arab feelings are wide of the mark; their stand was dictated not by anti-Arab feeling as such but entirely by their overriding support for African unity.

At its birth the OAU had pledged itself to complete 'the unfinished African revolution'—the 'liberation' of those parts of the continent where white minority rule still prevailed. To this end they established

as an instrument of OAU policy the African Liberation Committee (ALC) with its headquarters in Dar Es Salaam. Its objective was, *inter alia*, to give effective support to the African liberation movements in the Portuguese territories (Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Namibia (South West Africa), South Africa and the Comoro Islands. For this purpose all OAU members pledged themselves to provide a fighting fund—about £2 million a year —a pledge which has been better kept by some members than others. The ALC was also entrusted with the task of raising additional support from other ' friendly countries ' and, so far as possible, of ensuring that all foreign economic and military aid for the guerrilla movements should be channelled through its own account to avoid the risks of foreign political interests becoming entangled with the African liberation struggle. It was charged with directing aid in terms of the ALC's own scale of priorities set by its overall strategy. Its first priority was to the anti-Portuguese colonial struggle.

The Lusaka Manifesto of 1967

However, at the same time as pursuing this policy of support for armed struggle as a means of completing the ' African revolution ', the OAU was engaged in pursuing an alternative option: to offer to achieve a non-violent negotiated settlement with the regimes of Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. This approach—which it favours in principle over that of armed struggle—was embodied in the Lusaka Manifesto of 1967, whose two main authors were Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere. The manifesto is a crucial document in the annals of the OAU. It was originally endorsed by the members of the East and Central African Regional Organisation, then by the OAU itself, which offered it to the UN General Assembly as a basis for possible negotiations in Southern Africa. It expresses Africa's commitment to the achievement of majority rule in Southern Africa ' by every means possible '—preferably by peaceful negotiations but, if necessary, through a violent struggle. It offers to discourage all violence provided the white-ruled regimes agree to talk meaningfully about ways of achieving majority rule peacefully. If they do, the OAU would undertake not to insist on timetables for the final achievement of this objective. These conditions did not prove acceptable at the time to any of the three regimes to whom the offer was made.

A crucial change in the Southern African situation came with the military coup in Lisbon on April 25, 1974, which led to the renunciation by Portugal of its five centuries of colonial rule. The OAU's immediate response was to offer to negotiate with Lisbon (in terms of the Lusaka Manifesto) to ensure a peaceful transition to independence

in the Portuguese colonies. There was to be no undue haste, but nor was there to be any backsliding—especially not in the direction of General Spinola's original offer to hold referenda in each of the territories. The problem of transferring power in Guinea-Bissau was simple, since the Party for African Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) had clearly established its ascendancy on the mainland, if not yet in the Cape Verde Islands; so it was agreed to move to independence in Bissau while negotiating a later agreement for the islands. Mozambique, too, offered no major problems since only the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was a serious contender to form the new government; all that was needed was an agreed arrangement for an orderly transfer of power. It was, therefore, agreed to postpone independence until July 1975.

The real difficulty was over Angola, where the liberation movement had not only been less successful than in the other two colonies, but was also hopelessly divided. There were additional problems because Angola's neighbouring African states (notably Zaïre, the Congo People's Republic and Zambia) were all inclined to support their own favourites among the Angolan leaders. The OAU—fearing a possible civil war among the guerrilla movements in a struggle for power—decided that there should be no negotiations with Portugal about the terms of Angola's independence until a united front had been established, first by bringing together the three schismatic groups within the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and then by joining them with the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Union for the Total National Independence of Angola (UNITA). Despite President Mobutu's breach of the agreement not to begin negotiating prematurely with the Portuguese, the OAU's team of negotiators (Mobutu, Nyerere, Kaunda and Ngouabi, of the Congo) succeeded, although not without considerable difficulty, in getting the rival groups to unite—at least for the purpose of forming a transitional government.

The OAU role in co-operating with Portugal to try and achieve an orderly transfer of power in its African colonies has been of crucial importance in giving them a reasonable chance of avoiding the chaos and misery which had accompanied Belgium's sudden withdrawal from the Congo (now Zaïre). Having proved the *bona fides* of the offer contained in the Lusaka Manifesto, the African leaders felt the time ripe to repeat their invitation to South Africa and Rhodesia to accept the option of peaceful negotiations. This time, for reasons which lie outside the scope of this article, Pretoria was willing to engage in talks about detente on Rhodesia—a willingness that led to the Lusaka Agreement of last December which opened the way for settlement

talks in Rhodesia. The secret diplomacy that went into reaching this agreement to move towards even a limited detente in Southern Africa could succeed only because of the co-ordinated network of contacts provided by the machinery of the OAU.

Another striking example of the OAU's constructive role is the negotiations between Africa and the EEC about Protocol 22 of the 1972 Accession Treaty concerning the Community's relations with African and other developing countries. African countries had been divided three ways in their relations with the European Community. The mainly Francophone signatories of the Yaoundé Agreement strongly favoured association, but on better terms than they were able to secure in the past; the East African associates of the Arusha Agreement (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) shared an interest with other special-relationship countries like Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, in maintaining a limited relationship; Nigeria and Zaïre were at first among those strongly opposed, or even hostile, to any formal relationship with the European Community. These divergences of views, and of interests, were sharpened by the offer obtained by Britain for most of the Commonwealth countries to qualify as 'associables'. The 19 Yaoundé Associate States (who also include Mauritius) were anxious to improve the terms of their relationship; so were the East African states; but Nigeria was at first completely hostile to the idea—and it was powerful enough to make it difficult for those not associated to enter into any new negotiations.

This tough Nigerian stand naturally sharpened the tensions between Nigeria and the Francophone African states as well as the Anglophone associates. However, pressures from Nigeria's own influential technocrats and skilful diplomatic work by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) led the Nigerians to reconsider the position. They, and a number of other African governments, were unwilling to use either the ECA (a United Nations agency) or the Commonwealth Secretariat as the channel for negotiations, insisting instead on 'an African platform to produce an African stand'. The OAU's institutions—trade ministers, foreign ministers and heads of state—were all engaged in the negotiations that produced the common African stand embodied in eight principles adopted at a conference held in Abidjan in May 1973. They established a number of crucial new conditions for talks with Brussels, among them the right of all African states—not just the former metropolitan dependencies as was originally suggested—to be included among the 'associables'. The idea of 'associate status' was itself rejected as implying an inferior status. With the Abidjan agreement, Nigeria—instead of being the principal opponent of any formal links with the EEC—moved into a position of leadership in the hard

negotiations that went on for almost two years with Brussels. This collective stand put Africa (as well as the Caribbean and Pacific 'associables') into a much stronger position to argue their economic interests. The terms finally agreed in the Lomé Convention of February 1975 make the earlier Yaoundé Agreements look like the 'neo-colonialist' arrangements ascribed to them by Nigerian and other critics.

The OAU's involvement in the EEC negotiations is only one aspect of its ramified system of economic, trade, communications and social activities. Sadly, because of the mass media's tendency to concentrate so largely on political questions—and especially on 'crisis issues'—little is ever written about these activities. They range from participation in the African Development Bank to the construction of trans-African highways; from a bureau for the placement of refugees to the building of a continental system of telecommunications. An abbreviated checklist of some of its activities reported to the 1974 summit meeting at Mogadishu gives some idea of the scope of the organisation's activities. This included reports on the establishment of an executive secretariat for education, culture and human sciences; on the meetings of the conference of Africa ministers on the application of science and technology to the development of Africa (CAST-AFRICA), organised jointly by UNESCO, ECA and OAU; on preparations for the United Nations conference on the law of the sea in Caracas; on the activities of the OAU's scientific, technical and research commission (STRC); on economic, social, transport and communications matters and inter-African technical co-operation; on the second conference of African ministers of industry; on the establishment of an association of African trade promotion organisations; on the implementation of the African Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence; on the interim committee on the establishment of an African highways association; on the sub-regional meetings on combined transport arrangements in Eastern Africa; on the meetings of the African civil aviation commission and on the establishment of an inter-African airlines; and on the OAU postal administration and the pan-African telecommunications fund. In the field of technical co-operation there were reports on inter-African exchanges; on the activities of the UN working group on technical co-operation between developing countries. Finally, there were reports on conferences of African labour ministers and on the all-African trade union federation, as well as on other African non-governmental organisations.

In all these specialised activities the OAU has come to play a role in Africa not dissimilar from that of the United Nations. The value

of its work in all these fields is recognised by a special relationship established with the United Nations. In 1974 the British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Callaghan, announced the government's intention of establishing close co-operation with the OAU. Thus, in the space of under twelve years, pan-Africanism has grown from a movement of aspiration and rhetoric into a vigorous political, economic, technical and social arm of the continent's 42 independent states, excluding only South Africa.

Its record, as I have tried to show, is not faultless; but its achievements are not inconsiderable. There are more things going on in Africa than just quarrels among some of its leaders, military coups, corruption, some examples of undoubted tyranny, and armed struggles. It is a continent still struggling to emerge into the light as an equal among other continents, a process that will no doubt continue to keep it in a state of turbulence and rapid change for a long time to come. Unmaking a continent dominated for so long by outside powers, and converting it into a stable society of modern nations within a system of continental order, is no easy matter. It can—and will—be rushed; and it cannot hope to avoid the pitfalls of rapid growth and transformation. Africa's future is what its emerging leaders will make it, and nobody can yet be quite sure what that will be by the year 2,000.

THE DECLINE OF GAULLIST FOREIGN POLICY

Dorothy Pickles

IT has often been said that General de Gaulle's domestic policies were all, in reality, part of and subordinate to his foreign policy. His immediate successor, M. Pompidou, devoted much less time to foreign policy issues, and when he did discuss them, aroused far less comment, either hostile or approving, and far less speculation. This was partly, though not entirely, because one of the results of General de Gaulle's foreign policy had been to close a number of doors to his successor, while opening the door to increased social and economic pressures. These were politically far more divisive, and neither of the presidents who succeeded him enjoyed the particular political advantages to which General de Gaulle mainly owed his undoubted authority. These were, first, his record and personality, together with his unique style of leadership, and, second, the peculiar circumstances in which he came to power, which gave him a quite unprecedented opportunity to exercise authority. In 1958, the nation handed over to him one overriding obligation which, in its view, he alone would be able to fulfil, and so, until he had done so, he enjoyed a degree of political indispensability that few democratic political leaders have ever had in time of peace and that no French political leader had had since Clemenceau.

The fact that he did, in the end, fulfil that obligation, by achieving an acceptable, if not ideal, settlement of the Algerian problem, together with the peaceful and rapid evolution to independence of all of France's overseas possessions with any conceivable chance of viability as national entities, added to his personal prestige, thus helping him to prolong this indispensability, and to go on to carry out Gaullist policies and win support for Gaullist views in the field of foreign policy. In the climate of depressed impotence that the Fourth Republic had bequeathed to the Fifth, and that General de Gaulle had characterised as the absence of any foreign policy, the kind of comforting and heady verbal magic that he dispensed was more attractive to many Frenchmen than it would have been if it had been considered purely in the light of cold reason. In spite of its contradictions, and often its unreality, it appealed to many, sometimes for internal political reasons, sometimes precisely because it was remote from realities that had been for too long intractable, unacceptable or humiliating.

In such a climate, it was possible for very many Frenchmen to be persuaded that, under Gaullist leadership, France could hope to enjoy at one and the same time, national independence and membership of a closely knit West-European Community, of which it was destined to be the leader and spokesman; that it could hope to rely on the protection of the Nato nuclear deterrent, and at the same time go its own nuclear way, even to the point of abandoning Nato, while remaining a member of the alliance of which Nato was the sole expression; that it could hope, too, to become a real force in a Western world dominated by the United States, and at the same time exercise a powerful influence in the countries of the potentially hostile Eastern bloc.

By the time General de Gaulle resigned, in 1969, after his defeat in a referendum on purely internal matters, much of the magic had already disappeared. Some of the controversial issues were dead, some problems had been settled, and some irreversible decisions taken. The heated battles of 1960 over the creation of the French nuclear striking force had long since been forgotten; and, in spite of the familiar phrases of the Left, included in the Socialist-Communist 'common programme' of 1972, promising the cessation of nuclear production and holding out the hope of the dissolution of both Western and Eastern blocs, nobody in France would have wanted a government of any political complexion to get rid of the national nuclear deterrent. The debates of 1966 on France's abandonment of Nato were equally a thing of the past, and some members of the Centre parties, which had been the main opponents of the decision, were by then on the eve of agreeing to enter the government. The idea of European integration, to which the Centre parties and some of the Left had continued to pay lip-service during these years, was being much less talked about by those parties professing to believe in it, while the Communist party which had originally opposed the whole European idea, had, like everybody else in France, accepted the EEC as it was, as the bulwark of French interests; the Communists' political programme demanded only the 'democratisation' of the Community, without any clear indication of how or when this could be achieved.

By 1970, France's partners in the European Community also seemed to have lost any real belief either that progress towards the ostensible goal of European integration had been made, or that it was likely to be made in the foreseeable future. In 1965 M. Couve de Murville had argued that some of the integrationist ardour of France's partners in the EEC, like some of their defence of British membership, was inspired more by the desire to find a stick to beat France with than by the intention to take any concrete steps towards supranationalism.[1] Five years later, they had dropped even the pretence of ardour. And Herr

Willy Brandt, Socialist Chancellor of a theoretically committed integrationist Germany, neither shocked nor surprised his partners when he said in 1970: 'The time when co-operation can include some supranationalism has not yet come, far from it.' Nor could they disagree when he said in 1974: 'The European Community must come to the point where it not only speaks with one voice, but also has something to say.' [2]

From 1968 onwards, a number of informed commentators and influential personalities in France were no longer trying to hide their conviction that the Community was in a state of stagnation, and that national conflicts within it were increasing rather than decreasing. None of them wanted the Community to collapse—on the contrary—but they feared that it was entering a gradual, progressive and perhaps irreversible decline. Whatever the reasons for M. Pompidou's decision to open negotiations on Britain's membership in 1970, they certainly did not include any expectation that Britain would galvanise the Community into renewed integrationist activity. There is some evidence that he was thinking rather of the danger that Germany's rapidly developing and prosperous economy might present to France's hopes of being the Community's dominating member.[3]

In addition to these changes, there should be added the new and depressing climate in which General de Gaulle's policy of 'detente and co-operation' with the countries behind the iron curtain now had to be carried on, in so far as it did continue to have a theoretical existence. Between 1964 and 1968, it had been the most generally popular, and certainly the most widely publicised of all General de Gaulle's initiatives in the field of foreign policy. In 1968, in spite of attempts by the General and by M. Michel Debré to dismiss the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as 'a temporary hold-up' (*un accident de parcours*), a mere setback to the policy of detente and co-operation with the Eastern bloc, it was—or ought to have been—clear to all informed opinion that the invasion was a brutal demonstration of the simple and equally brutal truth that France had all along counted for nothing in the minds of the Soviet leaders. If it were true that political attitudes are determined by logical considerations, the policy of detente would have vanished like a puff of smoke. That it did not do so was due to its popularity with the general public and especially with the Left, and to the fact that, without it, the scope for anything that could be presented as an independent French foreign policy was by then seriously restricted.

[1] Debate in the National Assembly, June 18, 1965.

[2] Interview in *Le Monde*, Jan. 31, 1970; statement made in the *Bundestag*, Jan. 24, 1974.

[3] See for instance, Herr Willy Brandt's assumption that this was so, quoted in Uwe Kitzinger, *Diplomacy and Persuasion*. London: Thames & Hudson. 1973, p. 71.

By the time M. Pompidou became President, the focus of French foreign policy had already shifted, and it was to go on shifting. Preoccupations with Nato, defence, and the United Nations were already falling into the background. The policy of detente was reduced to a series of Franco-Soviet summit meetings, followed by communiqués that were merely declarations of intent providing for measures of economic, technical and cultural co-operation. During M. Pompidou's presidency, France's non-participation in East-West or American-Soviet negotiations combined with the increasing pressure of internal problems, both political and economic, to make foreign policy of less interest to the general public. The personality of the President and his own political priorities intensified this tendency. For where General de Gaulle's pronouncements had often been spectacular, occasionally shocking (as in the case of the 1967 incident, after his cry of *Vive le Québec libre*), usually ambiguous and therefore controversial, those of M. Pompidou were, in the main, conciliatory, unprovocative, and sometimes dull.

He had, in fact, a totally different set of circumstances to contend with in the domestic field, in which General de Gaulle himself had certainly had a far less sure touch than he had had in the field of foreign policy. The 1968 'revolution of students and workers' had been a traumatic experience. It had revived fears for the political stability so recently acquired, and only beginning to be taken for granted. It had left in its wake serious financial, economic and social problems on which public and government attention were both primarily concentrated. There were few foreign policy issues of interest to the public, and the second President of the Fifth Republic had not the capacity (even if he had had the will) to manufacture any, as his predecessor would no doubt have tried to do. The economic situation entailed a cut-back in nuclear production and the postponement of target dates for new nuclear weapons. European nuclear production was out of the question, for Euratom was moribund, having been brought close to collapse by prolonged conflicts between the European and national interests represented within it.

French governments were also isolated from initiatives in the international field. They objected in principle to negotiations between blocs and between super-powers. They therefore disliked the talks on strategic arms limitation (SALT), fearing that agreements might be reached over the heads of smaller powers. They disapproved of the idea of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) on the ground that *uniform* reductions would weaken the relative position of the West. They also objected to such negotiations on the ground that military detente was impossible without a prior political detente. They

were not, therefore, in principle opposed to the Soviet proposal for a European Security Conference on Security and Co-operation (ECSC), but mistrusted Soviet motives and so wanted to drive a hard bargain on prior conditions for their acceptance. On the basis of hopes of opportunities for diplomatic manoeuvre, leading perhaps to progress in East-West detente, they agreed to be present at the first meeting, held after a long period of preliminary negotiation in 1973. But mistrust soon replaced hopes, making France at least a moral absentee, convinced as it now was that Russia would use the organisation to increase its own influence in Europe *without* necessarily making any political concessions.

These fears were consistent with traditional Gaullist suspicions of negotiations carried on at large conferences, particularly if they included the Soviet Union. They explained France's distrust of the United Nations and its refusal to attend the 1961 Geneva disarmament conference (justified by the fact that, after more than 600 sessions, this had achieved nothing). France had never signed the test ban or non-proliferation treaties, which it had regarded as piecemeal and inadequate alternatives to a system of general and controlled disarmament, and as having the additional demerit of impeding the defence of smaller nations more than that of the great powers.

Behind all the suspicions, however, there lay the fear that some agreement might be reached without France's having a say in it, and especially one that might change the status of Germany or weaken European cohesion, these being regarded by France, together with the permanent non-nuclearisation of Germany, as the main planks in its defence against any revival of German aggression. This fear was always present—in France's relations within the Community, as well as in the wider European and international fields. For example, France approved of Germany's *Ostpolitik*, so long as it appeared to be sponsored by France and so could be controlled by France, but began to fear it, as containing the threat of a new Rapallo, as soon as it became evident that Germany was now strong enough not to need France's good offices. France both feared British membership of the Community as a possible threat to Franco-German control of it and felt the need of Britain's presence as a possible means of counterbalancing Germany's growing power within it.

In the international field then, M. Pompidou merely continued the Gaullist policy of isolation, that had been highlighted by General de Gaulle's spectacular departure from Nato. That isolation was perhaps slightly diminished by France's official abandonment in 1969 of the French strategic theory of *défense tous azimuts* (defended by General de Gaulle himself as late as 1968), and also by the existence of a

greater degree of practical, if unobtrusive, co-operation between French forces and Nato organisations than Gaullists cared to admit publicly. The fact remained, however, that France was still outside the military organisation on which it continued to rely for its defence, and whose forces must, in the French view, continue to be stationed in Europe for that purpose. Yet France had denied bases to Nato and would be obliged to deny adequate support in case of need, owing to the absence of all French participation in Nato co-ordination and planning bodies.

A policy of 'peace' and 'presence'

The more positive aspect of M. Pompidou's foreign policy was his attempt to obtain for France an enhanced status in the world, thanks to its role as a Mediterranean power, responsible for trying to restore and maintain peace in the area—the policy described by his first prime minister, M. Chaban-Delmas, as one of 'peace' and 'presence'. The role of arbitrator was not a new one. It had, indeed, been claimed by M. Bidault, when he was foreign minister in the immediate postwar years, as a compensation for France's absence at that time from the councils of the great powers. General de Gaulle had given it a world dimension, along with his detente and co-operation policy. France, he claimed in a television interview during his second presidential election campaign, was alone among the powers in being on good terms with all the world. 'We have given up domination', he said, 'and are trying to promote international co-operation. . . . France alone can play this rôle and France alone is playing it.'[4]

Whatever in France's political experience might be thought to have equipped Gaullist France to play this role, nothing indicated that there was any willingness to accept it in the two theatres in which the President chose to operate—namely, Vietnam and the Middle East. In Vietnam, France had had no real influence for years, and in the Middle East, developments during the Fourth Republic had actually diminished French influence. The Fourth Republic had seen the growth of public sympathy with Israel, partly as an expression of the anti-Germanism of the Left, and partly owing to French resentment of President Nasser's open sympathies with the Algerian Nationalists. The Suez affair had been, for France, primarily a Franco-Israeli attack directed against President Nasser. During the Fourth Republic, moreover, France had become one of the main suppliers of arms to Israel. Under the Gaullist regime, however, the need for France to remain on friendly terms with the newly independent Arab North African states, all of which were in varying degrees anti-Israel, made it politically imperative to re-build traditional Franco-Arab relations.

[4] Television interview, Dec. 14, 1965.

Since the Soviet Union was openly pro-Arab, a pro-Israeli policy might have been held also to endanger the Gaullist policy of detente. And since the United States was no less openly pro-Israel, the influence of French anti-American sentiment could not be wholly left out of account. Thus, throughout the 1960s there was an increasing growth of trade with Arab states and of exports of arms to some half-dozen of them.

The events of the Six Day War brought out the essential weakness and contradiction of the French position. Once the warnings made by the Gaullist government in an effort to keep the peace had been disregarded by the combatants, French policy was to try to limit the impact of the hostilities as far as possible, by putting forward, on the basis of France's own non-involvement, possible conditions for a settlement. This the French government did repeatedly, as well as restricting the supply of arms to the combatants. In January 1969, during the precarious ceasefire, the French government, therefore, imposed an embargo on the delivery of 50 Mirage planes to Israel (already 95 per cent. paid for). At the same time a French government spokesman objected to the Israeli raid on Beirut in terms that one could be pardoned for regarding as—to say the least—a somewhat eccentric expression of non-involvement, while some of General de Gaulle's remarks concerning Israel at this period were described by *The Times* as 'abrupt, personal, consistent and offensive'.[5]

Although President Pompidou maintained the same policy, his tone was markedly different, and his claim to a special role for France in the Mediterranean area was expressed in more modest terms. 'I would like to extend France's presence', he said. 'Since I am a realist, I intend to do this by stages, beginning, for example, with those parts of the world that are geographically close, such as Europe and Africa—whether North Africa or 'black' Africa.'[6]

This statement, made to *Time*, during President Pompidou's official visit to the United States in February 1970, was echoed by ministers, and by press comment, though the latter was sometimes accompanied by doubts. But it was the French government's action, in 1970, in selling 100 Mirages to Libya, which, more than anything else, made it impossible for France to be regarded as having a valid claim to 'non-involvement'. It also revealed the extent to which Gaullist governments in France were isolated from, or insulated against, world opinion, and unable to realise how outsiders would interpret their actions. The then minister of defence, M. Michel Debré, defended the transaction with vigour, offering to the National Assembly's Defence Commission a

[5] *The Times*, Jan 8, 1969. On Jan. 1, the General had condemned Israel for '*actes exagérés de violence*'

[6] *Time*, Feb 14, 1970

string of different explanations, some of which were both comprehensible and also defensible (though not as part of any meaningful interpretation of non-involvement). The arms, he said, were not sold to states directly involved (a weak argument, since any Arab state could intervene at any time, and Iraq, which had received arms from France, had intervened briefly); the Libyans had undertaken not to use the Mirages against Israel (a worthless undertaking, as was widely predicted at the time, and as President Sadat confirmed publicly in the course of his visit to France in January 1975)[7]; it would take a long time to deliver them (an irrelevant observation in the light of the relations then and since between Israel and the Arab world). He also argued that if France did not supply arms to Libya, other powers —that is primarily the Soviet Union—certainly would (a valid argument, of course, though not in relation to France's claim to non-involvement). His argument that France needed the exports was also valid, but hardly likely to be of much comfort to Israel and its many friends in France.

As correspondents did not fail to point out, the predominant reason for the action was undoubtedly that it formed part of France's effort to restore its traditional influence in the Middle East. Disappointed Centrists, who had hoped that France's Europeanism would not permanently estrange it from its partners in the Atlantic alliance, could comfort themselves, as did M. Jacques Duhamel, leader of the pro-government Centrists, by reflecting that the Mediterranean was one of the rare areas in which there was the possibility of 'an independent and concerted European action'.[8] In reality, it was far too late already for the French government's policy of 'peace' and 'presence' to succeed, if, indeed, it had ever been more than a pipe dream.

From 1971 onwards, M. Pompidou and his successor, M. Giscard d'Estaing, were left with only three areas in which France could claim to have any independent foreign policy. It could go on cultivating Arab friendship, multiplying agreements on aid, trade and arms deliveries, and extending these activities to states of the Third World. This policy may have done nothing to increase France's influence either in the world or with the states in question, but it certainly did enable it to make arms sales one of its major exports, which strengthened its economic situation, and, when the oil crisis broke, provided a useful contribution to the balance of payments. By 1973, almost a quarter of its workers in the arms industry were concerned with exports, which, by then, constituted one quarter of its total exports of capital goods. France was already competing with Britain for third place in the arms-export business, only America and Russia being larger exporters.[9]

[7] *The Times*, Jan. 30, 1975.
[8] *Le Monde*, Jan. 29, 1970.
[9] *Ibid.*, Jan. 15 and 26, 1974.

The second area was that of Franco-American relations. Neither President had, in fact, much elbow room, for no party in France was advocating France's return to Nato, or indeed, any significant modification of the policy of ' national independence ', accepted from Right to extreme Left. M. Giscard d'Estaing, an orthodox conservative who had never been a Gaullist, was widely regarded as being at heart more ' Atlanticist ' than M. Pompidou. As President, however, his majority in Parliament has depended on continued support from the Gaullists, who have remained the largest party, and so he has not had a free hand. Moreover, since the opposition parties failed to win the presidential election by only some half million votes and are no less opposed to Atlanticism than are the Gaullists, the President can scarcely feel much optimism about the possibilities of a successful flirtation with Centrists, Radicals or non-Communist members of the ' united Left ', with a view to forming a more widely based government.

M. Pompidou did succeed in producing something of a Franco-American thaw, though a potentially ugly incident organised by pro-Israeli Americans during his American visit seemed at one point likely to defeat his efforts. But the abrasive attitude of his foreign minister, M. Michel Jobert, especially after Dr. Kissinger made a proposal for a new Atlantic Charter in April 1973, did nothing to improve the climate, especially as M. Jobert was widely regarded as being a spokesman of President Pompidou and at one with him on all foreign-policy issues. M. Jobert himself certainly had no doubts on that score. Questioned on his relations with the President a few days after the latter's death, he replied: '*Ma vie avec lui a été un immense accord*', and this view was confirmed by the secretary-general of the Gaullist party.[10]

French-American disagreement over energy crisis

There was certainly evidence that M. Jobert's resistance to the American proposals for dealing with the energy problem, made at the Washington Conference in February 1974, had, as *The Times* correpondent claimed: ' flattered the jingoistic streak lurking in every Frenchman, right or left, Gaullist or Communist.'[11]

The Socialist leader, M. Mitterrand, described M. Jobert as ' one of the last intransigent spirits in foreign policy '.[12] But his own views were very similar. References in party resolutions to ' new exhibitions of imperialism ', and to the ' ever stronger affirmations of the United

[10] *Ibid.*, April 17, 1974. M. Sanguinetti had confirmed the accuracy of this view earlier. *Le Monde*, Feb. 21, 1974.

[11] *The Times*, Feb. 23, 1974.

[12] *Le Monde*, June 20, 1974.

States desire for supremacy'[13] had a markedly Gaullist ring about them. During the presidential election campaign, M. Mitterrand was, indeed, asked at his press conference of May 2, in what way his foreign policy differed from that of M. Jobert. In his reply he stressed the need for a coherent Europe, which would *one day* (my italics) have the means of defending itself, the need for more vigilance in preserving Europe from the grip of multinational companies (that is, American companies) and for a French monetary policy not determined in accordance with American economic strategy. Then, after expressions of friendship and gratitude towards the United States and of France's intention to remain in the alliance until an alternative had been found, he added: 'But there must be no submissiveness! And if that is considered "awkward", then more's the pity!'

Such views were not substantially different from those expressed by M. Jobert after the Washington Conference:

> I think that every Frenchman wants a policy of independence for France. . . . I prefer, however, to speak of dignity rather than of independence. . . . There is no incompatibility between this demand of ours for independence or rather dignity . . . and our position. . . . I want the maintenance of American troops in Europe. That having been said . . . I must add that this is not fundamental for us, though it is for the United States.[14]

Some press comment put the position of the French government with more brutal frankness. The director of *Le Monde*, a dedicated 'European', neither a Gaullist nor a Socialist, and never suspected of any reactionary tendencies, wrote after the Washington Conference:

> Standing alone, as in 1954, it [*i.e.* the French government] has been ordered by its American and German allies to accept a plan under which it would be subject to the determining influence of the United States, and would be deprived of the use of the supreme weapon of economic war, petrol. Standing alone, France has once again said "No". . . . What is at stake is the decision as to whether Europe will or will not be Atlantic, that is to say, in reality, American.[15]

M. Debré's reaction was more predictable, but basically similar. 'Do the European nations', he asked, 'want to constitute an independent power, or are they resigned to the status of satellites? [16] The comment of M. Pflimlin, who had been for a few hours the last prime minister of the Fourth Republic before General de Gaulle took over the reins, though he was a long-standing right of Centre European, represented only a tiny minority opinion in a sea of Gaullist sentiments, coming

[13] See text of resolution voted at the Socialist Party Congress, quoted in *Le Monde*, March 24 and 25, 1974.
[14] *Ibid.*, March 10 and 11, 1974, report of broadcast on Europe I.
[15] *Ibid.*, Feb. 15, 1974.
[16] *Ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1974.

equally from Left and Right. ' A policy,' he said, ' must be judged by its results. The results of our present policy will be bitter: an isolated France and a Europe torn apart and weakened '.[17]

The reactions to the Washington Conference did not help to improve Franco-American relations, any more than did Dr. Kissinger's outburst of impatience with M. Jobert, in which he pointed out that Europeans could not have it both ways, that is to say, they could not develop a political relationship with the United States based on hostility, while maintaining that America must maintain its forces in Europe at their present level. The statements quoted above, and many similar ones, made it perfectly clear that that was precisely what France *was* seeking to do, and believed *could* be done successfully.

The third area was the Europe of the EEC. Yet France was isolated within the Community on the issues raised by the Washington Conference, and the Community itself was divided on most of the important issues on its own agenda. The Community's weakness, as the President of the Commission, M. Ortoli, pointed out, was intensified by the absence of any agreed policy on monetary and economic union, or on regional policy. Now, faced with the new challenge presented by the oil crisis, it had revealed itself to be totally unable to achieve a common attitude. Commentators noted indeed, that European unification had reached ' zero point '.[18] M. André Fontaine went further and accused Europe of going backwards. Since the coming of the oil crisis, it was ' every man for himself and God for the strongest '.[19] ' When this crisis hit ', said the Chairman of Shell Transport and Trading, Frank McFadzean, somewhat more colourfully, ' everybody got on to their bicycles and went out to the Middle East to try and get a privileged position '.[20]

Neither President Pompidou, who was already very ill when the crisis broke and who died a few months later, nor his successor, M. Giscard d'Estaing, could have anticipated this situation. But it nevertheless constituted the most serious challenge that the European Community had had to face, and one that seriously threatened the future of European unification. Both Presidents concentrated their main activities in the field of foreign affairs almost entirely on action within the Community, partly because it had always been at the heart of France's foreign policy, and partly because it was by then the only remaining area in which there was any real scope for French initiatives. Both were unable to achieve any spectacular results in their efforts to

[17] Speech at the Lille Rotary Club, quoted in *Le Monde*, Feb. 22, 1974.
[18] *Esope*, Jan.-Feb. 1974.
[19] *Le Monde*, Jan. 23, 1974.
[20] Quoted by John Lambert in the *Sunday Times*, Jan. 27, 1974.

strengthen the Community and to eliminate some of the pessimism about its future that seemed to be becoming more widespread in France.

Both sought specifically a leading role for France and the national prestige that success in this attempt might bring with it. In 1972 M. Pompidou sought to return to General de Gaulle's objective of political co-operation by proposing the establishment in Paris of a 'European Political Secretariat'—a rather pale shadow of the organisation that had been envisaged in the General's 'Fouchet plans' of ten years earlier. This was quietly shelved by the European summit at the end of the year, without having really received any serious consideration.

M. Pompidou's other initiative, the French referendum of 1972, asking the electorate to approve British entry, had not, of course, strictly speaking, anything to do with foreign policy. Its purpose, as he himself indicated, was to obtain a resounding 'Yes', which would constitute a massive national approval of his European policy, and so give him added status in the Community. It failed to do this, because, in Pierre Viansson-Ponté's phrase, two out of every five Frenchmen preferred to go fishing, with the result that 39·52 per cent. of electors did not vote; 17·22 voted No; and only 36·52 voted Yes. In any case, it committed the French government to no action since British entry was already a fact, agreed to by the whole Community. Nobody expected the French Parliament to refuse to ratify a treaty, the terms of which had evidently been highly satisfactory to France.

By all accounts, the admission of Britain was M. Pompidou's personal achievement; he had been reported as saying as far back as 1968–69 that, if he were ever to become President, he would bring Britain in.[21] In 1969, however, he had inherited a difficult situation. What might have been intended by General de Gaulle as an exploratory gesture in the direction of British entry had led to a ridiculous diplomatic incident, the misnamed Soames affair—misnamed, because the unfortunate Sir Christopher Soames was admitted by the French to have been in no way responsible for it. The consequences, nevertheless, had been a Franco-British estrangement that lasted for over a year. In any case, the long-drawn-out final negotiations over the Community's Common Agricultural Policy were not completed until the end of June, 1970. And since General de Gaulle had always insisted that acceptance of the CAP was a fundamental condition of Britain's membership, M. Pompidou, still under the shadow of the General's silent presence at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises, could hardly have done more than what he did in fact do during the first year of his Presidency, which was to stall, by imposing conditions (the famous

[21] See André Fontaine, obituary in *Le Monde*, April 4, 1974.

tryptich of *achèvement, approfondissement,* and *élargissement*) that Britain still had to meet before it could join. Once the first, the completion of the CAP, had been achieved, the second disappeared from French government pronouncements, and the way was open for the third within a week.

Although M. Pompidou himself stated at the beginning of 1974 that the agricultural common market and the common tariff were 'the only substantial achievements of Europe',[22] it was clear that France was satisfied with the terms of British accession. For the government's immediate reaction to Mr. Wilson's request for a renegotiation of terms that certainly no longer suited his government in 1974 was a string of official statements insisting on the impossibility of any revision of the treaty. The President himself expressed his deep attachment to the CAP and said that France must hold firmly to it, while his foreign minister, M. Jobert, said bluntly that France had paid a fair price for Britain's entry into the Community and, therefore, saw no necessity to pay an additional price to keep it there.[23]

Little change could be noticed in the tone of French pronouncements after the election of President Giscard d'Estaing. The new prime minister, M. Chirac, stated in his declaration of general policy that the Common Agricultural Policy was non-negotiable (*intangible*) and that the British request for re-negotiation in itself appeared to the French to be 'irreconcilable with the fundamental objectives of the Community and also with the legitimate interests of the eight other members'.[24] It was common knowledge, wrote André Fontaine in *Le Monde*, that many people in Paris were in favour of 'an unqualified *non possumus* in reply to London's request for renegotiation, which would mean that, in their opinion, the Community could, in the last resort, do without England.'[25]

President Giscard's foreign policy initiatives

The President himself was more cautious. During his presidential election campaign he had expressed himself as against any substantial changes in the Treaty of Accession, but in the months following his election he did not discuss the question specifically. He did, however, take three foreign-policy initiatives during the first six months of his presidency, of which the third included consideration of at least one of the requests made by Britain. The first was concerned with the

[22] Radio interview, Jan. 23, 1974.

[23] Reported reply to Mr. Callaghan, quoted by Maurice Duverger, Les Protectorats d'Europe, in *Le Monde*, April 3, 1974.

[24] Declaration of general policy, June 5, 1974. These sentiments were reffirmed in September. See *Le Monde*, Sept. 2, 1974.

[25] L'Europe entre l'axe et le triangle, *Le Monde*, June 18, 1974.

energy problem. In his press conference in October, he suggested as an alternative, or possibly an addition, to the Kissinger plan, a tripartite conference of oil producers, large consumers and importers in non-industrialised countries, adding that, in any international conference, Europe should be represented as a single entity. The second was a somewhat ambiguous remark about the need to 'look again' at the Community's use of the unanimity rule, in the light of the practice that had grown up since 1966 after the disagreement of 1965, and the resultant so-called 'Luxembourg agreement,' whose terms he described as 'incomprehensible.' Finally, he proposed a European summit meeting.

The summit met in an atmosphere of French disenchantment regarding both the state of the Community and its future prospects. Pessimistic comments had indeed been appearing in the press for the past year, stressing the priority that all members regularly gave to their own national interests, and the failure of the Community to discover an identity or a function. Both the failure of the Copenhagen summit at the end of 1973 and the lack of solidarity between member countries over oil had increased pessimism about the chances of this summit's being willing to do anything to improve matters. What was needed, wrote one commentator, was not so much to revive an organisation that had broken down two years earlier as to save what remained of it from further deterioration.[26] Another wrote that

> In the crumbling state in which the Community finds itself today, without a single agreed plan on anything, the President's announcement that, in the coming weeks, France will propose a certain number of measures to revive the plan for European monetary and economic union is bold, not to say rash.[27]

The decisions taken at the summit conference were anything but rash. The President himself claimed six positive achievements. The first was the creation of a second personality for the Council of Ministers. Henceforth regular meetings would be held, at which, instead of their traditional Community hats, ministers would wear new hats as members of a 'European Council,' whose function would be to discuss urgent political problems on which co-ordination was needed. This was a modest triumph, in that it represented perhaps a first step towards the creation of the kind of Community political organ that had been proposed first by General de Gaulle and then by M. Pompidou. The second and third achievements were merely requests for reports, the first (to be produced by the end of 1975) on what was meant by the concept of European union; the second (to be produced by 1976) on the conditions required for the direct election of representatives of the

[26] Leader in *Le Monde*, Sept. 3, 1974.
[27] *Ibid.*, Aug. 29, 1974.

European Assembly. (The British and the Danes, however, refused to be associated with the second.) Neither of these decisions was impressive. To fix some future date has always been a Community method of avoiding doing anything today about a matter on which it has no real conviction that it will be able to do anything tomorrow. One example of this method is precisely the decision in 1972 (at the Paris summit of that year) to fix 1980 as the target date for European union, without having defined what was meant by the word. Mr. Callaghan, indeed, stated that he had no idea what it meant.

The fourth and fifth achievements concerned more closely the preoccupations of Britain. Agreement was reached on the establishment of a Regional Fund, and decisions were taken on the first distributions to be made from it. This subject had been complicating Community relations for some time, and it would be over-optimistic to regard this decision as likely to prevent future quarrels on the subject. It was also agreed to create what was described as a 'corrective mechanism' to iron out anomalies in the levels of members' contributions to Community funds. This again was a decision to take action at some future date, and the proposed machinery was clearly intended to be within the existing terms of the treaty.

Finally, the President stated that ministers had agreed to give up 'the practice of subordinating decisions on all questions to the unanimous consent of member states.' It is difficult to comment on the meaning of this decision, since the President's own statement to the press (quoted above) and the statements by British ministers on the subject were no less incomprehensible than had been the text of the Luxembourg agreement, or compromise, the interpretation of which they were proposing to modify. It was far from clear, therefore, what exactly they had agreed to give up. Mr. Wilson informed the House of Commons that 'we said we would renounce the practice, which consists of making agreements . . . with the unanimous consent of the member states, whatever their respective positions may be regarding the conclusion reached in Luxembourg on 28th January, 1966' (*sic*); while Mr. Callaghan, spelling it out, claimed that 'those who argue that there never was a compromise are free to go on arguing that there never was a compromise. Those who argue that they reserve the right, are free to go on doing so. In that sense there has been no change.'[28] Curiouser and curiouser!

These modest achievements, if, indeed, they prove to be more than merely words, do not indicate any probability that the Community is about to take any bold steps forward in the foreseeable future, and are unlikely to allay the fears of those French critics who can see no

[28] Statements in the House of Commons, Dec. 16 and 19, 1974.

future for it. It has been, however, the corner-stone of French foreign policy since its creation. Today, together with a somewhat precarious French and Community 'presence' in the Mediterranean, in the form of numerous trade and association agreements, it is all that remains of the ambitious edifice of French foreign policy erected by the speeches of General de Gaulle. No party in France has any alternative corner-stone to propose. Inevitably, therefore, something of a turning point has now been reached, perhaps only one of several. Some Frenchmen are pinning their hopes on a Community with Britain in it. According to reports, the French foreign minister, M. Sauvagnargues, is one of these.[29] Some fear that if Britain remains in the EEC, it may be a disrupting rather than a unifying factor. Some are beginning to wonder whether, in a world in which dependence on oil has been revealed to be so far-reaching in its effects, the concepts of national and European independence may not be becoming equally irrelevant. The comment made about a year ago by a correspondent of the Radical paper *l'Express* still represents, however, no more than a still small voice in France. 'Some ministers,' he wrote, 'though they remain silent, are wondering whether handing a divided Europe to America on a plate is not precisely the best way to ensure America's pre-eminence in Europe.'[30]

[29] *The Times*, Jan. 29, 1974.
[30] *L'Express*, Feb. 18–24, 1974.

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

Nonintervention and International Order. By R. J. Vincent. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. 1974. 457 pp. Bibliog. Index. $18.50. £9·80.*

As is well known, the theoretical study of international relations is divided into two hostile camps, the scientific and the traditional. Dr. Vincent's book (a study in the theory of international relations and not a book of international law), lies firmly in the latter and he handles the restricted range of methodological tools of his chosen approach with skill and conviction. Not only is the book free of neologism and sociologese, but it is also written in a clear style that makes it accessible, just as all well-written history or philosophy is accessible, to any reader of a sound general education, as well as to the specialist.

Broadly speaking, Dr. Vincent looks at the standing of non-intervention as a rule of conduct between states, from its reasonably specific formulation by 19th century English free traders to its place, in practice and in theory, in the modern world, together with its interpretation from the sidelines, especially as it relates to the concept of sovereignty, by international lawyers from Grotius to Falk. Dr. Vincent concludes that the principle is a good thing, that it has not outlived its usefulness and indeed is a principle to be supported in its strong form (i.e. no intervention) rather than its weaker variant (no intervention except to maintain the principle of non-intervention). In so doing Dr. Vincent naturally upholds the sovereign state as a viable entity in modern international relations, and lays about those doubters who see it besieged by everything from nuclear weapons to blocked sewers.

Satisfying though this book is—not least for those of us who are admirers of the robust, articulate and intelligent conservatism that is the hallmark of the Australian section of the traditional camp, to which Dr. Vincent now belongs—there are points of detail here and there that do not quite come up to the overall high standard of the work. It is always a difficulty for the traditionalist student of the theory of international relations that classical thought on the subject, for a variety of fairly obvious reasons, is sparse. Cobden and J. S. Mill, not generally renowned as 'international theorists,' provide Dr. Vincent with an important reference point for much of what he says about non-intervention—Cobden as the father of the strong version of the principle and Mill that of the weak. But Dr. Vincent does not

altogether rid the reader of the suspicion that Cobden at any rate was thinking more about war than about the wider range of more subtle interpenetrations that we nowadays call intervention. Again, the section on Soviet attitudes to the principle is slightly disappointing in that Marxism, which sees the world, or at least parts of it, broken into strata of class rather than islands of sovereignty, seems to be given rather short shrift as a guide to understanding either Soviet attitudes or those of the other, now rather numerous, semi-Marxist states. And in his defence of the sovereign state as a modern concept Dr. Vincent takes too seriously, it seems to me, the typically American claim that nuclear weapons have seriously compromised the effectiveness of the shell of security behind which sovereignty is said to prosper. The great continental states of Europe have lived since Napoleon in an awareness of their vulnerability to the offensive thrusts of mass armies—physically less damaging than nuclear attack, perhaps, but statistically more probable.

In spite of these small criticisms, this book lives up to the importance of its subject. We are, probably, in a new age of revolution where the global distribution and concentration of power is as likely to shift through internal change as through classical conquest. Dr. Vincent does us a service by taking the subject in a timely fashion out of the hands of disputatious international lawyers and exposing it to a searching enquiry in the best traditions of the theoretical study of international relations.

IAN BELLANY

War and Politics. By Bernard Brodie. *London: Cassell.* 1974. 514 *pp. Index. £3·50.*

Why Nations Go To War. By John G. Stoessinger. *New York: St. Martin's Press. 1974. 230 pp. $8.95.*

THE traumatic experience of the United States active intervention in the Vietnam conflict has led a number of scholars to attempt a re-examination of the role and limitations of the use of force in international relationships. The two books under review are symptomatic of this trend. John Stoessinger's *Why Nations go to War* consists of an examination of the antecedents of some of the interstate wars that have occurred during this century, and a concluding attempt to uncover some of their common characteristics. The wars selected for this case study treatment are the First World War, Hitler's attack on Russia, Korea, Vietnam, and both the Indo-Pakistan and Arab-Israeli conflicts. The types of common characteristic the author identifies include ideas such as 'no nation that began a major war in this century emerged a winner' (p. 219) and 'A leader's misperception of his adversary's power is perhaps the quintessential cause of war' (p. 227).

The basic methodology of this study is sound, but the effect of restricting its size to 230 pages is to make the case studies very superficial and shallow, and the majority of its conclusions rather simplistic. The case studies are all based on secondary sources, and while well written, they add nothing to the existing specialised literature on these conflicts. The author's conclusions parallel those produced by more explicitly behavioural studies of interstate conflict, but lack their depth of detail and supporting argument. This is illustrated by the way they degenerate into simple expressions of opinion devoid of any supporting argument, such as the statement that 'There has been a slow dawning of compassion and of global consciousness over

humanity's bleak skies in our generation' (p. 229). This book therefore offers no original contributions to an understanding of the causes of war.

Bernard Brodie's *War and Politics* appears to be an attempt to commit to paper many of the ideas on the relationship between these two phenomena that the author has uncovered over the last 30 years. It is neither a coherent nor a systematic work, and its second half gives the impression of being a number of articles which have been juxtaposed for the purposes of producing a book. The first half, however, has a strong theme running through it, namely Clausewitz's ideas on the relationship between politics and the use of military force. These ideas are explored in the light of the First World War (Chapter 1), the Second World War (Chapter 2), Korea (Chapter 3), and Vietnam (Chapters 4 and 5). By Chapter 5, however, it is apparent that the main motivation behind this part of the book is to examine why the American exercise of military force in Vietnam failed to achieve its political objectives. Up to this point, the work contains much original analysis and many interesting insights, and would have made an admirable monograph in its own right.

The book then concludes with a further five chapters the linkage of which is often obscure. It starts with an examination of changing moral, legal and philosophical attitudes towards war, followed by a chapter which catalogues a number of theories of the cause of war, ranging from Marxist to 'devil' explanations. It then continues with chapters on the nature of vital national interests; on the arguments and assumptions behind modern theories of nuclear strategy; and on the contrasts between the writings of the military tacticians of the 19th and early 20th centuries and the modern school of civilian strategists armed with modern management tools such as systems analysis The penultimate chapter is especially valuable for its trenchant critique of many of the politico-military assumptions underlying Nato's current military doctrines.

This book is both challenging and stimulating despite its discursive nature. It produces no clear-cut answers to the questions posed by the relationship between modern war and politics, but as a stimulus and a basis for further thought it is invaluable

JOHN SIMPSON

The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and Its Future. By Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjørn Egge. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press sponsored by the International Peace Academy with the support of the Charles F. Kettering Foundation and with assistance from the Louis Stern Memorial Fund. 1974. 353 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £6·25. $12.50.*

THIS is a useful book, although uneven in style and content. The authors' major concern is to demonstrate how United Nations and regional peacekeeping machinery might be improved so that any future operations might more effectively achieve their purposes.

The book has been divided into three parts: peacekeeping past, peacekeeping future and peacekeeping present. In the first section the authors discuss the meaning of peacekeeping, 'where a third party acts in the capacity of an impartial referee to assist in the settlement of a dispute between two or more parties' (p. 10); then, perhaps rather oddly, they consider the potentialities of the Security Council in directing future peace-

keeping operations and compare the achievements and limitations of a range of UN peacekeeping activities (UNEF 1956–67, the Congo 1960–64 and Cyprus from 1964 onwards—peacekeeping forces and observer and supervisory missions) with those of regional organisations (the Organisation of American States and the Organisation of African Unity) and the two international control commissions set up in Indochina in 1954 and 1973.

In the second part the authors consider possible future international political trends which might influence United Nations and regional peacekeeping opportunities, analyse a conceivable range of disputes which might invite international peacekeeping attention, suggest how the United Nations machinery for launching operations might be strengthened and how member governments' armed forces might be trained for peacekeeping functions. And finally the authors discuss the need for co-operation and co-ordination between a wide grouping of professional skills—diplomats, politicians, military and academics—to ensure that any international dispute in which the United Nations has an interest is managed more intelligently and rationally than some previous operations.

In the third section there is a good account of the political background to, the establishment of, and the lessons to be drawn by the Secretariat from, the second United Nations emergency peacekeeping force in the Middle East.

The second part of the book is likely to be the most interesting for students of peacekeeping. Here the authors argue that the office of the Secretary-General should be strengthened by a 'multi professional' central staff who would advise him on identifying possible 'conflict' situations by collecting data in depth from a variety of sources which could be collated with that gathered by the Secretary-General and his staff from governments. Thus it would be hoped that the United Nations early warning system would be improved. The second function of the group would be to assist the Secretary-General in launching and running peacekeeping operations, in particular to be the link between the political and military aspects of the operations. And thirdly the authors suggest that the United Nations requires a satellite telecommunications network to provide a constant flow of information to help in 'conflict-monitoring'. However, the authors do not clearly indicate whether a Secretary-General would find their proposals helpful or whether he would try to persuade governments that such a development within the Secretariat would be feasible.

The other two sections are likely to be of less value. In the case studies on the United Nations the authors, although drawing upon their own experiences as UN peacekeepers, cannot match the political sophistication of Alan James's *Politics of Peacekeeping* [1] or the depth of Rosalyn Higgins's [2] and Derek Bowett's work.[3] And the third part is likely to be superseded as more information becomes available and scholars can write at greater length and depth.

DAVID TRAVERS

[1] London: Chatto & Windus for the Institute of Strategic Studies. 1969. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1971, p. 387.

[2] *United Nations Peacekeeping 1946–1967. Documents and Commentary. Vol. I. The Middle East.* 1969. Oxford University Press for the RIIA. Rev. in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1969, p. 688. *Vol. II. Asia.* 1970. Reviewed Oct. 1970, p. 754.

[3] *United Nations Forces.* London: Stevens & Sons under the auspices of the David Davies Memorial Institute. 1964.

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Oil Producers and Consumers: Conflict or Cooperation. Synthesis of an International Seminar at the Center for Mediterranean Studies, Rome, June 24 to June 28, 1974. By Elizabeth Monroe and Robert Mabro. Preface by Sir Denis Wright. *New York: American Universities Field Staff. 1974. (Distrib. in UK by Bailey Bros. and Swinfen, Folkestone.) 76 pp. Map. Paperback: £2·25.*

Oil and Development. Edited by Frank Ellis. *Falmer, Brighton: The Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. 1974. 130 pp. (Institute of Development Studies, Bulletin; Special Issue, October 1974, vol. 6, no. 2). £1·00.*

WORRYING about oil, these last eighteen months, if judged by the puritan standards of 'energy budgeting', might itself be counted a somewhat oil-intensive activity. Every weekend of the last year or so, at the least, there must have been a seminar, or a conference, or some hearings going on somewhere about oil shortages, or oil financial surpluses; at any rate, about oil prices. Considerable tonnages of jet fuel and gasoline must have been burned up carrying distinguished worriers around the world to share their anxieties in different, comfortable places—often in much the same speeches, sometimes to many of the same people.

On balance, nevertheless, these confabulations have probably still been creative. First, it has taken time and talent to understand the problem; and it will take more of both to offer any practicable solutions. The political and economic quandaries suddenly slapped in front of the world at the end of 1973 by the Arab oil weapon and OPEC's enormous, unpayable oil bill have been more than anyone could immediately grasp alone. Energy economists, Middle East experts and international monetary pundits have had to assist each other in comprehending this. Secondly, they have had to assist the public and politicians to believe that the problem exists—and go on believing this.

The timetable of our oil tribulations has not been readily convincing. Modern communications media promote instant analysis and extrapolation; but then, nearly as dependably, promote disillusion, because what is foretold does not arrive as instantly. Oil doom has repeatedly been scheduled, then had to be postponed owing to the late arrival of the incoming calamity. The impact of the oil surplus funds that some people have been considering since mid-1972 and warning everybody about since late 1973 did not in fact fully materialise until the beginning of 1975. If all this anxious conferring about oil has helped to keep certain key politicians concerned (and more than once Dr. Kissinger, in particular, has clearly begun to get bored with the whole economic thing) that alone would have made it worth while.

Elizabeth Monroe and Robert Mabro are veteran seminarists in this international process of opinion formation. They were considering the implications of oil financial surpluses before OPEC, in late 1973, so hugely multiplied all the numbers involved. As early as mid-1973, indeed, they were discussing some of the ideas, such as specialised investment trusts for OPEC surplus funds, that have recently been revived and hailed as new and constructive. Their distillation of the exchange of views in the conference held by the Center for Mediterranean Studies in Rome in June 1974 rounds out their papers in earlier seminars on the same broad subject.

The Center's conference did at least include some representatives from OPEC states. Too many other groups discussing the issue have come almost exclusively from OECD importers. Miss Monroe's and Mr. Mabro's paper reflects some of these exporters' views. (The OPEC countries also have their perplexities from this bouleversement in bargaining power. Mostly, of course, much more comfortable ones than ours as importers. But occasionally, too, fears. . . .)

The special issue that the Institute of Development Studies Bulletin has devoted to oil seeks to represent, and is addressed to, a different constituency. This group, offered much sympathy of late if not yet much else, is what the Institute calls NOPEC, the non-oil exporting poor countries, or developing countries minus OPEC. The Institute is devoted to advancing their interests, bluntly and even aggressively.

Its summary of oil circumstances as they bear upon these most vulnerable importers is compressed and informative. Some of its financial figures (like any others produced at any time last year) were out of date before they were published. This does not matter much, either way. It hardly matters how much the price of Saudi crude is above the amount per barrel that the country can practically spend straight away (say $3 to $4?). Once it is substantially above, the oil surplus/deficit problem is with us. By the same token, how much the crude price exceeds what it was before may not greatly matter to the NOPEC countries. Even before the price explosion, they needed aid to balance their import bill. They could probably not afford to pay significantly more in goods and services for oil imports *even if* the OPEC exporters in surplus could accept these. Rich OECD importers have become borrowers for oil as involuntarily as the OPEC surplus countries have become lenders, simply because they just have no way to accept the goods and services that we might, at a pinch, produce and transfer to them. These NOPEC countries could not afford to do that even if it were on. One way or another, many of them would need extra credit to buy oil at anything above early 1973 prices.

The Institute's special issue—largely composed of 'in-house' studies, or drawing upon seminar discussions—is concerned to identify the effects of oil price increases on these countries, and suggest ways and means of mitigating these in the short term, and exploiting any potential beneficial side-effects in the long. Immediately, contributors advocate the use of special credit facilities on an international basis; the re-allocation but not the reduction of OECD countries' aid; special pricing for the poorest countries (the simplest and most direct assistance, which OPEC may have turned down too lightly); or bilateral and trilateral deals by which OPEC and OECD countries channel investment, loans or aid to the NOPEC countries. (One paper advocates, in Third World bargaining with richer countries, appealing over the heads of negotiators to general interest in the other country. That is an interesting proposition in terms of general bargaining. But it is not easy to fit into these countries' oil dilemmas.)

The keynote of this approach is best exemplified by two quotations from the Institute's director, Richard Jolly:

> . . . the oil price increases have in the broadest of terms improved world income distribution between the rich countries and the Third World (benefiting some poor countries within the Third World as well as some rich ones) but at the same time worsened income distribution between Third World countries, *to the particular detriment of some of the poorest countries* . . .
>
> . . . the crucial issue is to see the oil price increase as a major move broadly

> in the right direction, even if excessively rapid, and grotesquely unbalanced in its effects. This is so both inasmuch as the bargaining position of Third World countries in trade relations may improve in the future as a result of the lead given by the oil exporters; and insofar as the price increase has beneficial long-term technological and distributional effects in favour of the poorer groups within countries, particularly poor countries.

That is stated academically (and as such is in part at least highly debatable). But it fairly reflects an attitude among Third World oil importers, hard hit as they are, towards OPEC. They do not share the rancour, almost affront, of some OECD politicians that anyone else should dare to become rich. They applaud some of their own finally making the grade (against those 'ex-colonialists'). This is an attitude that will have to be borne in mind by any OECD politicians seeking to organise any united front of importers. So far, President Giscard d'Estaing has appeared almost alone in recognising it.

J. E. HARTSHORN

Tin: The Working of a Commodity Agreement. By William Fox. *London: Mining Journal Books. 1974. 418 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £9·25.*

Restrictions on International Trade in Steel. By Craig R. MacPhee. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Heath. 1974. 196 pp. Index. £7·30.*

THE international management of markets is going to be—indeed, already is—one of the hottest issues of international politics in the 1970s and 1980s. Arguments that we have already heard from both sides in the world market for oil will be repeated in other contexts: what is a fair price; who should bear the burden of adjustment; who should be allowed to tax; and what sanctions are permissible against the recalcitrant. These and many other essentially political questions concerning who benefits and who governs will surely figure prominently in international bargaining and negotiating sessions in the future. It is all a predictable consequence of accelerating economic interdependence. First, this increases the political pressure on national governments to depart ever further from laissez-faire, to support, to stabilise, to manage and to restore. Each national intervention, each new step towards direct or indirect state participation in turn affects susceptible neighbours and trading partners—whose people in turn in self-defence demand ever more state intervention. The vicious circle must lead to proposals for international agreement, perhaps to international market management—but on what principles and through what political processes?

This is why William Fox's book on the International Tin Council and its forerunners—which will certainly interest those in the industry, in the participating countries and in other international organisations—also deserves even wider attention from those engaged in international studies, political and economic. The author was Secretary-General of the International Tin Study Group from 1948 to 1956 and Secretary of the International Tin Council from 1956 to 1971. His knowledge of the industry and of the world market is obviously encyclopaedic; and his understanding of the problems of managing a volatile and unpredictable market and of functioning as broker between reluctant governments is profound. Nothing so comprehensive nor so non-partisan is likely to be published for some time.

And as one reads this long, detailed and fascinating story of tough international negotiation and ingenious international co-operation, one is

impressed with the *particularity* of international markets. In 1975, most of us are already aware (much more than we were in 1972, say) of the degree to which the circumstances governing the market for petroleum are wholly peculiar to that industry and are mirrored in no other world market; also the extent to which external political and economic factors can profoundly affect the bargaining strengths of those concerned in the market, companies as well as governments; and the unpredictable impact of technological change on market trends (in the industry and outside it) and therefore on relative bargaining positions. As great a variety of factors has affected the international tin market, though in different ways and with a different cast of actors—operators and governments. Yet some features are common; for instance, the powerful influence for good or evil of the United States—what Dr. Emminger once likened to being in bed with an elephant. In the tin market, the one most destabilising act in the whole period covered in this study was the American decision in 1973 to start selling off its $1 billion tin stockpile. Fox comments: 'That industry —with its long and unique record of international cooperation aimed at securing at least a degree of stability in the world tin price and enforcing some degree of order in a market notoriously disorderly—deserved something better than to have thrown upon it the consequences of the massive disposal of a strategic stock which had been built up unnecessarily and perhaps even irresponsibly 20 or 30 years earlier' (p. 384).

Mr. Fox's concluding assessment of the achievements of international co-operation, however, suggests that, although the ITC's example may not be susceptible to close wholesale imitation, its experience can still be of wider value. Clearly, as he says, more politically aware studies (such as this) of particular commodity markets are needed before we can perceive more clearly which techniques of collective management developed in one market can be applied elsewhere and which objectives of market management are capable of wider adoption. Fox, for example, regrets that a joint adjustment fund, financed by a tax on excess profits when the market price went above the ceiling price in the agreement, was never adopted by the producer countries. It could be that a little pressure here by the International Monetary Fund (whose financial support is acknowledged) would have made all the difference.

The study of steel is altogether more limited in aim, scope and understanding. Mr. MacPhee is a young American economist and the book is based on work on non-tariff barriers to world trade in steel done for a doctoral thesis at Michigan State University. It has been expanded to include a survey of non-governmental restrictive practices and an econometric attempt to measure the difference between effective and nominal tariff rates on steel imports between developed countries. It still bears some of the scars of the academic initiation process—the failure to distinguish between trivial and relevant facts; the compulsion to quote every available source whether good, bad or indifferent; the occasional retreat into jargon; the tenderness towards the barons of the profession even when, one suspects, the author privately questions their judgments. Most of all, there is the generic obsession with the business of measurement and the innocent trust reposed in the answers given by operators to academic questionnaires. For instance, the author recognises that some of the most important non-tariff barriers are unquantifiable—but cannot bring himself to abandon the attempt to measure their impact even though the sum is necessarily and admittedly incomplete. One tantalising paragraph (p. 114) is devoted to a graphic

description of the fiercely dirigiste penalties applied by MITI against laggard Japanese steel exporters—but (since it is unquantifiable) no attempt is made to assess its practical impact. And when only 13 out of 300 operators in the steel market answered his questionnaire, the results are solemnly given despite their slender base.

Still, the author's sincere concern to tell it how it is shines through. His message is a Bronx cheer to the moaning of the American steel industry against unfair foreign competition. 'The country whose steel trade balance with the others benefits most from restricted trade is none other than the United States. . . . It does not appear likely that differences in trade restrictions caused the American industry's competitive disadvantage in world markets to deteriorate.' Moreover, the overall conclusion is abundantly clear. This is a world market in which governments have been intervening and aiding and abetting all sorts of discriminatory practices for longer than in most others. But the only form of international management now applied to it is one—the voluntary export restrictions on American imports—which totally ignores consumer interests and in which other producers acquiesced only under threat of even tougher protectionist measures at the hand of the US Congress.

SUSAN STRANGE

Oil and Security. Preface by Frank Barnaby. *Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell; New York: Humanities Press. 1974. 197 pp. (A SIPRI Monograph). Sw.Kr. 42.00. $9.00.*

The Energy Question: An International Failure of Policy. Edited by Edward W. Erickson and Leonard Waverman. Vol. 1: The World. *376 pp.* Vol. 2: North America. *390 pp Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press. 1974. (Distrib. in UK by Books Canada.) $6.50. £3·10 per volume.*

Raw Material Supply in a Multipolar World. By Yuan-li Wu. Preface by Frank R Barnett. Foreword by James E Lee *New York: Crane, Russak for the National Strategy Information Center. 1973. 55 pp. Bibliog. (Strategy Papers No. 20; Series Ed.: Frank N. Trager and William Henderson with the assistance of Dorothy E. Nicolosi.) $4.95.*

It is now obvious that Dr. Kissinger conceives some circumstances in which force might be used against the OPEC cartel. It is thus extremely timely for SIPRI to have produced this monograph on oil and security, particularly since the authors have included a discussion of events as recent as September 1974. This efficiency, plus a sound overall framework, make this easily the most comprehensive and accessible analysis of the policy options of the post-embargo era.

The book contains a sound introduction to a variety of subjects such as the relative dependency of various countries and regions on oil, the events leading up to and following the Arab embargo, the various attempts to co-ordinate consumer responses through the OECD and the Energy Co-ordinating Group (now the International Energy Agency), Soviet interests, Middle East arms purchases, the strategic implications of sea-borne oil transport, and the military use of oil. For good measure, they throw in a number of appendices which cover, amongst other topics, the most recent bilateral deals made by consumer and producer nations, the official texts relating to both the 1973 oil embargo and the Washington

Energy Conference of February 1974, and the leading areas in which there are oil-related territorial disputes.

This monograph will be an invaluable source-book for all those working in this field. One does, admittedly, sense in a couple of cases (such as the initial acceptance of claims about leakages in the embargo aimed at the United States) that the authors sometimes trust their newspaper clippings too much, but in this kind of study, that is perhaps inevitable. In the meantime, oil commentators, diplomatic historians and military strategists will all find this a useful reference book until the definitive studies of this period come to be published.

The two volumes edited by Erickson and Waverman consist of a series of well-chosen readings examining the political, economic and technical factors which limit our options in the energy field. Although these volumes are not as up-to-date as the SIPRI study, the editors have taken care to get their contributors to update their pieces, or else have added interjections of their own pointing to the post-embargo implications of what a particular author may have written.

The volumes generally claim that there is no such thing as an energy crisis in the sense which the Club of Rome would like to argue. Rather than being the result of some form of ever-approaching limits to growth, the problems which had emerged before October 1973 stemmed from the sheer failure of policy makers either to counter the political challenge of OPEC, or to handle the various strands of the American energy market with any understanding.

The editors have ensured that there are creditably few weak contributions. Admittedly the viewpoint tends to be North American, but the presence of a Canadian editor means that the volume on North American policies gives due weight to the complexities of the Canadian experience which are normally overlooked by American authors. The first volume contains papers by M. A. Adelman, R. J. Deam and Joe Nye (basically his evidence to the Group of Eminent Persons of the United Nations multinational company study), which are all worth having. One should perhaps point out, though, that this is an interdisciplinary book and that articles directly relevant to international relations compete for space with more strictly economic, technological and environmentalist ones.

The study by Professor Wu is a slim volume in every sense of the word. Published in 1973, his judgments have been exceptionally cruelly exposed by the events of the autumn of that year.

LOUIS TURNER

The World Bank Since Bretton Woods. The Origins, Policies, Operations, and Impact of The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Other Members of the World Bank Group: The International Finance Corporation, the International Development Association, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. By Edward S. Mason and Robert E. Asher. Foreword by Kermit Gordon. *Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1973. 915 pp. Index. $17.50.*

Strengthening the World Bank. By Escott Reid. Introd. by Maurice Strong. *Chicago, Ill: The Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs. 1973. 289 pp. Index. $7.50 £3·00. Rs. 40.00.*

The World Bank Group, Multilateral Aid, and the 1970s. Edited by John P. Lewis and Ishan Kapur. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Heath. 1973. 168 pp. Bibliog. Index. $13.00.*

THE World Bank has consistently pursued the most intelligent policy of any international agency in encouraging independent studies of its operations, and of its areas of operational interest. In encouraging and indeed financing such studies, it has been reasonably tolerant of criticisms, and has often—to a surprising extent in view of its general reputation for arrogance—taken these criticisms into account in reviewing its own policies.

The results, however, have not always been entirely happy. At one extreme, the Bank has found itself condemned out of hand on thin evidence. At the other—for example in the Pearson Report—the Bank has failed to clear itself of the charge that it was promoting a public relations job. Studies that have fallen between these extremes have tended to be too narrow in scope to constitute a generally usable appraisal. What has been missing is a broad assessment that takes the Bank as it is—i.e. does not ask for an impossibly different kind of institution—yet is sufficiently detached to identify the failings that are remediable within these limits.

This deficiency has now been magnificently made good in the three books reviewed here. Two of them, by Mason and Asher and by Escott Reid, required close co-operation on the part of the Bank's staff, and are based on profound familiarity with what really goes on in the Bank (which is not true of some of the wilder attacks of recent years). The symposium edited by Lewis and Kapur includes several senior Bank officials among its principal contributors.

In all three, there is a remarkably firm consensus on what is wrong at the operational level. (Indeed, one suspects that they had all read each other's manuscripts before sending their own to the publishers.) There seems to be particularly strong agreement on the need for decentralisation of the Bank's organisation, for giving a stronger voice to developing countries in the Bank's policies, reflected in a redistribution of formal voting power rather than through the false proxy of the professional staff, for greater flexibility in the terms and conditions of Bank/IDA lending, for a more careful division of labour be ween the Bank and other agencies, and for greater willingness on the part of the Bank, especially now that its relative significance among the developing countries' creditors has been greatly increased, to participate in the renegotiation of debts. No doubt the Bank's management can produce sound arguments against these proposals, as it has in the past, but the consensus is now so massive that it has to be taken seriously.

Underlying these areas of agreement, there is rather less certainty concerning the Bank's future role in the development community at large. In all three books, one detects some unease concerning the Bank's pretensions as 'leader' of this community. It is seldom spelt out. All three, in fact, go out of their way to express approval of Robert McNamara's innovations and his efforts to turn the Bank into a 'development institution', whatever that is taken to mean (though only Mason and Asher discuss this slippery concept with sufficient care for the reader to assess precisely what they do mean). Mason and Asher go so far as to endorse the Bank's claim to '*the* leading role' in the international development effort (p. 722). However, this need only be taken as corroboration of their own observation of the tendency of 'various reports [to]

come up, *mirabile dictu*, with organizational pyramids that give top place to the agency that put the particular study group into orbit' (p. 575). In contrast, if one ignores the formalised conclusions, and concentrates on the description and analysis of the Bank's changing *practices*, as distinct from its proclamations, it is George Woods, McNamara's fractious predecessor, who emerges as the president who had the simple and sensible idea of developing the Bank as an institution at the service of its clients. And concern over the more overweening style adopted since is evident in the repeated calls in these books for a division of labour, and more specifically in their handling of the contentious issue of the Bank's use of its lending to exert leverage on its clients'/members' policies.

Both the agreed recommendations and the underlying concerns are argued through most thoroughly by Mason and Asher. This is not just because their book is the longest. In fact, quite a small proportion of this massive volume is devoted to critical analysis of current policies, but the discussion is always incisive (unusually so for what is virtually an official history), often witty, and sometimes brilliant. (See, for instance, their masterly handling of the domestic preference issue, pp. 246–7.) The historical and descriptive sections, equally, are not to be skipped, for time and time again they bring incidents which the external observer may previously have found puzzling into proper perspective, thus enhancing one's understanding. In spite of the price and the length, for the serious student of international development finance institutions this is *the* book.

Mason and Asher are particularly impressive in their discussion of performance, leverage and the Bank's conception of 'development', which for many critics of the World Bank, friendly and otherwise, are the central issues. Their aim is to set reasonable limits to the Bank's rights of intrusion, and their principal instrument is the careful drawing of distinctions:

> The Bank is vulnerable whenever it tries to substitute its own judgment of how economic capacity is to be used in the public interest for the judgment of borrowing member governments. It is one thing to broaden the scope of inputs that are taken into account in a lending program; it is quite another to redefine for the borrower the objectives of public policy. It is not altogether clear that the Bank in recent pronouncements has observed this distinction (p. 476).

Although their final judgment is in favour of giving the Bank the leading role, they have previously been careful to define in what that leading role consists, seeing the Bank as 'if not the leader of development thought, at least the main repository of what has in fact been learned' (p. 475).

Escott Reid's analysis of the same issues is gravely weakened by his failure to distinguish between what McNamara says and what the Bank actually does, or can do. He is aware that there is a difference, but seems to believe that the remedy for this dislocation is simply to bring the practical operations of the Bank more closely into line with its rather grandiose rhetoric, a questionable proposition. His strengths are his obvious commitment to promoting the welfare of poverty-stricken societies, a great deal of common sense (though his ideas do sometimes seem a little cranky as, for example, his enthusiasm for 'retirement villages'), and a profound understanding of the motivation and mentality of international civil servants. His principal weakness is that he

is entrapped in his own past as a UN architect. Elements of the old crazy design, which in Escott Reid's fading memory was a 'grand design' (p. 133), keep cropping up, with recommendations for including everybody in everything: sector studies of small-scale industries, for instance, require joint programmes undertaken by the Bank Group, the UNDP, UNIDO, the ILO and the regional bank concerned (p. 55). It is assumed, with approval, that a doubling of the World Bank's lending means a doubling of its power of leverage (p 36), while the vagaries of bilateral aid have the 'diminishing' effect (*sic*) of increasing the developing countries' bargaining power (p. 85). How he reconciles all this with his perception of the limits of development diplomacy (pp. 90–94) is not entirely clear. One reads Escott Reid as one would listen to an elder statesman sitting in the Athenaeum while he redesigns the world—with respect for his experience and his humanity, but with a nagging feeling that it is all just a bit too grand, and needs to be thought out at a more modest level.

The symposium edited by Lewis and Kapur, in its nature, is less coherent than either of the other two books. Adapted from oral deliveries at a seminar held in 1971, it consists mainly of papers by senior officials of the Bank, with commentaries by outsiders who are nonetheless well acquainted with the Bank's operations. It is interesting to observe how close to each other in style and perception are the insiders and outsiders of this rather narrow community. Of the two groups, the insiders are generally the more impressive, if only because they speak with greater knowledge and experience; but the lack of editing from the spoken word, coupled with the random selection of issues, makes this book much less useful than the others as analysis. It is very useful indeed, however, and after Escott Reid's rather frightening assumptions about the World Bank's capacity it is in a curious way reassuring, as evidence of how such people think and talk.

The question remains, why does none of the authors or editors of these three books grasp the nettle that they all so clearly see? One explanation —which in all other respects is their virtue—is that they are all quite properly concerned primarily with what the Bank actually does, rather than with what it does not do and perhaps cannot do. One of the things that the Bank does not do, as these authors note in passing, is to guarantee the borrowing of public and private entities in developing countries, which was seen originally as its principal function. Mason and Asher point out that such guarantees would have competed directly with borrowing by the Bank itself, since the effective limits are on its *total* exposure (p. 107). So it has preferred to evolve as an institution which mobilises resources for itself, passing these resources on to its clients at its own discretion, rather than as an instrument for assisting its clients to mobilise for themselves the resources which they see themselves as needing. This is a conflict which enters deep into the Bank's relations with its clients, constituting a more potent source of aloofness than the jealously guarded autonomy of its management or the frequently cited need to maintain its standing on the world's capital markets. It is significant that the IFC, which *is* a client-oriented institution in the traditional banking sense (though hamstrung in its choice of clients by the emphasis given in its Articles to the private sector), remains the Bank's disregarded poor relation, and receives scant attention from all the authors reviewed here. Mason and Asher are relatively weak, in a way which is also significant, in their

discussion of such workaday questions as how the Bank puts its projects together (concentrating rather on project *appraisal*, in abstract economic terms), and how effective are the Bank's procurement procedures.

The Bank has evolved in a way which sets up a conflict between the policies which will best enhance its own position and prestige and the policies which will provide the services that clients want. In the 1960s, when the Bank's operations were relatively small and were guided by an experienced banker, this was a source of strength, for it manifested itself in a commitment to professionalism. Under a more didactic style of management, there is an already manifest danger that what was a source of strength will become a source of irresponsibility and professional sloppiness. As the Bank's operations expand on the scale envisaged both by these authors and by the Bank itself, its relative immunity from the restraints of political control or of market tests may give rise to problems the solution of which will require more drastic changes than any of the authors reviewed here considers necessary. But, again, it is Mason and Asher who put us on the right lines. In contrast with the Bank's propensity for reviewing the performance of its borrowers, they note that 'there have not been many systematic attempts to compare project results with project expectations, let alone to assess their consequences in the development process' (p. 232).

JOHN WHITE

The Politics of Foreign Aid. By John White. *London, Sydney, Toronto: The Bodley Head. 1974. 316 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·50.*

THERE are many ways of classifying attitudes to aid. One of them is the division between those who see it as a missing component, assisting poor countries in bottleneck-busting and accelerating the march towards take-off, and those who regard it as a part of the international system of malign exploitation or inadequate conscience money for benign neglect. John White's distinction between the credulous and the cynical view of aid catches something of this division, but, by isolating aid from other features of the complex relationships between rich and poor countries and between groups within these countries, it fails to relate the division to the difference in the perception of the development process. It makes a radical difference to the analysis of aid whether one views development and underdevelopment as a linear progress through successive stages of growth, in which those in the vanguard can teach and contribute resources to those lagging behind, or whether one views underdevelopment as itself (partly) the result of the international system. As Dr. Sergei Zimin writes from Moscow: 'Focusing attention on the question of aid and its "crisis" artificially narrows the range of problems being solved by the developing countries and distracts their peoples from the establishment of more equitable international economic relations.'[1] So the chief defect of Mr. White's book is that it discusses aid in isolation.

Its chief merit is its historical and institutional approach. Mr. White is knowledgeable and perceptive about the independent life that man-made organisations take on and he fills an important gap in a field usually neglected by economists.

Mr. White has a way of getting entangled in linguistic and philosophical

[1] *Encounter*, Nov. 1974.

cobwebs. Thus he criticises definitions in general, and the Ministry of Overseas Development's 1965 White Paper in particular, for saying that the purpose of aid 'is to promote social and economic development.' He says repeatedly that this statement is either a truism or false and, more vehemently, a 'rather inane truism or blatant lie' (p. 51). Whenever a descriptive term denotes a *function*, we can understand the concept only with reference to an end or purpose. All terms defining objects or persons by their functions rather than by their substance have this characteristic. They therefore veer between positive and normative statements. 'A lawnmower is an instrument that mows lawns.' Is then the broken-down, rusty, knived and wheeled conglomerate in my garden a lawnmower? There is no harm in defining aid in functional terms, i.e. in terms of what it *ought* to do, and applying such a definition to an *actual* flow. 'Gentlemen lift the seat . . .': an inane truism or a blatant lie? British Railways presumably find it a useful notice.

The discussion of aid institutions, aid history and aid administration is excellent. One of the most valuable chapters is the discussion of aid theories. Mr. White distinguishes between two economic and two political theories. But it is a pity that in a book on the politics of aid he does not integrate the economic and the political, and in particular that he does not deal with the politics of programme aid. A closer examination of Albert Hirschman's stimulating suggestion that recipient countries try to maintain a certain average distance from big donors should have appealed to Mr. White. Distance is measured in two dimensions: the extent to which a country adopts economic policies suggested by the donor and the extent to which it takes the donor's position on the leading issues of international politics. The hypothesis is that the price of buying the 'right' economic policies is a compensatory and opposite move in international politics. (In Brazil, Quadros's move towards neutralism after adopting policies recommended by the United States and the IMF; Pakistan's rapprochement with China after import liberalisation; Mrs. Gandhi's 'surprising' foreign policy positions just after she had been so 'reasonable' in domestic economic policy.)

But apart from this failure to integrate economics and politics, and aid and other features of international relations, the book is a valuable survey of the leading issues in aid policy. Its critical, though committed spirit should refresh those suffering from aid fatigue.

PAUL STREETEN.

The Conquest of Famine. By W. R. Aykroyd. *London: Chatto and Windus; Toronto: Clarke, Irwin. 1974. 216 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £5·00.*

THIS book could hardly have come out at a more suitable time: in the autumn of 1974, just before the United Nations' World Food Conference in Rome, and when, as well, there was special alarm about difficulties in parts of the world traditionally liable to famine—such as Bangladesh. Dr. Aykroyd is an eminent nutritionist, medically qualified, with experience of several such areas, and his book, appearing at a time of world-wide economic disruption caused by the oil crisis, is of compelling interest.

Coverage is wide, and some may think it rather ill-balanced, geographically or historically. On famines in Ireland (1845–50), the Volga basin in Russia (1921–22), Bengal (1943), West Holland (1945), Biafra (1969), and the

incipient but averted one in Bihar (1967), the author is outstandingly informative. On other similar calamities however—in ancient Egypt, or China, or Czarist Russia—he has less to say. But that is due to lack of data.

Famines of course can originate in different ways. The most obvious, rainfall-shortage, can be equalled by war (West Holland, Biafra) or by crop-disease (Ireland). Pestilence can also play a part. But a fascinating part of the book is that in which the effects of prolonged food-shortage or ill-nourishment on the human body are described as if, in themselves, constituting a specific illness, whose mental symptoms are as characteristic as the more bodily ones. The onset is naturally insidious; and what is peculiarly baffling, to an untrained observer, during the later stages is the individual's utter apathy and loss of all sense of self-protection. This can readily exasperate inexperienced volunteer-helpers in the relief-centres. 'Famine diarrhoea', too, then becomes a specific hazard and may be lethal: 'the intestinal walls lose substance, become thin as paper, and transparent; resuscitation of the starving must proceed slowly; a full meal will finish them off'.

There are admirable chapters also on such problems as over-population, birth-control, the so-called 'green revolution' in agriculture, and work done by the international agencies: UNRRA, FAO, WHO and so on. And though many of the world's present nutritional problems do indeed seem insoluble, Dr. Aykroyd, in sum, cannot be classed as a pessimist.

Occasionally, he allows himself personal anecdotes, some of which can be vivid, as on p. 75 where he describes a scene at Khargpur railway station in Bengal during August 1943. A brief Indian historical retrospect on p. 50, however, involves him in several minor errors. These should be corrected in a reprint which, doubtless, will be wanted; for this is an important book, topical now, but of permanent value.

IAN STEPHENS

LAW

Der Rechtsstatus des Meeresbodens. By Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum. *Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1972. 385 pp. Bibliog. (Schriften zum Völkerrecht, Vol. 22.)*

DR. VITZTHUM'S book analyses the legal status of the sea-bed and subsoil located beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. This topic, which had already been commented upon by some prominent international lawyers in the 1920s and 1930s, is at present one of the focal points in the debate concerning the revision of the Law of the Sea. This has been shown by the work of the United Nations Sea-bed Committee as well as by the discussions which took place at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which was held at Caracas from June 20 to August 29, 1974.

The study reviewed here—which takes into account material published before December 1971—comprises an introduction and two main parts. The introduction examines certain terminological questions and explains why, in the author's opinion, an analysis of the legal status of the sea-bed should be preceded by an in-depth study of scientific data and of economic factors. Part I is devoted to these data and factors. It describes at length the geographical and geological structure of the sea-bed and the different uses

of the latter—including military uses, use for dumping of waste, scientific research, and transmission of communications. As conflicts may easily arise between the different uses and users, it must be concluded that the sea-bed is in need of a legal regime. Part II is subdivided into two chapters: Chapter 1 analyses the *lex lata* in great detail, and Chapter 2 contains some considerations *de lege ferenda*.

While Chapter 2 is already somewhat obsolescent owing to the fact that it is based on material published before December 1971, Chapter 1, which is devoted to the *lex lata*, continues to be of great interest. After having briefly considered the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, Dr. Vitzthum reaches what proves to be the core of his study: the delimitation of the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction and, consequently, the determination of the outer limit of the continental shelf. Special emphasis is laid on the interpretation of the words 'continental shelf' and 'adjacent' contained in Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. According to the author, these terms indicate that the contracting states did not intend to dissociate themselves entirely from the geological and geographical concept of the continental shelf; they further show that the legal continental shelf has to have an outer limit somewhere and cannot reach out to the middle of the oceans even if it becomes exploitable. His analysis leads Dr. Vitzthum to believe that this limit is to be found *de lege lata* at the point where the shelf proper breaks off and the continental slope begins. This implies that the claims at present put forward by certain coastal states, to the effect that they own *de lege lata* exclusive vested rights of exploration and exploitation over the adjacent sea-bed area down to the outer edge of the continental margin, are devoid of legal justification.[1] This conclusion is of considerable importance, since claims to such vested rights beyond the limits of the proposed 200-mile economic zone or patrimonial sea have been vigorously put forward at the Caracas Conference.

Dr. Vitzthum then turns to the famous question of whether the sea-bed beyond the outer limits of the national continental shelves constitutes a *res nullius*, that is, a space subject to occupation by any state, or a *res communis omnium*, like the superjacent water and air space. Though conceding that the sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction may have been a *res nullius* until recently, he declares that it has now attained the status of a *res communis* as a result of resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, in particular through the acceptance of the 'common heritage of mankind' concept embodied in Resolution 2749 (XXV) of December 17, 1970. This reviewer doubts whether the resolutions in question could have had this effect,[2] for in his opinion resolutions of the General Assembly as such cannot give birth to 'instant' customary international law. He agrees, however, that the sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is a *res communis,*

[1] It is submitted that the same conclusion can be reached without having recourse to geomorphological elements, *i.e.* on the sole basis of a textual interpretation of Article 1 of the Geneva Convention. It is suggested that this line of argument would even be preferable, for the use of geomorphological factors, such as the 'natural prolongation' theory developed by the International Court of Justice in the *North Sea Continental Shelf Cases* (*I.C.J. Reports* 1969, p. 4), instead of having the desired restrictive effect, might well result in the formulation of excessive claims. Indeed, several coastal states have invoked the concept of 'natural prolongation' in order to justify claims to vested rights over the entire continental margin beyond the proposed 200-mile limit.

[2] On the legal nature of Resolution 2749 (XXV), see K. Skubiszewski, 'La nature juridique de la "Déclaration des principes" sur les fonds marins', *Annals of International Studies*, Vol. 4, 1973, pp. 237–248.

perhaps not for the reason given by Dr. Vitzthum, but because this has already been its status under pre-existing international law. Dr. Vitzthum rightly concludes that the regime of *res communis* as it stands now embodies an unlimited and unregulated freedom to use the space in question and its resources. This freedom breeds confusion and conflicts between the different uses and users, and the present regime is therefore in urgent need of revision.

The work reviewed here undoubtedly constitutes a major contribution to the theory of the legal status of the sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, in particular because it contains what is probably the most careful and penetrating analysis of the outer limits of the continental shelf. The author's analysis of geographical and geological data is impeccable, and the same can be said of his study of the different uses of the sea-bed. Dr. Vitzthum deserves special recognition for not having yielded to the temptation to leave aside the existing law in order to indulge in futuristic speculations.

In view of these qualities, this book is certain to remain a standard work on the subject for a long time to come, despite the important changes which the law of the sea will doubtless undergo in the near future. It is however necessary to add one word of caution. Dr. Vitzthum's study is highly technical; it therefore constitutes difficult reading and is not addressed to the general public.

LUCIUS CAFLISCH

British Industry and European Law. Edited by George W. Keeton and S. N. Frommel. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1974. 206 pp. Index. £6·95.*

IN November 1972 the Division of Law and the Institute of Organisation and Social Studies at Brunel University held a conference on selected aspects of European Community Law and its impact upon the operations of British firms, in the United Kingdom as well as Common Market countries. The subjects selected by the organisers were: company law, corporate taxation, competition and restrictive trade practices, patent law and insurance. Separate chapters are devoted to each of these subjects, and they are preceded by a general chapter dealing with the incorporation of Community Law into English law.

The European Communities Act 1972, by providing that Community Law, present and future, as laid down in or ' under ' the relevant treaties, shall be given effect in the United Kingdom, has enacted a principle unique in the English legal system. While it may be arguable that the Act runs counter to the legislative sovereignty of Parliament, there can be no doubt that it severely curtails its powers. It also superimposes upon the rule of precedent, hitherto acknowledged as applying only to the decisions of the higher English courts, the further rule that decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Communities are binding on English domestic courts. Where any issue involving the application of Community law arises in domestic proceedings, defences under that law may be raised, and in the first case of its kind to come before the English courts (*Application des Gaz* v. *Falks Veritas* [1974] 3 All E.R. 51) the Court of Appeal permitted a defendant to amend a defence so as to allege a breach of articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty in proceedings which had been instituted before the accession of this country to the European Community. Ultimately the defence so raised will be

considered in the light of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice.

The impact of Community law on the law of this country will obviously vary, and large areas will remain entirely unaffected by it. The areas in which the impact will be greatest are dealt with in this book. Three aspects of company law are of considerable importance: harmonisation, mergers transcending the boundaries of individual countries, and the 'European Company'. Section 9 of the European Communities Act 1972 goes some way towards achieving the first of the three main objectives, *viz.* harmonisation, by abolishing the *ultra vires* doctrine of English company law and providing for more publicity in company matters. Less progress has been made in other fields, and the *societas Europea*, although much discussed in recent years, has not as yet become a reality. In the field of patent law too a great deal remains to be accomplished before the need for national patents ceases to exist, and it is doubtful if that time will ever come. These problems, and many others, are discussed in this book, and the individual contributions are of a high order throughout.

F. Honig

WESTERN EUROPE

Continuity and Change in European Society: Germany, France and Italy since 1870. By Martin Kolinsky. *London: Croom Helm. 1974. 242 pp. Index £5·50. Paperback: £2·50.*

In this book Dr. Kolinsky argues that social, economic and political changes have not eclipsed continuities in the development of France, Germany and Italy. Deep-seated tensions between authoritarian and democratic forces are not far below the surface of contemporary politics in these three countries. Although the theme is not original, its exploration might have provided some new insights and thought-provoking observations. Alas, Dr. Kolinsky's book is rather a pedestrian and jejune survey. One cannot make bricks without straw. An enterprise of this kind requires outstanding gifts of analysis and synthesis. To say this is no slur upon Dr. Kolinsky's abilities. His comparative approach to the subject is very much needed but the fact is that he has attempted too much too soon.

The publisher's blurb makes the ambitious claim that the book 'reviews and integrates the major theoretical contributions of Barrington Moore, Ralph Dahrendorf, Talcott Parsons and others'. Barrington Moore, however, is not listed in the index and the others do not receive close scrutiny. Since the book gives only a threadbare coverage of the recent history of France, Germany and Italy students would learn far more from reading one of the tested general histories—H. S. Hughes's *Contemporary Europe: A History* [1] or W. Laqueur's *Europe since Hitler*.[2]

One serious criticism must be made. Part II of the book is a study of Nazism and Fascism. The focus on Fascism means that France is given much less than its due. The book claims to be a survey of political and social development. But French social development between the two world wars receives only cursory attention. The reader is twice told that a major feature of French society was 'a very marked social stability' (p. 103).

[1] London: Prentice-Hall International 1961.
[2] Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1972.

It could be argued, however, that a major weakness of French inter-war society was the alienation of the working class from the state. Again, we are told that in the 1930s 'industrial relations were in a very primitive state, and previously there had been little social legislation' (p. 108). But this assertion is not elaborated or illustrated in any way, apart from one misleading reference to Popular Front social legislation. Moreover, the author concedes that 'home-bred French Fascism had no more than nuisance value during the thirties' (p. 103) but then devotes a chapter to explaining the failure of French Fascism to achieve power. Surely, the question that requires investigation is the failure of the Popular Front and social reform.

Lastly, the 'suggested reading' list is far from helpful. Arrangement by topic would have been more useful to students. Also, of 22 books listed, 15 are on post-1945 Europe. Dr. Kolinsky's publishers have served him badly. Printing, paper and lay-out are reminiscent of 1939-45 war economy standards.

ANTHONY ADAMTHWAITE

Europe in Question: Theories of Regional International Integration. By Reginald J. Harrison. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1974. 256 pp. Index. £5·25. Paperback: £3·00.*

DR. HARRISON has written a sound, workmanlike book for all those students of so-called political science who have been unwise enough to specialise in the study of theories of regional integration. He pilots the unfortunate student skilfully through the shoals of terminology used by men like Schmitter—terms such as 'spill-around', 'build-up', 'retrenchment', 'muddle-about', 'spill-back', and 'encapsulation'; all of which are quoted in just one paragraph towards the end of the book (pp. 233–4). But at the end of it all the detached reader forms the strong impression that the author's heart is not really in all the jargon-mongering which appears to be obligatory in works of this kind, and that he would have been much happier if he had been able to concentrate on those sections of his book—particularly Chapters 8 and 9—in which he offers some useful and penetrating analysis of the potentialities and problems of the European Community at its present stage of development.

For example, Dr. Harrison is right to draw attention to the fact that 'measures of positive integration with reallocative effects . . . are likely to be resisted as potential threats to élite power bases' (p. 247). Several years after the Community's 'golden period', when agreement was achieved on measures of mainly 'negative' integration in buoyant economic conditions which tended to minimise the potential for political disagreement, we can see the truth of this observation. He also draws what is surely the right conclusion from the 1965 confrontation between de Gaulle and the rest of the Community, namely that 'some degree of co-ordination in the realm of high politics to develop the perception of communality of vital interests would appear to be a prerequisite for progress in economic integration' (p. 202).

Dr. Harrison makes some interesting comments upon the institutional dilemmas facing both the EEC Commission and the European Parliament. He reminds us of the severe practical limitations upon the Commission's powers of initiation and leadership in its conduct of an unequal dialogue with the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Permanent Representa-

tives. And he puts his finger on the key indicators of institutional weakness in the European Parliament, when he points out that the final legislative power and popularly based political leadership still stems from the respective national Parliaments where the main pressure groups and party organisations concentrate their energies and resources.

It is hard to disagree with Dr. Harrison's main institutional conclusion that 'the basic institutional need, and the object of any realistic strategy for European unity, is to provide the Community with institutions legitimised by direct election, endowed with defined powers and autonomous resources and effective majoritarian procedures' (p. 225). And it is equally welcome that he should have seen fit in the concluding chapter to remind his readers that 'political integration, revolutionary or evolutionary, depends upon acts of political will rather than upon any known dynamic process' (p. 243).

NIGEL FORMAN

Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy 1945–1973. By F. S. Northedge. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1974. 382 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (Minerva Series of Students' Handbooks No. 27; Gen. Ed.: Brian Chapman.) £6·00. Paperback: £2·75.*

The Changing Structure of British Foreign Policy. By Roy E. Jones. *London: Longman. 1974. 191 pp. Index. £3·50.*

EVERY book on recent British foreign policy poses the question, 'What to do?', and answers it glumly. Of these two useful contributions to the debate Professor Northedge is the more gloomy and Mr Roy Jones the more analytical, although his ingenious examination of alternatives does not indicate any obvious panacea. Dr. Northedge's book is in the main a reissue of his admirable study, *British Foreign Policy: the process of readjustment, 1945–1961,*[1] with four new chapters on the Commonwealth, defence, the United Nations, and the EEC, bringing the story down to Britain's entry into the Community in January 1973. Mr. Jones, senior lecturer in politics at Cardiff, writes for students of foreign policy but assumes little technical knowledge in concentrating on strategic, economic, and institutional aspects of the present British predicament. He has a lucid and economical style and he likes to define his terms. His introduction on the nature of foreign policy, and much else in the book, deserve a wide audience.

In Northedge's view a failure of will probably explains everything: Britain has declined in power from the summit reached in 1945 through reluctance to face the implications of straitened circumstances and 'energetically apply them in daily work'. This may, or may not, be a fair comment on Britain's domestic economy: one must question its relevance to the main conditions of its external relations. The wartime peak years, 1918 and 1944, were the product of enormous, exhausting, but temporary effort for which two postwar generations have had to pay. The effort could no doubt be made again, given the 1940 conditions of conventional warfare, American aid, and second-rank opposition, but we can count it among our blessings that the need will not arise. Should we not think occasionally in terms of fulfilment? All through the inter-war years we sighed for the full deployment of American power in a western security system. We were

[1] London: Allen & Unwin 1962. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1963, p. 438.

pledged to the evolution of the empire into a commonwealth of independent dominions. And we thought that the world would be an easier place to live in if German and Japanese totalitarians would relax into ordinary human beings.

So we started the postwar era with some advantages, and Mr. Jones does not see recent British foreign policy as merely 'the story of declining strength making nonsense of frantic efforts to assert the sovereign power of the state.' Britain is now offered a complicated merging of the national entity into transnational systems, and his book discusses the problems and potentialities, harmful and otherwise, of the milieu of which Britain forms a part. In the process of searching for the most effective forms of participation in such transnational organisations it is giving expression to a general concern for the creation of a Western community which it has displayed, not always to its immediate advantage, since 1945. 'The Commonwealth was partly viewed, not as a colonialist hangover but as an exercise in international, multiracial association . . . it imposed few burdens on its members other than Britain.' In the long Malayan emergency Britain's role was the modest one of general service to local stability and independence, 'not the manic assertion of an impossible military dominance in Asia'. There was a very real measure of internationalism in such activity as its participation in the founding of the IMF. Later it exerted itself at the height of the cold war to modify the harsher ideological aspects of American foreign policy. Mr. Jones's essential theme is that transnational organisations ultimately occupy a position 'of complementarity, not competitiveness' with national organisations, and that Britain can seek with advantage to harmonise their activities.

Dr. Northedge concedes that the United Kingdom 'has in reality little to be ashamed of in its United Nations record', although this has been due rather, he suggests, to 'national interest in peace and pacification than to any obvious virtues'. Mr. Jones would argue, I think, that to be conscious of such interests was in itself the most obvious of virtues.

W. N. Medlicott

Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939. First Series, Vol. XIX. The Conferences of Cannes, Genoa, and The Hague, 1922. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, M. E. Lambert. Preface by Douglas Dakin. *London: HMSO. 1974. 1198 pp. £13·80.*

The present volume in the series *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939*, includes the minutes of the Cannes Conference in January 1922 and of the 34-nation conference held in Genoa in April and May 1922. It does not contain the minutes of the subsequent conference at The Hague in May–July 1922, which have already been published by the Netherlands government, but it includes telegrams and other despatches sent to the Foreign Office by the British Empire delegation at The Hague. These three conferences were concerned with Lloyd George's persistent but ultimately ineffective efforts to restore the five-year-old Bolshevik Russia to the 'comity of nations' and hence, he hoped, to fulfil his dream of European economic reconstruction after the First World War. There were formidable obstacles in his way; the sullen opposition of the French to any conciliation of the Bolsheviks, who had nationalised French-owned properties in Russia; the Russian refusal to acknowledge prewar public and private debts without

compensation for damage done in Russia by Allied interventionist forc during the civil war; the sharp but tactless diplomacy of the Germans, wh astounded the Genoa Conference by going off with the Russians almost a soon as the talks began and signing the Rapallo agreement; and not least, th tepid co-operation of the Foreign Office, which regarded Lloyd George' venture at Genoa as 'ill-conceived and ill-conducted'. But, then, Lloyd George was not the first British minister to think that such obstacles woul vanish when the prospects of good trade shone ahead.

F. S. NORTHEDGE

De Gaulle The Statesman. By Brian Crozier. *London: Eyre Methuen. 1974. 327 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. £6·00.*

ENGLISH scholars can now catch up with American in reading Brian Crozier's life of de Gaulle, since the British publishers found it necessary to publish in two volumes [1] what has appeared long since in the United States in a single volume, at a lower price.

Most readers will no doubt start by saying to themselves 'Je me suis toujours conçu une certaine idée de de Gaulle' and will look in this biography for confirmation, denial or elaboration of the concept already formed. The exercise will prove disappointing to the extent that Crozier did not meet de Gaulle and believes that 'exposure to the force of his personality might have interfered with my purpose, which was to treat him as a figure in history' (p. xi). This second volume opens with the *traversée du désert* when de Gaulle had little public life; but although the moving relationship with his mentally retarded daughter, and the financial arrangements (including the gift of royalties from the Mémoirs) for the Anne de Gaulle home stand out, the personality of de Gaulle remains elusive. There is little sense of what it was like to be close to de Gaulle (or evidence that many of those who were close were consulted) and no indication of his sense of humour (of the man who, inspecting a resistance unit most of whose members had enjoyed promoting each other to ranks of colonel or major, stopped before a lowly lieutenant and asked: 'Alors, on ne sait pas coudre?').

The book is at its best in narrative and will be valuable for its balanced account of de Gaulle's political career. Much of value has already been written, and Crozier readily acknowledges his debt to such authors as Pierre Viansson-Ponté, Dorothy Pickles, Jean Lacouture and Philip Williams; as well as to de Gaulle.

But it is lacking as a political biography in that it fails to achieve that important combination of sensitivity to a person and mastery of the complex web of events which the individual seeks to influence. This shortcoming is more obvious in this second volume than in the first, because of the increased complexity of events between France and Algeria, within Europe, between Europe and the United States. The bibliography (or rather the bibliographical note, a cross between a bibliography and reading list) is narrow (Algeria without Courrière, no American sources except for the war and postwar period) and the narrative is equally restricted, rich as it is in reportage of public events, or private exchanges which have for the

[1] *De Gaulle the Warrior*. London: Eyre Methuen, 1973. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1974, p. 301.

most part been made public elsewhere. Too often the foreign policy of France under de Gaulle is reduced to the dramatic events or the coarse outlines: Algeria disappears from the narrative after Evian, in spite of the personal interest which de Gaulle took in independent Algeria; the tense relations with Britain in Syria during the war are covered in the first volume; but the abandonment of Israel and de Gaulle's Arab policy have scant treatment in the second; there is a discussion of de Gaulle's attitude to Russia, but little on relations with eastern Europe.

The biography cannot fail to be useful and it brings together much material which cannot readily be found in one place. But the reader will need further study, and his own resources of sensitivity and imagination to be able to meet de Gaulle's shade and say: ' Je vous ai compris.'

WILFRID KNAPP

Franz Josef Strauss, die CSU und die Aussenpolitik: Konzeption und Realität am Beispiel der Grossen Koalitionen. By Detlef Bischoff. Foreword by Arnulf Baring. *Meisenheim am Glan: Hain. 1973. 347 pp. Bibliog. Paperback: DM 34.00.*

Schwarze Politik aus Bayern: Ein Lesebuch zur CSU. Edited by Stephan Schmidt in collaboration with the Presseausschuss Demokratische Initiative. Foreword by Theo Schiller. *Darmstadt, Neuwied: Luchterhand. 1974. 156 pp. (Sammlung Luchterhand 196.) Paperback: DM 5.80.*

WHILST the CSU (the Christian Social Union) has displayed considerable sympathy for the radical Right in the Federal Republic and for the Greek colonels, Chile's military junta and Franco's Spain, it has been characterised by paranoia in its attitude to left-wing radicals. It has, for example, applied *Berufsverbote* (occupational disqualifications) against left-wing professors and teachers whilst defending the right of NPD professors and teachers to stand for election. The attitudes of its chairman to internal party democracy and to critics reveal a level of contempt for citizens which others on the far Left might match but scarcely exceed.

Schwarze Politik aus Bayern documents the key features of CSU policy towards trade unions, education, the media and industry in order to establish that party's blindness to the Right and fixation with the Left. It is, however, rather a pity that in the process of persistent criticism the book ignores some of the accomplishments of Bavarian CSU ministers in state politics, particularly in the field of industrial development. Dr. Goppel, Bavaria's Minister-President, has provided an element of respectability which the CSU badly needs.

It is, of course, at the federal level, where Strauss is mainly active, that the CSU has really established its reputation as the power behind the throne within the CDU/CSU parliamentary party. One major source of its power is its unification around a clear-cut alternative foreign policy concept to the *Ostpolitik*. To Franz Josef Strauss, the architect of the CSU's foreign policy, negotiations with the East only become meaningful after the development of a militarily strong European state which is both fully aware of and prepared to meet the communist menace. Until such a time non-recognition of the *status quo* in Europe is axiomatic for CSU policy and detente is to be regarded with the utmost suspicion. Consequently, the CSU energetically

fought German ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty; a European nuclear capability was an essential prerequisite for fulfilment of its foreign policy goals.

Bischoff's critical study of CSU foreign policy views during the Great Coalition is to be warmly recommended. It pinpoints the underlying consistency of the CSU's foreign and domestic policies and, along with Schmidt's collection of essays, leaves the reader profoundly dismayed about some elements of the Federal Republic's Right.

KENNETH DYSON

Sehr verehrter Herr Bundeskanzler! Heinrich von Brentano im Briefwechsel mit Konrad Adenauer 1949–1964. By Arnulf Baring with the assistance of Bolko von Oetinger and Klaus Mayer. *Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe. 1974. 511 pp. Illus. Index. DM 45.00.*

FOR fifteen years Heinrich von Brentano was prominent in West German politics—from 1949 to 1955 and again from 1961 to the time of his death in 1964, as Chairman of the parliamentary CDU/CSU, and between these periods as Minister of Foreign Affairs. In both functions he was in close and constant, if not always in harmonious, contact with the Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer. The insight into their relationship offered by this selection of their correspondence, interspersed with many pages of skilful comment and interpretation by Professor Baring, is all the more welcome as the bulk of Brentano's political papers will not be released by the Bundesarchiv at Koblenz until 1998. (The papers drawn on here are the property of Michael von Brentano.)

The correspondence between the two men was extensive, partly because Brentano sent confidential reports from his many travels to the Chancellor, and partly because Adenauer preferred to discuss complex issues and differences of opinion in writing rather than in conversation. Much light is thrown on trends and questions, in domestic policy as well as in foreign affairs, during the 1950s and early 1960s. Among the ever recurrent topics is the problem of reunification and relations with the German Democratic Republic, not seldom referred to disdainfully as 'The Eastern Zone'. There are also interesting sections on the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1959 and on the fluctuations in Bonn's relations with the United States.

A generation younger than *Der Alte*, Brentano was a brilliant linguist and a skilful chairman but without the self-assured toughness of the Chancellor. He often expressed his doubts of Adenauer's ideas and actions, but in the end the Chancellor nearly always insisted on his own line. Having been himself the first Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic, he was determined afterwards 'to remain the real master in the Foreign Ministry' (p. 152).

When the two men travelled together to Moscow in September 1955, Brentano was not at all in favour of establishing diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. 'Filled with a deep, unsurmountable distrust of the Soviet Union in all her strangeness, he lacked the elementary, vital curiosity of the Federal Chancellor about meeting the powerful men in the Kremlin, about trying his strength with them, about being a match for them in the challenge of such personal confrontation' (p. 174). On the other hand, six years later when the GDR faced the world with the ugly fact of the Berlin Wall, both Adenauer and Brentano remained rather passive. They realised

that the Western powers were not prepared to pull the Berlin chestnuts out of the fire for West Germany. Influential circles in the United States favoured a re-orientation of its foreign policy. ' There are forces in Washington which wish to see Brandt as Chancellor '—Heinrich Krone, a leading CDU politician, wrote confidentially on September 9, 1961. ' They do not like the Old Man who is too tough for them. They seek an understanding with Moscow; Germany stands in the way ' (p. 377).

A week later the Christian Democrats lost their absolute majority in the federal elections. They began difficult negotiations on a coalition with the Free Democrats, who demanded the appointment of one of their own men, Walter Scheel, as Minister for European Affairs, probably to keep an eye on Brentano. This was unacceptable to the latter. He felt let down by the foxy Chancellor whom he had served so loyally, and he suddenly resigned. Eventually the idea of a Minister for Europe was dropped and Gerhard Schröder (CDU) became Brentano's successor. But Adenauer himself was only tolerated in office for another two years. In the end he realised more fully Brentano's personal qualities. There is something touching and sad about the friendship which sprang up between the two men when Brentano was slowly dying from cancer. Lacking Adenauer's unusual dexterity and cunning, Brentano had proved an able, if not an outstanding, politician, a good European and last but not least a gentleman.

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

Heinrich Brüning: Briefe und Gespräche 1934–1945. Edited by Claire Nix with the assistance of Reginald Phelps and George Pettee. *Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 1974. 556 pp. Bibliog. Index. DM 39.80.*

Hans Schäffer: Steuermann in wirtschaftlichen und politischen Krisen. By Eckhard Wandel. Introd. by Karl Erich Born. *Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 1974. 378 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Veröffentlichungen des Leo Baeck Instituts.) DM 38.00.*

THE volume of Brüning's *Letters and Conversations* is a welcome supplement to his *Memoiren*,[1] published in 1970. Carefully edited and annotated by his former American secretary, it offers rich insights into his personality, his views and attitudes during the years of exile. From 1934 until the outbreak of the Second World War Brüning travelled much in Western Europe and the United States. Although shadowed by the Gestapo, he remained in touch with elements of the conservative opposition in Germany, including Goerdeler, H. J. von Moltke and Trott zu Solz. From 1939 to 1952 he held a chair in public administration at Harvard.

Critically aware of the follies of many French and British statesmen and, as a Roman Catholic, of pro-fascist inclinations within his Church, he offered his advice only if solicited. He had, however, important contacts and talks with, among others, Baldwin, Vansittart, Lord Halifax and Winston Churchill in England, and Stimson, Roosevelt and George Messersmith in America. He was constantly in close touch with (Sir) John Wheeler-Bennett. As Brüning explained in a letter of December 1937, his appearance in public had ' only one aim . . . to show that the German people do not only consist of those now in power and that the traditions which made Germany great and secured the admiration of the world for her, are not altogether dead '

[1] Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt. 1970.

(p. 159). Later he refused to be considered for office in post-Nazi Germany; he felt that émigrés were unsuited for such a task. Yet some of his wartime memoranda in the appendix show that he was much preoccupied with the problems of Germany's future reconstruction. Whatever Brüning's shortcomings were as a Chancellor, he appears here to have been in subsequent years a conservative patriot of courage and integrity who used his considerable talents of analysis and foresight judiciously and often wisely.

Hans Schäffer, a leading German civil servant, made his reputation in the 1920s as an expert on the thorny question of reparations when taking part in many international conferences. As under-secretary of state in the key Reich ministry of finance he exercised great influence during the two years of Brüning's Chancellorship (March 1930 to May 1932). A friend of the leading bankers, enjoying good relations with both trade unions and industry, Schäffer was, in the later words of Schwerin von Krosigk, 'the heart and the brain of the Brüning Cabinet' (p. 142) during that period of crisis.

Dr. Wandel's lucid biography is largely based on the very intensive diary notes Schäffer used to jot down. In 1934 he emigrated to Sweden where he later obtained an important position in industry and became a Swedish subject. He did much to help mitigate the plight of his less fortunate German fellow Jews. Like Brüning, Schäffer declined to join the government of West Germany after the war. Nevertheless his contacts with Dr. Adenauer and also with the Social Democrats in Berlin were friendly and perhaps more acceptable than those of his by then rather isolated former chief.

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

An Economic Background to Munich: International Business and Czechoslovakia 1918–1938. By Alice Teichova. *London: Cambridge University Press. 1974. 422 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Soviet and East European Studies; Eds.: A. Brown et al.) £9·50. $27.50.*

DR. ALICE TEICHOVA has written a masterly exposition of the economic background to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938. It is the first monograph on the subject. The main reason for this neglect has been the difficulty of obtaining reliable data. All the more praise therefore to the author for her energy and skill in marshalling an impressive array of statistics, covering direct foreign investment, foreign long-term loans and the activities of international cartels from 1918 to 1938.

The end of the First World War brought a redistribution of the economic interests of the Great Powers. Austrian and German investment in central and south-east Europe was displaced by British, French, Belgian and American capital. With the loss of the Russian market, central and south-east Europe became, after the British Empire and South America, the third most important area for Anglo-French and American investment. Economically and politically, Czechoslovakia offered attractive conditions for investment: a high degree of concentration in its industries and banking, comparatively low wages, a stable democratic government.

Industrially, Czechoslovakia was much stronger than many of its neighbours. In volume of industrial production it ranked among the world's ten leading nations. In European production of iron and steel it held first place among the successor states. Mining and metallurgy, technically the

most advanced and economically the most important industries, were definitely controlled by foreign capital, with Anglo-French investment in first place, followed by German. Czechoslovakia was the base for further investment in central and south-east Europe and Dr. Teichova discusses Poland and Czechoslovakia's neighbours of the Little Entente.

The significance of Dr. Teichova's work is twofold. First, it effectively demolishes the long-held belief of Czechoslovak historians in an 'economic Munich before the political Munich'. Anglo-French capital, it was believed, had voluntarily retreated from the country in the 1930s. In reality, though there was a tendency to avoid further long-term investment, especially after Hitler's advent to power, British and French big business resisted German economic penetration—even after Munich. Secondly, Czechoslovak historians sharply distinguished between the agrarian bourgeoisie and the financial oligarchy grouped around the Živnostenská Bank. Dr. Teichova shows that the reality was both complex and variable and does not sustain the thesis according to which one part of the bourgeoisie was the ally of the West and the other of Germany.

After such a feast of information it may seem greedy to ask for more. However, a chapter pulling together the economic, financial and political threads would have been invaluable. Dr. Teichova refers to the financial pressures exerted by the French on Czechoslovakia but the theme is not systematically explored. The political activities in the Munich crisis of Dr. Preiss, director-general of the Živnostenská Bank, are not discussed. Lastly, regarding the Skoda armament works, in which France had a controlling interest, Dr. Teichova rather weakens her main argument by stating that in December 1938 the French holding company 'decided to sell its participation on fairly favourable terms to a consortium of Czech banks' (p. 216). This suggests that the initiative came from the French. In point of fact, as the French archives reveal, Germany served an ultimatum on Prague which left the French company with no option but to sell.

ANTHONY ADAMTHWAITE

Documents on Nazism, 1919–1945. Introduced and edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. *London: Cape. 1974. 704 pp. Bibliog. Index. £12·00.*

THE editors of this comprehensive and interesting collection of documents on Nazism have already made a name for themselves with their separate studies on the early history of the Nazi Party in Lower Saxony and Bavaria in the years up to 1933.[1] Covering the whole history of the Nazi party and government, their present joint contribution embraces all aspects of the subject. The book is divided into six parts: the Rise of Nazism, the Seizure of Power, the Political Structure of the Third Reich, the New Social Order: Idea and Reality, Foreign Policy 1933–39, and Germany at War 1939–45. Each section is carefully divided into at least three or four sub-sections, and there are useful tables covering the economy, rearmament, voting patterns for the NSDAP etc. Apart from a general introduction, each section has its own introduction, while each document selected is preceded by an explanatory paragraph or two.

[1] Noakes: *The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, 1921–1933*. Oxford University Press. 1972. Pridham: *Hitler's Rise to Power: the Nazi movement in Bavaria, 1923–1933*. Hart-Davis MacGibbon. 1973.

There is no doubt that the book will prove of interest, as the blurb has it, to all ' who are interested in the phenomenon of Nazism '. Its comprehensive coverage will introduce even to some specialists aspects of the Nazi movement and government that they may miss in the ordinary course of their reading, simply because here one can read in an extended form a speech by Hitler or other Nazi leaders or instructions to Party workers that in a specialised monograph may only be summarised or quoted in part. Moreover, by covering as wide a range of the subject as they do, the editors will enable many readers to get the essential ' feel ' of Nazi thinking and oratory in areas other than foreign policy and the Jewish question, which always seem to attract the most attention. In this way essential questions such as the Nazi management of the economy and rearmament, labour, the legal system, and the new Nazi government's relationship with the German civil service will be introduced to readers who might not otherwise include such subjects in their reading.

Apart from those members of the general public who are sufficiently interested in the subject to be able to pay the high price of this book, one hopes that it will be put to good use in academic circles. But students preparing extended or postgraduate papers should realise that because this is a selection of documents, they will have to extend their reading beyond it. It is a pity, therefore, that the editors did not place their important footnote references at the foot of each page instead of at the back of the book, although of course their hands may have been tied by the publishers. One wonders also whether it might not have been better to give each section of the book a more extended introduction, with interspersed references to the documents that follow, instead of prefacing each quotation with a paragraph or two of commentary. This system necessarily tends to simplify the commentary, while in many cases it draws attention away from the very things which should be read by themselves, the documents. But if the editors really wanted their book to be used as a ' tool ' for Nazi studies in this country, their decision to omit from the bibliography all references to books and articles in German (although these may be found by hunting through the chapter references at the back of the book) is astounding. After all, specialists in particular always consider that part of the price of a book will purchase them an up-to-date and clear bibliography in their subject. Yet a clue to the dilemma which probably faces the editors as university teachers, is given by the reason they give for this decision in the preface to the bibliography: ' Since this book is intended primarily for those with no German, it seemed pointless to list books in German in the bibliography '. This is eloquent enough, and needs no further comment.

JOHN P. FOX

Friedensinitiativen und Machtpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1942. By Bernd Martin. *Düsseldorf: Droste. 1974. 570 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Geschichtliche Studien zu Politik und Gesellschaft, Band 6; Eds. Wolfram Fischer et al.) DM. 82.00.*

As the Second World War fades into the past, historians of Dr. Martin's generation (he was born in 1940) naturally seek to approach it in a different perspective from those for whom it constituted a central experience in their

lives. The amount of published material now available is enormous and the author has worked his way through it with care and discrimination. He has also made use of unpublished sources now available in Britain, the United States, the Federal Republic and the Vatican. Perhaps it was his previous work on a bilateral theme—Germany's relations with Japan during the war—which led him to tackle a more comprehensive topic. He has tried to bring together in one study the various attempts, official, semi-official and unofficial, to bring about a compromise peace of some kind. Hitherto, the role of individuals—Dahlerus, for instance—has largely been looked at in isolation. Martin considers such men but builds up a complete picture of all the efforts. They were, of course, of varying significance and importance. After the success of the campaign in Poland, it almost seems as if every state in Europe began to hedge its bets. In the various Scandinavian countries, in the Low Countries, in Spain and Italy, governments and private groups began to see a future for themselves as mediators. Some groups, for example the Scandinavian churchmen, were well-connected within their own countries and had extensive contacts both within Germany and the United Kingdom. Others were in a less advantageous position and could only establish links on the periphery of power. The diplomacy of the Vatican comes into yet another category. It was to Hitler's advantage to allow the flurry of feelers to continue, even more so after the fall of France. Britain now had the choice between giving in and continuing the struggle. In his section on this problem he shows how uncertain were opinions in high political circles. Clearly, of very considerable importance to the result of this debate was the likely attitude of the United States. In an earlier chapter, the author threw much light on American attitudes in discussing the mission of Sumner Welles. The British had good reason to be worried before 'Western Hemisphere Defence' emerged, though the more perceptive realised that in the long run there would be a price to pay. But, even though it cannot be maintained that in no circumstances would Churchill have considered terms, in the end there seemed little chance that they could be of an acceptable character. Many Europeans, not least anti-Nazi Germans, now believed that the position of the United Kingdom was hopeless and that the British would be bombed into submission. They were proved wrong. The 'Pax Germanica' was a phantom and it was Hitler who went on his way to destruction.

Peace is, of course, a highly ambiguous term. In 1939–41 men of high and low motive in Europe wrestled to find a solution which would reconcile conflicting ideologies, social systems and economic interests. The phoney war might conceivably lead to a less phoney peace. In the end, it was Hitler who settled the matter. Peace for him meant world domination, Martin contends (p. 504), and any other conclusion was to be equated with capitulation. While one may disagree with an assessment of motive here and there, his book should encourage others to look at the opening years of the Second World War on the comprehensive scale he has attempted.

KEITH ROBBINS

Hitler and His Generals: The Hidden Crisis, January–June 1938. By Harold C. Deutsch. *Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1974. 452 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £8·75.*

The 'X' Documents: The Secret History of Foreign Office contacts with the German Resistance 1937–1939. By A. P. Young. Edited by Sidney Aster. *London: André Deutsch. 1974. 253 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·50.*

ALTHOUGH the main lines of what became known as the Fritsch-Blomberg affair are familiar from other studies on the German army in the Third Reich, Harold Deutsch's detailed examination of Hitler's purge of the army leadership at the beginning of 1938 will probably become the standard work on the subject in English. While it may be criticised for an over-reliance on memoirs, postwar depositions and interviews, Deutsch's analysis of the crisis, emphasising as it does the outlook and position of the German *Generalität* after nearly five years of Nazi rule, and his finely drawn portraits of von Blomberg, Reich Minister of War, and von Fritsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, establishes important signposts for the failure of the German General Staff to act decisively enough against Hitler and the regime later in 1938, and even in July 1944.

Deutsch's account of the underhand methods used by the Nazi leadership, especially Göring, Himmler and Heydrich, to effect the removal of von Blomberg and von Fritsch, exaggerating the former's misdemeanour in marrying a prostitute and trumping up false charges of homosexuality against the latter, confirms the findings of other detailed studies on other aspects of the Third Reich: while Hitler made known his general intentions and his likes and dislikes, the practical work was left to his subordinates who, in this way, saw an opportunity of advancing their own position in the Nazi state. On the other hand, Hitler used his subordinates' own domestic feuds and intrigues as a means of promoting his own interests and not necessarily those of his entourage. So it was with Hitler's dispute with the army leadership which came to a head at the fateful meeting of November 5, 1937, and immediately afterwards. This made it clear to Hitler that the 'wrong' men were in charge of the army, the war ministry, and the foreign ministry; they did not think like him, and his opportunistic postulates for German foreign policy were totally at variance with their more hesitant attitudes.

In the event, von Blomberg was the architect of his own—and ultimately of the army's—downfall. His scandalous second marriage to a prostitute, Eva Gruhn, witnessed by Hitler and Göring, played into the latter's hands. Hitler quickly saw that this sensation was the Trojan Horse he needed to undermine the power and influence of what he regarded as the conservative and reactionary General Staff—and even as von Blomberg was being dismissed he gave Hitler a list of leading anti-Nazi generals and officers (p. 120). In dismissing other accounts that it was the army leadership that brought pressure to bear on Hitler to dismiss von Blomberg, especially that by Sir John Wheeler-Bennett (p. 99, fn. 62), and in suggesting that Hitler may have known a little more about the background of von Blomberg's bride-to-be and the possible repercussions of the marriage on the standing of the General Staff than other writers have allowed for (pp. 107–8), Deutsch indicates that the initiative in the matter was held throughout by Hitler and not by the army. That it was, he feels, was partly due to General Wilhelm Keitel, Head of the Wehrmachtsamt in the War Ministry. Deutsch suggests (pp. 102–3) that had not Keitel 'washed his hands' of the matter when a police file of pornographic pictures of Eva von Blomberg was brought to his attention, and instead had used his influence to get the file passed to the army commander, 'the Blomberg case would have been brought to Hitler by the Wehrmacht

rather than the reverse. In every respect developments would have been profoundly and, from the Army's standpoint, favourably affected ' (p. 102).

While Deutsch's conclusion in this particular respect may be a little more definitive than is probably warranted, this episode is an excellent example of the often fateful influence exercised by the personal strengths and weaknesses of many of the principals in this generally sordid story. This is particularly true of the central character of the main part of the book, Werner von Fritsch, Hitler's main target since at least November 5, 1937. To gain control of the army von Fritsch had to be removed and far-reaching personnel changes imposed at the top. Again, as Deutsch carefully shows, it would have been harder for Hitler to obtain the execution of his intentions had it not been for the work carried out by others in the Nazi leadership, especially Göring, and the fact that Hitler's intentions to rid himself of von Fritsch coincided with Göring's own ambition to attain, by any means, a position of dominance over the German armed forces. More important, Deutsch shows (pp. 144ff.) how the Blomberg case was almost a secondary issue to the main task of getting rid of von Fritsch.

Since many of the most important conversations between the principals were conducted in secret or without any reliable record being taken, Deutsch has had to rely fairly heavily on postwar accounts by survivors. This could have been a severe handicap, but it is to Deutsch's credit that he presents a credible and detailed account of this fascinating story, and where there is conflicting evidence he presents the several versions before explaining why he prefers one or the other.

In many senses the Nazi victory over the army in February 1938 was a Pyrrhic one for it acted as a form of catalyst for a more concerted effort by the various opposition groups within the armed forces. We must await Deutsch's next volume, covering the rest of 1938 and 1939, for further developments in the field of army opposition to Hitler. Of particular interest will be his account of the contacts between these groups and the British government, especially at the height of the Czech crisis culminating in Munich. A. P. Young's book takes us on to this minefield of the contacts between German opposition groups and the British government in the years 1937 to 1939. Young, an English industrialist, was the British government's go-between with one of the most noted leaders of the German resistance or opposition to Hitler, Carl Goerdeler, one-time Mayor of Leipzig. Young's main thesis, repeated throughout 218 pages of shrill anti-appeasement polemics, is that the Second World War might have been avoided if only the British government had contributed to the overthrow of the Hitler regime in two ways: by standing firm and acting steadfastly in the face of all Hitler's threats and *coups de main*, and secondly, by adopting a more positive and encouraging attitude towards the secret German opposition to Hitler. This is an old argument, not least of its disadvantages for British readers being that it conveniently shifts responsibility for the continued existence of Hitler and the Nazi regime away from those Germans who acquiesced in the regime in the first place, or who failed afterwards to take resolute enough action to replace it.

While it is interesting to read Young's correspondence with Goerdeler, its publication would have had a greater significance for historical knowledge had an historian, competent in the general field of Anglo-German diplomatic relations in the inter-war period, been able to use it in an objective study. As it is, and contrary to the publisher's high-flown claims, the inclusion of this

correspondence in such memoirs will only continue to mislead the general public about much of the history of the 1930s.

The only satisfactory part of this book is the appendix, an academic and objective essay on Carl Goerdeler and the Foreign Office, written by the editor. This shows that, unlike Young, the British Foreign Office was more realistic and more reserved in its attitudes towards people like Goerdeler. But it is asking too much even of serious historians to expect them to pay the full purchase price of the book for 21 pages of quality.

JOHN P. FOX

The Communists in Spain: Study of an Underground Political Movement. By Guy Hermet. Trans. from the French by S. Seago and H. Fox. *Lexington, Mass., Farnborough, Hants.: Heath. 1974. 238 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Saxon House Studies.) £5·25.*

THE publication in English translation of Professor Hermet's study of Spanish communism, which appeared in French in 1971,[1] is very welcome. The work is certainly one of the most distinguished to appear on modern Spanish politics, and is the more valuable for dealing with a theme about which it is difficult to find reliable information. The author recognises that the secrecy in which the Spanish communists must often operate limits the availability of evidence and imposes caution in the interpretation of what there is. He contends however that the neglect of underground parties in the literature of politics justifies the study of one on which at least some documentation is available; and by his skill in drawing together evidence of many different kinds (including some discreetly handled private information) he certainly casts much new light on the ethos of Spanish communism and the problems it has faced. The tension between the underground and the émigrés has been noted before, but Professor Hermet does particularly well to bring out the importance of the Communist party's relationship with the international communist movement as a whole, both in providing moral and material sustenance for the Spaniards and in influencing their stance in Spanish domestic politics. The tone of the work is sympathetic to the Party, in particular to the steadfastness of its militants, but it contains some cold candour about its failings. The dilemmas of permanent opposition, providing willy-nilly a bogey for the Right, while unable seriously to contemplate making a revolution, are pointed up. 'Their one important role,' writes Hermet of the PCE, 'is to bring up a fresh generation of potential working-class leaders and to keep alive a working-class awareness in Spain' (p. 201). Despite the challenges of ETA[2] and dissident communists, the orthodox Party certainly maintains this role today, though not even Hermet is able to suggest what latent strength the anarchist tradition may retain. Throughout the work evidence is in general most judiciously weighed, but the author surely overstates the degree of deliberate manipulation of the communists' image by the Spanish regime, while underestimating the extent to which journalists and public figures are themselves anti-communist by reflex. This is a small criticism however of what is an excellent book, and one which has dated surprisingly little considering the pace of events since 1971.

J. W. D. TRYTHALL

[1] *Les Communistes en Espagne, étude d'un mouvement politique clandestin.* Paris: Colin.

[2] *Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna* (Land and freedom of the Basques).

The Greece of Karamanlis. By Maurice Genevoix. Trans. by Dorothy Trollope. Introd. by Constantine Tsatsos. *London: Doric Publications. 1973. 206 pp. Illus. Index. £3·40.*

The English version of Maurice Genevoix's book is particularly timely, since its subject has recently made a dramatic reappearance on the Greek political stage. It is an impressionist portrait rather than a conventional biography, but it is the fruit of years of friendship with Mr. Karamanlis and reveals many details, facets of personality and philosophic beliefs which could only be known to a friend.

The career of Karamanlis has remarkable parallels with that of the other major Greek politician of the 20th century, Eleftherios Venizelos. Like Venizelos, he emerged from the marches of the Greek world (Venizelos a Cretan, Karamanlis a Macedonian) where national consciousness is forged into steel by the fear, and often the reality, of foreign domination. Both men gained an extraordinary political ascendency, interrupted by long exile; both were recalled after national disaster as expected saviours of their country. In this last phase, Venizelos failed, as Karamanlis may yet do, though Karamanlis has arguably the better chance with the example of his great predecessor behind him.

Some of the most interesting chapters of the book deal with Karamanlis's family background and early manhood, with their obvious bearing on the industry, thrift and will-power which underlay his political successes. The picture drawn of the young Karamanlis as an insurance salesman, working his way determinedly from door to door to clear a debt incurred by his father, vividly foreshadows the prudent steward who stabilised the Greek currency after a series of devaluations which had caused the drachma to slump from 600 to the pound sterling in 1944 to 84,500 before he came to power.

The lifetime of Karamanlis has been a period of almost unbroken violence and upheaval. Thus we read, that 'in 1955 [the year before Karamanlis's first premiership] a Greek of forty had known, suffered, applauded or deplored three depositions of the monarch, seven coups d'etat and three dictatorships' (p. 132), not to speak of wars and civil wars. Small wonder that in charting Karamanlis's progress through fewer than two hundred pages, the author has treated the pageant of Greek history even more impressionistically than he has his central character; it would be hard to piece together an understandable narrative from the story's wild vicissitudes without a lot of previous knowledge.

The English translator has made a workmanlike job of what is clearly an inimitable style.

KENNETH MATTHEWS

Modern Turkey. 4th ed. By Geoffrey Lewis. *London, Tonbridge: Benn. 1974. 255 pp. Illus. Map. Bibliog. Index. (Nations of the Modern World.) £3·75.*

GEOFFREY LEWIS'S book has long been a standard recommendation to those seeking a concise, lively and accurate introduction to modern Turkish history and current politics. The previous edition was prepared in 1965: instead of merely adding an extra chapter to bring his account up to date, the author has now re-written the whole book.

Dr. Lewis begins by giving us a summary of the Ottoman political system, the decline of the empire and the attempts of the later Sultans to meet the challenges of the 19th century. He goes on to describe the emergence of the Turkish republic and the reforms of the Ataturk period, including chapters on the two attempts to form an opposition party in the Grand National Assembly in 1924–25 and 1930. This section of the book is not intended as a biography of Ataturk, but Dr. Lewis nevertheless presents us with a convincing, warts-and-all portrait of modern Turkey's founder. After a useful chapter on foreign relations and the Turkish position during the Second World War, the book embarks on the story of the transition to a multi-party system during the postwar years. In explaining the success of Adnan Menderes's Democrat Party, Dr. Lewis appears to have revised his earlier emphasis on the part played by Islamic conservatism in the party's mass support; he points also to the economic demands of those who supported Menderes and explains Islam's role as part of a broad set of popular values.

In later chapters, the author explains the complicated party politics of the 1960s and 1970s. His points are illuminated with telling incidents and the less defamatory of the popular jokes which add spice to Turkish politics. He describes the campaign against the Left during the period of shadow rule by the armed forces of 1971–73 in caustic terms, and explains the build-up of the campaign during Demirel's administration of 1965–71. He ends, however, on a more hopeful note with the return to full civilian rule in 1973 and Bülent Ecevit's accession to the premiership at the head of a radically altered Republican People's Party. Nor has his conclusion that 'the future course of Turkish politics promised to be anything but dull' (p. 197) proved wide of the mark.

The final section of the book, which attempts to outline current social and economic developments, seems less satisfactory. Dr. Lewis's collection of facts and figures fails to give a clear account of the way in which economic development has affected the functioning of the political system, and it is at this point that readers will need to turn to other, more detailed, studies.

WILLIAM HALE

Current British Foreign Policy: Documents, Statements, Speeches. 1972. Edited by D. C. Watt and James Mayall. *London: Temple Smith. 1974. 1006 pp. Indexes. £12·50.*

IN this third annual collection of documents there is greater emphasis than formerly on statements bearing on the foreign relations of the European Communities, and issues arising within the enlarged E.E.C. which have a direct bearing on British foreign policy and also on Britain's policy at the United Nations. The provision of both chronological and subject indexes facilitates both quick reference and long-term research.

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

The Social Prelude to Stalinism. By Roger Pethybridge. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1974. 343 pp. Bibliog. Index. £7·00.*

MOST accounts of Soviet history tend to shy away from the problem of reconciling the humanist ideals of the Bolsheviks with some of the ugly

realities of Stalinism. As a result, as Roger Pethybridge observes: ' Polemical inclinations with regard to the Russian Revolution have tugged writers either to the left, which over-indulges in fantasy and hides from harsh realities, or to the right, where too much emphasis is put on sordid episodes and not enough on the nobility or influence of ideology ' (p. 8). It is a virtue of the author that, like de Tocqueville on the French Revolution, he has a sincere admiration for the force of values behind the Russian revolution, even though he feels compelled to condemn many subsequent developments.

As its title implies, the book is an attempt to trace in Russian social conditions the roots of such ingredients of Stalinism as the purges, the personality cult and rampant bureaucracy. These conditions included a predominantly illiterate peasant society, backwardness enhanced by the 1914–21 military situation, and the persisting small-scale structure of Russian society which, it is claimed, remained largely impervious to Marx's large-scale class theories inherited by the Bolsheviks. These and similar social factors led to what the author aptly describes as ' the [enormous] gap between Bolshevik hopes and the social heritage from the prerevolutionary era ' (p. 8). It is useful to be reminded of them as an antidote to excessively optimistic estimates of what the Bolsheviks were in a position to achieve. They certainly played their part in shaping subsequent events, even though they may not constitute the full or even the major explanation, which has to be sought, *inter alia,* in economic and such political circumstances as the degeneration of political life in general, and of the political life of the Communist party in particular, which gathered momentum in the 1920s.

One of the most contentious aspects of the book is its author's interpretation of Bolshevik attitudes and policies in the months immediately following the revolution. He asserts, for example, that a reading of Lenin's ' The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government ', published in April 1918, shows that ' its author genuinely believed in the instant need for Socialist economic organisation ' (p. 97). In fact, its keynotes were consolidation and good management; Lenin lists the slogans of the day as ' manoeuvre, retreat, wait, build slowly, ruthlessly tighten up, rigorously discipline, smash laxity ', and expressly condemns the ' sorry revolutionaries ' who advocate ' instant ' socialism. Likewise, Roger Pethybridge says that Lenin ' adopted ' and ' advocated ' the American system of scientific management known as Taylorism (pp. 38–39). Yet, in the above-quoted article, Lenin describes Taylorism as ' a combination of the refined brutality of bourgeois exploitation and a number of the greatest scientific achievements in the field of analysing mechanical motions during work ', and he made it clear that it would have to be ' adapted to our own ends ', not adopted. No less contentious is the way the author depicts War Communism as ' real ' Bolshevism, the product of Bolshevik ' Utopianism ' and social experimentation (pp. 31–32), rather than being an improvisation imposed by the exigencies of scarcity, civil war and foreign intervention. Is it not, too, an over-simplification (*pace* Rosa Luxemburg) to affirm that in ' What is To Be Done? ' Lenin formulated ' an élitist party acting independently, but in the name of the working class ' (p. 58)?

Nonetheless, these objections to interpretation should not detract from the overall merit of this challenging work that adds a new, social dimension to the well-covered economic and political studies of Stalinism. It is written in the scholarly, honest and cultured style that one has come to associate with

Roger Pethybridge, and is undoubtedly one of the most important works on the Soviet Union published in recent years. JAMES RIORDAN

Samizdat: Voices of the Soviet Opposition. Edited by George Saunders. *New York: Monad Press for the Anchor Foundation. 1974. (Distrib. by Pathfinder Press, New York.) 464 pp. Illus. Index. $12·00. Paperback: $3.95.*

DESPITE widespread and growing interest in political dissent in the Soviet Union, little has been published in the way of analysis or even description of opposition activity by Marxists (or Marxist-Leninists) in that country. Mr. Saunders's book, which has been prepared from a Trotskyist viewpoint, goes some way towards filling this gap. In it, Mr. Saunders attempts to document the existence of Marxist-Leninist opposition currents in the Soviet Union today and their historical ties to the 'Left Opposition' in the 1920s and 1930s. He has selected thirty-nine documents and provided each with an explanatory and interpretative note and footnotes.

The first three documents (comprising 165 pages) are essays by communists who spent many years in Stalin's labour camps. Each is informative about the fate of the 'Left Opposition'. For example, the essay 'Vorkuta (1950–53)' by 'B.M.' provides a rare account of the massive strikes in the Vorkuta labour camp complex after Stalin's death. But these three major documents are not *samizdat* at all, having been smuggled out of the country for publication abroad rather than being circulated inside Russia. They seem to have been included in order to provide a Trotskyist frame of reference for the contemporary *samizdat* documents in this collection. Very few of the latter can be described as 'Trotskyist' or 'Left Oppositionist', despite Mr. Saunders's effort to show that these historic 'deviations' command increasing respect among Soviet Marxists. The communist essays included in this volume are written by men who, having been trained to be loyal and orthodox party members, eventually refused to accept the gulf between Marxist-Leninist theory and practice. One feels that there must be many of these among the 14 million members of the CPSU. But the task of locating and describing them, let alone reproducing their written opinions, is enormously difficult not only because of the censorship but also because so few party members are self-sacrificing enough to communicate their criticisms to others. Mr. Saunders has largely failed to overcome these difficulties.

In fact many of the contemporary *samizdat* documents in this book are not by or about Marxists, and shed no light on the extent or character of the Marxist-Leninist opposition. This is disappointing, since it is in the documentation of this opposition that the book could make a pioneering contribution. However, the juxtaposition of writings by avowed communists such as Kosterin, Grigorenko and Yakhimovich with statements by non-Marxist dissenters brings home the fact that persons in these two broad categories of 'dissidents' attack the same abuses of power within the Soviet Union and are exposed to the same fates: harassment, loss of employment, and incarceration in prison or psychiatric hospital. In the contemporary *samizdat* documents by Marxist-Leninists in this book there is little evidence of the obsession with ideological purity which characterised the Bolshevik opposition movements of the 1920s and 1930s and which brought 'Left' and

'Right' oppositionists into physical conflict with one another even in Stalin's prisons (a phenomenon described in the anonymous 'Memoirs of a Bolshevik-Leninist', pp. 63–64). The anonymous Old Bolshevik's description (pp. 100–101) of the Red Army's 1945 advance into Europe as a revolutionary wave which should have been extended 'deep into Western Europe' is in striking contrast to the attitude of contemporary Marxist 'dissidents': Kosterin, Grigorenko and Yakhimovich have protested publicly in the name of communist ideals against the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops in 1968.

As Mr. Saunders acknowledges in his introduction, this collection is not intended to cover the whole range of material circulating today in the form of *samizdat*. The reader misled by the title and seeking a representative sampling of *samizdat* writings will find no examples here of non-conformist belles-lettres, nor of the more technical tracts written in *samizdat* as an alternative source of information and analysis in such fields as law and economics. A more serious omission is the absence of any writings on Marxist philosophy. Although examples of theoretical analysis in the manner of the Praxis school of thought in Yugoslavia may not be available from Russia, Mr. Saunders might well have commented on this absence and the reasons for it.

CLAYTON YEO

Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern. By Branko Lazitch in collaboration with Milorad M. Drachkovitch. *Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution Press. 1973. 458 pp. $15.00.*

THIS volume should undoubtedly find a place as a most valuable addition to all reference libraries dealing with communist affairs. It contains 716 individual biographies covering various categories of Comintern personalities, not only those better known figures forming its Executive Committee and other bodies of the Directorate, but also members of secret missions sent abroad and other less easily definable characters such as the graduates of the four principal Comintern schools. Thus, the editors are to be congratulated on their far flung efforts to scrape together any, even if often meagre, information on many typically obscure Comintern agents, and on the high level of accuracy of their material. It is curious however that they should have throughout omitted any mention of marriages or offspring in the individual biographies.

Unique though the Comintern organisation may have been, it is difficult to accept the claim, made in the blurb, that 'there has never been another organisation able to mobilise the masses in the same way . . .' Mobilisation of the masses may have been one of the main objectives of the Comintern but its success in this objective was largely confined to frothy verbal proclamations.

Among the sources listed, the outstanding work of the late Mrs. Jane Degras does not appear. There is a considerable amount of material relating to the careers of Comintern personalities in her three-volume *The Communist International* 1919–1943 [1] and it should certainly have been included in sources which contain such strictly non-biographical works as Theodore Draper's volumes on communism in America and Ruth McVey's book 'The Rise of Indonesia Communism' (p. XI).

VIOLET CONOLLY

[1] London: OUP for the RIIA. 1956, 1960 and 1965.

The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919–1929. By Gregory J. Massell. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. 1974. 448 pp. Map. Bibliog. Index. £9·70.*

It is of course difficult in this country to judge the impact on American readers of the overloaded, unnecessarily pedantic type of language often employed by Mr. Massell. But, as a result of his curious linguistic devices, many non-American readers will, I feel, find it hard at the outset to come to grips with the valuable substance of Mr. Massell's study. The title is perhaps as good an example as any of this sort of obfuscating language. For who at a first glance would realise that 'The Surrogate Proletariat' means, as spelt out in the sub-title, Moslem women and revolutionary strategies in Soviet Central Asia?

Mr. Massell's main thesis is that the Soviet government, confronted with the lack of an indigenous proletariat in Central Asia as a political basis for its attempt to smash the old feudal conservative social system, turned to the oppressed female caste as an alternative lynch-pin for its revolutionary campaigns.

While there is no doubt that the great mass of these Turki/Moslem women were without personal rights and completely dominated by their fathers and husbands, the attractions offered to those prepared to accept unveiling, factory work, and life in a 'free society' where men and women met on an equal basis, were not strong enough to counter the fear of the terrible vengeance that would be exacted by their male 'protectors' if they ventured into the emancipated outer world. Moreover, on Mr. Massell's showing, thousands of those who were brave enough to venture forth were eventually forced to return to their Moslem homes because the Soviet power was not at this time strong enough to protect them from the vicious tentacles of the old conservative society. And those women who did cast in their lot, however temporarily, with the Soviet regime tended, as far as the meagre information on the subject allows a conclusion, to be 'orphans, runaway child-brides, young widows' (p. xxxiii)—not a very reliable basis on which to build an industrial proletariat. (This proletariat was in fact later created by industrial workers imported from other more developed parts, in the first place the RSFSR, of the Soviet Union. But that story lies beyond the scope of Mr. Massell's book.)

On all the problems associated with *khudzhum*, or the first Soviet female emancipation campaigns, Mr. Massell's book is a mine of precise information dug out of Soviet Russian documentation (though this wide sweep does not seem to have included any Turki or other local language material). In particular, it is valuable for the careful scrutiny of the Russian periodical literature of the period under investigation. As a result, Mr. Massell's work excels any other hitherto published on these problems.

Nevertheless, perhaps in his very zeal for his chosen field of research, I am inclined to think that Mr. Massell somewhat exaggerates the value placed by the Soviet government on Moslem women in its early revolutionary campaigns in Central Asia. They were undoubtedly, as he states in his introduction, 'one essential facet' of the assault on the traditional basis of Moslem society, but that scarcely justified regarding them as 'a surrogate proletariat'.

VIOLET CONOLLY

Essays in Honour of E. H. Carr. Edited by C. Abramsky assisted by Beryl Williams. Preface by C. Abramsky. Bibliog. of the Works of E. H. Carr by Beryl Williams. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1974. 387 pp. Index. £10·00.*

WHILE it is indeed fitting and gratifying that a group of scholars should wish to pay tribute on Mr. E. H. Carr's 80th birthday to his great contribution to Soviet studies, one cannot but regret that for the most part these essays make such dull reading and indeed are sometimes almost unreadable (at least to this reviewer). A notable exception is Professor Erickson's essay on the '" Militia Army " Controversy 1919–1920 '.

A *Festschrift* such as this, being the arbitrary offerings of admirers to a master, will only too easily lack continuity of subject or interest. This is certainly the case with this collection. Few readers will be able to assess the value of the very disparate essays in the sections labelled 'Intellectual History in the Nineteenth Century'; 'Diplomatic History and International Relations'; 'Soviet Studies'; 'Related Studies' (it is difficult to understand why Mary Holdsworth's essay on 'Lenin's Imperialism in Retrospect', which is published in this last section, should not have been grouped in the previous one).

One of the best things, however, in this very highly priced book is the excellent photograph of Mr. Carr (at his most sympathetic and astute best) to whom we should also like to send congratulations.

VIOLET CONOLLY

The Soviet Domination of Eastern Europe in the Light of International Law. By J. A. B. Gawenda. Foreword by Airey Neave, M.P. *Richmond, Surrey: Foreign Affairs Publishing Co. 1974. 220 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·00. $8.00.*

PERHAPS it is a coincidence that at this time of detente Professor Gawenda has chosen to publish his book as an appeal to the United States and Western Europe to be careful before committing themselves to, and institutionalising, this detente. Though this warning sometimes smacks of pedantry and is often couched in heavily emotive terms, it is, nonetheless, worth consideration. The author is preoccupied with the problem of Eastern Europe whose change of independent status after the Second World War has so far not been legally regulated by a peace conference or international treaty. But, if 'detente' negotiations prove successful, the status quo in Eastern Europe based on war, conquest and occupation, will finally be sanctioned legally. To prevent this from happening, Professor Gawenda argues out his case most passionately. Obviously Poland is his test case throughout: the war started because of Hitler's invasion of his country; the Yalta conference promised it independence and the United Nations was to enforce this international decision. However, by 1949 all Eastern Europe, and not only Poland, had been firmly brought under Soviet control through a number of internal political manoeuvres, and the author tries to draw a lesson from these experiences. Although from the point of view of international law all these takeovers were illegal, they still remain political facts. However, the analysis of the more recent events in Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1970) are more relevant and pertinent to the current negotiations.

Although Soviet armies have intervened many times in Eastern Europe, the most recent interventions, especially that in Czechoslovakia, have caused numerous international complications. So the Brezhnev doctrine had to be devised to justify the new circumstances within the communist bloc, and the world-wide application of the doctrine made the current negotiations for collective security more difficult. It is clear to Professor Gawenda that the new definition of sovereignty must be the real stumbling block in international law and in negotiations, and even its re-definition will not remove the obstacle. As it is, the Soviet definition of sovereignty, backed by the new concept of internationalist communist solidarity, could lead to the invasion and occupation of Western countries, provided the local communist parties created civil disorders with which the government in power could not cope effectively. The communist forces could then appeal to the Soviet Union and its armed forces for ' internationalist ' aid.

The book also deals with all sorts of aggressions, occupations, subversions, wars and conquests, but its most important aspect is probably this particular problem of sovereignty, which, if judged intellectually plausible, should furnish Western countries and negotiators with much food for thought. An incomplete bibliography but a useful index are appended.

J. F. W. BRADLEY

Tschechen und Deutsche 1939–1946. By Johann Wolfgang Brügel. *Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung. 1974. 326 pp. Bibliog. Index. DM 65.00.*

THIS valuable and trustworthy book is the continuation of a previous study by Dr. Brügel published in 1967 and covering the period 1918–1939.[1] Based on printed and unprinted British, American, German and Czech sources, this volume unveils both the drama of the Czech people under Nazi occupation and the tragedy of the Sudeten German minority. The latter was the inescapable consequence of the former. *Wer nicht vertrieben sein will, muss vertreiben.* The author aptly used these harsh words, put by Schiller in Wallenstein's mouth as the title of a chapter in which he describes President Edvard Benes's efforts to obtain support from Great Britain and the United States for his plan to expel disloyal Germans and Hungarians from restored Czechoslovakia. During the Second World War he never obtained it to his entire satisfaction. He was never given the text of the decision of the British Cabinet of July 6, 1942, agreeing in principle that the transfer after the war of German minorities from central and south-east Europe into Germany would be ' possible in cases when this would appear necessary or desirable '. Only in mid-1944 did the Postwar-Policy Committee of the United States government accept the principle of transferring some minorities from Czechoslovakia in an ' orderly way, by stages, and under international auspices '.

While in October 1940 Benes spoke cautiously of reducing the number of Germans in his country by one million, in 1942 he increased that figure to two million, but in a broadcast to his people from Moscow on December

[1] *Tschechen und Deutsche 1918–1938.* Munich: Nymphenburger. 1967. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1969, p. 352. English edition, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich.* Cambridge University Press. 1973. Reviewed Jan. 1974, p. 144.

21, 1943, he spoke for the first time of his country as a 'homogeneous national state of Czechs, Slovaks and Carpathorussians'—in other words more than three million Germans had to be expelled.

In another chapter of his grim but courageous book Dr. Brügel reveals that long before Hitler the pan-German nationalists had been propagating the idea of Germanising the Czech lands and expelling the Czechs 'somewhere to the Russian steppes'. In 1932 Hitler told Hermann Rauschning that he would colonise Bohemia and Moravia with German peasants and transport the Czechs to Siberia. In the summer of 1940 Baron von Neurath, the first *Reichsprotektor* of Bohemia and Moravia, sent Hitler a memorandum in which he declared his support for the 'total expulsion of the Czech population from the Protectorate and for filling it up with German people'. Karl Hermann Frank, a Sudeten German and Neurath's secretary of state, propounded to Hitler his own final solution of the Czech problem in combining expulsion, Germanisation (*Umvolkung*) and murder (*Sonderbehandlung*). As both in the occupied country and abroad Czech leaders knew about the Nazi plans, Dr. Brügel is not surprised that they came to the conclusion that, after the destruction of the Third Reich, the removal of all Germans from Czechoslovakia was unavoidable.

When in April 1945 President Benes returned from London—via Moscow —to Prague he did not mince his words: complete de-Germanisation of Czechoslovakia was his policy. In May and June a mass expulsion of Germans took place. On August 2, at Potsdam, the heads of governments of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union decided—three months too late—that the transfer to Germany of the German population . . . 'remaining in Czechoslovakia will have to be undertaken', and that it should be effected in an orderly and humane manner'. Dr. Brügel chose not to describe the exodus of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia but his final judgment is firm and clear: the gravedigger of the Sudeten Germans is *Leisst* Adolf Hitler.

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

To the Back of Beyond: An illustrated companion to Central Asia and Mongolia. By Fitzroy Maclean. *London: Cape. 1974. 144 pp. Illus. Map. Index. £4·50.*

THIS is a beautifully produced book and does justice to the author's lovely photographs in colour and black and white, many of which were earlier published, but far less impressively, in his *Back to Bokhara.*[1] Some of the chapters on the great Central Asian cities, Samarkand, Bokhara and Khiva, are also strongly reminiscent of pages in this earlier work. But the extremely lucid summary of the complex history of Central Asia before the Russian conquest is new, and should be invaluable to intending travellers to that region. The concluding chapters on the establishment of the Outer Mongolian Republic and the situation there today bring the author's camera and his ever lively comments beyond Central Asia to the borders of Siberia and China.

[1] New York: Harper; London: Cape. 1959.

MIDDLE EAST

Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies. By Elie Kedourie. *London: Cass. 1974. 327 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·95.*

It is a sobering experience to look about one today and reflect that, for all the long British connection with the Middle East, for all the decades spent in cossetting and cajoling one Arab regime after another, for all the years of earnest debate about Arab affairs, not least within the walls of Chatham House, this country's influence in the Middle East now amounts to naught. What is more, and worse, its very financial survival depends in grotesquely disproportionate degree upon the condescending indulgence of a handful of desert sheikhs. How, one may well ask, did such a monumental failure of foreign policy occur? A thousand reasons can probably be adduced to explain it, but one that surely merits particular consideration is the utterly illusory conception of the Middle East, and especially of Arab society and politics, which has been fostered in this country over the years by a legion of Arabists and Arabophiles, most notably in official and intellectual circles. To construct a foreign policy on the basis of a phantasm, to wit, a Middle East peopled not by flesh-and-blood Arabs, Persians, Turks, Jews, Armenians or Kurds but by *doppel-gängers* bearing these labels, is to invite disaster, and we have been issuing invitations of this kind at regular intervals for sixty years now, ever since the day we encouraged the Sharif Husain ibn Ali of Mecca to rebel against his lawful suzerain.

Professor Kedourie is not only a rare mind in a field of studies which abounds, today more than ever, with apologists and propagandists of one kind or another, but it is perhaps his supreme virtue as a scholar that he has never confused the real Middle East with the factitious one, or treated with other than profound scepticism the facile orthodoxies of the day and the cant in which they are usually expressed. A number of these orthodoxies, particularly as they concern British policy and policy-making in the Middle East since the First World War, were demolished by him in a memorable collection of essays published some four years ago under the title of *The Chatham House Version and other Middle-Eastern Studies.*[1] He has now, in his latest collection, widened his purview to take in the fate of constitutional government in the Arab states, the intellectual origins and composition of Arab political parties and movements, the emergence of the new and radical style of politics which is now so prevalent, and the vicissitudes of minorities caught up in the turmoil of the past half-century. Within these general categories his choice of topics is as diverse—for example, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Young Turk revolution, the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, the Rashid Ali *coup*—as what he has to say about them is fresh or illuminating. As always, he displays great learning and independence of judgment, and he writes with a lucidity and elegance which few, if any, contemporary authors in this field can match.

One of the most valuable and instructive essays in his collection is the title essay, 'Arabic Political Memoirs,' in which Professor Kedourie takes to task, and rightly so, those western Arabophiles who, he says, 'have managed to give currency to a picture of the Arab as a humourless, solemn, sententious, tediously strident creature' (p. 178). Just how distorted a picture this is he goes on to demonstrate by quoting at length from a selection of

[1] London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1970. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1970, p. 589.

recently published memoirs by both prominent and obscure figures in Arab political life. All manner of human qualities and emotions is revealed in these extracts—humour, pathos, fanaticism, self-deception, compassion, regret—and no one reading them could fail to realise that they represent the actuality as opposed to the illusion of Arab politics in all its abundant variety and its sometimes bizarre manifestations.

Only a few of the essays are concerned with aspects of British policy in the Middle East, but two in particular give rise to disturbing reflections, one a long examination of the memoirs of Sir Hugh Foot (Lord Caradon), the other, an account, based on Foreign Office sources, of the sack of Basra and the massacre of part of the Jewish community in Baghdad in 1941. To be reminded again of the delusions and feelings of guilt about the Arabs which filled the minds of Foot and other influential British officials in the Middle East in years gone by, or to learn of the ineptitude and pusillanimity of the British ambassador in Iraq in 1941, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, in allowing British troops to stand by while the Jews of Baghdad, whose sentiments had been pro-British for generations, were butchered by a mob, is to understand why we have lost all reputation and standing in the Middle East, and are today the sport of petty despots in one dusty capital after another.

J. B. KELLY

Imperialism and Nationalism in the Fertile Crescent: Sources and Prospects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. By Richard Allen. *New York, London, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1974. 686 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £9·25. Paperback: £2·90.*

THIS large book appears to be intended primarily for use by American college students. It attempts, with reasonable success, to provide a straightforward account of the Palestine problem in its Middle East contexts from the First World War until the present time. The first nine chapters survey the remoter past of the Arab and Jewish peoples; the useful epilogue covers the Yom Kippur war and its diplomatic sequel down to the early weeks of 1974. Narrative and discussion are based on well-known general histories and monographs in English; the author makes no pretence of original research or unusual insights, though his occasional speculations about what might have happened had the course of events been different at some critical point are sometimes stimulating. But a less narrative, more analytical treatment, more closely related to the familiar documents (which are seldom quoted or examined at any length) would have made the result more useful as a text-book; whilst it may prove acceptable as a readable introduction for the wholly uninstructed layman, it is hard to believe that it will find much favour with teachers of Middle Eastern history in British universities.

J. S. F. PARKER

The Kurdish Revolt 1961–1970. By Edgar O'Ballance. *London: Faber. 1973. 196 pp. Maps. Index. £2·95.*

THE re-eruption of fighting between the Kurdish forces of Mullah Mustafa Barzani and the Iraqi army in 1974 has re-awakened interest in the long-standing Kurdish problem, particularly as it affects Iraq. Major O'Ballance's book has thus appeared at an opportune moment.

Fortunately for newcomers to the subject, Major O'Ballance devotes his first three chapters to a resumé of the history of Kurdish nationalism up to the 1960s. He says disappointingly little, however, about the proposals for 'a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas' of the former Ottoman empire contained in the abortive Treaty of Sèvres of 1920. Nor does he produce authority for his surprising statement that the former Turkish President Ismet Inönü was 'himself a Kurd' (p. 28).

In dealing with the story of the Kurdish revolt in Iraq during 1961–70, with which his remaining six chapters are concerned, Major O'Ballance goes into much more detail. He does not neglect the important relationship between the Kurdish resistance and the tortuous politics of the Arab majority of Iraq. As he explains, each turn of the political-military roundabout in Baghdad has brought, with each new coup d'état, an attempt at settlement between Kurds and Arabs; the fragile peace has then invariably collapsed and fighting re-erupted until yet another coup produces another shaky truce. He does not try to present a false picture of unanimity on the Kurdish side. The prolonged struggle between Mullah Mustafa and Jelal Talabani for leadership of the movement, the cool attitude of most Iranian Kurds towards their fellows in Iraq, and Mullah Mustafa's ruthless tactics when dealing with his tribal rivals, are fully explained. His conclusions will make depressing reading for the Kurds' supporters; 'Greater Kurdistan,' he believes, has little chance of materialising, since geographical and military conditions severely militate against it.

Major O'Ballance's book seems refreshingly realistic in a field where the scanty literature is often partisan. The military aspects of his story are fully covered. What appears to be missing is a proper exploration of the possibility of a constitutional rearrangement in Iraq which might bring about some sort of peaceful coexistence between Kurds and Arabs. Remote as the possibility may be, this is presumably the only way out of the military stalemate which the book describes.

WILLIAM HALE

AFRICA

Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity. By John Markakis. *Oxford, London: Clarendon Press 1974. 409 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (Oxford Studies in African Affairs; Gen. Eds.: John D. Hargreaves and George Shepperson.) £6·50.*

IN one sense, Ethiopia's recent and continuing changes culminated in the deposition of Haile Selassie on September 12, 1974. This act by the military came as a shock to most outsiders, but the apparent unexpectedness of the event was an illusion, as indeed this work demonstrates. For Dr. Markakis's book is a fascinating and excellently written analysis of the Ethiopian polity as it existed under Haile Selassie, and to a great degree it provides the background for any study of the current situation. Inevitably, because of the events of the last year, what was intended as an up-to-date political analysis has lost immediacy; it has not lost validity. The main intention of the study was to apply the standards and criteria of political science, which have so often been lacking in academic investigations of Ethiopia, to produce an account of the social structures that have been emerging over the last thirty years, and to put these structures into their historical context.

In his introduction, Dr. Markakis makes the point that the trend started by such conditions as tradition, the expansion during the late 19th century and the beginning of modernisation, has been towards the creation of a class stratification in Ethiopia. The class concept has therefore been used to investigate recent and historical developments in society, but not to the extent that it might have been. This is not the place to discuss the arguments over whether Ethiopia should be called a feudal or a traditional society—Dr. Markakis sees it as the latter—but some points might be noted with reference to the formation of classes in the northern Christian provinces. The alleged openness of the nobility, and the suggestion that appointment brought an official into the aristocracy, are at variance with the genealogical evidence of the great families and with what was in practice the hereditary nature of office holding and the usufructory rights that were in theory disposed of by the Emperor. Similarly, to argue that ' while class distinctions and social distance separate the nobility and the peasantry, hierarchically ordered relationships produced vertigal integration which tends to diminish class antagonism to vanishing point ' ignores the numerous peasant revolts that have taken place throughout Ethiopian history, and which still persist today. Since the restoration of Haile Selassie in 1941, there have been major revolts in Tigre (1943), in Bale (1964–70) and Eritrea (1961–) in which the class antagonism of the peasantry has been an integral element. In addition there have been many small-scale uprisings in which such an attitude has been of crucial significance.

It is indeed true, as the chapters on education, urbanisation and the modes of recruitment demonstrate, that the older methods of appointment and promotion have changed in the postwar years. Ability and educational competence have begun to play a significant part. Yet a central factor in the administrative structure, especially at the local level, has been the continuation of the links of family, land and connection. It is easy to exaggerate the importance of the educated elite and to forget that a substantial section of them do in fact come from the great aristocratic families so much used by Haile Selassie. This has not of course stopped them from partaking in the general dissatisfaction among the educated—and indeed the uneducated—with the rule of Haile Selassie. As Dr. Markakis rightly emphasises, a vital part of the challenge to the imperial rule in the last decade has come from the students. Without the catalystic element of their demonstrations it is extremely likely that the events of February 1974 would still not have happened. The students, however, were not alone in their opposition, although they were the most vocal and publicity-conscious group among the opponents of Haile Selassie and his regime. Some of the other challenges to the imperial system perhaps deserve more coverage than they are given especially since the class element in them is discernible.

These criticisms are not, however, meant to detract from the very real value of this study of the system operated by Haile Selassie. It contains many notable insights and makes a valuable contribution to the study of Ethiopian society and government.

PATRICK GILKES

Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State. By Larry W. Bowman. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1974. 206 pp. Map. Index. £4·75.*

U.D.I.: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion. By Robert C. Good. *London: Faber. 1973. 368 pp. Map. Illus. Index. £4·95.*

THESE are two important contributions to the study of Southern Africa. Both authors have undertaken the difficult task of writing the modern history of Rhodesia—difficult because much of the ground has been amply covered elsewhere. Thus Bowman, who covers Rhodesian politics (largely white politics) in the federal and post-federal periods, cannot say much that is new about such subjects as the dissolution of the federation, the run-up to UDI, or the negotiations since UDI between the British and Rhodesian governments. Similarly, Good, whose book is a detailed diplomatic history of the years 1965–72, has necessarily used much familiar material. The two accounts do not overlap as much as might have been expected, since Good, to a greater extent than Bowman, is concerned with UDI in its international context. He therefore pays greater attention to the British political system, the Commonwealth, the United Nations Organisation (which Good thinks was irresponsibly damaged by the demands Harold Wilson made on it) and the OAU, as well as those of Rhodesia, Zambia and South Africa, and their interactions. Both authors have direct experience of the area, Good as the United States ambassador to Zambia and Bowman as a lecturer in the (then) University College of Rhodesia. Both make extensive use of interview material, much of which (particularly in Good's case) is unattributable. Good's diplomatic language sometimes takes some decoding, but he writes with considerable authority, particularly when he records the view from Lusaka.

Bowman is never boring, and often pungent, and it is good to hear an American voice joining the many British commentators who have castigated the British government's (and particularly Harold Wilson's) handling of the Rhodesian situation. Good's much longer account might in parts have been wearisome, but is saved by the nuggets of new information which are quite frequently to be found. (Who, for example, would have guessed that Wilson would be calling Smith 'Ian' by the time they met on *Fearless*?)

Bowman attacks many established ideas. He does not see Todd's ejection from office as a turning point in Rhodesian politics, to be followed (so far as white politics is concerned) by a series of lurches to the right. Nor does he believe Whitehead's purpose was to liberalise the system so much as to provide Britain with the excuse to withdraw with honour from its residual commitments in Rhodesia by introducing *seemingly* liberal concessions to Africans. In Bowman's view Rhodesia has consistently pursued the goals of confirming white supremacy and eventual independence. Changes of government have been changes of tactics, whilst values and strategy remain the same; an analysis of white politics in class terms, or even the use of the terms 'left' and 'right,' is irrelevant in a situation where all whites share a common, racially defined, interest. The real turning point in Rhodesian politics came in 1962 with the formation of the Rhodesian Front, because that was the first party to build an organisation which persists effectively between elections, and allows real participation by the rank and file.

Bowman's analysis does not necessarily exclude those which he rejects. The important point, however, which Bowman might have developed in his really excellent chapter on the Front, is *why* that party, with its new emphasis on grass roots politics, should have been so peculiarly suited to the mood of white Rhodesia in the early 1960s. To say that it was more effective, and more determined to preserve the old order than any of its

rivals, makes its ability to gain votes intelligible. But why should the electorate at the same time have developed a new desire for continuous involvement in the political process?

The chief attraction of Good's book (apart from his undoubted breadth of knowledge) is its astringent tone. He twice quotes Churchill on Abyssinia —'we should not intervene in these matters unless we are earnest and prepared to carry our intervention to all necessary lengths'—but he shows that British policy towards Rhodesia had an 'insubstantial and frenetic quality,' characterised by bad political judgment, poor staff-work, unrealistic aims ('a change of heart' among the whites), insufficient means (sanctions), and general half-heartedness.

Good writes with bemusement, sometimes incredulity, of the policies of Harold Wilson, whose 'political virtuosity tended towards a preoccupation with the short term.' He recounts with restrained gusto the 'bathtub nautical drama' of the tanker *Joanna V* and has a gift for the damaging quotation, like Wilson's broadcast remark on the day of UDI: 'At this anxious time I hope that no one in Rhodesia will feel that Britain has forgotten them.' His account of Wilson's 'quick kill,' which was to end the rebellion in weeks rather than months, could hardly be bettered.

With, as he says, the benefit of hindsight, Good believes Britain could, and should, have used force against Rhodesia. His discussion of the pros and cons is excellent and he makes the point, which can never be made too often, that, whatever the decision, Wilson made an incredible error in telling Smith in advance that force would not be used. Instead Britain fell into the 'appropriately daft' gyrations of NIBMAR. As Good wryly comments of the events of 1967: 'a rudderless policy, caught by contrary cross-winds, sometimes ends up going in circles.' The summing-up is complete.

CHRISTOPHER R. HILL

ASIA

Southeast Asia: Documents of Political Development and Change. Edited by Roger M. Smith. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1974. 608 pp. Index. £10·70.*

THIS collection of documents is intended to provide a representative sample of the political thoughts and actions of South-east Asians and their governments over the past twenty-five years. The book is organised into eight chapters (Singapore is included with Malaysia and both Vietnams are taken together), each of which is preceded by a brief essay surveying political change up to 1973. In addition, each document is preceded by a short introduction designed to put the material in full context and to provide a basis for continuity. This is a valuable and useful collection, prepared by notable specialists, which anyone with a professional interest in South-east Asia will want to acquire, despite the price. It is also an automatic choice for libraries and research institutes.

The title of the volume indicates, however, the emphasis in the selection of documents, namely the domestic dimension of politics in the countries concerned. Readers of this journal are likely to be more interested in those documents dealing with foreign policy. In this respect, the collection is somewhat uneven. There are special sections on foreign policy in the chapters on Thailand, Cambodia and the Philippines. In the other chapters,

however, there are only a limited number of documents of an international significance and they are not treated in a systematic fashion. It is surprising, for example, in the section on Malaysia and Singapore not to find any reference to the neutralisation proposal. Similarly in the case of Indonesia, no mention is made of confrontation or of the Archipelago Principle which is at the root of the joint Indonesian-Malaysian assertion concerning the status of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In addition, there is only one reference to the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the collection and that in a critique of the Suharto government by a group of communist émigrés in Tirana. These omissions among others indicate some lack of balance in the material assembled from the viewpoint of those with a special interest in international relations. This volume is of considerable worth, nonetheless, in terms of content. It provides a valuable complement to a growing literature on the politics of South-east Asia.

MICHAEL LEIFER

The Political Economy of Agrarian Change: An Essay on the Green Revolution. By Keith Griffin. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1974. 264 pp. Index. £7·00.*

PREDICTIONS of prolonged famine in Asia 'rarely are heard today—and rightly so.' This was written in October 1973 when the international oil crisis was in the making and harvest failures in Russia had led to the largest-ever grain purchases in history and to the preparations for a World Food Conference a year later. Similarly misplaced statements can be found elsewhere in this volume, such as the prediction of a 'continuing decline in world prices' and of a 'tendency for supply to increase faster than demand, particularly in the case of rice' (p. 159). It is risky to make global statements of this kind at a time when annual fluctuations are still large enough to upset conventional expectations of marketable supplies and of trade prices.

The volume originated in a study on the 'green revolution,' undertaken for the UN Research Institute for Social Development in Geneva. Five of the eight chapters of the book under review are in fact largely reprinted as written in 1972. The author is right in drawing attention to the 'imperfect' and fragmented nature of the markets for farm products and farm requisites, which has far-reaching effects on economic results, social status and political power in the rural areas. As a result of the 'green revolution,' concentration of land and political polarisation have increased. Income inequality has worsened and real wages of farm workers have fallen. These developments are due to a conflict between production-orientated and welfare-orientated policies. This part of the author's analysis makes good sense. Even so, the politically trained reader may not be able to follow the author when he presents his mathematical work-sheets. After all, it is the finished product rather than the tools that matters. We economists should write for the intelligent layman rather than for each other.

Whilst the author deserves credit for showing the undesirable side-effects of the 'green revolution,' he tends to see the agrarian scene in a somewhat simplified way. He believes that 'an analysis conducted in terms of a simple division between landlords and peasants will suffice for many purposes' (p. 251). In reality the situation is more complicated. Tenants and share-

croppers, though exposed to great pressure, are not yet eliminated from the rural scene. Indeed they deserve our special attention, since by comparison with owner-occupiers they are usually disadvantaged.

The final section of the book on political objectives and options is bound to be its most controversial part. Here the author is too sweeping in his judgment. To change man's relationship to the land—be it his own or another fellow's domain—requires more discriminating thought than the author has devoted to the matter. Even on practical issues he generalises too much, as when he says that 'fertilisers must be provided first; then comes water' (p. 207). Conditions vary even within the narrow confines of, say, a district in Maharashtra or Tamil Nadu. Among the author's options is the 'organised production in collectives and state farms' which 'might succeed in reducing risk and could perhaps thereby eliminate an obstacle to rapid technological change' (p. 224). At a conference in Dacca early in 1973 the author went so far as to suggest the immediate acquisition by the state, without compensation, of all land in excess of five acres. Advice of this kind is likely to be heeded where agrarian revolutions occur. Elsewhere solutions somewhere in between the author's concepts of technocratic and radical strategies will still be worth trying before policies which are bound to lead to largescale bloodshed are recommended.

W. KLATT

Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century: Relations with the USSR, Germany, and Britain. By Ludwig W. Adamec. *Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press. 1974. 324 pp. Map. Illus. Index. $13.00. Paperback: $7.95.*

IN an earlier book [1] Dr. Ludwig Adamec examined the foreign policy of Afghanistan during the crucial period of the early years of this century, when British control over the country's foreign relations was ended. His latest work continues the story up to 1950.

Dr. Adamec tackles his subject in a strictly chronological and narrative manner. His first two chapters, which cover the period 1901–22, summarise the findings of his previous book. Emphasis is put on the role of Germany in providing a 'third force' which helped to free Afghanistan from the Anglo-Russian vice in which it had previously been caught. This emphasis is continued in his discussion of later developments during King Amanullah's reign, when German expatriates provided most of the expert manpower for the young king's ill-coordinated attempts at economic modernisation. As Dr. Adamec explains, however, Afghanistan's external relations were complicated by the colourful if chaotic drama enacted on the domestic stage in 1929. In January of that year Amanullah was overthrown by the bandit Bachah-i-Saqqau, who enthroned himself as 'Amir Habibullah.' Ten months later the Bachah was himself deposed by a counter-rebellion led by Muhammad Nadir Khan, who took the throne as Nadir Shah. Some Afghans believed that the British had had a hand in instigating the Bachah's revolt, while others pointed to the presence of Pathan tribesmen from the Indian side of the frontier in the ranks of Nadir's army as evidence of British

[1] *Afghanistan 1900–1923: a Diplomatic History.* California: University of California Press; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1967.

support for his successor. Soviet Russia, meanwhile, had undoubtedly aided Ghulam Nabi Charkhi's attempt to restore Amanullah in April 1929. Nor did the story of foreign intrigue end there: in 1940, for example, the German Foreign Office considered a second plan to restore Amanullah (who was not himself consulted) and thus establish an Axis dependency in Central Asia. In the event, the Afghan government succeeded in maintaining a precarious wartime neutrality, to meet the postwar challenges which Dr. Adamec mentions in his final chapter.

Within the chronological limits which he sets himself, Dr. Adamec's book is generally thorough. It is enlivened with engaging accounts of several cloak and dagger escapades, such as the escape of Subhas Chandra Bose from Calcutta to Berlin, via Afghanistan, in 1941. At the same time, readers unfamiliar with the historical and geographical background will find themselves thrown straight into the deep end of a sometimes murky pool without the benefit of any introductory tuition. Moreover, Dr. Adamec's discussion of the postwar period is so brief that one imagines he might have done better if he had ended his narrative at 1945 rather than 1950.

WILLIAM HALE

The Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier. By Karunaka Gupta. *Calcutta: Minerva Associates. 1974. 173 pp. Index. Rs. 30.00.*

The McMahon Line and After: A Study of the Triangular Contest on India's North-eastern Frontier Between Britain, China and Tibet, 1904–47. By Parshotam Mehra. *Delhi, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta: The Macmillan Company of India; London: Macmillan. 1974. 497 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £7·00.*

FROM its conception the McMahon Line, the alignment claimed by India for its north-eastern boundary, has been the subject of deliberate obfuscation, and, although in the 1960s independent scholars succeeded in separating the facts from the fabrications, attempts to confuse the issue again continue.

The story of the McMahon Line begins with the attempt of Sir Henry McMahon, foreign secretary of the government of India, to take advantage of the 1914 Simla conference to gain for India a 'strategic frontier' in the north-east—one that would lie along the Himalayan crest-line some 60 miles north of the historical alignment at the foot of the hills abutting the Brahmaputra Valley. In secret exchanges, he won the Tibetan delegates' agreement to such a boundary; but he failed in his attempt to obtain, by subterfuge, unwitting Chinese approval of his alignment. McMahon's actions were contrary to London's instructions, and they were explicitly disavowed by the Viceroy when he reported to the home government on the Simla negotiations. The records indicate that in fact London had been given no notice of McMahon's plan to secure a new frontier—and small wonder if that was the case, since his dealings with the Tibetans were clearly in breach of agreements recently concluded between the British government and those of Russia and China.

McMahon's abortive venture was forgotten, the recognised Indian boundary remained at the foot of the hills. Then, in 1936, McMahon's Line was re-discovered in the archives by an official of the Indian government; and he persuaded New Delhi and London that India's future security required that the McMahon Line be made the north-eastern boundary.

While a slow forward move towards the McMahon Line was begun on the ground, to establish a new *de facto* boundary, evidence began to be fabricated so that in due time it might be argued that the McMahon Line was also the *de jure* boundary. Official Indian maps began to show the McMahon Line as the boundary; and in 1938 a new version of the 1929 edition of Aitchison's *Treaties* (the official record) was published and, wherever possible, substituted for the originals, which were ordered to be destroyed. In this spurious '1929 edition' the account of the Simla conference was re-written; the 'purpose was to falsely assert that the abortive tripartite Simla Conference . . . was a partial success and that it fixed the north-eastern frontier of India along the Himalayan crest-line . . .' (Gupta p. ix).

Dr. Karunakar Gupta describes that diplomatic forgery as a 'veritable time-bomb', suggesting that it played an explosive role in rupturing Sino-Indian relations in the late 1950s. He believes that the Nehru government never discovered the truth about the false 1929 edition of Aitchison, and was misled by it. It is far more likely that the Indian officials concerned knew full well that this piece of the evidence which they advanced to substantiate their case was spurious, but used it anyway to obscure the fact that India's 'claim to the McMahon Line had no firm basis in international law' (Gupta p. 96).

The faking of Aitchison was first detected by Sir John Addis, who found a copy of the original 1929 edition in the Harvard library in 1963; and the history of the origins of the McMahon Line was disinterred in Professor Alastair Lamb's definitive study; [1] but Dr. Gupta carried on from where Lamb, blocked at 1914 by the then '50 year rule', had to leave off. Gupta, working on the records in London, followed the story up to the 1940s. The results of his research were published in separate papers in academic journals: brought together in *The Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier,* they make an essential book for anyone concerned with Sino-Indian relations.

To turn from Dr. Gupta's dispassionate and lucid work to the pages of Professor Mehra is as if to move abruptly from sunlight into fog. If a reader knows the terrain, so to speak, from readings of Lamb and Gupta, he will be able to follow the story of the McMahon Line through Mehra; but, as in a fog, the familiar will sometimes take on a puzzling shape. For example, although the narrative makes clear that McMahon had sought to annex Tibetan territory, and that his proposed alignment had remained a dead letter, Professor Mehra can still describe the Tibetan presence in Tawang and other areas in the late 1930s as 'Encroachments South of the McMahon Line' (p. 425). He presents the covert publication of the new edition of Aitchison in 1938 as no more than a belated setting-right of the record, never alluding to the fact that the new edition carried the date of the earlier one it was designed to replace. In fact he simply calls the substituted and falsified version, 'Aitchison's 1929 edition' (p. 470).

Professor Mehra's approach unfortunately vitiates a substantial work, reflecting a good deal of study. But in so far as his attempt is, as he declares, to recount 'the birth and growth of a definitive boundary line' (p. xi), it is tendentious. The Sino-Indian boundary line has never been legally defined,

[1] *The McMahon Line: A Study in the Relations between India, China and Tibet, 1904 to 1914.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966.

and will not become ' definitive ' until it is agreed and demarcated by the two governments concerned. (Professor Mehra, who sees ' cartographic aggression ' in Chinese maps which do not show the McMahon Line as India's definitive north-eastern boundary (p. 437), will be displeased with the new *Times Atlas of China*. Reverting to earlier *Times* practice, this depicts the McMahon Line as an undefined and disputed frontier.)

One paper in Dr. Gupta's collection looks at another ' hidden history ', that concerning the origins of the Korean war. There again Gupta's scrutiny throws up some important new light, which justifies his conclusion that the North Korean account of an initial assault from the south has enough evidence behind it to deserve a full and objective enquiry.

NEVILLE MAXWELL

Language, Religion and Politics in North India. By Paul R. Brass. *London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1974. 467 pp. Map. Bibliog. Index. £10·50. $27.50.*

SINCE India became independent some onlookers have from time to time feared that it might break up through the pull of regional, and especially of linguistic, nationalism. These fears were overdrawn; they have now given way to fears of other kinds of strain, chiefly economic. They were, however, strong in 1966–67, when Professor Brass began this study. In it he puts forward persuasive arguments, both empirical and theoretical, for thinking that fear of linguistic nationalism in India rests on a misunderstanding—itself born of preoccupation with a narrow model of unitary national identity which scarcely applies outside a few countries of Western Europe and Japan. In India's system of many-layered elites, he considers, the leaders at the centre have worked out implicit rules under which they are prepared to give scope for much regional diversity short of secession: ' India is, in fact, a developing multi-national State ' (p. 16).

Although the alarms of 1967 may have occasioned this study they are not its chief subject. Professor Brass concerns himself with the relation between language and religion in shaping the identity and the demands of several North Indian groups—the Sikhs of the Punjab, the Muslims of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, and the advocates of a language-based state of Mithila to be carved out of Bihar. He asks why a movement like that of the Sikhs has won a separate state whereas the movement for Mithila has got nowhere (the North Indian Muslims fall in between; they have kept up their communal consciousness but their cultivation of the Urdu language and script has not, since Partition, secured for them a distinct political identity). One of his main conclusions is that in North India—unlike other regions—language has been secondary to religion as an identifying symbol; but, since India cannot afford conflicts ostensibly religious, it has been manipulated by Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh elites to instil into the masses a sense of group identity.

Beyond this the book is much taken up with the theory of nationalism, to which (following Karl Deutsch) it makes a solid contribution. Professor Brass uses his Indian material—much of it taken from the census—to argue that nationalist movements flow at least as much from the will of particular elites as from sets of ' objective ' conditions. Nationalism is ' the striving to achieve multi-symbol congruence among a group of people defined initially in terms of a single criterion ' (p. 410); its emergence and success depend on ' the

perception of the existence of unevenness in development between two or more groups' (p. 419), on the construction of myths, even of language, and on deliberate political activity and organisation. Some of this will be less novel to historians of Europe (the late Denis Brogan used to say much the same, less systematically, in Cambridge lectures of a quarter-century ago) than it apparently is to political scientists brought up on 'functionalism' and innocent of dialectic.

Professor Brass has none the less written a rich, absorbing, and important book, of interest to students both of India and of nationalism in general. It is lucidly written throughout, though avoidance of repetition could have made it shorter and cheaper—so far as anything put out by the Cambridge University Press can ever be called cheap.

JOHN ROSSELLI

The Economic Development of Bangladesh within a Socialist Framework: Proceedings of a Conference held by the International Economic Association at Dacca. Edited by E. A. G. Robinson and Keith Griffin. Introd. by E. A. G. Robinson. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1974. (Distrib. in USA by Halsted Press.) 330 pp. Index. (International Economic Association Publications.) £7·00.*

THIS volume, like other proceedings of conferences held by the International Economic Association, deserves the attention of planners and scholars concerned with Asian affairs. Originally, the conference was to deal with the Economics of Extreme Poverty—a case study of East Pakistan. By the time the conference took place early in 1973, it was held in the capital of the newly born state of Bangladesh. Unlike other meetings of the IEA, this latest one dealt with a single country rather than with economic problems afflicting a number of nations. Once again, the proceedings are ably edited by Professor Robinson, who is aided on this occasion by Keith Griffin of Magdalen College, Oxford. Prominent among the participants were Professor Nurul Islam, the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission in Dacca, and some of his colleagues, Professors Chenery and Ramis from the United States and Paul Streeten and Michael Lipton from England. There were also some economists from Russia and Eastern Europe, none of whom had been in Asia before. It may be questioned whether a debate between two groups, one of which—according to Anisur Rahman—is ignorant of Bangladesh and the other of socialism (p. 66) helped or hindered the dialogue with Bengali economists, many of whom were themselves doctrinally more committed than might seem good for a country badly in need of flexible policies. In any event, a wide enough range of views was presented to the participants of the conference to provide food for thought for some time to come. Professor Robinson's introduction to the proceedings deserves careful reading. He knows about the need to give priority to agriculture, treated by many Bengali intellectuals—and by the Five Year Plan—as a peripheral rather than a central issue, and to develop, 'at an almost negligible opportunity cost' (p. XXI) the rural infrastructure and the social services.

Similarly realistic are Nurul Islam's assessment of the state and prospect of the economy and Swadesh Boses's report on the strategy of agricultural development. The same cannot be said of some of the other contributions. Anisur Rahman of Dacca University deplores the lack of political consensus;

to remedy this, he wishes priority to be given to the formation of political cadres. He also proposes 'demonstration collective farms, functional mass literacy and barefoot medical care' (p. 23). Mohuiddin Alamgir of the Institute of Development Economics starts from the bold assumption that 'Bangladesh will continue to be a socialist State', and he presents his calculations on the basis of the unproven claim of 3 million deaths during the fight for independence and with the aid of international prices of questionable validity. He also demands the collectivisation of the 7 million farms in the country's 65,000 villages. He cannot have read about the Soviet farm record during the last fifty years.

The remaining sections of the proceedings deal with questions of industry, employment, foreign trade and investment in infrastructure. They are largely factual. Rehman Sobhan, known as the author of a study on Ayub Khan's 'basic democracies', and Muzaffar Ahmad, both now members of the Planning Commission, investigate the problems connected with industrialisation and nationalisation of industry. Badrud Duza and Iftikhar Ahmed of Chittagong and Dacca Universities respectively deal with the all-important subjects of population and employment policies. K. H. Imam and A. F. A. Husain conclude the volume with sections on foreign trade and infrastructure projects. These sections have been presented in a refreshingly factual manner; this cannot be said of the conference and the discussions as a whole. It can, for instance, hardly have been helpful when a newcomer to Bangladesh, such as Branko Horvat of Belgrade, gives advice: 'whenever an activity is risky, it should be centralised, and whenever the government is in doubt, centralise' (p. 236). A report on his native Yugoslavia's difficulties caused by lack of trained personnel might have been of invaluable service to his hosts. With regard to the doctrinal aspects of the conference, Professor René Dumont spoke, a little sarcastically, of 'socialism at the Planning Commission level' (p. 177). As to the econometric models liberally presented at the conference, Professor Hollis Chenery warned that 'they can distract attention from the major issues' (p. 138). Both being specialists, in the spheres of ideology and econometrics respectively, knew what they were speaking about.

W. KLATT

Politics in Sri Lanka 1947–1973. By A. Jeyaratnam Wilson. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1974. 347 pp. Maps. Index. £7·50.*

APART from certain secondary works such as those of Wriggins, Kearney and Woodward, Professor Wilson has drawn on government and semi-government documents, personal interviews and communications, numerous journal articles including a dozen or so of his own and, finally, on English-language newspapers. Consultation of Sinhalese and Tamil newspapers would, however, have given him information and points of view that are not to be found in the English-language newspapers.

There is much evidence of haste and inadequate proof-reading: 'conventional showers' (p. 6), 'leadership is ultra-constructive' (p. 165) (also pp. 104, 229, 250, 264, 285, etc.); infelicitous expressions and statements such as 'resulting in investment in development suffering' (p. 106), 'political instability goaded by . . . proportions' (p. 123) (also pp. 12, 27, 164, 169, 303, etc.). There is a lack of balance in the map at page 4 where a town like

Chilaw is indicated but not equally important towns like Kegalle or Kalutara. In the second map the coconut and rubber areas can scarcely be distinguished on account of the unsatisfactory shading; and whilst many less important rivers are indicated, the extremely important Kelani finds no place. Hasty organisation of the material is indicated by frequent repetition (see pp. 23–24, 126, 137, 140–42, 152–59, 165–68, 212–14, 221, 280, 301). More serious in its implications is the manner in which facts and arguments have been compartmentalised. For instance, if the information on pages 28–29, 39–42 and at 103 had been closely related—there are not even cross references—a more meaningful exposition of the 'Indian problem' could have been presented.

In the conclusion, Professor Wilson, whilst touching on certain economic and statistical questions, focuses attention on divisive factors of a communal (and religious) character. In effect, the thesis is that the degree of national integration achieved under the aegis of an English-educated elite is threatened by 'the reassertion of primordial societies', or more specifically, by the Sinhalese Buddhist peasant society. The full evidence relating to the pre-colonial state of this 'primordial society' does not, in fact, support this very popular thesis. The manner in which the English-educated elite itself introduced, among other things, new communal and religious attitudes into both Sinhalese and Tamil peasant societies in efforts to preserve, break into, or break up colonial structures still awaits investigation.

In the introduction, Professor Wilson contends (pp. 2–3) that non-alignment in foreign policy does not serve Sri Lanka's interests. He attempts to substantiate this view by referring only to certain immediate results. His further argument—a surprising one—that countries with mutually conflicting interests have all supported Sri Lanka purely out of self-interest (pp. 301–02) testifies to the success of non-alignment rather than its failure. Moreover, elsewhere (for example pp. 299, 307–08) he himself adduces sufficient evidence to controvert his thesis.

When all is said and done, however, there is much evidence that the author has striven strenuously to be fair and impartial. Besides, as implied earlier, many of the book's inadequacies are such that a patient reader can make most of the necessary corrections by himself. Moreover, the book contains much new material, particularly for the period 1968–72. Finally, it can be said that Professor Wilson provides the most up-to-date and comprehensive single work on the politics of Sri Lanka between 1947 and 1972.

K. W. GOONEWARDENA

Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore. By T. J. S. George. *London: André Deutsch. 1973. 222 pp. Bibliog. Index. £2·95. Paperback £1·75.*

HAVING put down Dick Wilson's recent book on Singapore [1] with the feeling that more should have been said about internal political relationships, this reviewer turned to T. J. S. George in hope of some compensatory enlightenment. D. J. Enright had already commented [2] on the value of this book in providing detailed accounts of incidents which the world press saw

[1] *The Future Role of Singapore*. London. Oxford University Press for the RIIA. 1972. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1974, p. 496.

[2] D. J. Enright, 'Tight Little Island', *The Listener*, Vol. 90, No. 2332: Dec. 6, 1973, p. 786.

fit to ignore. Indeed this highly quotable biography-of-sorts tells us much about Lee's single-minded skill in achieving power and holding on to it, and anyone who is unfamiliar with political practices in other parts of South-east Asia will seethe with indignation. Yet there is too little here about what Singaporeans think of Lee, to balance the copious references to Lee's thoughts about them. The writer observes much 'drab conformity' and 'mindlessness', but this may not mean much more than that Lee's philosophical inconsistency does not irritate the people of Singapore as much as it does T. J. S. George. The mindless reproduction of a neo-Marxist critique of Singapore's economy [3] is unduly conformist (pp. 106–8, 166, 176). George persistently leaves the impression of having confined his research to those intellectual (and sometimes expatriate) coteries which add conspiratorial spice to any politically-oriented visit to the island. As to philosophical inconsistency, he exposes himself to the very same accusation by ridiculing the clean streets policy (p. 196): readers of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* will remember George's praise of the clean streets of Hanoi.[4] A striking ambivalence runs through the book in the form of alternating accusations that Lee is not Asian enough *and* that he has betrayed social democracy.

The work is weakest on the crucial detail of detentions with, for instance, undocumented references to a previously unknown mass detention in 1962 (pp. 65, 120), and a failure to specify Kuala Lumpur's role in Operation Cold Store, 1963 (p. 68).[5] The sequence of events of 1963–65 (Chapter 5) is generally confused. This is not, therefore, a work of reference. Meanwhile, the author approaches the regimentation of Singapore society 'more in sorrow than in anger', but since he strives more for effect than balance, and since the book's publication in Singapore was predictable (the censorship record is rather better there than in Malaysia), one may be excused for wondering whether there was some political motive. There is nothing reprehensible in commitment, but one would have welcomed a preface, in which the author's objective could have been clarified. On the other hand, the closing lines of the book are not lacking in frankness (p. 215): '. . . the observer is forced to hope that [Lee's] departure from the scene he commands will not be long delayed'. High stakes indeed!

ROGER KERSHAW

American Economic Aid to Thailand. By J. Alexander Caldwell. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Heath. 1974. 248 pp. Bibliog. Index. £7·30.*

IN the continuing controversy over the role of foreign aid in economic development, this book, which critically examines the motives and effectiveness of the aid programme of the United States Operations Mission in Thailand between 1950 and 1970, is an interesting contribution. It arises from Caldwell's own attachment to USOM in 1967–69 and makes extensive use of the mission's vast collection of Thai development material, a selection of which is included in an extensive bibliography.

[3] See Iain Buchanan, *Singapore in Southeast Asia: an Economic and Political Appraisal*. London: Bell. 1972. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1972, p. 703.
[4] T. J. S. George, 'The End of the Beginning', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 81, No. 33: Aug. 20, 1973, p. 18.
[5] James Puthucheary was picked up and detained on the mainland.

Setting the work in the context of the changing political situation in South-east Asia, Caldwell describes the expansion of the USOM commitment in Thailand with the initial fear of communist domination, its decline in the early 1960s as this threat seemed to recede, and its further growth from 1965 to counter insurgency, particularly in the sensitive North-east region. It is suggested that the initial small-scale programme of the early 1950s was valuable in assisting Thailand's postwar rehabilitation, but that, as the level of economic aid increased, so the structures of aid administration, both Thai and American, had an important effect on the relative success of individual projects. Taking the so-called ' Pittsburgh Model ' of institution building, the author demonstrates through examples of particular USOM projects that the commitment of the Thai government leadership, the extent to which each programme served to fill a real deficiency in the country and the extent to which they fitted in with the existing structures of authority were all crucial to their ultimate achievement. Caldwell also rightly points out that the staffing requirements for USOM advisers in the various institutions of the Thai government varied over time in a manner which also affected the efficacy of the American aid contribution.

Relating the programmes to the stated aim of assisting Thailand's capacity to resist communist insurgency, the author criticises the assumption that Thai villagers require extensive economic and social development projects to keep them out of the hands of the insurgents. Even in the backward North-east region, the people feel themselves to be Thai, a sentiment long engendered by the primary education system now strengthened by USOM support of the teacher-training programme. Only mistreatment by the Bangkok administration in general is likely to lead to disaffection, for the villagers are suspicious of and seek protection from the communists. Caldwell points out that only in the isolated areas where government administration is poor do the latter appear to have taken any real hold.

It is in such areas of development of effective and beneficial programmes of co-operation between village and government, as in local irrigation, rural credit and agricultural extension, that the USOM programme in Thailand has been least able to assist, for its staff have been short-term advisers with little knowledge of Thai language or culture. Perhaps this too is Caldwell's own failing, for the book lacks any indication of the first-hand knowledge which, in certain aspects, particularly relating to the analysis of the scope for village-level subversion, would have given it added weight.

HARVEY DEMAINE

Peace is not at Hand. By Robert Thompson. *Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co.; London: Chatto and Windus. 1974. 208 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. £4·00.*

A GOOD deal of attention has been paid to the Kennedy and Johnson periods of the American involvement in Vietnam, and with the publication of the Pentagon Papers we now know many (but by no means all) of the details of the inner history of the period before 1968. Much less has been written about Vietnam during the Nixon era and consequently one approaches the present book in the hope of new enlightenment, especially

in view of Sir Robert Thompson's position as adviser to the President from 1969. Unfortunately the hope goes largely unfulfilled: the book is disappointing.

The most important chapters are those which deal with the events of 1972–73, and—somewhat more superficially—the years 1969–71. So far as they go, these sections of the book are worth reading. The author's thesis is that during the years 1969–70 the effective new policies of Nixon and Thieu led to a sharp decline in the capacity of the southern Vietnamese communists to continue the type of guerrilla war which had been waged so successfully until 1968. Therefore, he argues, it was necessary for the North Vietnamese army to intervene on a larger scale, and the result was the 'invasion' in the Spring of 1972, in which the war took on a completely different character. The offensive failed, partly because the bombing of the North in 1972 was much more effective than it had been during 1965–68, and so the communists were obliged to enter into negotiations and sign the agreement of 1973. Thus far, the argument is at least coherent. But the author is quite ambivalent in his assessment of the agreement itself, which he wants to treat sometimes as an American victory which the communists accepted only because they were forced to do so, and sometimes as a defeat which the Americans accepted because they were too weak-willed to obtain a 'real and enforceable peace' after the Christmas bombing of 1972. Is he, one wonders, trying to create a new myth?

The other chapters of the book, in which one might have hoped to find something in the nature of personal memoirs, give us instead a series of emotional outpourings directed against those who have either defended North Vietnam in general terms, or have criticised the author himself. Sometimes his attacks on bad reporting may well be justified, but he has made no attempt to distinguish between the shortcomings of the news media and the serious attempts of scholars and politicians to reassess the whole direction of American foreign policy since 1968. The fundamental question is not why Vietnam became so important, nor even whether the Americans made a mistake in insisting on its importance; the question now is whether Vietnam any longer matters in world politics, in the way it mattered during the 1960s. It is a question which Sir Robert Thompson fails completely to face, and which will not be answered in the crude terms of a polemic about South Vietnam's electoral system and the shortcomings of post-colonial communism. The events of Vietnam during the Nixon-Kissinger years will only be fully understood when they are effectively placed in the changing world context, which the present book does not even attempt to do.

R. B. SMITH

Revolutionary Organization: Institution-Building within the People's Liberation Armed Forces. By Paul Berman. *Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books; Toronto, London: Heath. 1974. 249 pp. Index. £6·80.*

RIGHT from the moment of the collapse of the Indochina Sûreté at Hanoi in 1945 and the escalation to armed conflict of the struggle of the Indochina Communist party (to whose cadres their Vietnamese rivals unwarily handed over the Sûreté files), systematic collection of police intelligence was

neglected in turn by French, Vietnamese, and American commands; it was not until 1968 that the last of these realised the value of publishing captured documents and interrogation reports instead of shelving them, if not throwing them away. Even General Westmoreland's report on his conduct of the war concentrates on the fortunes of the battlefield and throws negligible light on the communist forces at work out of sight of mechanical reconnaissance devices. However, ten years ago the RAND Corporation conducted, though it did not publish, interrogations of communists in captivity; Dr. Berman has re-examined some of this material and elicited from it certain conclusions about the motives of communist recruits and their attitudes to the Party as an institution.

In presenting his results, Dr. Berman follows the fashion of contemporary social science: every fact has to be a mathematical statistic, and if it is not susceptible to numerical expression it is disregarded. A similar attitude to intelligence notoriously marked the American high command during its season of dominion in Indochina—whence the sarcastic ribaldries current in Saigon a few years ago about the chief of staff and his computer, 'scientific' substitute for commonsense. Not surprisingly, the motives for which Dr. Berman found that recruits had joined the People's Liberation Armed Forces were as various as those which Professor Lucien Pye discovered twenty years ago had moved Malayan Chinese communists; few had volunteered out of land hunger or because of the Party's nationalistic propaganda—which most took with the same pinch of salt as Pye's subjects—and none at all out of zeal to fight for the establishment of a collectivised state under Party rule. On the other hand, personal ambition for status and influence by the short cut, as well as family ties, featured prominently among the actual volunteers, although a large number of the men had been press-ganged—not hesitating, one might add, any more than Nelson's tars, to press-gang other unfortunates in their turn. Morale was maintained by the camaraderie of men kept both fully occupied all day and isolated from other sources of information than the Party's; indiscipline was minimised by frequent sessions of criticism and self-criticism, which gave rise in the confessional to the invention of petty sins to own up to. Positive lapses were punished by public opprobrium or assignment to unpleasant duties. The principal reason for leaving the movement—and the majority of men interviewed had surrendered, not been captured—was undoubtedly fear of getting wounded or killed; but the original interrogators do not seem to have asked explicitly how many of their subjects felt frightened in action or tried to avoid it. The study does not go into the actual organisation of the Party or its command structure, nor into relations between southern recruits and northern cadres; but it relates to a period before the latter took over so completely, after the decimation of the People's Liberation Armed Forces in the 1968 Têt offensive.

DENNIS J. DUNCANSON

The World and China 1922–1972. By John Gittings. *London: Eyre Methuen. 1974. 303 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (The China Library.) £5·25.*

China and Southeast Asia since 1945. By C. P. Fitzgerald. *London: Longman. 1973. 110 pp. Maps. Index. (Studies in Contemporary Southeast Asia; Gen. Eds.: Wang Gungwu and J. A. C. Mackie.) £2·25.*

China in Burma's Foreign Policy. By Ralph Pettman. *Canberra: Australian National University Press. 1973. 56 pp. (Contemporary China Papers No. 7; Gen. Ed.: S. T. Leong.) A$2.50.*

JOHN GITTINGS's book sets out to be a history of the ideas that have shaped China's, and more particularly Mao's, foreign policy over the years. Clearly, the author feels that China needs defending against its detractors and critics, both in the West and in the Soviet sphere. As so often happens, however, in works of this kind, the explanation of behaviour turns into an apologia. Thus we find China more sinned against than sinning, the victim of hostile foreign powers, misunderstood and obstructed. Mao, on the other hand, as the chief instigator of China's foreign policy, has been both rational and consistent. The zigzags often noted by foreign observers, culminating in the reception of President Nixon in Peking, are in fact 'consistent with the long-term thrust of Maoist foreign policy'. The theme is familiar and is all a bit too good to be true. Mao is undoubtedly a remarkable man, though presumably human, but is it really necessary in finding fault, Heaven knows, with Western policies, to see him as infallible, logical and successful for nigh on fifty years?

There is this to be said about Western apologists for Communist China, that their task, already complicated by the Sino-Soviet split, has been made even more difficult by the conflict within the Chinese leadership in recent years, as well as by China's new diplomacy. One fears that their position will become intolerable should any new leader arise in China who consigns Mao and all his works to outer darkness, as Mao has done to Liu and Lin, or as Khrushchev did to Stalin. No such doubts assail Mr. Gittings, who sees only 'the inner rationality of Chinese foreign policy in the past and probably in the future as well'. This is an article of faith.

The Chinese view of the world that is here interpreted for us stretches all the way from ruthless Western 'exploitation' in the early years, to some of the latest developments in relations with the West ('imperialism') and the Soviet Union. The first chapter deals, unusually, with cigarettes, or rather, 'cigarette tobacco of the flue-cured Virginian variety', and the operations in China of the British-American Tobacco Company This is an attempt 'to recapture something of the flavour of life for the Chinese in their semi-colonial country of the 1920s'. Thus the scene is set for what follows. In Part One there are chapters on the Communist Party and colonialism, the united front strategy, wartime relationships, and postwar American efforts at mediation (described as a 'myth'). Part Two deals with the foreign policy of the People's Republic on the world stage.

When he uses his own critical faculties, John Gittings provides an interesting analysis of the forces at work, and displays a nice sense of humour as well. Overall, one might question such a complete identification of foreign policy with Mao personally, which tends to obscure the foreign policy debates that are known to have occurred in China in recent years. All the same, few will quarrel with the assertion that Mao has provided 'the strategic framework'.

Since his retirement from the Australian National University, Professor Fitzgerald seems to have entered upon a prolific period of authorship, which will surprise no one familiar with his versatility. In his little book on China and South-east Asia, he provides a useful summary of historical and contemporary relationships between the ten countries involved. He also

includes a chapter on the continuing problem of the Overseas Chinese communities. Like many observers, he sees a new era opening in Asia, and wisely concludes that China's relations with the area are as yet in a transitional stage.

This is, perhaps, less true of Burma than of other South-east Asian countries, since relations between Peking and Rangoon were established in 1949. Ralph Pettman's essay is a useful contribution to our understanding of those relations. It is clear that the fears that assail a small and weak country bordering a huge and powerful neighbour are fully present in Burma's attitude to China. This essential fact has governed Burma's compliant attitude towards China, seeking to please in order to remain unmolested. It is a policy that has been fairly successful, despite the falling-out during China's cultural revolution. The author might have made a little more of the relevant personal differences between U Nu and Ne Win, the one from the Westernised urban elite, the other feeling more akin to the Burmanised and rural counter-elite, in so far as the latter affords a greater affinity with the Chinese tradition. But the essay is written in a distinctive style, and maintains the high standard of the Contemporary China Papers.

V. FUNNELL

Atlas of China. By Chiao-min Hsieh. Edited by Christopher L. Salter. *New York, London: McGraw-Hill. 1973. 282 pp. Bibliog. Indexes. (McGraw-Hill Atlases; Consulting Ed.: Norman J. Thrower.) $14.95. £6·50.*

STUDENTS of Chinese affairs have long had to labour with inadequate source material, and commentators and scholars have until recently been unable to supplement and check such sources by field visits. Any study which attempts to survey existing material up to 1972 is therefore welcome, and it is potentially very satisfactory that the results should be presented graphically. Professor Hsieh's atlas does not, however, replace atlases which provide large scale maps (for example 1: 1,000,000) of China's relief and topography for, except for a few sketch maps of major urban centres, there are few maps at a larger scale than 1: 15,000,000 (equivalent to the United States shown on a double page spread of *International Affairs*). The collection of maps does provide a comprehensive treatment of environmental and cultural aspects of China's land and peoples, with regional and historical features comprising the second half of the volume.

Those who look for other things in an atlas beyond its content will, however, be disappointed in the quality of the cartography and its reproduction. The editors have presumably faced problems in financing technically adequate cartography in a publication which will probably have a relatively limited sale, compared at least with atlases of the world for the mass educational market. The relatively low price of this *Atlas of China* has been achieved by avoiding the complexity and expense of colour reproduction, although the severely monochromatic character of the volume is somewhat lightened by the printing of a light brown tone as a background to many of the maps.

The quality of the cartography is inconsistent, reflecting inadequacies in drawing and photography (pp. 89, 124, 142) both of maps and some particularly inelegant block diagrams. Photographic inconsistencies show

themselves in the weight of lettering on adjacent pages (pp. 176–177), and difficulties in matching new sheets of dot and line screens (p. 252) are evident. That the maps were prepared over a long period and by a number of individuals is clear, and though this is reflected in the cartography, the editors have done a thorough and consistent job with respect to the controversial matter of transliteration, conforming to the United States Board on Geographic Names except in the case of a number of names firmly fixed in Western literature (p. xv).

It will be taken as an omission by some that no sources are given, either in the text, but especially on the maps showing economic data. Proper emphasis is given in the preface to the difficulties which face students of contemporary Chinese affairs through the paucity of up-to-date socio-economic data, but this possibly makes more necessary the provision of information on sources in a book which purports to present a version of the current position, yet lists in its bibliography publications which date mainly from the 1950s and to a lesser extent from the 1960s. The book has been designed imaginatively and is easy to use, although the absence of page numbers, often for a number of pages consecutively, might disturb some users unaware of the editorial convenience of such omissions. Metric units are used throughout with miles also indicated on occasions. There is no conventional index, which is missed in a book with more than 25 per cent of its space as text. There are, however, very clear contents lists and there are easily scanned lists of maps which guide users quickly to the maps which interest them.

The atlas was being finally prepared at the time of the rapprochement between the United States and China, as reflected in the concluding reference to the presidential visit to China in the winter of 1972, which apparently gave rise to 'new hopes that Americans could travel in China . . .' (p. 253), a hope which in the event has only been partially fulfilled. That access to mainland China is still relatively restricted does, however, mean that Professor Hsieh's spatial analysis of the country and its resources will continue for some time to make a substantial contribution to the literature available on 'the mother nation of Asia' (p. 253).

J. A. ALLAN

NORTH AMERICA

Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections. By Robert A. Divine. Vol. 1: 1940–1948. *353 pp.* Vol. 2: 1952–1960. *359 pp. New York: New Viewpoints; London: Croom Helm. 1974. Bibliogs. Indexes. Paperback: £2·50 per volume.*

PROFESSOR DIVINE is a distinguished historian of American foreign policy with several books to his credit; unfortunately, these two volumes will add little or nothing to his reputation. The title is somewhat misleading in that the analysis of public opinion does not extend beyond rudimentary polls, while the need to fill in the story between elections has produced what is in effect a narrative history of American foreign policy from 1940 to 1960. The viability of the enterprise depends upon two questions: have foreign policy issues been important in determining the character and outcome of presidential campaigns?; and have presidential campaigns had a major impact on the course and conduct of American foreign policy? Professor

Divine discovered that 'foreign policy played an even larger role in the electoral process' than he had 'suspected'. He was also 'driven to the inescapable conclusion that politicians treat foreign policy as an elaborate charade, raising issues that promise them votes rather than ones that reveal their future intentions in world affairs' (Vol. 1, p. ix). It is perhaps a little ingenuous for an historian as knowledgeable as Professor Divine to come to such a startling *post hoc* conclusion.

This two-volume survey is based on a good deal of research, but little that is new emerges to elucidate an already well-documented theme. Since 1940, when the fall of France helped Wendell Willkie win the Republican nomination, and helped make a third term for Roosevelt a more palatable break with convention, candidates for the nomination, and the nominees themselves, have been anxious to demonstrate their capacity to manage foreign relations. Kennedy's stress in 1960 on America's declining prestige and military weakness is well known, as is his advocacy of a tough American line on Cuba. It is also true that what is said, or not said, is influenced by electoral constraints ('Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars'), just as it is influenced by considerations of security (Nixon could not reveal in 1960 the action that was being planned against Cuba). Not only, however, are there continuities of policy which presidential campaigns rarely interrupt (Cuba being a prime example) but major changes in policy are more likely to occur mid-term than in the course of an actual campaign (the Nixon-Kissinger China *démarche*, for example). As circumstances change, so policy has to change, and the makers of foreign policy are more ready to appease public opinion than to take direction from it.

By making the fleeting relationship between presidential contenders and the electorate the nub of his narrative Professor Divine neglects other more important considerations; pressure groups and elites (not to mention elite preconceptions) are excluded from the scope of his brief, and American foreign policy is made to seem so obvious and straightforward as to possess an almost pellucid simplicity.

D. J. S. Morris

Financing Elections: the politics of an American ruling class. By David Nichols. *New York: New Viewpoints; London: Croom Helm. 1974. 191 pp. Index. Paperback: £1·95.*

Building Coalitions: American Politics in the 1970s. By Andrew M. Greeley. *New York: New Viewpoints; London: Croom Helm. 1974. 430 pp. Index. £6·25. Paperback: £2·50.*

Congress: The Electoral Connection. By David R. Mayhew. *New Haven, Conn., London: Yale University Press. 1974. 194 pp. Index. (Yale Studies in Political Science, 26.) $7.95. £4·00.*

Each of these three books concerns an aspect of American electioneering; otherwise they have nothing in common. *Financing Elections* is a hardline (but not unsubtle) Marxist tract based on the familiar proposition that the wealthy corporations really rule the country and the voter can choose only between candidates who do not threaten their power. Nearly half the book is about its sub-title, not its title. However, the other half is a thorough and accurate compilation of scattered material, including many shrewd observations (for example, that money matters most of all to a new candidate seeking

recognition in a primary: pp. 52–3; *cf.* p. 131) and many absurd ones (for example, the clever 'fat cats' who bank-rolled Senators Eugene McCarthy and George McGovern were diverting the workers' discontent out of revolutionary channels: pp. 103–4, 114).

Father Greeley, a Catholic sociologist from Chicago, has written an admonitory tract for 1976 addressed to the Democratic Party. A liberal admirer of the Kennedys, he defends the traditional American politics of compromise and coalition-building against the more recent quest for ideological purity, asserts the moral legitimacy of the professional politician wanting to win against the amateur idealist wanting only to witness, and insists that Roosevelt's old coalition is still absolutely indispensable to social progress and perfectly viable if only the liberal establishment will listen to, instead of scorning, the grievances of Middle America. He provides much useful survey material about the attitudes of American voters generally to the political system, and of the major coalition groups towards one another, the whole society and its major problems such as Vietnam, integration and social welfare. This material convincingly supports his case, showing the blacks to be more moderate than their reputation, the Catholic ethnic groups much more liberal, and the Southerners more reconciled to change. Unfortunately he weakens the impact of an argument to which this reviewer is wholly sympathetic by the stridency of his attacks on the McGovernites (though these are suddenly muted two-thirds of the way through a long and discursive book) and by his failure to recognise that in 1972 many regular Democrats were quite as purblind and self-righteous as the ideologues of the Left.

David Mayhew, one of the most perceptive academic writers on Congress, explores the implications of assuming that its members' activities are wholly directed to their own re-election. He traces how they attract support by self-advertisement, by 'credit claiming' (for benefits obtained for individuals or their district), and by 'position taking' (assertions by speech or vote of a view intended to please a block of constituents). These activities need not inconvenience other Congressmen: for the benefits are shared out, not monopolised by the majority; and, since the position taken matters more electorally than success or failure, members need not be at each others' throats to win all the time. He ends with two discussions, in themselves valuable but awkwardly integrated into the essay. One outlines the mechanisms by which Congressmen try to preserve the reputation—and the power and prestige—of the institution against the havoc which would otherwise result from the presumed electoral rapacity of its members; the other analyses the possible lines of congressional reform. Differences between members, by region or seniority or house, are brought out as well as similarities, and the argument is illustrated throughout with pertinent recent examples, and related both to model-building theories of political behaviour and to foreign analogies. There is, however, one danger in this well-written, informative and stimulating book. Professor Mayhew's terms of reference, though wide, do not allow for such cases as the powerful committee chairman who takes all his campaign funds from one of 'his' industries, so as to buy himself total independence in all other matters. But the author makes clear at the start that he is consciously overstating his case for the sake of clarity in his model-building: he knows that politicians do not all or always behave as he describes, and that many of them do often advocate causes because they believe in them and want them to triumph—not just to please their constituents. However, the student reader, having less information and

sophistication, may forget the careful qualifications stowed away at the start. If so, he will be misled about the realities, and turned cynical about the men and the process, by swallowing a seductively presented but exaggerated argument more thoroughly than its author ever intended.

P. M. WILLIAMS

Cold Winter, Cold War. By Robert G. Kaiser. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson: New York: Stein and Day. 1974. 226 pp. Bibliog. Index. £6·00.*

THIS work claims to throw new light on the origins of the cold war: apparently scholars and the reading public have forgotten the influence on foreign policy of domestic conditions in Britain and the United States in 1946 and 1947. Kaiser sets out to examine the ' politics ', presumably meaning by this ' the political decisions taken by the politicians ', and intends, by so doing, to demonstrate that ' the beginnings of the cold war should seem less conspiratorial and more reasonable than they might otherwise ' (p. 9).

Kaiser describes the fuel crisis in Britain which apparently dispelled the assumption that that country was a great power. When treating the United States mention is made of witch-hunting, subversion in high places, meat shortages and coal strikes. Surprisingly, the United States's rapid return to peace-time thinking, drives to ' get the boys back home ', and mutinies in the armed forces, all of which significantly influenced foreign policy, are largely ignored. [These issues were ably covered by Eric F. Goldman in *The Crucial Decade—And After*[1] and Stephen E. Ambrose in *Rise to Globalism.*[2]] But then, as Kaiser states, he has arbitrarily decided to describe domestic and foreign policies separately. This is the weakness of the book. There is nothing new in Kaiser's survey of the foreign policy issues such as the negotiation of the peace treaties, difficulties over Palestine, Iran, Bizonia, and the background to the Truman doctrine. Indeed there is much that he could have gleaned from other secondary works which it appears from the bibliography he has not used, to say nothing of the collections of published documents. The rigid separation of the policies of Britain and the United States is misleading, and would suggest, for example, that Kaiser is unaware of British pressure on the United States to take a firm stand over Iran during 1945 and 1946. But then Kaiser argues: ' Though British and American politics both moved towards the denouement of the Truman Doctrine during 1946–7, they moved along entirely different paths. Their conjunction in March 1947, was largely coincidental ' (pp. 13–4). Apparently Bevin had little to do with securing the United States's commitment to Europe. It was not his meeting with Byrnes in New York in December 1946 which showed that the United States was ready to undertake such a commitment, and which caused Bevin to move, but rather ' the fuel crisis which created the conditions which finally persuaded Bevin to act ' (p. 178).

The book is annoying to read. It is written in journalese: the author has difficulty in constructing an English sentence and resorts continually to dashes and asides in brackets. Furthermore, as there are no references provided, it is impossible to check the author's sources.

R. OVENDALE

[1] New York: Knopf. 1966.
[2] London: Allen Lane. The Penguin Press. 1971. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1972, p. 451.

The Devil and John Foster Dulles. By Townsend Hoopes. *London: Deutsch. 1974. 562 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £4·95.*

THIS is a good narrative history, based on standard sources but also using extensively, and sensibly, the Dulles Oral History Collection at Princeton. The interpretation is orthodox, blaming Dulles for the moralistic tone of United States foreign policy rhetoric throughout the 1950s, and he is also held responsible for a 'subliminal' influence on President Kennedy (p. 505). This grave, rather humourless man is recognisably built into an American tradition that is both easy to admire and tempting to scorn. Son of the manse, and inheritor of a firm family code, he was also subjected to the flattering society of Washington, D.C. His grandfather, for eight months Secretary of State to Benjamin Harrison, became an adviser to the Imperial Chinese government, and his summer visitors at Henderson Harbour on Lake Ontario exposed John Foster Dulles to a very different world from the small town puritanism of up-state New York. Dulles went to Princeton, accompanied his grandfather to the Second Hague Conference in 1907, studied at the Sorbonne, read law at Washington and joined Sullivan and Cromwell in New York City.

Further influence, and support, came from Robert Lansing, Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State, who had married his Aunt Eleanor. Dulles attended the Paris Peace Conference, developed a love for good food and wine, and acquired a smattering of French. He became head of Sullivan and Cromwell in 1926. A sound lawyer, his mind was narrow, practical, and self-concerned. You could not, Oliver Franks later remarked, have a conversation with John Foster Dulles for he was locked into his own structural process (p. 39). The firm was heavily engaged in business in Germany but Dulles displayed little moral reaction to what was happening under Hitler until the implications were pointed out to him. His book, *War, Peace and Change* [1] is an impressive intellectual exploration of the problems of nationalism, and eloquent advocacy of the need for mechanisms within the international community for promoting peaceful change.

Three things changed Dulles's world. He became actively associated with the Federal Council of Churches, politically associated with Thomas Dewey, and a reading of Stalin's *Problems of Leninism* persuaded him that international problems were matters of fundamental moral conflict rather than political or economic competition. *War or Peace* [2] is a tough, morally self-righteous anti-communist tract quite unlike his earlier book. He developed a taste for political partisanship, lobbied for office in the Republican administration and found his ambition totally satisfied as Eisenhower's Secretary of State. His belief in the political necessity of playing to the right wing of the Republican party coincided with his new moral stance, and his policy pronouncements were a curious amalgam of lawyer's brief and preacher's rhetoric. He tried to be intellectually honest and politically sensitive but was blind to wider reactions to the language of massive retaliation and agonising reappraisal. After describing the policies of the 1950s Townsend Hoopes delivers a harsh judgment: 'Dulles avoided actual war, yet his strident approach to nearly every crisis weakened the trust and support of allies and led at times to the almost total diplomatic isolation of the United States. The rigidity of his moral stance and the power of his advocacy also defined the limits of his constructive statesmanship' (p.

[1] London: Macmillan. 1939.
[2] New York: Macmillan; London: Harrap. 1950.

490). The Japanese Peace Treaty may well have been his greatest achievement, but the leaders of the 1950s perhaps deserve some credit for the policy restraint that usually accompanied oratorical excess. Opportunities for detente were lost but war was avoided. It came later under different men of equally good faith.

D. K. ADAMS

LATIN AMERICA

Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities. Edited by Julio Cotler and Richard Fagen. *Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1974. 417 pp. Index. $17.50. £10·00. Paperback: £2·90.*

Latin America and the United States consists of a set of papers and commentaries prepared for a conference in Lima held in September 1972, under the auspices of the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies of the United States Social Sciences Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies. The papers have been revised and where necessary translated into English, but still substantially antedate the Chilean coup of September 1973 in which one of the nine translators died. Their importance principally lies in the fact that they grapple throughout with the major issues initially raised by the scholars of Latin America termed 'radical' by one contributor (Abraham F. Lowenthal). Theorists of international relations will, moreover, be especially interested by the way in which the principal feature of the reconciliation between the 'liberal' and 'radical' views of the relationship between the United States and Latin America is the repeated use of the 'bureaucratic' model of foreign policy making propounded by Graham T. Allison. A European reader may well not find this model as revolutionary as did, apparently, the American scholars who took part in the conference, nor is he likely, in any event, to share most of the basic assumptions of a citizen of the United States holding either the 'liberal' or the 'radical' persuasion. It is likely, therefore, that his interest in this book may now be mainly historical. It represents a cross-section of views at a time when convergence between the United States and the Latin American thinkers on the problem of Latin American economic development was tending to produce a rearrangement rather than a revision of ideas. For the main effect, it seems, of the acceptance in the United States of the new orthodoxy of the Latin American writers on dependency theory was to provide American writers with a fresh set of reasons for believing that the principal influence on Latin American internal politics was that of their own country, and that precisely when, as Luigi Einaudi points out, the United States had actually begun to dismantle the interventionist apparatus it previously possessed.

An ironic counter theme is provided by Aníbal Pinto, who in his article on 'Economic Relations between Latin America and the United States: Some Implications and Perspectives' draws attention to the relative marginalisation of Latin America from the United States market during the past decade and to the contradictions between capital flows between finance and trade. The curiously named piece on 'The Politics of US Multinational Corporations in Latin America' by Luciano Martins (how 'US' *is* a multinational corporation?), tackles directly the central arena in which this

paradox is acted out, and provides a mass of information on it. In short, this book gathers together and summarises much that is essential to understanding the changing political realities in Latin America. But it does not, and perhaps cannot, tell us definitively which are the changes, and which the realities.

PETER CALVERT

Democracy and Dictatorship in Venezuela, 1945–1958. By Glen L. Kolb. *Hamden, Conn.: Connecticut College in association with Archon Books. 1974. 228 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Connecticut College Monograph No. 10.) $10.00.*

Democracy and Dictatorship in Venezuela provides a clear narrative of events from the fall of General Medina to the fall of General Pérez Jiménez, from 1945 until 1958. It does not use any new sources, and cannot be called either exhaustive or subtle. It adds little to what can already be found in John D. Martz's *Acción Democrática*,[1] or in Winfield J. Burggraaf's *The Venezuelan Armed Forces in Politics, 1935-1959*,[2] neither of which two standard works does the author appear to know. Like them, this author suffers from having to rely on the press, particularly on the foreign press, and from the persuasiveness of the writings of Rómulo Betancourt. It is not that Betancourt's *Venezuela, Política y Petróleo*,[3] is a bad source—it must be one of the ablest works written by a head-of-state this century—but that it is not a complete analysis of Venezuelan politics. Most of the years between 1945 and 1958 were dominated by a different Venezuela, which is not to be much understood without a greater knowledge of the country and its history than Professor Kolb displays. There is not enough on the antecedents of his protagonists, not enough feel for the different regions of the country. The author overestimates the influence of the Venezuelan church. His reflections are always benevolent, but often naive. Nonetheless, his book is worth reading: it contains the best description and analysis yet of the assassination of Delgado Chalbaud, some properly scathing paragraphs on Eisenhower's Venezuelan policy, and throughout much material of interest to students of one of OPEC's most formidable and least-studied founder-members.

MALCOLM DEAS

GENERAL HISTORY AND MEMOIRS

Who Killed the British Empire? An Inquest. By George Woodcock. *London: Cape. 1974. 356 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·00.*

IN the answers which he provides to his question, Mr. Woodcock offers no surprises. He lists ' natural causes '—the fact that vast areas were subordinated to Britain's imperial will at the same time as philosophies diametrically opposed to imperialism were developing in Britain, the fact of change in military techniques and the relative decline of Britain as an industrial and financial power. In support of these natural causes, as it were, came external

[1] Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966.
[2] Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1972.
[3] Caracas: Senderos, 1969.

influences (such as pressure of world, and especially United States, opinion), and the influences and actions of individuals as diverse as Gandhi and the 19th century Canadian advocates of independence.

The great merit of this sparklingly written study lies not in any new theories about the change from empire to independence and association in the Commonwealth, but in the way he sets the development in its historical perspective. No words are wasted. His range is astonishingly wide.

The early sections of the book, looking at 'the great routes of empire' and the settlement colonies, provide an admirable short survey of the main themes of imperial thinking. The author underlines, with many telling examples, how important were strategic and economic considerations, particularly, for instance, in deciding attitudes to the Suez Canal as late as the 1956 débâcle. He points out the inconsistencies that lay behind much thinking on the empire, and especially the inconsistency of the dedicated Free Traders accepting the realities of imperial possession and captive markets. His most significant thesis is the crucial importance of Canada, where the development, and gradual acceptance by Britain, of full internal self-government provided the lever 'that would shift and eventually shatter the structure of the Empire' (p. 191). Interestingly, Canada has remained in the van in developing the Commonwealth in its modern form.

Mr. Woodcock writes with understanding about the now vanished empire. He combines with this a clear appreciation of the realities of the new Commonwealth relationship, by no means a universal combination. On the Suez crisis he writes that 'though the events of that time spelt the end of what remained of the Empire, they guaranteed the survival of the Commonwealth by forcing it to exist as a completely flexible association of States' (p. 159). And, right at the end of his book, he comments that 'if Britain moves out of the centre into the circle of equality in what becomes a genuine Commonwealth of Nations rather than a British Commonwealth, then it may survive as a common ground in which co-operation will eventually lead to concord' (p. 334).

Inevitably, in covering so much ground the author has perpetrated some errors of compression. They are minor, and are certainly not to be seen as blemishes on a fascinating study.

W. P. KIRKMAN

Britain and the Sino-Japanese War 1937–1939: A Study in the Dilemmas of British Decline. By Bradford A. Lee. *Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1973. 319 pp. Index. Bibliog. £4·75.*

IT will take much burrowing into British diplomatic and other papers before it is possible to trace at all clearly the history of British policy towards the emerging Japanese empire in the period up to 1941. Even then what will emerge may be no more than a series of paradoxes.

In his very refreshing study of the years 1937–39 Dr. Lee sets out one paradox in particular. At the very time Britain was trying to appease Germany it was taking a decidedly different line towards Japan. That there should be an interaction between the various areas of British concern was wholly natural; by general consent the armed services could not fight on several fronts at once and care had to be taken not to provoke two enemies simultaneously. It was therefore odd that Britain should not attempt to appease Japan.

Despite half-hearted efforts made by Eden, Chamberlain was obviously convinced that no support against Japan would be forthcoming from the United States. None was likely from France or the League of Nations, and none was sought from the Soviet Union. Britain had vital interests to safeguard throughout Asia. For a prime minister willing to appease Germany there was no apparent reason for not dealing similarly with Japan.

Yet, two instances apart, no serious effort was made. The Foreign Office was mainly hostile. To Chamberlain, Japan was far away, committed to its Chinese invasion and therefore no immediate problem. In any case, he had no real desire to alienate the United States through friendship with Japan or to encourage Soviet penetration of China by the same tactic. In contrast to Germany, Japan was generally held to be unjustifiably aggressive and basically unappeasable; and there was a strong British interest in the Chinese market. There also appeared to be a fair chance that China would keep Japan tied down until Britain was free to cope with and even profit from the Far Eastern struggle. So the policy adopted was one of benevolent neutrality aimed at propping up China, yet neither opposing nor appeasing Japan.

In the end Britain probably reaped the worst of both rejected extremes. Dr. Lee sees this as the almost inevitable result of Britain's declining power which posed insoluble dilemmas. Perhaps he could have probed deeper. Britain's decline was less certain at the time than has since been alleged. Neville Chamberlain followed the family tradition of opposing Russian expansion and supporting Anglo-German superiority. The British public liked 'bolsheviks' and 'yellow men' no more than he did and were equally inclined to believe in the future of imperial interests in Asia.

No doubt Dr. Lee will extend his study and reveal more of the contradictions embedded in British policy. In the interim his book is a useful addition to the sum of research on British appeasement in its world-wide setting.

WILLIAM V. WALLACE

The Abyssinian Crisis. By Frank Hardie. *London: Batsford. 1974. 294 pp. Map. Bibliog. Index. £6·00.*

The League of Nations. Edited by Ruth B. Henig. *Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. 1973. 203 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Evidence and Commentary, Historical Course Books; Series Eds.: C. M. D. Crowder and L. Kochan.) £3·50. Paperback: £1·75.*

DR. FRANK HARDIE points out that he enjoys an advantage nowadays rare for those who write about the years between the wars. He can both remember the 'flavour' of the events, and has access to the official documents about them. But, seemingly in an effort to be brief, he does not give himself room to do justice either to his memory or to the hard evidence now available.

Of his memories, he scarcely makes use at all. For instance, he omits, or relegates to mere mention, incidents that anyone who pinned his faith on the League of Nations still finds unforgettable because they struck its knell. Examples are the sinister coincidence on March 16, 1935, of the two main news headlines—Abyssinia's appeal to the League under Article 15 (notification of disputes 'likely to lead to a rupture') and the announcement of Hitler's rearmament decree; or the publication by the *Giornale d'Italia* (February 20, 1936) of a secret British Cabinet paper which could not be

denied, and which stated that interests were the only things worth using force to defend and British interests were not affected if Italy conquered Abyssinia; or the chagrin of watching a diminutive, careworn Haile Selassie mounting the rostrum of the League Assembly to tell 52 nations that they had failed to stick either to their principles or their word. A good chronology does not make up for the lack of snapshots such as these. Almost the only piece of eye- or ear-witness evidence that he uses is his recording of Sir Samuel Hoare's emphatic repetition, after a pause, of the word 'collective' when preaching to the Assembly on collective maintenance of the Covenant in his famous but misleading speech of September 1935.

Simultaneously, Dr. Hardie skimps or over-condenses the new evidence available. He neglects almost all French and Italian sources. Presumably this is because he sees Britain as the only power physically capable of stopping Mussolini, and therefore primarily to blame for not giving a lead, but if so his book is mis-titled. It ought to be *Britain and the Abyssinian Crisis*. Yet he under-uses even the British public records. He backs too many of his absolute statements with secondary evidence from a single source. For example, on page 63 his strictures against Laval for seeing the problem 'narrowly, shortsightedly and superficially' are based only on Alexander Werth's opinion, and those against Mussolini for going to war not for the fruits of victory but 'because he wanted war' (p. 232), only on the evidence of Hitler's interpreter. Both judgments are modified by Dr. Hardie's own evidence elsewhere.

The book has some advantages. No good one has yet appeared of a subject that was almost at once swept out of mind by Hitler's crimes nearer home; the book forthcoming from F. W. D. Deakin may surpass it, but meanwhile it stands alone, for the other accounts available dwell on the military rather than the diplomatic scene. It is well written, and invents some telling phrases, such as Baldwin's 'streak of selective indolence' (p. 65). It is also totally dispassionate, which cannot be said of Professor Arnold Toynbee's longer and much livelier instamatic exposure in Volume II of the 1935 *Survey*.

Who is it written for? Not for beginners; for them, it too often refers without explanation to incidents or acts they will have forgotten or do not know (for example, 'the East Fulham election' of 1935, or 'the Nine and Four Power treaties' about the Pacific). If for students and scholars, it is uncomfortably arranged. For lack of an alphabetical bibliography, they will find that reference to sources entails much tedious hunting for information that is partly in footnotes and partly in a sort of essay on good books. For anyone, it is much too expensive for a text of only 240 or so pages, and one without any costly adjuncts such as illustrations or maps.

The audience for which Ruth Henig has composed her paperback is plain. She is a university teacher, and it is arranged for students in the form of contemporary extracts from speeches or writings, plus a brief commentary. In a double review, it is tempting to judge her chiefly on her Abyssinian chapter; this stands up well to Dr. Hardie. Her quotations from General de Bono, and the Duce's instructions to him, point up Italy's motives. She sums up American sanctimoniousness about isolation in a paragraph, and the failure of sanctions by quoting Hungary: 'The exclusion of Italy from Hungary's restricted and limited trade outlets would completely upset our economic and financial equilibrium'. Others who thought the same were less candid. Her handling of the Manchurian incident and the League's several successes in the 1920s is equally succinct and based on a similarly wide range

of knowledge. In a prelude, she shows that it was Smuts rather than any of the many other purveyors of peace plans who set President Wilson off on devising the pattern of the Covenant as an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles, and in the course of her comment reveals how fatal was this decision to the maintenance of great power membership. As a forum, she sees the League as a 'qualified success'; as a guarantor of members' territorial integrity and political independence, as 'a non-starter'. Part of its failure was shortage of great power members, the corollary of which is too many small power voters, trying 'to tailor the League to fit their own requirements'. Disaster followed when great powers did the same. She reckons that had the League been a total failure, the United Nations Organisation would never have been founded, but some of her explanations for the League's futility are depressingly true of the United Nations today.

ELIZABETH MONROE

Race to Pearl Harbour: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II. By Stephen E. Pelz. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1974. 268 pp. Illus. Map. Bibliog. Index. (Harvard Studies in American-East Asian Relations 5; sponsored and ed. by the Committee on American-Far Eastern Policy Studies of the Department of History at Harvard University.) £8·75.*

AT the first London Conference of 1930 the Japanese agreed, albeit very reluctantly, to continue the 5: 5: 3 ratio for the navies of Britain, the United States and Japan as signed at Washington in 1922; but both the other powers had to make sacrifices to secure Japanese agreement. For example Britain reduced its total cruiser needs from 70 to 50 and the United States its heavy cruisers built to Washington Treaty limits from 23 to 18. The two treaties expired at the end of 1936, and negotiations for their renewal began informally some 16 months previously. But the world situation had altered fundamentally in the meantime. Britain and America were still beset by the aftermath of the great economic crisis and were committed to budgetary orthodoxy; Japan had got away with flagrant aggression in Manchuria in 1931, and had since been steadily expanding its influence in north China; Germany was rearming in defiance of the Versailles Treaty; Italy and France were at loggerheads on naval strength and highly suspicious of each other; and Britain (as the leading naval power in the League of Nations) had come to the brink of conflict with Italy over the partial sanctions imposed as a consequence of its invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. Despite all the warning signs pacifist feeling was very strong in Britain and the United States, and neither country was prepared to embark on large scale rearmament; while in America there were unmistakable signs of a return to isolationism as well as passionate opposition to 'entangling alliances'.

Professor Pelz's study is mainly, though not solely, concerned with the major powers' naval policy from 1934–39, and is particularly valuable for the use he has made of Japanese records, which are not easily assimilated and analysed by English-speaking historians. He sets the political scene in each country with clarity, though I admit that I think he errs in playing down the cares and worries of the British about the security of their Far Eastern possessions and interests. All the British records from 1921 onwards show how deep was the concern over the loss of the Japanese alliance in 1922 and the need to counter Japan's strategic control of the Western

Pacific (a legacy of the Washington Treaties). Thus it is an over-simplification to conclude that the British government of the 1930s 'ignored their possessions in the Pacific' (p. 191) and 'shut its eyes to the danger in the East and built only enough ships to counter the growing threat in Europe' (p. 210)—though Pelz does qualify those statements by explaining what the latter threat was and how it arose. Again and again did the Chiefs of Staff warn the government that to fight all three dictatorships simultaneously would be suicidal; and that explains the attempt first to arrive at a modus vivendi with Japan and, when that proved impossible without antagonising the United States, to restore friendly relations with Italy after the débâcle over Abyssinia. It is true enough that we grossly underestimated both Japanese technical skill and fighting prowess, were obsessed by the dominance of the big gun battleship, and started rearmament too little and too late; but the Americans were not guiltless of similar misjudgments, while it was the Japanese who built the biggest battleships of all time. On the other hand, there was sense in the desire of Chamberlain and the Treasury to husband our financial resources and preserve our shaky credit; for who in 1936 could have foreseen the Lend Lease Act? Indeed until 1938 America appeared in British eyes as a very uncertain ally, and Roosevelt's 'Quarantine' speech at Chicago in the previous year had raised a howl of outrage from the isolationist lobby—many of whose members belonged to his own party.

At the 1935–36 conference Japan was determined to get the Washington ratios abolished. It proposed a 'common upper limit' for the three powers, and the abolition of 'offensive' types—including battleships and aircraft carriers—knowing as well as we knew when, in 1921 and 1930, we had proposed to abolish the submarine, that there was no chance at all of it being accepted. But Pelz's account of the actual negotiations is both fair and masterly, though he might have stressed the exemplary patience shown by Admiral Chatfield, the First Sea Lord, and Sir Robert Craigie of the Foreign Office in trying to prevent a breakdown. Norman Davis, the chief American delegate, was less patient and it was not until nearly the end of 1935 that he reported that 'the only solution was Anglo-American co-operation' (p. 143). The climax came on January 15, 1936, when the Japanese delegates withdrew, whilst 'pledging that Japan would not start a naval race' (p. 164).

That statement was a bare-faced lie, since the Japanese navy had meanwhile greatly strengthened its position vis-à-vis the army and its case for a southward drive—to secure the oil and raw materials of south-east Asia. 'The belligerence of the [Japanese] navy leadership', remarks Pelz 'was the most remarkable aspect' of that period (p. 178); but he might have mentioned the antagonism aroused by the overtly racialist American immigration laws and the effects on Japanese exports of the high American tariff wall. The Japanese believed that in the short term they could outbuild America, and so launched in the utmost secrecy their huge third, fourth and fifth 'Replenishment Programmes' of 1936–41. They expected to reach a peak of advantage in about May 1942, which made it essential to strike about six months earlier. But the very size of Japanese building at last 'shocked the Americans from their slumber' (p. 209), their vast industrial capacity was mobilised just in time and their spirit aroused by the attack on Pearl Harbour. The Battle of Midway of June 1942 falsified all Japanese hopes and ambitions just at the time when they had expected conclusive victory.

Though Mr. Pelz might have been more generous about all that the

Americans gained from us in 1939–41 this is a well written and authoritative account of the naval policies, strategies and personalities of the preceding five or six years.

STEPHEN ROSKILL

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

R.U.S.I. and Brassey's Defence Yearbook. 1974. Edited by The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London. Preface by S. W. B. Menaul. *London: Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual Ltd. in association with Thornton Cox Ltd. 1974. (Distrib. by Seeley Service and Cooper.) 338 pp. Bibliog. £7·50.*

THE well-known Brassey's annual has taken on a new look and a new title with its 85th edition. Part I *Strategic review*, contains ten articles by academics of international repute. A good balance has been achieved in the choice of topics which include China's strategic posture in a changing world, the Yom Kippur war, the defence of Europe, Soviet-American relations and the problems resulting from the energy crisis. Part II is a factual survey of weapons systems in service or under development. This will be updated in later editions. Part III lists a selection of the studies on defence published between June 1973 and May 1974.

The International Who's Who. Thirty-Eighth Edition. 1974–75. *London: Europa. 1974. 1923 pp. £13·00.*

DESPITE the fact that there have probably never before been so many changes in government and political leadership as during 1973/74, the latest edition of this remarkable reference book manages to take account of most of them. Science, the arts, the business world and education have not been neglected either. Professor Dahrendorf is even noted as the BBC Reith lecturer for 1974 although the lectures were broadcast after the book was published on October 17, 1974.

The International Foundation Directory. Edited by H. V. Hodson. *London: Europa. 1974. 396 pp. Bibliog. Indexes. £7·95.*

THE 550 foundations listed in this directory are all non-profit making, they possess substantial capital assets and they are not subordinate to some other institution; for example, research institutes of universities are excluded. The range of subjects covered, however, is wide and includes education, science, medicine, economics, law, social welfare, technical assistance and international relations. Some were founded to provide financial support to individuals and organisations, others to carry out research themselves or to act as pressure groups. The entries, which are arranged by country with title and subject indexes, report on the foundations' aims and activities and give brief details of their financial assets and governing bodies.

Annuaire Européen, European Yearbook: Vol. XX, 1972. *The Hague: Nijhoff under the auspices of the Council of Europe. 934 pp. Bibliogs. Indexes. Fl. 180.00.*

THE first part of this annual contains seven articles on topics concerning Western Europe. The second and most important section begins with a chart showing the membership of European organisations in 1973 and then has sixteen chapters each devoted to a different organisation. The usual pattern is a chronology for 1972, a report on activities and a selection of the texts of basic documents followed by a list of publications of the organisation in question. The third section contains reviews of six books on European

co-operation and a fifteen-page select bibliography of periodical and pamphlet material on the topic.

Bibliographie zur Aussenpolitik der Republik Österreich seit 1945. (Stand: 31. Dezember 1971.) By Lilly-Ralou Behrmann, Peter Proché and Wolfgang Strasser. *Vienna, Stuttgart: Braumüller. 1974. 505 pp. Indexes. (Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik und Internationale Beziehungen, Band 7.) Sch. 588.00. DM 85.00. Sw. Frs. 98.00.*

THIS is an extremely well produced bibliography which should be in any library dealing with international affairs in Western Europe since the end of the Second World War. It contains references to books and pamphlets and also to articles in several hundred periodicals and to chapters in symposia. The entries are classified and within each class arranged chronologically.

Particularly useful sections cover Austria's position at the crossroads of Europe and the problem of the South Tyrol.

Yugoslavia: A Bibliographic Guide. By Michael B. Petrovich for the Slavic and Central European Division. Foreword by Sergius Yakobsen. *Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress. 1974. 270 pp. $3.25.*

THIS guide is part of a series dealing with the countries of central Europe. Since it aims at serving the general reader, the research specialist and the librarian, it cannot, as the compiler himself says, fully satisfy any of them. The first part is a bibliographical survey covering reference works and books on the social and historical sciences, the arts and the humanities in West European languages and in those spoken in Yugoslavia. The second lists in alphabetical order the books previously discussed (more than 2,500) and gives their Library of Congress call numbers.

The Middle East and North Africa 1974–75. Twenty-First Edition. A survey and directory of Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spanish North Africa, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic and Yemen People's Democratic Republic. *London: Europa. 1974. 931 pp. Maps. Bibliogs. £10·50.*

Now that it has reached its twenty-first edition this reference book is so well known as to require little comment. It continues to maintain its usual high standard in the country surveys and in the section on regional organisations. Professor W. B. Fisher contributes a concise review of the year in the Middle East, Richard Johns of the *Financial Times* writes on oil while Hanns Maull contributes a new article on the arms trade.

NEW PERIODICALS

Journal of Southern African Studies. Volume 1, Number 1, October 1974. Editors Anthony Atmore, Richard Hodder-Williams and J. E. Spence. Introd. by James Barber, Chairman of the Editorial Board. *London, New York, Lusaka, Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 1974. 136 pp. Annual sub.: £4·00. $13.00. Each copy: £2·00. $7.00.*

THIS new journal focuses on Southern African studies. The region embraced covers South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Angola and Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi and Rhodesia and occasionally Zaïre, Malagasy Republic and Mauritius. The editorial board consists of academics from a variety of British universities who believe the area deserves special study, both in its own right and because of its international significance. Its professed aims are to be interdisciplinary and 'at all times objective' in the selection of articles.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

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CORRESPONDENCE

From Professor L. F. Rushbrook Williams

To the Editor, *International Affairs.*

Madam,

Brigadier Harbottle's courteous reply to my letter on page 149 of the January 1975 issue of *International Affairs* argues some failure on my part to clarify the point I was trying to make about the attitude of a former Pakistan Government towards the peacekeeping functions of the United Nations. In fact, it was while support for the independence movement in East Pakistan had only begun to escalate from the Indian side that the then Pakistan Government made a series of requests for the good offices of the United Nations to assist in the return of the refugees, to inspect the arrangements made for their resettlement and—ultimately—to send a team of observers to help in keeping peace on the frontier by arranging for the withdrawal to an agreed distance of Regular forces on either side. These initiatives failed because of Indian opposition; but do they not show that Pakistan's approach to the United Nations when India invaded East Pakistan was the final stage in a sustained effort to seek the good offices of that organisation in the whole tragic dispute? It seems doubtful if any Government could have done more to invoke United Nations help in view of the fact that until India invaded her neighbour, the rising in East Pakistan was, in law, a domestic matter, just as are the risings in Mizoram and Nagaland in India today.

Yours sincerely,

L. F. Rushbrook Williams

BOOKS REVIEWED, APRIL 1975

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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'KISSINGERISM': THE ENDURING PROBLEMS

J. L. S. Girling

THIS article is *not*—at one end of the scale—about the personality of the man or the legacy of his diplomatic manoeuvres: what was said to Sadat and retailed to the Israelis, and vice-versa; how reporters were briefed and Congressmen influenced. It is not about such virtuoso performances, made possible by prodigious energy, patience, skill and cunning; in sum, the attributes of a superb tactician. Nor—at the other end of the scale—is it about the *irrelevance* of Kissingerism (that is, of conventional diplomacy, however capable or inspired) to the elemental problems of the world: economic, environmental, problems of food, population and energy, which by-pass, or rather overwhelm, the limited capacities of nation states and their statesmen. On the contrary, this is a study of the traditional, perennial, topic of power politics, which, if dwarfed by planetary issues, is still a matter of great importance to many people and, in some areas, literally a matter of life and death.

The politics of Kissingerism is revealed in the answers to two questions he posed in 1969, before his appointment as Presidential Assistant on National Security Affairs. What is it in America's interest to prevent? And what should we seek to accomplish? Answering the first question, he criticised the 'undifferentiated globalism' and confusion of purpose in America's containment policy. Kissinger's recommendation was to think more in terms of *power* and *equilibrium*: principle, however lofty, must be related to practice. As for the question of 'positive goals', Kissinger acknowledged—for it was evident by 1968 that a turning point had been reached in American foreign affairs—that the United States could no longer impose its preferred solution, but must contribute instead to a structure of policy that would foster the initiative of others. A clearer understanding of America's interests and the requirements of equilibrium, he affirmed, 'can give perspective to our idealism' and lead to 'humane and moderate objectives', particularly in relation to political and social change.[1]

These are the two faces of what may conveniently be called

[1] 'Central Issues of American Foreign Policy', in *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays*. (New York: Norton; London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1969), pp. 91–94.

'Kissingerism'. For the Nixon-Kissinger realignment of foreign policy has become the norm, signifying the *continuance* of Kissingerism without Nixon and with or without Kissinger. The realignment is two-fold: the expectation and to some extent the realisation of 'high policy' detente among great powers (Kissinger's 'equilibrium') combined with 'low policy' supremacy over most of the rest (Kissinger's 'power').

By 'supremacy'—or hegemony in the sense of leadership of a confederacy—I mean not only the position of America as 'supreme commander' of the North Atlantic pact and supreme protector of Japan at the 'higher' level; but in particular on the 'lower' level as the major partner in military alliances with some fifty countries and as the leading arms supplier to even more [2]; as the dominant force, along with its allies in Western Europe and Japan, in the market economy of the non-communist world; and thus at the apex of a global hierarchy of military, political and economic power.

This supremacy is to be understood, not merely in the formal sense, as leader of an alliance or alliances, bilateral or multilateral. Just as important is the informal aspect of American supremacy, expressed sociologically as 'patron-client' relations. It is in the 'interest' of clients (most Third World regimes) to keep on good terms with their patron, as it is in the interest of the patron to provide what the client needs—above all, security. Similar to the feudal system of lord and vassal, there is a functional relationship of mutual benefit: the 'lord' gets more out of the system, because he has more power, wealth and prestige; but the 'vassal' also benefits, chiefly in the form of protection, but also in proportion to his lesser power and wealth. For the nature of the system is such that the vassal or client, in international terms, is also the lord or patron in his own *domestic* hierarchy. The 'patron' —authoritarian leader, or members of a military clique or military-bureaucratic establishment, for the most part—has his own dependent clients in a subsidiary system of mutual benefit: such as businessmen, technocrats, lawyers, middle level officers and officials, better-off farmers, and so on down the scale.

In effect, the profitable functioning of an international hierarchy of patron-client relations depends on the proper functioning of all these subordinate patronage systems. This rule applies to each of the super-powers; to other great powers with military, political or economic dependencies (whose functions may overlap with those of the super-

[2] In the fiscal year ending June 1974 the United States sold $8.5 billion worth of arms (including $4 billion to Iran, $1 billion to Israel, and $700 million to Saudi Arabia) —nearly double the previous year's sales—compared to 1973 sales of $2 billion by US allies, chiefly Britain and France, and an estimated $2.5 billion by Russia and Eastern Europe: *New York Times* Weekly Review, July 14, 1974.

power); and even to the intermediate range of 'middle powers', acting as regional patrons: such as Indonesia in much of South-east Asia, Iran in the Persian Gulf, perhaps Egypt in the Arab Middle East, and Brazil in Latin America.

Considered 'realistically'—from the standpoint of the existing distribution of military, political and economic power and its use, not necessarily as power *should* be used, or not used [3]—patron-client relations are most satisfactorily maintained at the international level by *indirect* means: that is, each knows his role in the system and plays his part accordingly; while the ultimate sanction of direct intervention by the patron is held in reserve. (Similarly, within a satisfactorily functioning state the outright resort to force is normally only for emergencies.) This is explicitly formulated in the 'Nixon Doctrine', which is one of 'assisting' clients to do their job properly—*i.e.*, within their sphere of competence—precisely so that the patron does not have to go to the expense, trouble and perhaps risk (of entangling with a rival patron) of having to intervene directly to put things right.

The problem with the doctrine—as with Britain's 'informal empire' in the 19th century—is what to do when indirect methods fail: that is, when there is a challenge to supremacy at one or another level of the global hierarchy. Then, according to the implications of the doctrine, more direct methods must be considered. These range from expanding economic and military assistance to beleaguered regimes up to the deployment of various forms of force. But the choice of methods depends, not only on the 'motivation' of the patron, but on the viability of the client, the importance of the area, the availability of power and the opportunity to use it. The latter in turn usually depends on the 'legitimacy' of the context—such as response to a government's appeal for help—and on the assumed likelihood that intervention will not set off a wider conflict. In other words *discrimination*—that is, adapting policies to circumstances—is inseparable from the proper functioning of the 'informal' strategy.

Indeed the connection between the 'higher' and the 'lower' levels of United States policy—between detente among the great powers and supremacy elsewhere—is precisely that *under present circumstances* detente is a more realistic method than 'containment' for preserving the essential: the *status quo* generally favourable to American patronage. Containment had proved unworkable as a result of the

[3] This is in line with Kissinger's views, expressed in *A World Restored* (Boston: London, 1957), that 'legitimacy' in international relations should not be confused with 'justice'. Legitimacy means no more than an international agreement about the nature of 'workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy'. 'An order whose structure is accepted by all major powers is "legitimate" . . .': quoted by Alastair Buchan, 'The Irony of Kissinger', *International Affairs*, July 1974, p. 369.

global 'resist aggression' thesis, the risks and burdens of which had become evident to Kissinger in 1969. Detente, but without dropping America's guard, is seen, on the contrary, as a way to create 'vested interests on both sides in restraint and the strengthening of peace'.[4] For the mutual interest in building a 'stable structure of peace' is that 'all countries share its benefits'—though some, as we have seen, more than others. And so far from detente being at the expense of a 'leading American role in world affairs', this role 'continues to be indispensable to the kind of world our own well-being requires'.[5] Thus both 'high' and 'low' policies combine to form an infrastructure of national security upon which Kissinger's 'positive goals'—humane and moderate objectives, in relation to political and social change—are on display as a desirable, if insubstantial, superstructure.

If these are the objectives sought, to what extent have they been achieved? For the realistic and the idealistic aspects of Kissingerist policies are subject to the countervailing pressures of the immediate and the particular. These affect policies in two ways. First, as structural problems that are to a considerable extent independent, as Kissinger writes, of the intentions of the policy-makers. Second, in so far as immediate pressures reinforce or undermine the basic ideas and attitudes which shape policy. In other words, not only are there differing, and even contradictory, conceptions at work at the various levels of Kissingerism, but the resulting performance in every case is moulded by circumstances that cannot be completely managed even by a super-power.

Intelligent adaptation of policies to circumstances is critical to performance. Policies, as already indicated, are of high and low level 'realism', and include the recognition of values. Circumstances are those of super-power rivalry and co-operation, partnership and competition with allies, and elements of global interdependence, at one level; and of stable or unstable regimes in areas of strategic or non-strategic importance to America, at another. The product—performance—provides the standard by which Kissinger himself would have policies judged. Those that are realistic under the circumstances and that serve the 'national interest' (of which conformity with deeply-held values must be part) can be considered 'sound'; the 'unsoundness' of policies, on the other hand, varies according to the degree of inconsistency between high and low levels of policy, between policies and circumstances, and finally between realism and values. For

[4] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace*, Report to the US Congress by Richard Nixon, May 3, 1973 (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 8.

[5] 'The Philosophy of a New American Foreign Policy', *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace*, Report to Congress by Nixon, Feb. 9, 1972, pp. 2–3.

example, the 'credibility' of America's commitments—a constant theme from Truman to Ford—reflects the significance of low policy (maintenance of supremacy) in the higher 'equilibrium'; but the insistence on credibility under almost any circumstance only obscures the question whether and to what extent commitments can realistically be sustained under adverse (unsound) conditions. In such cases it is not the credibility of the Administration's will or ability to uphold commitments that is lacking, but the credibility of its judgment.

In the following sections I propose to set out both the evidence for and the implications of this contrast between goal and reality—or what Kissinger, in a more limited sense, calls the 'gap between conception and performance'—in regard to present American policy towards the Third World. In my view, however, faulty performance is due to something more than Kissinger's gap: my conclusion is that while the basic conception of global co-operation instead of conflict is sound, *other* leading conceptions are not; and that the performance resulting from these conceptions—allowing for the contingent nature of foreign affairs—is only what can be expected. Thus if the performance is open to criticism, as Kissinger acknowledges in his address on 'Moral Purposes and Political Choices' to the *Pacem in Terris* Conference in October 1973 [6]—although his examples reflect on Congress rather than the executive—then it is these conceptions which need to be changed.

To understand the changes required, it is necessary to analyse first, the Nixon Doctrine, which in the form of Kissingerism remains central to American policy: whether it does or does not provide adequate guidance to distinguish between 'unsound' and 'essential' commitments, to extricate from the former without damaging the latter, or to reconcile the 'lower' with the 'higher' level of policy; second the specific test of the Nixon Doctrine posed by the various forms of struggle in Indochina; and finally the 'problems of Kissingerism', which are basically those of 'credibility', international power in a world of sovereign but unequal states, and the ambiguity of 'moral purposes and political choices'.

The Nixon Doctrine

The 'key elements' of the Nixon Doctrine are:

> The United States will keep all its treaty commitments. We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens . . . In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we

[6] Text in Dept. of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 29, 1973.

> shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.[7]

However, as Gibbon observes, 'it is not usually in the language of edicts and manifestoes that we should search for the real character or the secret motives of princes . . .'[8] According to one scholar, the real character of the Nixon Doctrine is far less imposing than is often maintained. It is 'not really a strategy'; it 'offered no criteria by which U.S. officials could determine the importance of countries or regions for American security. Nor did the doctrine define the kind of world order deemed desirable by the United States and ways of achieving such order'. As for the 'secret motives' of the prince:

> At best the doctrine was a statement of qualified military disengagement and the substitution of American treasure for lives. At worst the doctrine comprised a loose collection of ambiguous statements by which neither allies nor enemies could predict what situations would lead to what kinds of American intervention.[9]

The ambiguity of the doctrine, emphasised by Simon, reflects the instability and 'uncertainty' of the environment in which it is supposed to operate: to be more specific, the contrast between favourable tendencies at the 'higher' level of international relations and depressing prospects at certain areas of the 'lower'. For although the climate of detente allows more freedom of manoeuvre for the United States, on the one hand, the circumstances of its client states continue to impose embarrassing, at times unsuspected, and occasionally harmful limitations on the other. Thus detente and the trend towards multipolar differentiation—and perhaps diffusion—of power encourage the belief that America's burden of global security can both be shared (among 'partners') and reduced, because the threat of international conflict has been reduced; yet the burden has simply assumed another, and hardly less contradictory, form. For Washington's endeavour to be free of risky liabilities is harnessed to an even more evident desire to maintain its assets—that is, a generally favourable status quo.

To preserve the status quo in a peaceful and stable environment presents few problems. It is where conditions are unstable, as in the Middle East, parts of Latin America, and South-east Asia, that the United States faces an insoluble dilemma. Either it seeks to extricate itself from awkward commitments so as to avert the danger of getting

[7] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace*, A Report to Congress by Richard Nixon, Feb. 18, 1970, pp. 55–56.

[8] *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (abridged ed. by D. M. Low, Penguin Books, 1963), ch. 16, p. 234.

[9] Sheldon Simon, *War and Politics in Cambodia: a communications analysis* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1974), p. 104.

involved in conflict; yet this compounds the insecurity of an already unsettled regime, which in turn further encourages its opponents (domestic or external), rendering the regime still more precarious and thus bringing about the very situation (the compulsion to intervene) which the original policy was designed to prevent. Or else the United States whole-heartedly backs its commitment from the beginning, which not only antagonises the domestic or regional opponents of the client regime, but may also alienate great power rivals which have security interests of their own in the area and which accordingly step up support to *their* clients, thus creating a similar situation—with added danger of international escalation and conflict—to the first.

There are therefore three distinct ways of assessing the Nixon Doctrine: first, from the standpoint of balancing interests against commitments; second, in terms of a stable or unstable environment—in other words, where there is muted (or ineffective) adversary reactions, on the one hand, and determined and effective opposition, on the other; this, too, should be subdivided into indigenous, regional or international manifestations. And finally the doctrine must be considered from the perspective of global policy: whether the emphasis is on the political aspects (contributing to detente) or on the strategic aspects—*i.e.*, maintaining the alliance system and involvement in the internal security of 'friends' and allies.

The *optimistic interpretation* [10] of the doctrine reflects the official assumption that 'our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around' and/or the existence of a stable environment. The *pessimistic interpretation* stems from the belief that priority is still given to the preservation of existing assets (that is, American backing for commitments regardless of 'interests', discriminatingly defined by area and circumstance) in an unstable environment. In either case, or in mixed cases, the policy of the Administration (from discriminating to undiscriminating) in a particular setting (from stable to unstable) affects both national interest [11] and the international balance.

[10] 'Optimistic' in the sense of giving effect to those aspects of the doctrine that are conducive to more stable and constructive relations among allies and adversaries. This, in other words, is a reformist standpoint—to *improve* the international policy and practice of a super-power—not a radical one, which tends to reject 'globalism' entirely. War provides an analogy. It is more practical to limit the effect of war than to try to abolish it outright. The first attitude is realistic, the second utopian.

[11] 'National interest' is an elusive concept: like love, we know what it is about, but it is difficult to define. Indeed the more we attempt to define it, the more the 'feeling' we have for it disappears. Evidently national interest can be analysed into its spiritual, physical and sentimental components: values (felt to be worth realising, worth defending), strategic, political and economic interests, and so on. Like Rousseau's 'general will' they are in the national interest if they are directed to the 'common good'; but if partial interests are not the general will, nor is it the sum of these interests, then how do we know what is? Is national security—the ultimate interest—to the common good

In conditions of stability and realism (where interests shape commitments) the optimistic interpretation emphasises the tactical role of the doctrine in the strategy of 'higher policy': detente between the super-powers, in an era of negotiation, leading to the creation of a 'stable structure of peace'. But the pessimistic interpretation—viewing 'assets' as 'liabilities'—is concerned with the damaging effect of open-ended commitments to insecure allies, in regions of low strategic importance, on the overall balance.

The optimistic interpretation takes the doctrine seriously both as a profession of faith (in the future world order) and as a statement of intent (how the United States will act with regard to its commitments so as to help bring about that world order). The pessimistic interpretation takes political behaviour seriously—noting that vested interests, bureaucratic inertia and long-established commitments inhibit or contradict the proposed changes—and it considers the doctrine sceptically, if not cynically, either as a facile attempt to have it both ways (extensive commitments *and* a structure of peace) or as a dignified facade hiding the ugly reality of 'tilting', expediency and *realpolitik*.

Although it is beyond the power of the United States to 'have it both ways', it is still possible, from an optimistic point of view, to reconcile carefully-defined national interest with a stable balance of power. Indeed the Nixon Doctrine, in its self-reliant aspect, proposes a discriminating approach to potentially critical areas: 'In contemplating new commitments'—old ones that are 'unsound' will *in time* be liquidated—'we will apply rigorous yardsticks: What precisely is our national concern? What precisely is the threat? What would be the efficacy of our involvement?' The more American foreign policy is based on a 'realistic assessment' of our own and other interests, the presidential report goes on, 'the more effective our role in the world can be'.[12]

Yet it is not so much the question of new as of *old* commitments that is the flaw in the doctrine. Unsound commitments—*i.e.*, backing unstable regimes in areas not of major strategic importance to America—should be ended for this very reason. But it is argued that this cannot be done quickly for fear of undermining the 'confidence' of other allies in American readiness to come to their assistance. 'Phasing out' gradually, on the other hand, means continuing to

if the greater the effort to realise it in a competitive world the more insecure others become? Is 'world order'—necessary to safeguard the political interests of each—to the common good if it legitimises the status quo, hence inequality among nations and within nations? 'National interest' is essentially subjective: *e.g.*, I believe it is in Britain's interest to stay in the E.E.C.; others believe the exact opposite. Each view is a synthesis that cannot altogether be justified by analysis.

[12] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace*, Feb. 25, 1971, p. 5.

underwrite an unstable ally for a dangerously open-ended period. For as long as the ally remains unstable it cannot be 'abandoned'—at least without loss of prestige. Thus the guarantor ends up with precisely the risk of 'having' to intervene (in order to retain credibility), which it is the aim of the doctrine to avoid. Here in all its ambiguity is the desire (optimism), but not the ability (pessimism), to see the United States extricated from rash and ill thought-out commitments, undertaken for reasons of out-moded global strategy, to governments whose inability to cope with domestic difficulties lays an unnecessarily heavy burden on the intervening world power.

Thus the optimistic interpretation of the Nixon Doctrine clearly favours a return to the 'indirect approach', characteristic of British imperial policy during much of the 19th century; this indeed was also characteristic of American policy, apart from Central America and the Caribbean—*i.e.* economic expansion free of political entanglements—up to the outbreak of the Second World War. But America's current international responsibilities cannot be assured merely by maintaining the network of political and economic ties involved in the system of 'bargains' with Third World elites. As Gallagher and Robinson point out with reference to 19th-century Britain, where informal means failed to provide security for its enterprises, then it was necessary to resort to direct rule. Both were intertwined aspects of expansion overseas. Political action aided the growth of commercial supremacy which, in turn, strengthened political influence. The latter varied with the economic value of the territory, the strength of the political structure, the readiness of rulers to collaborate with the metropolitan power's commercial or strategic purposes, the ability of the native society to undergo economic changes without external control, the extent to which domestic and foreign policy situations permitted external intervention, and how far foreign rivals allowed a free hand. 'Stable governments' were encouraged as 'good investment risks', while weaker or unsatisfactory states were liable to be coerced into a more co-operative attitude.[13]

The inescapable problem of what sanctions are to be employed by a super-power to maintain 'supremacy' in an international system of states with such diverse capability and authority cannot be resolved according to global principles—but only by a process of discrimination which establishes concrete priorities.

Given the immense power of the United States, the variety of forms in which this power can be used (military, political or economic) and the many opportunities available in the Third World for using it,

[13] John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', *The Economic History Review*, August 1953.

the question of vital importance is whether priority is to be given to commitments *or* interests (including the enlightened self-interest implicit in a stable structure of peace); to a 'global' *or* a discriminating policy towards friends and allies (according to the calibre of their regimes and their strategic importance to the United States or lack of it); and to taking due account of the reasons for instability *or* acting on the mere presumption of internal subversion or external manipulation. The doctrine is plausible: but what of the performance?

Indochina: the test

'The Vietnamese war will eventually have to be justified and understood', writes George Liska, 'as one of the less agreeable manifestations of the American world role'. This role defines—by force if necessary—the terms on which regional balances of power are evolved and American access to individual regions is secured, even as these regions move to greater self-dependence. In order that it may be exercised most of the time by indirection and circumscribed delegation, Liska explains, 'American leadership must on occasion be direct and forcible'.[14] Such is the logic of the imperial role.

'Normally' there is no need for American military intervention—at least on such a scale as in Indochina. The international system of the non-communist world—apart from the effects of super-power confrontation—is self-regulating. Thus, in security terms, the ruling elites can be relied upon to defend their privileges forcefully and effectively (the composition of the elites may vary, in the process of modernisation, but the elitist system remains). It is only exceptionally that insurgents have come to power in the Third World, and it is rarer still for them to carry out radical social transformations that either prevent American 'access' or upset the 'regional balance'.

Indochina is thus an extreme case. But that is the point. It lies at the opposite end of the scale from the attitude of co-operation and 'benevolence' reserved for countries that are orderly and behave. For American (or any other power's) policies vary, according to circumstances of alignment or opposition, on a scale from co-operation to coercion. A second scale of conduct, varying according to the degree of importance attached to the country, has already been mentioned. Thus a South-east Asian country will normally receive more attention, whether it is in the form of co-operation or coercion, than an African country; within South-east Asia, a regional 'leader' like Indonesia will now receive more attention than the former 'backstop'

[14] *Imperial America: the international politics of primacy.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1967. Preface.

Thailand, whose strategic importance to the United States has been eroded by events.

A third scale is one of perceptions and values, or rather the rationality or irrationality of those perceptions: this applies both to means (whether or not they are appropriate to achieve the end desired) and to ends—the latter being judged according to the values held by the observer. Indeed, the threat of Chinese 'expansionism' perceived by US administrations from Dulles to Dean Rusk ('a billion Chinese armed with nuclear weapons'), to counter which was a major motive for American intervention in Indochina, was in my opinion unreasonable, not just when exaggerated by Rusk in 1967, but for the entire period of twenty years before.

Indochina met the three criteria for coercion: it upset the imperial role of shaping and maintaining a 'necessary modicum of world order';[15] it was an area considered 'vital' to American security; and just as American Presidents and the Secretaries of State and Defence were convinced that they were confronting an aggressive China, so they perceived the national struggle in Vietnam globally—and incorrectly—in terms (a) of Chinese instigation and (b) 'Aggression from the North'.

Although these criteria have since been modified, it is well to remember that heavy American bombing of populated areas in Cambodia, for example, was only halted in August 1973 by Congressional opposition and that 'Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form', as its author pointed out on November 12, 1971. The aim, he said, was to help the Cambodians to help themselves 'rather than to go in and do the fighting ourselves'. The problem, however, is what to do if 'the Cambodians'—meaning Lon Nol and his supporters—*cannot* help themselves. The Nixon Doctrine is for 'normal' situations; but in a period of crisis—which is surely the ultimate test of a policy, in the same way that an engineering structure must be designed to cope with unusual stress—the doctrine of 'assistance' provides no answer.

(*i*) *The Case of Cambodia*

American policy towards Cambodia in and after 1973 is the *reductio ad absurdum* of Kissingerism: that is, the attempt to maintain at a heavy cost—in expenditure, in destruction of a way of life, and in judgment—a transitory and incapable regime in a country of negligible strategic importance. This is a policy, not merely of political, but of moral, bankruptcy. Why persist in aiding a regime, which without

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

massive external support would have collapsed of its own weakness long before? Why prolong the agony of the Cambodian people? To what end? Was it really in the hope—the illusory 'light at the end of the tunnel' observed so often in Vietnam—that if Phnom Penh could survive a few more months it would have finally turned the corner? Or, regardless of the fate of the Cambodians, was it rather to demonstrate *to others* America's will and ability to meet commitments, however unwise they may have been in the first place, and however unsound they have since become? Or was Kissinger's objective a more pragmatic one, based on the theory of bargaining, that some sort of military victory was needed to negotiate for peace, if not from a 'position of strength' (which, if desirable, was not attainable) then at least not from one of utter weakness?

Finally, is (or rather was) the American policy of hopes, demonstrations and bargains also based on the assumption that Hanoi did not want either too speedy or too complete a victory by the Khmers Rouges for fear they might become too independent of the Vietnamese,[16] and that in such an 'inconclusive struggle' American support, even for a precarious regime, was a valid 'low risk' strategy? In my view, however, any 'restraints' by North Vietnamese on the National United Front of Cambodia—in terms of logistics, military support and, especially, sophisticated weapons—were placed for two main reasons: first, so as not to divert scarce resources from the main theatre, South Vietnam; and second, so as not to offer any pretext for the United States to intervene: indeed for years the Pathet Lao in Laos was restrained—or restrained itself—from occupying 'sensitive' areas along the Mekong for this very reason, so as not to 'provoke' over-reaction by Thailand and its ally, the United States. But whatever the force of this argument, it is clear that the enfeebled state of the Lon Nol regime was itself the surest guarantee of the victory even of 'restrained' opponents.

Thus, while there is little reason to doubt the genuineness of Kissinger's attempts since 1973 to settle for a compromise peace in Cambodia, based on a coalition government—on the model of Laos—there is ample reason to doubt whether this was feasible, even in 1973, and there is all the more reason to doubt thereafter. The circumstances of the two countries were quite different. The 'Vientiane side' in Laos had a certain social basis of support (in Western and parts of Southern Laos), and it had a leader of international stature, who was acceptable as a negotiator to the other side. None of these essential conditions for compromise existed in Cambodia. The

[16] See, for example, the report by Sydney Schanberg, 'Cambodia's "Little War": 600,000 Casualties', *New York Times* Weekly Review, Sept. 8, 1974.

American effort to *create* them, by artificially preserving both the Phnom Penh regime and its discredited leader, only invited the scornful rejection of Lon Nol's overtures [17] by Prince Sihanouk and the National United Front. Why negotiate, they would explain, with a regime that could not last? They had only to wait for the 'rotten fruit' to fall.

(ii) The Case of Vietnam

Deterioration in the security of an unstable ally raises two problems. First, what sanctions can a super-power apply to maintain the status quo? And second, what kind of policy should be followed if, for various reasons, effective sanctions are not possible?

In the first case, Nixon's personal assurance to Thieu in January 1973 that he would use 'full force' was only revealed after the surrender of Saigon; but his message had long been evident. The 'reintroduction of American power', as the Defence Secretary, James Schlesinger, affirmed as late as January 14, 1975, was intended to provide sanctions against any serious communist violation of the Paris Agreement. Schlesinger argued in the same vein as he had a year before, when he stated on January 7, 1974, that it was 'highly likely' that the President would ask Congress for authority to renew American bombing in Indochina 'if the North Vietnamese were to choose, without provocation, to launch an all-out offensive . . .' However, the force of these sanctions was blunted, first, by the passage of the War Powers Act [18] over Nixon's veto in November 1973; and second, by Congressional reluctance and eventual refusal to go along with the Administration in giving full support to a regime which had itself openly violated important provisions of the Paris Agreement.

Congressional restraints on the Executive's handling of foreign policy have been sharply criticised by Kissinger. He claims that they have hampered the Administration's freedom to manoeuvre and, above all, have cast doubt on America's 'will' to back commitments, if necessary by force. But why did Congress impose such restrictions? Precisely because of its disillusionment, in the case of Indochina, with the 'unrestricted' use of power from at least 1960 onwards: the

[17] These were hardly the acts of an independent leader. According to a staff study by the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee in 1974, US Ambassador Dean appears 'to exercise veto power over nearly every programme or policy the Lon Nol Government wishes to effect': quoted by James Laurie, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 21, 1975.

[18] Essentially the Act states that in the absence of a declaration of war, the President can commit armed forces to hostilities only in the event of a national emergency. The President must then report to Congress within 48 hours and the commitment must be terminated within 60 days unless Congress authorises its continuation.

deceptions, cover-ups, excesses and follies of successive US Administrations which Congress, belatedly, realised must be curbed.

After all, what is (or rather was) the policy Kissinger sought to be 'free' to carry out in Indochina? To put it crudely, if the situation (say in Cambodia or Vietnam) does not fit the requirements of American policy, then bomb it till it does. This is no exaggeration. The 'brutalising' attacks on Hanoi in December 1972, to give one example, were intended in part to put pressure on North Vietnam to make concessions in the peace negotiations. But their main purpose was to demonstrate to the uneasy Thieu regime, which was the chief source of obstruction in the negotiations, that American sanctions could be relied upon. Similarly, the rationale for the extraordinarily destructive bombing of Cambodia (up to August 1973) was that it provided an 'incentive' for the other side to negotiate which, in view of the anticipated collapse of the Lon Nol regime, would otherwise be lacking.

Now, after 1973, Kissinger was not free to continue this *realpolitik*. Thus in the absence of effective sanctions, the Administration's insistence on the *maximum* objective—the preservation of militantly anti-communist regimes in South Vietnam and Cambodia—was, given the 'unsettled' conditions there, doomed to failure.

So far from striving for the political compromise which circumstances indicated, the Administration became a prisoner of its own rigid conceptions of power and performance. Realising that the United States could not forever be bound by unwise commitments, entered into when the Cold War was at its height two decades before, nevertheless Nixon and Kissinger argued:

> The challenge is not merely to reduce our presence, or redistribute our burden, or change our approach, but to do so in a way that does not call into question our very objectives. Others judge us—and set their own course—by the steadiness of our performance. . . . This balance we seek abroad is crucial. We only compound insecurity if we modify our protective or development responsibilities without giving our friends the time and the means to adjust, materially and psychologically. . . .[19]

Ironically, it is the very determination to maintain 'stability' at all costs that has brought about the present 'disaster' for Kissingerism in Indochina. For stability dictated how the 'liquidation' of unsound commitments should be construed: not that withdrawal should take place *because* existing commitments were unsound, but that the United States should extricate itself only *after* an unsound commitment had

[19] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace*, p. 6.

been made sound. In other words, only after unstable regimes had become so improved and 'stabilised' by American assistance that they could be considered self-reliant. For example, Nixon evidently decided early on in his first Administration that serious negotiations on the future of South Vietnam could not take place until towards the end of his term. This was not so much because the other side was 'intransigent'—for its intransigence was not put to the test—but rather because the programme of 'Vietnamisation', meaning the stabilisation of the Thieu regime, was not sufficiently advanced to do so without risk. (The US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, had reported in the 'National Security Study Memorandum No. 1' of February 1969 that Saigon's armed forces 'would not be able to cope with purely indigenous V.C. forces without US combat support until the completion of the [military] modernization program in 1972.')[20]

By the time that Vietnamisation had been 'completed', the Nixon-Kissinger policies were put into effect to make American military extrication not only possible, but also worthwhile. For the objective of preserving American assets would be realised—by arming and financing client regimes, backing them up where necessary by air-power—without requiring a costly, and indeed domestically unacceptable, direct American presence. Thus in 1973 Nixon and Kissinger may well have *desired* a political settlement in South Vietnam, as stipulated in the Paris Agreement. For this would conform with their higher policy of creating a new structure of international relations. But what they *needed* was American military withdrawal combined with 'peace with honour', meaning no risk of sudden collapse of the anti-communist regime, whose survival had only been assured (up to then) by so many years of blood and toil.

The Paris Agreement was the result of a complicated bargain, or series of bargains. Withdrawal of American military forces was balanced by the continuance of Thieu in office. To make up for the other side's tacit acceptance of Thieu (the communists had previously insisted on the prior formation of a coalition government, as in Laos) it was offered the expectation of change, by political means. To ensure the security of the newly legitimised political forces—both neutralist and communist—the presence of North Vietnamese military units had also to be tacitly accepted, under the formula of 'cease-fire in place'. But what was a promise to the PRG—a guarantee against vengeful reprisals by Saigon, preventing a repetition of the massive persecution that had occurred after the 1954 Geneva Agreements—was a threat to the Thieu government, for it foreshadowed the inexorable fulfilment

[20] 'Summary of Responses to N.S.S.M.-1', dated Feb. 21, 1969; text in US House of Representatives, *Congressional Record*, May 10, 1972, p. E4979.

of the thrice-thwarted ambition (in 1946, in 1954 and in 1965) to achieve a unified Vietnam.

The result was a stalemate, or rather deterioration threatening a conflagration. Thieu saw no need to risk his position by initiating political moves, and the US Administration considered it not in its interests to put pressure on Thieu. Yet the American posture was hardly as negative or neutral as it may seem. It did not represent indifference to commitments so much as a last phase of commitment. The first phase was that of direct armed intervention, which averted disaster in 1965. The second was reliance on airpower, which averted defeat in 1972. The third and final phase was military aid: well over two billion dollars in 1973, over one billion in 1974, and one and a half billion requested—though this amount was halved by an unusually assertive Congress—for fiscal year 1975. These vast sums can be compared with under two billion dollars in military assistance to Taiwan for a period of *fourteen years* (1950 to 1963) and somewhat less to South Korea for the same period.[21] In contrast, as the US Central Intelligence Agency reported in March 1975, Soviet and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam in 1974 ($400 million) was not much more than half the actual American aid to the South.[22]

In spite of the Administration's recognition that ' the fundamental question in the negotiations, in short, is the means of allocating political power in South Vietnam ' and its assumption that ' our proposals call for a fair competitive process . . . ',[23] Thieu continued to suppress ' neutralist ' elements, refused to release political prisoners and thus prevented the formation of the ' National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord ' stipulated in the Paris Agreement. Saigon's military policy after the ' cease-fire ' was equally uncompromising. As an American observer recalled, ' the communists evidently did think there would at least be a period of peace and were unprepared for—and staggered by—the aggressiveness of the [Thieu] government's operations '. In January 1974 Thieu ordered his armed forces to ' hit them in their base areas '; and in March the North Vietnamese called on their troops to regain lost territories.[24]

A year later came the crucial test when America's client could no longer carry out its intended, but provocative, role. Then the Nixon

[21] *Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1971* (Washington, D.C., US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1971), p. 244.

[22] George Wilson, *International Herald Tribune*, April 1, 1975, p. 2, col. 2.

[23] *US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace*, p. 22.

[24] Maynard Parker, ' Vietnam: The War that Won't End ', *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975. Parker, an experienced reporter, although critical of aspects of American policy, favoured continuing American military aid to Saigon at about the $1 billion level: the United States in return should ' encourage ' Thieu to seek political accommodation with the communists.

Doctrine, because it had not abandoned its ambitious objectives but only modified the means to attain them, also broke down. The Administration failed to act according to its supposed criterion of discrimination. Yet if Kissingerism had really discarded 'globalism' of this outmoded sort, by admitting that some regimes were too precarious to be viable, and that some areas were of little strategic importance to America anyway, then if Indochina 'went communist' it would be no great loss. Indeed, if the United States had pressed for a political compromise in South Vietnam, as it did in Laos, it could have lived with a politically uncertain situation. This would no doubt eventually, because of the superior political skill, organisation and determination of the National Liberation Front, have resulted in communist control. A gradual political takeover, however, after a 'decent interval', would not have damaged American credibility; because it would not have been in question. But by seeking to achieve the maximum advantage —continuation of an anti-communist regime, regardless of the political provisions of the Paris Agreement—the US Administration lost not only an ally but, by over-dramatising the issue, some credibility as well.

Conclusion

The fundamental problems of Kissingerism are the inconsistencies of the higher (equilibrium) with the lower (supremacy) level of policy, of policies with circumstances, and of realism with values. The contrast between policies and circumstances in Indochina was and still is a prime cause of the Administration's 'credibility gap'. The contrast between the higher and lower levels of policy—between the requirements of detente among the great powers and the need for 'supremacy' in the Third World, as in parts of South-east Asia and the Middle East —is also affected by the frustration of 'super' power in an environment of 'sovereign states'. And the dilemma of moral purposes *or* political choices is imposed by the contrast under certain circumstances—those, for example, of Salazar's Portugal and the Greece of the colonels—between strategic realism and democratic values. Let us briefly consider these problems in turn.

(1) 'Credibility'. The overriding theme of 'confidence', that is the credibility of American commitments everywhere, is precisely the 'undifferentiated globalism' Kissinger criticised when not in office. There are two major inconsistencies involved. The first arises from the fact that the marked *difference* in circumstances—the stability or instability of allied or 'friendly' regimes and their strategic importance or lack of it—rules out any 'undifferentiated' approach. The second is that in spite of the 'universality' of the theme, if applied universally

it is self-contradictory. For example, credibility—the 'demonstration' of the will to back up commitments and possess the desired 'reputation for action'—although promoted by American politicians and strategists and intended to apply to American policy, is evidently a universal mode of behaviour (not the only one, fortunately). What applies to American conduct, with the aim of reassuring 'wavering' allies, must also apply to every other power in similar circumstances, including the 'other side'. But if one country will not yield in a crisis for fear of 'losing face', neither can its enemy—for the same reason. Carried to its logical conclusion, 'credibility' or 'reputation' becomes mutually suicidal.

In practice, however, most countries: (a) recognise the difference between 'sound' and 'unsound' conditions and are even prepared to 'cut their losses', as France did in Indochina and Algeria, when the cost of commitments became exorbitant (and who can say France's position has not improved?); and (b) sensibly refuse to make a fetish of 'reputation' and 'credibility', as witness even Dulles's inaction during the 1954 Indochina crisis, Khrushchev's withdrawal at the height of the Cuban missile crisis and Mao Tse-tung's lack of riposte when his allies, the Indonesian communists, were being massacred.

(2) Super-power and national sovereignty. The situation of a few states with enormous power, on the one hand, and the legal limits to that power set by numerous, but extremely unequal 'sovereign states' on the other, is one designed for frustration. Power—military, political and economic—has not disappeared; pushed out of the front door, it comes in through the back. Kissinger's subversion of the elected government in Chile is the equivalent of 19th century gunboat diplomacy; reprehensible though they both are, the latter was not only more direct and more evident, but possibly more effective. Moreover, CIA or multinational corporations' subsidies to their 'natural' allies and friends *within* the sovereign state differ little in effect (the assisted persons and institutions being usually the same) from the military and economic aid allocated by the Defence and State Departments to client regimes within a hemisphere.

All that the citizen can urge (and try to ensure) is that power be used soberly, realistically, discriminatingly and above all with 'humanity and moderation'. The greater the availability—and the opportunity of employing—power, the greater the responsibility to do so wisely. For military, political and economic power overwhelms and undermines the fragile barriers of national sovereignty just as inflation, the need for energy and food, and the effects of population and ecological change, all do; if it is acknowledged by statesmen that these problems can only fairly and efficiently be dealt with on an

interdependent basis, surely the same argument applies to the varied uses of power?

Interdependence is no less important at the higher level of the Nixon Doctrine. As we have seen, lower level supremacy is an essential part of the higher equilibrium, 'tilted' as it is in America's favour.[25] Yet over-reaction to events or domineering conduct governed merely by the fact of power—that is, without sufficient consideration for the global or regional interests and needs of others, whether allies or adversaries—such conduct cannot preserve the equilibrium, but may even destroy it.

(3) Values and realism. The demands of political morality pose immense, perhaps insoluble, problems in an international system governed by strategic necessity. At best the way is arduous and the result precarious; at worst there is no solution—only the agonising choice of the lesser evil. Consider, for example, the object lesson of Kennedy's 'Alliance for Progress' in Latin America, from which so much was expected. The programme was a compound both of intrinsic and utilitarian values: on the one hand, belief in freedom, democracy and social justice; on the other, trust in reform as the most effective way to avert revolution. Yet it was launched into an unstable environment in the midst of threats of takeover either by the Right or the Left. Moreover, the US Administration shared with the elites of its Latin American allies an overriding preoccupation with security. The result was the collapse of ideals in face of the reality of 'national interest'.

According to the old maxim, 'an Ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country'; but any country's foreign policy, depending on the perceived degree of 'necessity' for action, is not just a matter of lying, but of cheating, robbing, killing and destroying as well. For there is little apparent correlation between domestic forms of government (honest or otherwise) and the actual conduct of foreign affairs. A country like America, with the proud and inspiring claim to be the 'home of democracy' and the 'cradle of liberty', has a postwar record of 'coercive diplomacy' that surpasses by far in violence and destruction that of either of its 'totalitarian' rivals. Now if, among American leaders, Nixon and Kissinger are perhaps less open to the charge of interventionism than were their predecessors, and if they are less hypocritical (or less naive) with regard to the freedom

[25] Despite the collapse of American-backed regimes in Cambodia and South Vietnam, as James Reston observes, this is 'obviously a serious problem . . . but not a world crisis'. Even the failure of Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy in the Middle East 'may be a disappointment for Henry, but it is not a disaster for America': reported in the *International Herald Tribune*, Apr. 3, 1975, p. 4, col. 6.

of much of the ' free world ', their pragmatic brand of ' realism ', by contrast, permits excessive indulgence of repressive regimes; and this at times to an extent that is quite unrealistic.

The latter circumstance explains the unusual, if unavoidable, confession by Kissinger after the overthrow in 1974 of the dictatorships in Portugal and Greece. In this statement he admitted that satisfaction with the status quo was ' one of the troubles of Western societies ', so that ' the tendency is not to change governments ', even though their ' political base erodes invisibly '. Kissinger does not refer to his own role of consistently supporting strategic stability at the expense of democratic change; but the inescapable conclusion is that ' pragmatism unrelated to a purpose becomes totally self-destructive '.[26]

The final irony of Kissingerism, however, is that it is one of the laudable features of the doctrine he helped propound—the emphasis on self-reliance—that has two most disturbing, if largely unforeseen, consequences. The first is that with the easing of cold war tensions there is no longer the sense of urgency that inspired US Administrations, from Truman's ' Point Four ' programme onwards, to build up the economies of the developing countries in order to prevent them ' falling ' from misery and dissidence into communism. While McNamara's dual watchword was ' security is development ' and ' development is security ', it was the policy of the Nixon Administration, on the contrary, to reduce America's grain reserves—and this on the eve of a world food and energy crisis.

The second consequence of the Nixon Doctrine of self-reliance is that it *requires* the ' militarisation ' of allied and friendly regimes if ' assisted ' regimes are to defend themselves (without calling for American intervention) against either non-nuclear external threats or internal unrest: the latter, whether or not this is the intention of the aid-giver, being the usual target. Thus massive and increasing arms supplies (not only, but chiefly, from the United States) coupled with more effective military training, have not only expanded the coercive (' defence ') capacity of Third World regimes but have, for this very pragmatic reason, *made them more likely to use force*, rather than persuasion, in dealing with the threat to ' national security ' posed by endemic ethnic, religious, regional or class tension and conflict.[27] The trend to more authoritarian behaviour by militarised regimes, on the

[26] Interview with James Reston of the *New York Times*, reported in the *International Herald Tribune*, Oct. 14, 1974, p. 2, col. 4.

[27] The example of Chile, where American military aid *increased* during Allende's Presidency, is not lost on the armed forces of the Third World: thus popular movements and constitutional governments alike more than ever face the threat of suppression by military leaders, who have arrogated to themselves the ' right ' and have effectively been supplied the power, to act in the ' national interest '.

one hand, confronts the growth of internal discontent, aggravated by that behaviour, on the other, with predictable, destructive, results. Kissingerism, for all its tactical brilliance, its diplomatic patience and perseverance, its audacious 'linkages' and its vision of world order, if certainly not irrelevant to this problem (as it is irrelevant to the profound economic and ecological changes in the world) also has no constructive answer to it.

ASIA AFTER THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE

W. Klatt

THE uninitiated may be forgiven if they are somewhat confused by widely differing accounts of the world food situation. Following the crop failures of 1965, an apocalyptic picture of hunger, disease and death was conveyed to a public which had grown used to believing in the almighty power of industrial growth. Yet, a few years later, an image of imminent abundance was portrayed when the first promising results of technical progress led to premature euphoria, expressed in such terms as ' miracle crops ' and ' the green revolution '. A few years later still, the beginning of the last quarter of our century gave rise, once again, to gloom and despondency. The World Food Conference, held last November in Rome, was hailed by Sayed Ahmed Marei, its Secretary General (and Egypt's former Minister of Agrarian Reform), as a ' watershed of history '. Dr. Waldheim had warned that increased food production depended ' not on a torrent of words and resolutions but on adopting new and tangible objectives ', but his advice remained unheeded. In a year during which more than enough had already been written and spoken at conferences on the world's population, raw materials and fuel resources, some 360 pages of documentation [1] were handed to a thousand delegates of national governments. Also briefed was the international fraternity which fed public opinion during the twelve days when the world, in the words of the United Nations information services, ' faced one of the gravest crises in its history '. Yet, a few months later, reports of rising food stocks, falling demand and declining prices on the world commodity markets seemed to call in question some of what had been said so recently. Thus there is ground to pause and ponder about orders of magnitude and their likely significance in days to come, when the irrelevancies of a grandiose public relations exercise will have given way to consideration of the more lasting aspects of the world food situation.

The organisers of the food conference were right in advising its preparatory committee to distinguish between the food shortages of the immediate future and the long-term problems caused by insufficient

[1] *Assessment of the World Food Situation; present and future.* 125 pp. Rome, 1974. United Nations (E/Conf. 65/3). *The World Food Problem; proposals for national and international action.* 237 pp. United Nations (E/Conf. 65/4).

farm production and food supplies. The two are, of course integral parts of one and the same phenomenon. The short-term emergency could well have been handled through existing channels, such as the American Food Aid Convention and the World Food Programme, if concern for the underlying causes of the crisis had not given way before the temptation to have a display of *panem et circenses*. There was of course a good deal of serious dialogue, but there were also the recriminations of the politically committed, without which no international business seems possible nowadays. There was also the spectacle of a weighing machine designed to shame obese delegates, and there were appeals from a comedian, a professor and a foreign minister to set aside a day of fast or to restrict consumption to an Asian cultivator's intake so as to assist participants in their endeavour to formulate their final resolutions. Some of these resolutions looked, in the words of one of the ministerial delegates present, 'like the turkey two days after Thanksgiving dinner'. Thus the conference provided plenty of food for thought, if not for the hungry.

The immediate food emergency was due to a combination of circumstances which tends to recur once in a decade or so; yet the world's planners still seemed to be taken unawares. Poor harvests had been gathered in 1972 in large parts of the Soviet Union, the Indian subcontinent, South-east Asia, China and Australia—an area which accounts for over half the world's population and almost as much of the world's grain consumption. Human imprudence compounded the year's capricious weather. Ten years earlier, in similar circumstances, Russia under Khrushchev sacrificed 30 million pigs on the altar of self-sufficiency. This time, under Brezhnev, the pigs were mostly kept and fed with some of the 28 million tons of grain purchased, without any forewarning, in the world markets. In the United States the taxpayer subsidised this transaction to the tune of $300 million. A year later, the European Community helped to improve the Russian diet, at the cost of another $100 million, by the concessional sale of 20,000 tons of butter. But there were also others who looked after their own interests. China doubled its wheat imports to 6 million tons in 1972–73 and increased them further to 9 million tons in 1973–74 (whilst merely raising its exports of rice to 2 million tons during the same period).

The situation was aggravated by a continually high demand throughout the industrialised parts of the world, where economic prosperity was enjoyed by most nations. Within less than a decade, per capita grain consumption had increased by one-tenth in Western Europe and by one-sixth in the United States and Japan. Whilst direct grain consumption by human beings rarely amounts to more than 150–175 lbs. per head annually in the Western world, or half as much as in, say,

India or China, the use of grain in animal farming raises total requirements to about 1,000 lbs. in Western Europe and 1,800 lbs. in North America. In a year of poor harvests, the disparity between demand and supply can only be met from reserves. According to FAO calculations, world stocks of wheat and coarse grains declined from 104 million tons at the beginning of the crop year 1972–73 to half as much two years later,[2] whilst rice reserves, never large, became minimal. India's grain stocks, which increased during the good crop years of the late 1960s, were rapidly depleted when the gap caused by the demands of the Bengali refugees was not filled by another bountiful harvest.

A steep increase in prices, spurred by dollar devaluation and trade speculation, was a foregone conclusion. American wheat, which cost $1.60 a bushel at the beginning of the crop year 1972–73, doubled in price within twelve months and increased by the same amount again before the autumn of 1974. Similarly, the price of American milled rice more than doubled from $9.00 per 100 lbs. to almost $20.00 and stood at $30.00 in the first half of 1974. During this period the price of nitrogen fertiliser also trebled. The prices of other farm products and farm requisites followed suit, though at different rates. The resulting disparities led to changes in crop patterns, for example from cotton and jute to wheat and rice. The price benefits accrued mainly to farmers in developed countries, whilst food importing countries were hurt in the process. The situation deteriorated markedly when the prices of mineral oils and their derivates were greatly increased after the Middle East war of 1973. The main impact was, and is, felt where cultivation, irrigation, harvesting and transport depend on diesel oil and fertilisers, which use mineral oils as 'feedstock'. Whilst some agricultural raw materials, such as rubber and wool, have improved their competitive position vis-à-vis synthetic products, which are based on petrochemicals, on the whole the detrimental effects of increased costs of farm requisites and freight charges outweigh any temporary advantage. This is true most of all of countries which depend heavily on imports of food, fuel and fertiliser and which suffer, as a result, from a chronic shortage of foreign exchange. This applies in particular to many parts of South and South-east Asia, where the farm and food situation is tight at the best of times.

The last years proved, if proof were needed, that the margin between abundance and scarcity is often extremely narrow. At present, food supplies are particularly dependent upon the results of a single crop. Imbalances in farm production can be corrected where ample supplies are held in reserve and pass through international channels. This only applies where national and international action is concerted to this

[2] US Department of Agriculture have estimated 150 and 108 million tons respectively.

end. In fact, this is rarely the case. A more likely phenomenon is ' over-reaction ' by governments, farmers and traders, which can turn abundance into scarcity and vice versa. International trade accounts for only a part of global production, ranging from one-fifth in the case of wheat to about one-third for fats and oils. Thus even small variations in output tend to be reflected by significantly greater trade fluctuations, unless reserves are large enough to act as buffers. The situation is particularly fluid where less than, say, 5 per cent. of world supplies enters the international market. This is what makes the paddy rice economies of Asia so highly vulnerable every time the monsoon fails. In any consideration of the long-term aspects of the world food situation, special attention ought, therefore, to be paid to that part of the world where over half the world's population lives a precarious existence.

Modern death rates and mediaeval birth rates

Whereas the most immediate shortage debated at the Rome conference appears to be in the process of being met, the long-term problems are far less open to solution. Notwithstanding massive amounts of food and non-food aid, the underdeveloped parts of the world—and of Asia in particular—are heading for a period of privation as great as, if not greater than, in the past. Lest Asia be taken to be without any prospect of redemption, let it be said that in the last twenty years farm production increased by over 30 per cent. in each of the two decades, at first chiefly because of extended cultivation and later as a result of improved farming methods and increased farm inputs. Indeed, at present, four-fifths of the high-yielding varieties of wheat and rice are used on the Indian subcontinent and in South and South-east Asia respectively. However, these and other innovations are hardly sufficient to cope with present growth rates of population. Not enough is being produced to meet even the unchanged demand of a steadily rising population. Any increase in consumption is largely limited to the well-to-do, and all too often this is achieved at the expense of the poorer sections of the community. Even if some surveys show high income elasticities for foodstuffs at the lower end of the social scale, the general picture suggests a highly skewed pattern of consumption in favour of the better-off, except for cheap coarse grains and root crops, the chief diet of the poor. Leaving annual fluctuations aside, many of the underdeveloped parts of Asia have a growth rate of food production and consumption per capita close to zero. This is true of large parts of the Indian subcontinent and of South-east Asia, where population densities are high and land tenure systems are unsatisfactory. Modern death rates, which exist side by side with mediaeval birth rates,

have created a situation previously unknown to mankind. In some parts of Asia, growth rates of population have quadrupled within living memory. It is all too obvious that in this situation the gap in living standards, as well as in industrial growth, is bound to widen between the rich and the poor. As Austin Robinson has observed in the case of Bangladesh, in order to stand still in terms of capital equipment per head of population, the present rate of growth of population requires almost 50 per cent. more capital investment than a European population growth rate would require.[3]

In any speculation about the future, the number of people involved as claimants on Asia's limited resources has to come before all other considerations. When planning ahead, it does not suffice to allow for the additional mouths to feed; finding employment is just as important. In fact, this task is likely to become the most crucial issue of the next two decades, when those already born will expect to find a homestead and a place of work. It is possible to think of the Western world as closing Asia's food gap, but work has to be found in Asia itself, since in the present world order any large-scale transfer of human beings to the areas of surplus production is clearly inconceivable. The numbers with which to reckon are important here. In the next twenty years almost 100 million, or 20 per cent., may be expected to be added to the agricultural working population of Asia (including China). Outside Japan and Taiwan, the only countries where the farm population is declining in absolute numbers, Asia will remain a predominantly agrarian continent, even though it is at the same time becoming increasingly industrialised. This situation is not easily grasped in its full magnitude and its implications. As far as one can see ahead, the scramble for land is likely to reach dimensions not previously seen. Landowners are bound to be tempted to turn tenants-at-will into labourers without any security of employment, as some have indeed done in recent years. Fathers, whose working lives, thanks to the skills of the medical profession, last longer than those of their ancestors, will see their sons waiting impatiently to take over the family farmstead. The very fabric of rural society is likely to come under strains more severe than anything known in the past.

In this situation, some of the forecasts presented to the delegates of the Rome conference seemed rather unreal. The techniques employed in such projections are, of course, familiar from previous exercises by FAO, such as the commodity projections and the indicative world plan for agricultural development, covering the period up to 1985. Of necessity, certain assumptions have to be made in calculations of this

[3] 'The Economic Development of Malthusia'. Kingsley Martin Memorial Lecture. *Modern Asian Studies*, 8, 4 (1974), p. 526.

kind. In the assessment of consumption trends, disparities in income distribution are disregarded, and on the side of production an uninterrupted flow of technical innovations is taken for granted. Prices of, and price ratios between, products and requisites are assumed to stay the same at farm and retail levels and national policies to undergo no major revisions. At a time of dramatic changes in production methods, income patterns, price relations and government regulations, these provisions are bound to raise doubts about the validity of some of the documentation presented at the Rome conference and on the relevance of some of the recommendations based on the statistical findings, even if the mathematical extrapolations were adjusted 'on a judgmental basis '.[4]

On the basis of the assumptions summarised above, a theoretical gap between demand and output was calculated which, in the case of grains, would amount to 85 million tons in 1985 (for the developing, non-communist countries as a whole), as against a deficit of less than one-fifth of that amount around 1970. Further gaps would emerge if similar calculations were lifted from FAO's commodity projections and indicative world food plan. The Orwellian picture which emerges led the organisers of the Rome conference to present an 'all too familiar catalogue of objectives and programmes'.[5] This will not be reproduced here. However, some proposals, which were discussed at length and which finally emerged as conference resolutions, deserve to be recorded. The main proposals were designed to help increase food production, improve nutritional standards and create safeguards against a repetition of food emergencies as they had occurred in the past. Laudable efforts of this kind had, of course, been made as far back as 1946, when a World Food Board was proposed for the first time in connection with the first postwar international meeting on urgent food problems. Impressive lists of recommendations were presented on many subsequent occasions, including the two previous World Food Conferences of 1963 and 1970. If only a few of these efforts met with success, the reason must be sought in the unrealistic nature of many of them. This sad fact was recognised in the concluding chapter of the documentation available at the Rome conference. The question arises whether the proposals made on this last occasion distinguish themselves by a greater degree of realism.

The proposals for future action, accepted by the Rome conference, included the creation of a world food council, an umbrella for the co-ordination of international activities in the agricultural sphere; an international fund for agricultural development for the voluntary col-

[4] *Assessment of the World Food Situation*, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
[5] *The World Food Problem*, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

lection of means to be used for agricultural investment projects; a co-ordinated network of national grain reserves, supported by a world-wide information and early warning system; and an arrangement for the allocation of not less than 10 million tons of cereals a year, on a three-year planning basis, and other foodstuffs to needy developing countries, including the most stricken areas on the Indian subcontinent. Whilst in his closing remarks the Secretary General could record ' widespread interest and concern ' among the delegates of the conference, there was a good deal of unease about the lack of precision in some of the final resolutions and the absence of support on the part of some of the major participants. The creation of the world food council, which, in Mr. Marei's words, would provide a ' direct inter-relationship among development agencies non-existent or unclear at present ', had to await the approval, at the end of last year, of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Conflicting interests between the various international agencies, which are involved in the new umbrella organisation and which are not always at one on policy decisions and their implementation, have yet to be sorted out.

The agricultural development fund, which was to raise international assistance from the present level of $1,500 million a year to $5,000 million, received a rather lukewarm response. If procedural and financial obstacles can be overcome, it may in time become one of the channels through which the oil-producing countries will be persuaded to direct investment funds, of as yet unspecified amounts, to needy countries. However, these donors may well choose to help countries sympathetic to their cause through their own institutions, such as Saudi Arabia's Islamic Development Bank, or Kuwait's Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, which so far have not shown much inclination to consider the needs of secular states, such as, say, India or Bangladesh. Also, the oil-producing countries are likely to give preference to projects such as fertiliser and petro-chemical plants. Thus only scant attention might be given to the substantial financial requirements of countries in need of irrigation, drainage and land reclamation projects, on whose fulfilment the extended use of fertilisers could well depend. The possibility of yet another lopsided development in the agricultural sphere cannot be ruled out. In the new context the arguments about the value of aid in its various forms might be revised. The OPEC donors, like the members of the Development Assistance Committee before them, might find themselves accused of being mean, if their aid fell short of expectations, and of having ulterior motives, if the aid were made dependent on conditions thought to be detrimental to the aspirations of the recipients.

To keep matters in proper perspective, it should be said that almost

all aid is given under certain conditions which it can be irksome for the recipient to meet. Yet, on balance, this form of international assistance has been beneficial. Indeed, food aid, the most controversial form of help to poor countries, has often been crucial in emergency situations. Properly distributed, food aid has not done the harm which it is sometimes accused of doing to indigenous food producers. At times, it has even been instrumental in creating the preconditions of development. It thus seemed a little ungracious at the Rome conference if some delegates deprecated, rather than praised, the supply of food to the needy. It suggested a lack of compassion, without which international co-operation has little chance of success. The $25 milliard worth of food aid provided in the last twenty years under the US Agricultural Trade and Development Assistance Act (Public Law 480) must have saved many a man who, without this assistance, would not now be there to accuse the United States of interference in his country's food production. Perhaps understandably, American legislators are getting a little wary of this kind of criticism and less ready than in the past to part with their taxpayers' contributions to meet the needs of the underdeveloped countries. In the light of growing criticism, Western donors are generally no longer fully convinced that the concept of enlightened self-interest can usefully continue to guide foreign aid policies. Yet, food aid could be of particular benefit at this stage, if it were used in support of public works programmes and thus created employment opportunities where otherwise none exist.

Ultimately, the question of aid, as that of grain reserves, to meet short-term emergencies, hinges on the willingness of the developed nations to give continued financial assistance to those less fortunate than themselves. One of the main features of the Rome conference was the failure of the major participants to agree on how to share global financial commitments. At present storage rates, a global grain reserve of 40 million tons, usually considered a minimum working stock, would cost $1,000 million a year. The United States administration is no longer willing to meet expenses of this magnitude alone, and other nations have been reluctant to offer their financial support. Even the appeals for contributions to the more modest international fertiliser supply scheme, set up on the initiative of Mrs. Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, have so far met with less than enthusiasm. More pronounced still was the lack of response to the setting-up of a world-wide information and early warning system, without which a repetition of the events of the last few years can hardly be avoided, since a regular flow of reliable information on food production and utilisation is a pre-condition of the orderly management of scarce world resources. This applies, of course, in particular to the potential large-

scale buyers of cereals. Of these, only India provides early, though not always wholly accurate, information on production, domestic trade, imports and consumption of essential foodstuffs. Even data circulated by the Indian government's intelligence units for internal use are usually made available to outsiders. Against this, Russia's and China's delegates to the Rome conference rejected the plea for co-operation in an international scheme which, they feared, would expose their centrally controlled purchasing agencies to the market forces of world trade and would thus deprive them of advantages which they had enjoyed in the past when dealing with individual traders in the commodity markets. Subsequently, the Soviet Union and China declined to attend a meeting of the world's leading grain exporters and importers, called, two weeks after the end of the Rome conference, to consider the available supplies of surplus producers and the immediate requirements of countries in need. After this experience, the prospects for an effective world-wide early warning system do not seem too promising.

Dearth of statistical data

In this situation, a special responsibility falls upon the organisations which are the chief collectors of statistics and thus the guardians of international data. Unhappily, the world community has not been served as well in this respect as might have been expected. To prove this point, a few examples may suffice. In recent years, the world rice paddy production data published by the FAO of the United Nations and by the US Department of Agriculture have differed by 7–12 million tons a year, the disparity being due entirely to the high FAO estimates for China, which does not publish any data in this sphere.[6] In the case of fats and oils, FAO's production and foreign trade data are regularly 4 and 2 million tons respectively above those published by USDA, but here it is impossible to establish with certainty whether the reason for the difference lies in FAO's 'rough estimates for China'.[7] As for China's food consumption, FAO published at one and the same time two estimates which varied by 200 calories per head per day.[8] This may seem insignificant, but the difference is equal to 20 kilos (44 lbs.) of milled rice per head per year or 24 million tons of paddy for China as a whole. This amount corresponds to the total annual increase in cereal requirements due to population growth throughout the world. If pro-

[6] There has been a steady upward revision of FAO estimates for China's paddy rice production from 1 million tons for 1972 to 5 million tons for 1974.

[7] *Commodity Review and Outlook*, 1973–74, p. 97.

[8] China's food consumption 1969–71: 2,170 calories per day. *Assessment of the World Food Situation*, *op. cit.*, p. 52. China's food consumption in 1970: 2,370 calories per day. *Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics*, September 1974, p. 3.

duction and consumption data differ to such an extent, and change with such rapidity, it is hardly surprising that the confidence of those dependent for their judgment on accurate data, and a full explanation of any changes made, is undermined. The explanation that the FAO estimates for China 'are consistent with the available information'[9] hardly meets the standards which may be expected from international agencies entrusted with keeping the world records of production, trade and consumption.

Besides, it is hardly fair to treat the performance of the largest country in the world in the way this is being done. Even in the absence of statistical reporting, enough is known about farm production and food consumption throughout the world to apply the checks which, in the past, made it possible to estimate with a fair degree of accuracy, say, the output and consumption of foodstuffs in Europe during the Second World War or in the Soviet Union after the war, when statistics were withheld. If the same techniques were applied in the case of China, it would become fairly clear that 250 million tons or so of grains, pulses and potatoes (in grain equivalent), a figure occasionally mentioned by China's leaders, probably refers to the crop in the field and not in the barn. The practice of estimating crop output in terms of biological yield was abandoned in 1960, but the 'model survey' technique then introduced may not have been entirely purged of upward bias. This possibility seems to be borne out by the calculation of the cost of the food basket in relation to income. Based on the FAO food balance sheet for 1964–66, the last one available, some 60 per cent. of an average urban family income was spent on foodstuffs, a proportion common in other Asian countries. As one kilo of milled rice, the basic staple of the Chinese diet, costs today the equivalent of one working hour in industrial wages (compared with 23 minutes in Japan and 24 minutes for a kilo of bread in Russia), it is not easy to see how an urban family of five can pay for a diet which provides 2,370 calories, even if two out of a family of five earn an average urban wage —by no means a normal occurrence. As incomes and consumption seem to be more evenly spread in China than in South and South-east Asia, there is probably less need for a margin of supply designed to meet the effects of large-scale social disparities. Thus a lower average food intake than is considered necessary elsewhere in Asia might well be sufficient to provide adequate, if modest, dietary requirements. As China accounts for the largest portion of Asia's farm production and food consumption, a careful reassessment of all available information on this complex subject would seem highly desirable.

Little need be said here about Russia, except that three times during

[9] *Production Yearbook 1972*, p. 423.

the last decade it has purchased unexpectedly large amounts of grain in the world markets. At other times it has had export surpluses. The urban dweller in Russia is increasingly aiming at a pattern of consumption similar to that of other Western industrialised nations. In consequence, the demand for grain has increased, within the last decade, by about one-third to almost 1,500 lbs. per head per year.[10] As at present 300 lbs. of this amount—or twice as much as in the United States—are consumed directly, a further switch from cereals to animal products might well occur. Thus, as long as Russia lags behind the West in its farming practices, the occasional need to fall back on cereal supplies from world stocks cannot be ruled out. In the absence of Soviet co-operation in the exchange of advance information, for the time being it will remain the task of Western agencies to anticipate the magnitude of Soviet purchases and sales abroad so as to minimise their effects on the orderly management of world reserves.

On the Indian subcontinent, the situation is less difficult to assess. Because of the effects of poor harvests and increased world prices, India's national income and expenditure will at best remain stagnant in real terms; per head of population they will decline in the 1974–75 season. Total foodgrain production is unlikely to reach the 100 million ton mark, against a record of 108 million tons in 1970–71, when India was temporarily self-sufficient in cereals; and grain imports of the order of 8 million tons will become necessary. Although good tea and sugar crops have eased the foreign exchange position, a trade deficit of well over $1,000 million will have to be met from international sources. In the long run, farm output will have to be increased by more than 2 per cent. a year in order to keep in step with the growth in population. To achieve this aim in other parts of the subcontinent, such as Bangladesh, farm production will have to increase by more than 3 per cent. This should be technically possible when the results of the research undertaken at IIRI in Los Banos and at the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) at Hyderabad begin to make their impact on the farms. However, even then the technological advance may not penetrate beyond a limited number of farmsteads unless some major institutional changes make the risk involved worthwhile.

Major changes in Asian countryside

It is now clear that, in the absence of simultaneous structural change, the very process of technical advance is a prime cause of growing economic inequality, likely to lead to social tension and ultimately to

[10] Lyle P. Schertz, ' World Food: Prices and the Poor ', *Foreign Affairs*, April 1974, p. 514.

political instability. Whilst the Rome conference dealt at length with the technical, organisational and financial side of the business in hand, it paid only scant attention to the institutional aspects of the world food problem. The attitude to these matters of the authors of the proposals for action can perhaps best be gleaned from their concern for 'mobilising people' for rural development, rather than making them participants in it.[11] In the main conference document, the bias in favour of large farmers and landowners to the detriment of small subsistence cultivators and landless labourers was acknowledged,[12] but the proposals contained little of practical value beyond an appeal for 'the maximum possible consensus on broad objectives and approaches'.[13] It was left to Lady Jackson (Barbara Ward) and her committee of experts to ask for urgent measures designed to increase the effective participation of small farmers. The conference delegates were not inclined to investigate the inequalities which exist in their own societies or to consider any measures likely to alleviate them. Neither is this an easy task.

The last internationally comparable data on farm sizes, farm patterns and land tenure systems date back to the 1960 world census of agriculture.[14] In the intervening fifteen years, at least one-third of Asia's farmsteads have changed their owners, their sizes and their patterns of both land use and tenure. In some cases, these changes have been for the better; in others they have led to friction within farming families, to evictions of tenant cultivators and to the replacement of farm hands by labour-saving devices. There is no way of knowing any orders of magnitude at this stage, since the results of the 1970 world census have not yet been published by FAO for any of Asia's agrarian communities. Until this material has been assembled and assessed, only partial data can be drawn on. Some of these data are such as to hinder, rather than help, a comparison over space and time. Where definitions and methods have been altered, as in the Indian population census of 1970, it is not even possible to know with certainty the size of the change in the number of cultivators and labourers. In other cases the comparability of farm sizes, land use patterns and tenure conditions may also be impeded, even where no pressure was exerted on tenant-cultivators and farm labourers to disguise their status in the census records.

Although full documentation is lacking, it can be accepted without any reservation that during the last decade great changes have taken place in the Asian countryside. A growing concentration of landed property, side by side with the breaking up of farmsteads, has led to a

[11] *The World Food Problem*, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
[12] *Assessment of the World Food Situation*, *op. cit.*, pp. 63 and 119.
[13] *The World Food Problem*, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
[14] *Report on the 1960 world census of agriculture.* Rome: FAO. 1965–1970.

degree of polarisation previously unknown in the densely populated parts of South and South-east Asia. Ownership, for which no data are ever published, and thus social prestige and political power, is even more concentrated than the distribution of holdings suggests. In some areas these developments have led to local unrest and in others to open rebellion. This is not the place to repeat what has been stated elsewhere.[15] However, it is worth saying that, of the United Nations agencies, the World Bank has displayed more understanding and concern than others for the structural and institutional constraints affecting agricultural progress in Asia and elsewhere.[16] Credit for identifying these impediments and suggesting ways and means of overcoming them must go to the World Bank's President, Robert McNamara, who time and again calls for social and political change to take place side by side with technical and economic advance. ' It is only a question of time ', he urges, ' before a decisive choice has to be made between the political costs of reform and the political risks of rebellion '.[17] Understandably, McNamara's appeal is not always welcome to the members of ruling elites who, on the whole, prefer to uphold the **status quo.**

It has been argued at times that economic growth has to be preceded, rather than accompanied, by structural and institutional reforms which aim at equality of social opportunity. The World Bank report, in fact, shows that ' land reform is consistent with the development objectives of increasing output, improving income distribution and expanding employment '.[18] There is ample evidence to show that, under otherwise identical conditions, owner occupiers farm more intensively than tenant cultivators, small holdings yield bigger crops than large farms and members of farm families work more satisfactorily than farm labourers. In countries in which labour is ample and capital is scarce, small-scale farming by owner cultivators therefore makes economic sense. It also enhances social justice and political participation. These are aims which should attract governments whose legitimacy is less than firmly established in the country districts—and this is a situation all too familiar to the student of rural Asia. An effective reform can bring about both economic growth and social welfare, provided that it aims at creating security of tenure and the transfer of land to the actual operator, and that it is accompanied by compensation designed to interest former

[15] W. Klatt, ' Causes and Cures of Agrarian Unrest in Asia '. *South East Asian Spectrum*, Vol. 3, No. 1. SEATO, Bangkok, October 1974.

[16] World Bank (IBRD), Land Reform. Rural Development Series, Washington, July 1974.

[17] Robert S. McNamara, *One Hundred Countries, Two Billion People: The Dimensions of Development*, p. 112. New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1973.

[18] World Bank, Land Reform, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

landowners in new industrial ventures and by a land tax directed at giving employment to landless labourers in public works. Technical and economic programmes, which are meant to take the place of social and political changes rather than to accompany them, may serve as temporary expedients, but in the end they are bound to open, rather than block, the road towards violent change.

Although each country in Asia can claim to be a special case, the events which led to the change of command in Saigon deserve to be studied with care. When President Thieu took control of South Vietnam, the American Military Commander was advised that the ideal position would be 'one in which few peasants operate their own land, the distribution of land holdings is unequal, no land redistribution has taken place . . .'.[19] The Vietcong had a different understanding of the situation. When eventually President Thieu introduced the law establishing his land-to-the-tiller policy, the time had passed for this reform to forestall the revolutionary programme of the Vietcong. The question of control over the use of land, and this meant the power which such control entailed, was a prime issue. On this the guerrilla tactics, combined with the military intervention, of the Vietcong proved superior to the strategy and tactics of South Vietnam's agrarian reformers. After this lesson, let nobody say that 'it cannot happen here'.

[19] Edward J. Mitchell, *Land Tenure and Rebellion: a statistical analysis of factors affecting government control in South Vietnam*, p. 31. Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation. June 1967.

ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

Richard B. Lillich

NOW as never before economic considerations dominate the international as well as the domestic political scene. The claims of the developing countries to a fairer share of the world's economic pie are being heard—and are often being followed by co-ordinated action by groups of these countries to back up such claims. The Arab oil embargo of 1973–74, which turned OPEC from a paper tiger into a permanent force to be reckoned with internationally, was merely the first indication of what the future holds in store. Subsequent collective action by the International Association of Producers of Bauxite has succeeded in boosting the price of that mineral, albeit nowhere near so spectacularly as in the case of oil,[1] and the recent decision of the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries to cut shipment by 10 per cent in an effort to shore up the price of copper, while so far having little effect, may cause further economic difficulties for the industrial countries in the not too distant future.[2]

Reaction to the above developments, especially the traumatic oil embargo, has been swift and predictable. Calling it 'blackmail', a phrase later used by the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, the columnist William Buckley contended in November 1973 that '[i]t is both a moral and a legal question whether the Arab embargo has reached the point of asphyxiation that warrants belligerent reprisals'.[3] Although with the easing of the embargo last summer this crisis atmosphere passed, in September the US Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, was still explaining that the United States was 'not contemplating' any military action against the Arab oil producers,[4] and in late November *The Times* reported the study of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on 'Oil and Security' under the headline: 'Military action against oil nations deemed unlikely'.[5]

[1] *New York Times*, Mar. 7, 1974, p. 55, col. 2.
[2] *The Times*, Nov. 20, 1974, p. 21, col. 8.
[3] See his syndicated column of Nov. 10, 1973, reprinted in the *New York Times*, Nov. 14, 1973, p. 10, col. 1. Compare text at notes 6 and 30 below.
[4] *The Times*, Sept. 26, 1974, p. 6, col. 2.
[5] *Ibid.*, Nov. 20, 1974, p. 10, cols. 5–6. The article acknowledged, however, that '[t]he possibility of outside military intervention in the oil-rich Middle East cannot be lightly dismissed . . .'. See text at and accompanying note 7 below.

While such action currently appears out of the question, as indicated by Dr. Kissinger's remark last January that it would be considered only if 'there is some actual strangulation of the industrialised world',[6] the increasing pressure which last year's fivefold increase in the price of oil has put on the balance-of-payments problems of many industrialised countries, as well as on the world's monetary system generally, may some day produce a military response, conceivably in conjunction with another round of the Arab-Israeli war.[7]

Perhaps more realistic, and certainly more hopeful, has been the attempt, led by the United States, to establish in advance patterns of response to any future oil boycott. The newly-created 18-nation International Energy Agency is an historic attempt to co-ordinate the actions of Western countries should another energy crisis erupt. Under the agreement establishing IEA, the member states in effect surrender much of their freedom of action—their so-called 'sovereignty'—should such an emergency arise, since mandatory cuts in consumption and a formula for sharing during shortages have been predetermined.[8] Laudable as this approach is, however, it does not come to grips with the continuing high price of oil. Nor, of course, does it provide more than a guideline—and perhaps an unsuitable one at that—for how to structure a response to the claims of the bauxite, copper and other raw material producing countries. Indeed, from the viewpoint of the ideal international economic order, the formation of groups like OPEC, on the one hand, and IEA, on the other, seems as undesirable as it is understandable. It is ironic, to say the least, that laissez-faire economics,

[6] See his *Business Week* interview of Jan. 13, 1975, reprinted in 72 Dept. State Bull. 97, 101 (1975). Compare text at note 3 above. He added, 'I want to make clear . . . that the use of force would be considered only in the gravest emergency'. *Ibid.* President Ford subsequently endorsed these remarks. *The Times*, Jan. 25, 1975, p. 4, col. 2. For clarifying comments by the Secretary of State, see *ibid.* Jan. 17, 1975, p. 7, col. 5; *Int. Herald-Tribune*, Jan. 29. 1975, p. 2, col. 5.

[7] Such a war presumably would trigger another oil embargo, which the US Secretary of Commerce, Frederick B. Dent, has stated 'would strangle us, because we have become even more dependent on Mid-East oil than we were in 1973.' *The Times*, Feb. 14, 1975, p. 6, col. 7. See also the Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas Ender's remarks that a total embargo 'would be something very close to nuclear warfare. That would be as big a threat as could come to the industrialised nations.' *Int. Herald-Tribune*, Feb. 15–16, 1975, p. 1, col. 5. Compare text at note 6 above.

For a strong critique of the United States' virtual foreclosure of military action, see Tucker, 'Oil: The Issue of American Intervention', *Commentary*, Jan. 1975, p. 21. Compare Middleton, 'Taking Over Arab Oil Fields Held Possible but Dangerous', *Int. Herald-Tribune*, Jan. 13, 1975, p. 2, cols. 1–2 (pro-Tucker), with Lewis, 'Thinking the Unthinkable', *ibid.*, Dec. 31, 1974, p. 6, cols. 3–6 (anti-Tucker). An even stronger plea for such a response, with a complete intervention scenario, may be found in Ignotus (pseudonym), 'Seizing Arab Oil', *Harper's Mag.*, Mar. 1975, p. 45. This article, it is said, accurately describes a Department of Defense contingency plan 'to invade Saudi Arabian oilfields in the event of another Middle East war and a further Arab oil embargo'. Aris, 'How US troops would seize Saudi oil wells', *The Sunday Times*, Feb. 9, 1975, p. 8, col. 3.

[8] Crawford, 'Oil: Sharing It,' *ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1974, p. 62, cols. 5–8.

so generally discredited domestically, has made such a significant comeback internationally.

Basic to the creation of a 'new international economic order'—an objective receiving near-unanimous support at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly held in the spring of 1974[9]—is international law. Surprisingly, in the welter of economic, social and political claims during the past year, legal considerations have had little impact. What does international law say about economic coercion? What substantive norms and procedural devices can it recommend as models for the restructuring process now going on so haphazardly and at such cost? Does it have any role to play at all?

International law and economic coercion: past trends

Traditional international law allowed states almost unfettered discretion with respect to the use of force. War being a legitimate tool of foreign policy, obviously economic coercion, which is not even a breach of the peace, was deemed permissible. With the coming of the United Nations in 1945, however, the international community adopted an entirely different approach, at least insofar as military coercion was concerned. Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter requires that member states 'shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . .'. Thus, save for collective or individual self-defence against an aggressor, international law now forbids the use of forceful measures. But Article 2 (4) is silent on the question of economic coercion, presumably because the framers of the Charter believed, as was quickly shown, that the organisation would have its hands full stamping out coercion of the military type.

Over the years, however, it has been argued with growing conviction that the 'threat or use of force' proscribed by Article 2 (4) should be construed to cover acts of an economic nature by a state when directed against another state's 'territorial integrity or political independence . . .'. Thus, in a recent article entitled 'The Arab Oil Weapon—A Threat to International Peace', Professors Paust and Blaustein contend that Article 2 (4) 'prohibits more than the threat or use of "armed" force'.[10] In their gloss of the article, heavily influenced by the policy-science approach to international law made

[9] See 'Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order', U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (S-VI) (1974), reprinted in 13 *International Legal Materials* 715 (1974) and 68 *American Journal of International Law* 798 (1974).

[10] Paust and Blaustein, 'The Arab Oil Weapon—A Threat to International Peace', 68 (AJIL) 410, 417 (1974). For a reply to this article, see Shihata, 'Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality Under International Law', 68 (AJIL) 591 (1974).

popular by Professor McDougal of Yale, coercion—economic as well as military—may be forbidden. Thus they conclude, after a lengthy survey of Charter policies, that 'the substantial impairment of goals of the international community as articulated in the Charter through the deliberate use of coercion against other states, not counterbalanced by complementary policies relating to legitimate self-defense or the sanctioning of UN decisions, constitutes a violation of Article 2 (4) as well as of other provisions of the Charter '.[11]

It would be easy to discount their construction of the Charter as the knee-jerk response of Western international lawyers to the Arab oil embargo were it not for the fact that, somewhat ironically, most African, Asian and other Third World spokesmen actively advocated such an interpretation throughout the 1960s and, indeed, up until October 1973. Thus, in the UN debate on the General Assembly's Declaration on Friendly Relations,[12] about which more later, Mr. El Reedy of the United Arab Republic maintained that in construing Article 2 (4) it was 'essential to include economic and political pressure as an illegal use of force because, in view of the present political and economic interdependence of States, powerful States could strangle weaker States with pressures of that kind to the point of threatening their political independence and territorial integrity '.[13] The Western states, although generally opposed to what they then considered a rewriting of the Charter, nevertheless left open the possibility that certain types of economic coercion might violate international law. To confine Article 2 (4) to military coercion, stated Mr. Sinclair of the United Kingdom, 'was not to say that all forms of economic and political pressure which threatened the territorial integrity and political independence of another State were permissible: they might well constitute illegal intervention '.[14]

Indeed, even a cursory survey of UN declarations during the past decade reveals strong support for the proposition that at least certain types of economic coercion now violate international law. Thus the UN General Assembly's Declaration on Non-Intervention,[15] adopted by a 109–0–1 vote in 1965, after condemning not only armed intervention but also 'all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements ', goes on to state specifically that ' [n]o State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of

[11] Paust and Blaustein, note 10 above, p. 415.
[12] G.A.Res. 2625, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. 28, p. 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970), reprinted in 65 (AJIL) 243 (1971).
[13] UN Doc. A/AC.125/SR.25, p. 12, para. 23 (1966).
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 16, para. 39.
[15] G.A.Res. 2131, 20 UN GAOR, Supp. 14, p. 11, UN Doc. A/6014 (1965), reprinted in 60 (AJIL), p. 662 (1966).

measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind '.[16] Among the oil-producing states supporting the Declaration were Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the UAR. Needless to say, after the imposition of the oil embargo, with the shoe on the other foot, nothing was heard about this document from the above states.

The UN General Assembly's Declaration on Friendly Relations also is squarely to the point. Unanimously adopted in 1970 as the authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter, it begins by stating that it is 'the duty of States to refrain in their international relations from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State', and then, using language taken from the Declaration on Non-Intervention, proceeds to declare such economic measures to be in violation of international law.[17] Once again, despite the fact that the oil-producing states were among the group pressing hardest for this principle, and indeed for the proposition that it already was part of international law, nothing has been heard from them about its applicability to the oil embargo. As Professor Gardner notes caustically, '[n]ot a single voice has been raised in the United Nations to cite the relevance of this authoritative declaration to the Arab oil embargo—which is typical of the "double standard" that currently prevails in the world organisation and accounts for much of the scepticism about the integrity of its decision-making process'.[18] Even the United States failed to make the point, presumably because it thought to do so would be counterproductive. This decision, undoubtedly part of Dr. Kissinger's short-lived strategy to lower the price of oil by placating the Arabs, has been roundly criticised by the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, which has recommended that '[t]o discourage further economic warfare, the United States should ask the Secretary General of the United Nations to serve notice on the Arab oil producers that their actions violate the UN Resolution . . . limiting the use of economic and political pressure'.[19] The Administration completely ignored this recommendation.

Finally, in a classic case of adding insult to injury, when the UN General Assembly adopted its latest resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources on December 17, 1973,[20] two

[16] *Ibid*. Arts. 1, 2, p. 12, 60 (AJIL), p. 663.
[17] Note 12 above, pp. 122, 123; 65 (AJIL), pp. 244–45, 248.
[18] Gardner, 'The Hard Road to World Order', 52 *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 556, 567 (1974).
[19] Joint Economic Comm., *The 1974 Joint Economic Report*, H.R.Rep. No. 93-927, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 17 (1974).
[20] UN Doc. A/RES/3171 (XXVIII) (1974), reprinted in 68 (AJIL), p. 381 (1974).

months after the imposition of the oil embargo and one month after the Arab leaders had adopted a joint resolution calling for the continued use of oil as an 'economic weapon',[21] Paragraph 4 thereof specifically deplored 'acts of States which use force, armed aggression, *economic coercion* or any other illegal or improper means in resolving disputes', while Paragraph 6 emphasised 'the duty of all States to refrain in their international relations from military, political, *economic or any other form of coercion* aimed against the territorial integrity of any State . . .'.[22] Apparently the Arab oil producers saw no inconsistency in supporting this resolution while simultaneously maintaining their 25 per cent reduction in oil shipments to the Common Market countries and Japan, plus their total embargo on shipments to the United States and the Netherlands, actions which Paust and Blaustein contend 'can be authoritatively proscribed as a violation of basic Charter goals and of Article 2 (4)'.[23] Moreover, they recently compounded this inconsistency by unanimously supporting the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 12, 1974, Article 32 of which contains once again an authoritative condemnation of economic coercion.[24]

One final legal point generally has been overlooked. Even if one ignores the UN Charter and the above documents adopted under it, the actions of the various oil-producing states may still run foul of international law if they violate prior treaty commitments entered into by such states. Under a little-known bilateral treaty between the United States and Saudi Arabia, for instance, both states guarantee each other 'most-favoured-nation' treatment.[25] This clause clearly prevents discriminatory actions by both states, including actions such as the oil embargo, which bore harder on the United States than, say, on

[21] *New York Times*, Nov. 29, 1973, p. 16, col. 6.

[22] 68 (AJIL), p. 38 (author's italics).

[23] Paust and Blaustein, note 10 above, p 439. 'The Arab strategy constitutes the deliberate employment of an economic instrument of coercion . . . against other states and peoples in order to place intense pressure upon their freedom of choice. . . . As such, the Arab oil embargo is in violation of international law, as formulated in the United Nations Charter and key supporting documents'. *Ibid.*, p. 412.

[24] UN Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX) (1974), reprinted in 72 Dept. State Bull. 147 (1975). Article 32 provides: 'No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights'. *Ibid.*, p. 153.

President Echeverría of Mexico, the prime mover behind the Charter, has claimed that it will be 'frequently invoked in defence of countries threatened by economic pressures or injured by foreign intervention in their economic affairs'. *The Times*, Feb. 19, 1975, Mexican Section, p. VIII, col. 5. One wonders whether he had the industrial countries in mind. Compare text following note 32 below.

[25] Treaty with Saudi Arabia on Diplomatic and Consular Representation, Judicial Protection, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 7, 1933, 48 Stat. 1826 (1933), 11 C. Bevans, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776–1949*, US GPO, p. 456 (1974).

France.[26] Similar treaties are in force between the United States and Iraq and the United States and Oman.[27] In addition, Kuwait and the UAR are both parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,[28] the multilateral treaty which is aimed at eliminating discriminatory treatment in international commerce. Articles 1, 11, 13 and 20 of GATT also preclude actions such as the oil embargo.[29] Once again, both in the case of the bilateral treaties and GATT, neither the United States nor its European allies thought it wise to raise these legal points for fear of offending the Arab states. While efforts to avoid confrontation in international relations are generally laudable, this refusal to demand compliance with the relevant legal norms obviously gained the Western states little in the short-term. It also contributed nothing to the long-term clarification of the norms of international law governing economic coercion.

International law and economic coercion: future developments

If, as the above survey reveals, there are now some restraints, however nebulous, upon a state's unilateral resort to economic coercion, what are they and how can they be enforced? Before exploring these questions it is perhaps worth emphasising that, while the discussion necessarily must focus on the Arab oil embargo, the Arab states certainly have no monopoly on the use or abuse of economic coercion. In response to Dr. Kissinger's characterisation of the embargo as 'blackmail',[30] George Ball, former Under Secretary of State in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, noted in the *New York Times* that it 'has the sour sound of sanctimony in the chancelleries of other nations. We Americans, after all, have been leading practitioners of economic sanctions to advance our own political—and even moral—policies, and if those sanctions have rarely, if ever, achieved the intended result, that has not deterred us'.[31]

More detailed criticism has come from Gardner, who, warning against 'an unduly self-righteous attitude on these matters', points out that

[26] 'The export embargo on oil was applied selectively to the U.S. and the Netherlands, and thus clearly violated the most-favored-nation provisions in the bilateral agreements'. Gardner, note 18 above, p. 566, n. 3. *Contra* Shihata, note 10 above, pp. 623–24.

[27] Shihata, pp. 624–25. See text at and accompanying note 26 above.

[28] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 4 C. Bevans, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776–1949*, p. 639 (1970).

[29] Paust and Blaustein, note 10 above, pp. 423–24. *Contra* Shihata, note 10 above, pp. 621–23.

[30] *New York Times*, Feb. 7, 1974, p. 1, col. 4. See text at note 3 above.

[31] Ball, 'Your Evil Embargo; Our Purity of Purpose', *New York Times*, Mar. 21, 1974, p. 41, col. 7.

> the United States itself has been one of the worst offenders in using trade controls in ways which have adversely affected other countries. As a result of congressional pressures, the President was given the authority to cut off aid to countries trading with Cuba or North Vietnam. Last summer we unilaterally cut off exports of soybeans and other agricultural products to our trading partners in Europe at the very time we were pressing them to modify policies of agricultural self-sufficiency and become dependent on our production. And the House of Representatives only recently adopted amendments to the trade bill denying most-favored-nation treatment and trade credits to the Soviet Union and other ' non-market economy ' countries until they grant free emigration to their citizens.[32]

Thus, in recommending normative guidelines and procedural sanctions in this area of international law, as in all areas of law generally, the ' mirror image ' principle must be kept in mind: namely, that the claims one projects against others inevitably will be reflected in similar claims against oneself.

Keeping the above in mind, in the first place it is desirable, and indeed mandatory if any real progress is to take place, to eliminate the military overtones in the rhetoric employed by both sides. Thus Dr. Kissinger's reference to economic ' blackmail '[33] and the Arab leaders' reference to oil being used as an ' economic weapon '[34] shed more heat than light. Similarly, Gardner's use of the phrase ' economic warfare ',[35] and Hobart Rowen's invocation of the term ' economic aggression '[36] in a *Washington Post* column, add little to the debate. Indeed, the use of such language necessarily raises expectations about the possibility of a military response, expectations hardly conducive to the short-term settlement of disputes or the long-term maintenance of peace and security. Moreover, as Paust and Blaustein rightly observe, ' [n]ot only are these terms generally too confining for a proper focus, but some are merely conclusions that may be attached to a particular coercive process after fact and law have been fully considered.'[37] To use them initially, in short, is to prejudge the case.

[32] Gardner, note 18 above, p. 567. Compare text at notes 51–53 below.
[33] See note 30 above.
[34] See note 21 above.
[35] Gardner, ' Economic Warfare: " All Can Play " ', *Washington Post*, Dec. 14, 1973, p. A30, col. 5.
[36] Rowen, ' The " Economic Aggression " of the Arabs ', *ibid.*, Dec. 6, 1973, p. A31, cols. 3–5. ' The extraordinary thing about the Arab oil boycott is the refusal of the Western World to recognise it for what it is—economic warfare—and to deal with it in those terms. Economic aggression is no less a hostile act than military aggression.' *Ibid.* at col. 3. For evidence that this fact finally has been recognised, see text at and accompanying notes 6 and 7 above.
[37] Paust and Blaustein, note 10 above, pp. 412–13.

Secondly, it needs stressing that economic coercion, even of the most blatant type, is permissible when undertaken pursuant to internationally-authorised measures. Thus, in the case of UN sanctions against Rhodesia, not only is the economic coercion involved obviously compatible with world community policy, but it actually is made legal by the UN Charter itself.[38] For this reason, there can be no objection to the Arab oil embargo insofar as it may have affected Rhodesia, or for that matter perhaps even South Africa. What is at issue is only the unilateral use of economic coercion by a state or group of states without colour of international authorisation.

Thirdly, assuming unilateral acts of economic coercion may violate international law norms, what criteria should be applied to determine whether they do or do not? Here there is little, if any, precedent upon which to rely. Dr. Derek Bowett, in a prophetic article published three years ago, observed that 'it will require a great deal of practice, of "case-law", to give the concept of illegal economic coercion substance and definition.'[39] To illustrate the difficulties involved in determining what measures of coercion should be deemed illegal, he cited the American withdrawal of financial support for the Aswan Dam in 1956. 'Was the United States free to do this', he asks, 'or was the action illegal because it was "coercive" and aimed at the subordination of Egypt or securing advantages from Egypt?'[40] Similarly, what about the United States cutting Cuba's sugar quota in 1960? 'Was this', he asks, 'an attempt to coerce the Cuban Government into less antagonistic policies, and therefore illegal?'[41] Or, to raise an issue from the 1970s, is the so-called Jackson Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974, making extension by the United States of most-favoured-nation treatment to the Soviet Union dependent upon that country's relaxation of its emigration policy with respect to its Jewish population, illegal because it admittedly is aimed at changing Soviet domestic law?

One cannot answer these questions definitively, but one can sketch out an approach based upon the general principle that serious and sustained economic coercion should be accepted as a form of permissible self-help only when it is also compatible with the overall interests of the world community, as manifested in the principles of the UN Charter or in decisions taken or documents promulgated there-

[38] UN Charter art. 41. On the lawfulness of UN sanctions against Rhodesia, see, for example, McDougal and Reisman, 'Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern', 62 (AJIL) 1 (1968).

[39] Bowett, 'Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States', 13 *Virginia Journal of International Law* 1, 4 (1972).

[40] *Ibid*. p. 3.

[41] *Ibid* p. 4.

under. This approach, like the determination of many other issues in international law, rests more upon subjective than objective standards, a point well made by Bowett.

> Much of State economic activity is harmful to other States for the very obvious reason that State economies are competitive and that promoting one's own economy may well be injurious to others. This suggests that it will be necessary to characterise unlawful economic measures by their intent rather than their effect. In other words, measures not illegal *per se* may become illegal only upon proof of an improper motive or purpose.[42]

Lawyers, of course, are quite familiar with this approach in the context of domestic law. Indeed, as Bowett explains, '[t]his idea is found in the English common law. For example, the tort of conspiracy evolved to cover the situation in which two or more persons conspire to commit acts which are lawful *per se* but are motivated predominantly by the desire to injure the economic interests of the plaintiff rather than to protect the interests of the defendants.'[43] Since the proof of any doctrinal approach rests with its success when applied to concrete situations, what results flow from the application of the above approach to recent situations involving economic coercion? Two examples will suffice for present purposes.

In the case of the Arab oil embargo, it is apparent from the very words of the Arab leaders that, apart from obtaining a tremendous increase in the price of crude oil, its prime objective was to weaken the economies of the major Western countries, plus Japan, to the extent that ultimately they would, in Rowen's words, 'swallow hard and dump the Jewish state'.[44] Withdrawal of support for Israel, plus tangible support of the Arab cause, was the articulated demand upon which cessation of the oil weapon's use depended. Thus Japan, almost wholly dependent upon Arab oil, undertook the most humiliating reversal of policy. Suddenly, after a meeting on December 18, 1973 with President Sadat of the UAR, the then Deputy Premier, Takeo Miki, found himself announcing Tokyo's eagerness to extend to Cairo a 25-year loan of $140 million to widen and deepen the Suez Canal. Mr. Miki also indicated that Japan was prepared to participate in a wide range of joint economic and industrial projects, concluding that Japan was 'determined to do as much as possible to assist Egypt'.[45] Other states also shifted their positions vis-à-vis the Arab states in less dramatic fashion.

[42] *Ibid.* p. 5.
[43] *Ibid.*
[44] Rowen, note 36 above, p. A31, col. 5.
[45] *New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1973, p. 11, col. 1.

The argument has been made, of course, that harmful as the oil embargo admittedly was, the Arab states had no other recourse in their attempt to secure justice for their Palestinian brethren.[46] It will not wash. During 1973 the combined contributions of the Arab states to the UN relief programme for Palestinian refugees was only $2.25 million, just 9 per cent. of the American pledge of $25 million. Moreover, Arab contributions have been even smaller over the time span since 1950. ' With Saudi Arabia alone spending more than $1 billion on the 1973 Egyptian and Syrian war effort ', Paust and Blaustein remark, ' one wonders why more Arab oil profits could not have gone to feed the Arab poor '.[47] Certainly the Arab states' concern has been selective, to say the least, when it comes to the Palestinians.

When it comes to the poor and hungry of other lands, though, until recently it has been almost non-existent.[48] Dr. Borlaug of the Rockefeller Foundation has estimated that as many as 20 million people may die because of crop shortages caused primarily by the lack of fertiliser due to the oil embargo.[49] Developing countries heavily dependent upon oil imports, such as Brazil, India, Singapore and South Korea, are running up staggering balance-of-payments deficits.[50] Another thirty of the poorest states, with over a quarter of the world's population, are witnessing the complete undercutting of their development programmes by the fivefold increase in the price of oil over the past year and a half, an increase which may well consign them to permanent ' Fourth World ' status. The poorest lands, Bangladesh being the classic case, will simply be driven bankrupt. Viewing these consequences of the oil embargo and its aftermath, including the current oil-fueled inflation, it can hardly be argued that it has served the overall interests of the world community.

In the case of the Soviet Jews, however, a different situation existed. Under the Trade Reform Act of 1974, the United States did not suddenly deny the Soviet Union access to a vital commodity, but merely refused to bestow financial and trade benefits long sought by

[46] See Shihata, note 10 above.

[47] Paust and Blaustein, note 10 above, p. 437, n. 110.

[48] This attitude may be changing. See ' Petro-aid takes off ', *The Economist*, Feb. 15, 1975, p. 72. During 1974, for instance, OPEC countries apparently committed $9.6 billion to foreign aid projects. Monroe, ' Petro-dollars and Petro-aid ', *The Times*, Mar. 20, 1975, Arab Renaissance Section, p. V, col. 2. Yet ' OPEC aid is not quite as simple as these bald figures suggest. First, the actual delivery of the aid is lagging quite a way behind the promises to give it—only roughly $2.6 billion was actually handed out in 1974. Secondly, although the spread of aid is increasing fast, it is still highly concentrated ' Power, ' OPEC as an Aid-Giver ', *Int. Herald-Tribune*, Mar. 5, 1975, p. 6, col. 3.

[49] *New York Times*, Jan. 26, 1974, p. 1, col. 1.

[50] ' The World Bank estimates that the increased cost of the current volume of oil imports for the non-oil-producing developing countries is $10 billion. This is equivalent to 15 per cent of their total import bill. For India it is roughly the same as two-thirds of its entire foreign-exchange reserves and over 25 per cent of its total exports.' Power, note 48 above.

that country. This action was taken not to achieve financial or trade advantages for the United States, or indeed for its allies, but to bestow human rights upon thousands of persons who have no effective means of achieving them without external assistance. Human rights, after all, are one of the two major purposes of the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[51] unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, provides in Article 13 (2) that 'everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own . . .'. More recently, the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,[52] to which the Soviet Union became a party in 1973, contains almost identical language in Article 12 (2): 'Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.' In the absence of international procedures to assist persons in the Soviet Union wishing to exercise this right, action by individual states to achieve such ends surely is and should remain permissible. Whatever economic coercion is involved, which admittedly is aimed at changing Soviet law and policy, is designed only to secure compliance with international law. Not only does it not adversely affect other states, but it actually supports their shared objectives in the human rights area. Thus, just as with the UN sanctions against Rhodesia,[53] the US stand on Soviet Jews serves the overall interests of the world community.

Conclusion

In an attempt to forge a constructive approach to the problems occasioned by the Arab oil embargo, it is necessary to go well beyond the present state of international law and even beyond the creation of special interest agencies like IEA to counter the special interest activities of groups like OPEC.[54] What is needed, as Gardner has

[51] G.A.Res. 217, UN Doc. A/810, p. 71 (1948).

[52] G.A.Res. 2200, 21 UN GAOR Supp. 16, p. 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1967).

[53] See note 38 above.

[54] According to OPEC, interestingly enough, what is sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander. In a 'Solemn Declaration' issued at the end of their Algiers conference in March 1975, the OPEC member countries denounced 'any grouping of consumer nations with the aim of confrontation, and condemn[ed] any plan of strategy designed for aggression, economic or military, by such grouping or otherwise against any OPEC Member Country.' *The Times*, Mar. 18, 1975, p. 9, col. 2. The target of this denunciation obviously was IEA.

Such utterances not only are one-sided, ignoring the 'mirror image' principle, but they are myopic as well. If, as will be argued in the text that follows, international stabilising commodity agreements provide the best solution to current problems, then groups like OPEC and IEA are inevitable, and indeed necessary, adjuncts to the negotiating process, as are unions and business groups to industry-wide collective bargaining in the United States. For an imaginative article along the above lines, suggesting that '[t]he price and production negotiations of the future, in a growing range of items, will be systematic arms-length bargaining sessions at which exporter and importer governments will face each other as equals to hammer out agreements that will constitute

suggested, is the writing of new rules of international law providing for equal access to raw materials and the use of international sanctions against states violating such rules. Authority to do so surely may be found in the UN Charter and the numerous documents adopted during the past decade. Indeed, Professor Rostow of Yale, seeing Article 2 (4) as a possible 'Sherman Act in disguise', has argued for world community regulation of any coercive and monopolistic manipulation of resources.[55] Any such effort at 'collective economic security' would have to be a two-way street, however, for as Gardner notes it 'could degenerate into a North-South economic war unless it is based on principles that are acceptable to a substantial number of developed and developing countries.'[56] If laissez-faire is to be abandoned to the extent of guaranteeing equal access to commodities, the quid pro quo obviously must be its abandonment insofar as prices for such commodities are concerned too. They must be guaranteed, as they rarely have in the past, by international stabilising commodity agreements.[57]

Writing a dozen years ago about the International Coffee Agreement, under which countries importing coffee assumed a number of obligations to make the agreement possible, Professor Bilder observed that 'their interest in the coffee problem is . . . primarily an indirect interest in the achievement of a stable and healthy world economy. Their co-operation thus demonstrates a growing international recognition of the fact that no one nation or group of nations can effectively insulate itself from the poverty and problems of others, and that in this interdependent modern world, the solution of such major problems has very much become every country's business and responsibility.'[58]

the international economic order of the future', see Franck and Chesler, '" At Arms' Length ": The Coming Law of Collective Bargaining in International Relations Between Equilibriated States', 15 (VA. JIL) (forthcoming) (1975).

[55] See Paust and Blaustein, note 10 above, p. 411, n. 7.

[56] Gardner, note 35 above.

[57] The Soviet Union evidently supports such an approach, albeit in the context of UNCTAD-sponsored agreements, which most industrialised countries would regard less favourably than agreements concluded bilaterally between organised groups of producers and consumers (the OPEC-IEA model). See letter from B. Rachkov to *The Times*, Dec. 19, 1973, p. 15, cols. 4-5, 'Only the establishment of mutually beneficial relations between the oil-producing and oil-buying countries can guarantee a normal, uninterrupted supply to all nations. What are these relations? In the present-day world they could develop within the framework of international stabilising commodity agreements drawn up, as is generally known, under the auspices of the United Nations, or to be more precise, UNCTAD.

An agreement on one or another commodity envisages the involvement in it of both exporters and importers of the item. It does not take the property right to a commodity away from those to whom it belongs. It only periodically, on a long-term basis, determines the quantities and prices of deliveries acceptable to all.

Such agreements can, to some degree, guaranteee the world market against sharp rises and falls or prices, against a sharp change of abundance on the market to acute shortage. In UNCTAD, the idea of concluding such an agreement on oil is also supported by the Soviet Union, along with the oil-rich developing countries and dozens of other states.'

[58] Bilder, 'The International Coffee Agreement', 57 (AJIL), pp. 888, 891 (1963).

That this responsibility has now been recognised by most countries is shown by Article 6 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which categorically states that '[i]t is the duty of States to contribute to the development of international trade of goods particularly by means of arrangements and by the conclusion of long-term multilateral commodity agreements, where appropriate, and taking into account the interests of producers and consumers.'[59]

Today the price of oil is too high, yet according to the World Bank it will go still higher by 1980. On the other hand, the price of commodities such as sugar and wheat, which has risen spectacularly in recent years, may well fall between now and then.[60] Speculating about future price trends, however, is not the best approach to achieving the 'stable and healthy world economy' to which Bilder refers. Putting aside international laissez-faire, therefore, together with periodic bouts of economic coercion and reprisals, the producing and consuming countries of oil and other commodities need to hammer out new and mutually beneficial rules and agreements which, if subsequently broken, can be enforced automatically and effectively by international sanctions. 'A co-operative effort', Paust and Blaustein conclude, 'is called for to obtain a more inclusive regulation of the economic instrument of coercion and a more inclusive and policy-serving use of the earth's resources—not for war and unilateral dominance, but for peace and mankind.'[61] Surely this goal must be shared by reasonable men everywhere. If so, it is high time their leaders, elected and otherwise, demonstrated more determination to achieve it.

[59] See note 24 above. Despite its participation in the International Coffee Agreement, '[t]he United States historically has opposed price agreements, preferring to let the market forces work. Last month [February 1975], Thomas Enders, Assistant US Secretary of State, indicated that Washington still opposed such accords. Washington prefers aid to trade, notwithstanding that the recipients nearly always prefer trade.' Goldsborough, 'U.S. and Oil-Price Accords', *Int. Herald-Tribune*, Mar. 7, 1975, p. 4, col. 4.

[60] *Ibid.*, Apr. 5-6, 1975, p. 9, col. 1. But see a CIA research report indicating that world grain shortages are likely to increase in the near future, giving the United States 'a measure of power it had never had before—possibly an economic and political dominance greater than that of the immediate post-World War II years'. Weinstein, 'CIA Study Says Food Crisis Could Increase U.S. Power', *ibid.*, Mar. 18, 1975, p. 3, col. 1. Should such a situation materialise, presumably current apologists for the Arab oil embargo would be singing a different tune.

[61] Paust and Blaustein, note 10 above, p. 439.

EUROPE'S ARMY OF IMMIGRANTS *

Jonathan Power

FOR too long in Britain immigrants have been regarded as a domestic problem, a legacy of Empire, a home-grown plant that had to be nurtured, pruned or uprooted according to one's racial beliefs. That immigration was part of a European-wide phenomenon which depended more on economics than on culture, philosophy or political systems has been ignored; and the fact that there are, in the Common Market alone, more than 10 million of these new proletarians, comes to most British as an astonishing surprise. In Switzerland they comprise 30 per cent of the labour force, one million in a population of only six million. In Stuttgart, Germany, one worker in four is foreign and in Munich 50 per cent of the dustmen and 70 per cent of the street cleaners come from overseas. Even Norway has its Pakistanis.

The distinguished American economist, C. P. Kindleberger, has argued persuasively that this elastic supply of immigrant labour has been one of the major contributions to Europe's economic growth.[1] Yet, vital as these immigrants are to servicing the unpleasant underneath of the European economy, public opinion is fast moving against them. In that Britain is not alone. The Swiss talk of *Uberfremdung* (foreign domination). In Germany and France the oil crisis is used as an excuse to announce an end to all immigration.

But why this fear? Emigration and immigration, the movement of men from one opportunity to another, are almost as old as the hills. And throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries the industrialised countries of Western Europe relied heavily on immigrant labour. After

* This article is based on a paper commissioned by the International Institute for Environment and Development.

[1] Kindleberger writes: '. . . the major factor shaping the remarkable economic growth which most of Europe has experienced since 1950 has been the availability of a large supply of labour. The labour has come from a high rate of natural increase (the Netherlands), from transfers from agriculture to services and industry (Germany, France, Italy), from the immigration of refugees (Germany), and from the immigration of unemployed and under-employed workers from the Mediterranean countries (France, Germany and Switzerland). Those countries with no substantial increase in the labour supply—Britain, Belgium and the Scandinavian nations—on the whole have grown more slowly than the others'. Of Britain he writes: '. . . the difficulties of supply in a tight labour market, which led to rising prices in periods of expansion like 1951, 1955, 1960 and 1964, after little more than fifteen or eighteen months of expansion. These rising prices turned the balance of payments adverse and led to tightened monetary and fiscal policy and slower investment and growth'. (*Europe's Postwar Growth: the role of labor supply*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1967, pp. 3 and 77.)

the Second World War, however, immigration appeared to belong to a bygone age, to economic conditions that no longer applied. Indeed, the worrying problem was how to absorb the demobilised servicemen and the refugees—West Germany alone received eight million of them from the east. Large-scale emigration was predicted. Yet within a decade attention was turning to new sources of labour. Postwar reconstruction helped by the Marshall Plan had rapidly absorbed the returning soldiers. Birth rates began to fall—reflecting the new-found prosperity. Children stayed at school longer. The working week began to shorten. Older people started to retire earlier. While the total population of the original six members of the EEC increased on average by 1 per cent a year in the years 1958–68, the population of working age (15–64) increased by only 0.6 per cent and the economically active population by a mere 0.1 per cent. Ironically, West Germany experienced this phenomenon of a contracting labour supply in a more pronounced form than anyone else. Between 1962 and 1972, although the German population grew by around 4 per cent, labour in full-time employment fell by an astonishing 6.6 per cent. In working hours this meant a loss to the economy of 3,200 million hours.

Economic growth and labour immigration

Indeed, economic progress and labour shortages seemed to be inseparable twins. Although emigrants left Algeria, Turkey or Jamaica because of lack of opportunity at home, they only came in response to the demands of Europe. A regression analysis by the German economist, R. W. Böhning, showed that 96 per cent of the variation in the inflow of foreigners to Germany in the years 1957–68 was explained by the variations in the German demand for labour. Likewise a study of West Indian immigration into Britain [2] showed that immigration was strongly correlated with unfilled vacancies. Only when an over-anxious British government tried to legislate immigration away was there a rush to beat the ban. Thousands of immigrants raced to Britain only to find there were not enough jobs waiting for them.

Immigrants are now so rooted in the European economy that it is almost impossible to conceive a situation short of war or economic catastrophe that would lower their number significantly. Although since the oil crisis there has been a sharp increase in unemployment in Germany, there is still a shortage of labour in a number of sectors

[2] E. J. B. Rose and associates, *Colour and Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations*. London, New York: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations. 1969, p. 74.

of the economy. This is true of Holland, France and Belgium too. Even in 1967, when Germany's growth rate dropped to 0.3 per cent, immigrant workers were still needed. The return flow was only marginally larger than it would have been during boom conditions. The decrease of about 200,000 (out of an immigrant work force of 1,300,000) was not due to the dismissal of foreign workers by employers, but was almost entirely the result of the fall in the number of new immigrants.

It now looks as if Europe has reached a stage in which the numbers of immigrants are so large that the sheer dynamic of immigration has become self-sustaining. This is because migrants, although perhaps seeing themselves initially as 'target workers'—in Europe only long enough to save up money for a new house or a small business back home—soon begin to change their aspirations. For a start they find that, given the cost of living in the host countries, it takes them longer than they had anticipated to amass their little fortune. As the months, and later the years, roll by, what once appeared as sensible targets when viewed from a Turkish or Algerian village, get overtaken by new ideas. Submerged in a new milieu, however much they may be estranged from it in terms of culture and colour, they cannot help but be infused by its life style. Besides, life in the European city is lonely; sooner or later, the immigrant sends for his wife and children.

But if the immigrant himself is plugged into the European economic system, so is the phenomenon of migration. The Dutch Central Planning Office has made an interesting calculation. First it assumes that there is an annual addition of foreign workers amounting to 1 per cent of the total labour force. It also assumes that these workers are married with a family size that corresponds to the Dutch population. (This latter assumption of course underplays the impact of the rest of the calculation.) It then assumes that they require a commensurate amount of public expenditure as the Dutch—schools, hospitals, housing and so on. Working from these assumptions, it has calculated that the workers, far from satisfying demand, would actually, through their own economic demands, create a further labour shortage amounting to a quarter of the original shortage after one year and 11 per cent after five years. This seems to suggest that migration begets migration and more migration begets even more migration. (In reality, the Dutch model, although revealing a trend, is rather overdrawn. In practice, European governments do not provide houses, schools and hospitals commensurate with the standards of the average of the native population.)

Although all the evidence would suggest that emigration to Europe is growing, developing, even sustaining and feeding on itself, although

Europeans are becoming more entrenched in work habits that are increasingly removed from the kind of jobs immigrants do, although history tells us that this is the way things often have been, there is developing a strong counter-current—man's prejudice to man. This counter-current itself has deep historical roots—at least as old as that of migration itself. Man has always feared the other sect, the other tribe, the other race, the other country. And today, although the immigrants are Europe's new proletarians, removing from us burdens we do not wish to bear, there is a growing anxiety that they are invading our territory, taking over our cities, even competing for our jobs. There is an expanding fear that ' they ' will be stronger than ' us '. So paradoxically, although there is a strong economic case that without immigration jobs would not be done, capital would not work as efficiently (night-shift work in particular), upward wage pressure would increase and with it inflation, the peoples of Europe, prisoners of their prejudice even more than of their self-interest, demand of the politicians that immigration must stop.

Is immigration inflationary?

Waiting in the wings during the last decade of migrant build-up has been a school of economic thought that was given short shrift when immigration seemed to be a less sensitive issue. It is that immigration is inflationary. Castles and Kosack sum up the argument:

> Economists who think that immigration leads to inflation tend to approach the question from the demand side, rather than the supply side emphasized by Kindleberger. This view agrees that additional labour supply raises total output but holds that this new output is more than outweighed by the consumption of the immigrants, so that in fact output per head falls. In other words, immigration creates excess demand, which leads to price rises and inflation. It is admitted that immigration tends to redistribute income in favour of capital by holding down wages and increasing profits, but this is not thought to generate growth in *per capita* national income. In such models, the excess demand does not come principally from the personal consumption of immigrants whose wages are low and whose propensity to save is high, but from the capital investment required to employ them. Whether immigration is thought to be inflationary in the short, but not the long term, or vice versa, depends on whether this additional investment is assumed to take place immediately after immigration, or later on.[3]

[3] Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations. 1973.

But the economic debate around the inflation argument is extremely confused. Mishan and Needleman argue [4] that these inflationary pressures are concentrated in the early years of immigration and that later, once the initial capital investment and infrastructural costs are paid off, the immigrants make a greater contribution to the economy. Mishan and Needleman assume that immigrants arrive with their families or bring them over relatively soon. They also assume that these new migrant families are provided with new workplaces, houses, schools, hospital places and so on. Following through on these assumptions, Mishan and Needleman calculate that each immigrant household requires £5,300 of capital investment: two-thirds of it social and one-third industrial. They reckon that this capital is provided over a two-year period and that the average annual value of the product of an immigrant worker is £1,512, of which £1,200 is paid to the worker in wages. Not surprisingly, given these assumptions, the authors conclude that immigrants require—in their early years of settlement—more expenditure than they contribute. Hence, they argue, immigrants create excess demand and are therefore inflationary.

The German economist, Professor Rüstow, has made similar calculations. However, he does not assume that there is a family reunion to begin with. First, he calculates that the capital required for each new workplace in Germany is DM. 100,000.[5] He goes on to argue that the foreign worker's product is worth about DM. 27,000—of which he receives DM. 19,000 in pay. He then makes the unlikely assumption that 90 per cent of foreign workers' income is spent in Germany and finally concludes that each foreign worker contributed about DM. 20,000 to German national income. Rüstow therefore argues that it takes about six years before a foreign worker has provided a surplus equal to his initial capital demand. For these six years the immigrant is creating excess demand; after he is producing excess supply.

But the case of both Mishan and Needleman and Rüstow suffers from some obvious weaknesses. Apart from the West Indian immigrants in Britain, family reunion rarely happens in the early years of settlement. Social capital has been only grudgingly provided. Hence the still uncleared bidonvilles in France and the 250,000 immigrant children out of school in Germany. Likewise the argument of the economic cost of providing workplaces is seriously misleading. The overwhelming majority of immigrant workers come in response to unfilled vacancies to do jobs that otherwise would not be done. Indeed,

[4] E. J. Mishan and L. Needleman, 'Immigration: Some Economic Effects', *Lloyds Bank Review*, No. 81, July 1966, pp. 35–40.

[5] Somewhat under £10,000 at 1966 exchange rates. (His article was written in 1966.) See Castles and Kosack, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

as in the case of the British textile industry, it can be said that they come to keep going industries that would otherwise close down.

The Swiss economists,[6] who have pioneered the argument of inflation later rather than sooner, provide a contrary school of thought. They argue that when immigrants first come, they work for low wages, they save a lot, they come without their families and therefore they place few demands on the social structure. Consequently wages are held down, and these immigrants help to use existing industrial capacity more productively. Indeed, although they do not refer to it, they appear to accept the argument of Madeleine Trébous who, in her study of Algerian workers, argues that France has received a windfall of £375 million from its Algerian immigrants.[7]

These Swiss economists, however, argue that in later years the cost of immigration begins to mount. First, because immigrants keep wages down and therefore prices, which leads to increased pressure on exports. Secondly, as the migrant stream matures and migrants are joined by their families, consumption rises, social infrastructural demands increase and more immigrants are imported merely to service the needs of those already here. In sum, the effect is to put pressure on the economy; it overheats and inflates.

Although this argument was first developed in Switzerland—perhaps understandably since Switzerland's work force is 30 per cent immigrant —it is now spreading throughout Europe as the conventional wisdom of the day. The reason is that it fits the politics of the day. Naturally, European governments are responding to the popular current of discontent. But to restrict immigration on the grounds that it is inflationary makes it more intellectually palatable.

Senior policy makers will admit in private that the economists'

[6] A. Guehm, *Ausländische Arbeitskräfte—Vor und Nachteile für die Volkswirtschaft*. Berne: Haupt Verlag. 1966. V. Lutz, ' Foreign Workers and Domestic Wage Levels with an illustration from the Swiss Case '. *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review*, No. 64, March 1963, p. 44. K. Huber. *Die auslandischen Arbeitskräfte in der Schweiz* (Dissertation, Solothurn, 1963).

[7] Madeleine Trébous, *Migration and Development—the case of Algeria*. Paris: OECD. First pub. 1970. English ed. 1973. On page 202 she argues that France receives young men whose ' economic value ' is at a maximum, whose ' rearing ' has cost France nothing, and who, for the major part, will not have to be supported for the period of inactivity in old age. (Most Algerian workers, albeit a decreasing number, still return home after a spell of work in France.) Mme. Trébous quotes a calculation that estimates the cost of rearing an Algerian worker in Algeria as one franc per day. If one assumes the ' rearing period ' is fifteen years, the total cost of rearing an Algerian worker is approximately Fr. 5,000 (i.e. about £500). Therefore, the French economy chalks up a windfall of Fr. 10,000 million for every 200,000 immigrant workers. In fact there are now 700,000 Algerian workers in France, a total immigrant workforce of 1,770,000. For the Algerian section of this alone it means a bonus to the French economy of £375 million. But if this ' cost of rearing ' is calculated by European standards—which would be more correct as the Algerian worker takes the place of Frenchmen—this figure must be multiplied by at least five. It is interesting to note, by way of comparison, that Kindleberger calculated that each refugee from East Germany to West Germany represented a gift of $5,000.

arguments are conflicting. Indeed, many would wonder if *at any point* immigrants contribute to inflation. But given the political pressures, it is the Swiss economists' case that is now being listened to because that is the one that seems to suit the need. The German government, with its dramatic decision on November 23, 1973, to cut off all immigration forthwith, has perhaps given the most visible manifestation of this new change of mood. On July 4, 1974, the French government followed suit. In Switzerland, the government has been committed for the last two years to holding the male foreign working population down to 600,000. In Holland, despite advice from the Central Planning Board which argues that a net immigration of 26,000 a year is necessary for continued economic growth, the government have publicly set their sights on a sharp cut in numbers. Britain, like Switzerland, has been cutting back its immigration for more than ten years, and since 1971 it has become almost impossible for a black non-professional to enter Britain to work.

European industrialists are increasingly worried about the direction in which the tide is running. An overwhelming majority of them are convinced exponents of the free labour supply theory. 'The proof of the pudding is in the eating' argues Dr. Waldraff, the chief personnel officer of Bosch & Co., the giant German electrical company. 'We had immigrants coming in throughout the sixties and we had fast economic growth and little inflation.'

Although governments are telling industrialists that they must economise on the use of labour by automating, more hard-headed businessmen do not easily accept such arguments. 'What worries me', says Marc Ouin, Renault's secretary-general, 'is the rising aspiration of the French worker, not the increased possibilities of using automation. French workers, especially those in the Paris region, are increasingly looking for white-collar jobs and the only way we can match this outflow of French workers is by using immigrants.' Nearly 25 per cent of Renault's work force is now immigrant. Ouin agrees with Roger Böhning, the German economist, who argues that more automation can create more of the repetitive subdivided type of jobs that European workers do not want to do.[8]

[8] Perhaps one of the most interesting case studies of the impact of automation on workers' attitudes is the General Motors' car plant in Ohio, where the new Vega cars are produced. It was heralded as a model factory, constructed around entirely new principles of automation. Instead of an assembly line moving at 60 cars an hour, the Vega one moves at 100. This is made possible by greatly simplified assembly methods and robot welders. The result of this was mind-boggling—800 Vegas passed before each worker in an eight-hour shift; one every 36 seconds. So despite the fact that the men were among the highest paid industrial workers in the world, they rebelled. The GM management began to complain of 'tardiness, loitering, failure to follow instructions and abuse of employee facilities'. In some periods, absenteeism rose as high as 16 per cent. There were complaints that workers had attacked the paint, upholstery and controls of cars.

Indeed, automation is such a mixed blessing that many European firms are moving in a diametrically opposed direction—to 'job enrichment'. Two years ago, Volvo, the Swedish car firm, became the first motor car manufacturer to build a car assembly line without an assembly track. The track has been replaced by a battening-down platform which carries the emerging car from one group of workers to another. No longer is it merely one man screwing on an endless number of hubcaps and another riveting untold lines of engines in place. Now each group of workers is given a marked degree of independence and flexibility in how they manage their section of the assembly process. Small teams of workers work on a wide variety of tasks on each platform, interchanging tasks at will. Absenteeism has dropped sharply and productivity has gone up. But although job enrichment helped to hold native workers, it does not cut back altogether the drift out of industry. Neither does it attract more workers to fill the new jobs opened up by expansion.

Immigration versus economic decline

There is a clear consensus among European industrialists: governments must choose between immigration and economic decline. And to the surprise of industrialists, some governments through force of circumstances are slowly moving to an anti-growth position, or to be more exact, a position of modified growth. The Germans recently decided in principle to trade off 0.3 per cent of economic growth so as to counteract any extra wage-push inflation that might be induced by a cut-back in immigration. It is also encouraging Germans to retire later and becoming more vigorous in pushing industry into Germany's own underdeveloped areas, where there is a ready supply of indigenous labour.

In November 1973, the Dutch government published a memorandum (white paper) on immigration. It is the most comprehensive policy document on immigration yet produced by a European government. It firmly rejects the possibility of Holland continuing to absorb an increasing number of foreign workers. It argues that Holland must stabilise its present immigrant population by encouraging family reunion—until now it has discouraged this perhaps more than any other country. But once this is done, no more. The government is prepared to accept some diminution in economic growth, but how much is not really specified. One senior civil servant, whose influence on the drafting of the memorandum had been significant, said 'We will pay a price, a big price, but not any price.' Finally, the memorandum argues that capital must be encouraged to go to labour—to take the work to the developing countries from which the labour comes.

Switzerland, which has been trying to restrict immigration longer than anyone else, has yet to face seriously the dilemma of economic slow-down versus immigration. It is generally accepted that the cut-back in immigration has had some impact on reducing growth. But so far, there has been a good deal of slack to take in. The old small-scale craft-based industries had long shied away from labour-saving practices and now they are being pushed to make a more effective use of machinery. This is not large-scale automation—just the straightforward use of machines which, although perhaps not so sensitive as the craftsman's hands, do raise his productivity quite significantly.

Two other developments have also helped postpone the day of reckoning. First, is the fact that the Swiss government has, as it were, cheated. Although it has sharply reduced its long-term immigrant inflow, it has allowed the number of seasonal and frontier workers to increase. These are workers who come on short-term contracts and who have to return home for at least a month a year. They are not allowed to bring their families and it takes them up to six years to earn residence qualifications. They often live in barracks. Inevitably, they are politically docile and easily exploited by unscrupulous employers. Fortunately, the Swiss government is beginning to tighten up on the abuse. The other buffer against the true cost of Switzerland's decision is the increasing amount of family reunion, and a concomitant decrease in male rotation, that has taken place in the last few years. This has meant that although the net inflow has decreased, the size of the residual work force has increased.

France and Britain are in a rather different position. France has always been more ready to accept its immigrants than other European countries. Its male population was devastated by war and it has exhibited the slowest rate of natural increase of any of the major European nations. Immigration has long been seen not merely as an economic need but a major contribution to France's demographic imbalance. But one has heard less of the demographic argument in France in the last three or four years. After all, it was bound to lose some of its validity as racial ghettoes formed and the population no longer mixed easily. But the economic need persists and President Pompidou's government was not prepared to deny industry the labour it said it needed. Besides, the French economic spurt of the decade preceding the oil crisis was built on the premise that inflation could be dealt with as long as economic growth did not falter. The Sixth Plan foresaw a net inflow of 65,000 immigrants, which is as high as it was in Britain's peak year, 1962—a year that was itself exceptional in Britain because of the last-minute rush to beat the impending restrictions on immigration. But even France is not immune from the currents of

opinion now swirling through Europe: moreover by mid-1974 unemployment in France was fast increasing. On July 4, 1974, the new government of President Giscard d'Estaing announced a halt to all new immigration.

The situation in Britain is very different. Immigration into Britain has been gravely distorted by racial animosity. Such has been the intensity of this animosity that, unlike in other European countries, there has never been an open debate about its economic consequences. The facts of the matter are quite the opposite of what is commonly supposed. Although in the 1960s there was a large inflow of West Indians, Pakistanis, Indians and Irish, it was exceeded by the outflow of workers, most but by no means all of whom were white native British. During the 1960s there was a net loss of population through migration of 600,000. And since 1962, when restrictions on immigration began, there has never been any sustained economic growth. Only momentarily, as for a short period in 1972, did the dilemma of immigration versus economic slow-down arise; there was a brief surge in economic growth and some labour shortages. One Midlands car plant was giving away a free car to any of its workers who could recruit ten new employees. But then came the oil crisis and the panic was over.

In sum, it appears that the real debate about the economic cost of immigration is in its infancy. Yet if the industrialists are right and immigration can only be halted at the risk of undermining economic growth quite seriously, then the debate is going to become one of the key issues of the decade. The voters who elected the governments of Europe will be compelled to choose in no uncertain terms: what exactly in life do they want?

Is the rotation of labour a solution?

Meanwhile, there is a danger that industrialists and politicians will play for time, in order to put off as long as is possible the day of reckoning. (It is realised by both sides that the recent wave of restrictions is only an interim measure, a sop to public opinion, made possible by the slow-down in economic activity.) Almost with one voice, the employers are calling for a system of rotation. They argue that if the European electorate is worried about the increasing number of foreigners invading its cities, then the problem can be reduced to more manageable proportions by deciding to exclude the women and children. If this is done, they believe, many of the social pressures will be removed. The men can be housed in barracks attached to the factories in which they work. After two or three years in the recipient country they will return home, use their savings to establish themselves in their home economies and then a new lot of young men can take

their place. In this way, so runs the argument, they will maximise their contribution to the European economy, their presence in the community here will be less aggravating, and they will have skills and capital when they go home to put to use in the fight against underdevelopment.

In effect what the argument implies is a kind of South African model where young male labour is sucked off the reserves, only to be pushed back again once it has contributed its services to the industrial sector. Yet we know from what has happened in South Africa that this produces enormous social problems as well as undermining the rural economy. In their own defence, the European advocates of rotating migrant labour argue that there would be important differences from South Africa. Unlike South Africa, there would not be constant calls on the same men. The European economy would content itself with the 18–24-year-olds and would only take them for two or three years. Yet are there enough men in this age group in the source areas from which Europe now draws its manpower? It is doubtful. After all if white South Africa, with a much smaller base population than Europe yet drawing on the whole of Central and Southern Africa, has had constantly to rotate the same men, why does Europe think it would have more flexibility?

The Dutch government, which was close to introducing a rotation system before the new socialist-orientated government came to power in September 1973, reworked its original proposal because of criticisms of this kind. First it attempted to make rotation an option. Young foreign workers who came to Holland and who agreed to return home and to stay there after a two-year stint, were to receive a bonus of 2,000 Kroner (£400). In October 1974 parliament threw out this proposal. Now there is merely the inducement of a programme which offers returnees training programmes for new skills. Recognising that the skills practised in Furope are rarely applicable in the immigrants' own countries, the Dutch plan at the end of their two-year contracts to give these young men a three-month programme in which they can learn a useful relevant skill.

The German cabinet considered rotation and has now firmly rejected it. The Swiss have done likewise, although there was a real danger at one time that the seasonal and frontier workers would develop into a rotational labour force. The French and the British position, however, is more ambiguous. The French, after years of holding open the door to family reunion, are now making it quite difficult for wives and children to join their menfolk. Although there is no legal pressure for men to return home after two or three years (unless they lose their jobs), such strict family control policies in effect

demand this. In Britain, the situation is somewhat more complex. Immigration, because of the continuing economic crisis, is slight. Those that come are here to do jobs the British worker would rather be unemployed than do. They are recruited mainly for two kinds of work. First, as domestics; there is an annual quota of 8,000, and they are not allowed to bring their families. (Besides working for private families, a high proportion of them work in the lower grade jobs in the hospitals.) The other major employer of foreign workers is the hotel and catering industry. For this there is an annual quota of 8,500 and families can only come if 'adequate' accommodation is found. In practice, especially in the metropolitan areas, it cannot. If Britain did have economic growth again, there is every reason to believe that future immigration would be made to conform to similar kinds of restrictions.

Taking capital to labour—another way out of the dilemma?

If rotation is seen as the industrialist's escape route from the conflict between economic needs and popular resentment, then the idea of taking capital to labour is the academic's and the civil servant's. Here, many of them argue, is a simple way of relieving social pressures in Europe and at the same time aiding the cause of development in the Third World. Yet in practice there are a number of formidable obstacles. First is the fact that most of the European nations—Holland and Germany excepted—are trying to cope with the new oil-induced balance of payments deficits. The last thing they want is new capital outflows. There is also the very real question of the usefulness of this kind of large-scale capital when it goes to the developing countries. Would it help or hinder the rural/urban imbalance that in most Third World countries is the reason why young men flee the land in the first place? Professor Elkan in his paper *Unemployment in Low Income Countries*[9] argues that increased urban employment in developing countries merely induces increased urban migration. He cites the example of how in 1964 private employers in Nairobi and the Kenyan government agreed to increase their payrolls by 15 per cent. at once, on condition that the trade unions agreed to accept a wage moratorium. In the event, the government could not afford to increase its labour force, but private employers did and 'this acted like a magnet attracting new workers into the urban labour market'. Thirdly, as Dr. Ernst, the senior civil servant responsible for West Germany's immigration policies, has pointed out, 'our suppliers of immigrant labour do not correspond with where we want to invest our capital. German capital

[9] British Association for the Advancement of Science, Annual Meeting 1970, Section F, Sept. 4, 1970.

wants to go where there is political stability and low wages. This means South Africa, East Asia—and we would if we could, Eastern Europe. It does not mean Italy and Turkey from where most of our migrants come.'

Research carried out in South Africa is a warning of just how difficult it is to make capital go where it does not want to go. Since 1956, when the Tomlinson commission presented its report on the development of South Africa's underdeveloped areas, the South African government has been promoting the economics and politics of separate development. First came tax concessions (the option of five year tax holidays was one). But when that failed—a mere 2,200 jobs a year had been created—the government, in 1967, passed a bill which stopped factories in the urban areas taking on additional African workers without the prior approval of the ministry of planning. It was a short-lived policy. In 1972, a government white paper conceded the private sector's case that the implementation of the policy of decentralisation had had an adverse effect on the economy. The government was forced to tone down—although it certainly did not abandon—its previous highly rigorous position.

Trevor Bell's conclusion, at the end of his exhaustive survey of South Africa's regional policy, is that 'forced industrial decentralisation involves a cost which rises more than in proportion to the percentage of additional capacity which is diverted.' Bell finds that markets and materials, not labour costs, are the predominant elements in locational decisions; that one cannot conclude, on the evidence, that increasing city size brings diseconomies of scale; and that industry, despite the inducements (and punishment) handed out to encourage it to move to the border areas, has been loath to do so. And he goes on to argue that if separate development were followed on a scale sufficient to reduce the black/white population to 1 : 1 in the southern Transvaal industrial complex, or to bring an end to the expansion of the African industrial labour force in that region, it is exceedingly doubtful if South Africa could continue its present rapid rate of economic growth.[10]

Regional policy—a third way out of the dilemma

Thus the South African experience does not give much support to those who see the movement of capital to labour as an alternative to immigration. However, it might be more feasible, beset by many of the same difficulties though it is, to think of ways of getting European

[10] Trevor Bell, *Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press 1973.

industrial capital to move into Europe's own underdeveloped regions. At least in these regions, cultural and social patterns are not as divergent as they are in South Africa, or between Europe and the Third World. There is often quite a marked degree of available industrial infrastructure, albeit archaic, left over from earlier periods of economic prosperity. The north-east of Britain and the north and north-east of France are prime examples. Other areas like the Massif Central and the Mezziogiorno of Italy, although underdeveloped in a European sense, do have the advantage of being within striking distance of a highly developed system of rail and road transport. And they face local consumer markets that are moderately well developed. Yet despite all these advantages, industrialists are extremely conservative about moving out. They argue that there is too high a proportion of older people in these declining areas; that they would be too far away from suppliers, subcontractors and markets. And finally, as the OECD has pointed out in a recent review of European regional policy, governments are not prepared to allocate the resources necessary to alter some of the disadvantages. As long as there is a gap in opportunity, one of the most critical factors—the supply of young men—will continue to leave for the big industrial areas. The OECD report in summing up the problem of the Italian case, states:

> In Italy we can see that the magnitude of the gap is such that it would call for a very much larger effort, in the shape of transfer of resources to the South, to reduce it at all and without it the gap will remain a continuing feature of the Italian economy indefinitely. The very considerable effort that has been made, in a climate of national economic growth, has raised the absolute level of income or well being in the South, but not the level relative to the North. An increased effort to transfer more resources for the development of the South could have the effect of diminishing the overall national growth unless it could be shown—contrary to experience (and, the author would say, the evidence)—that a given quantity of resources could provide a higher rate of return than in the North.[11]

The capital to labour solution is clearly fraught with difficulties. Certainly there is some room for manoeuvre here, particularly in regional policy, and the governments must be encouraged to make use of it. But in the end it is likely to be only a partial contribution to the problem. In the end, Europe will be forced to decide how much economic growth it is prepared to sacrifice for the luxury of halting a continuing inflow of its new proletarians. The balance of argument is

[11] A. Emanuel, *Issues of Regional Policies*. Paris: OECD. 1973, p. 5.

probably well on the side of limiting economic growth. For there is one argument, not mentioned so far, which in my opinion dwarfs all the others—the negative impact of emigration on most of the sending countries. Without doubt, they are sending us their finest young men with disproportionately little gain, and indeed harm, to themselves.

But whatever the decision, whether the rate of new immigration is halved, quartered or cut still more sharply, the fact that there are 10 million immigrants already here cannot be avoided or forgotten. Already there are warning signs—the Turkish quarter of Kreuzberg in Berlin, the Arab Casbah in Marseilles, West-Indian-influenced Holloway, or Indian-dominated Southall. Wherever agglomerations of people of a different colour and race and religion are left isolated and neglected, there too are the seeds of crime, turbulence and social upheaval. Our self-interest alone compels us to revise our urban and social policies to accommodate their needs. Moreover it can be argued that the immigrants who came to Europe in the 1950s and 1960s were more instrumental than any other factor in making us affluent. The least we can do is give them an honest price for their labour.

BOOKS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: ISSUES OF FOCUS AND METHOD

J. Frankel

World in Crisis: Readings in International Relations. 4th ed. Edited by Frederick H. Hartmann. *New York: The Macmillan Company; Toronto, London: Collier-Macmillan. 1974. 519 pp. Paperback: £2·50.*

Research and Development and the Prospects for International Security. By Frederick Seitz and Rodney W. Nichols. Preface by Frank R. Barnett. *New York: Crane, Russak for the National Strategy Information Center. 1973. 74 pp. (NSIC Strategy Papers No. 22; Series Eds.: Frank N. Trager and William Henderson with the assistance of Dorothy E. Nicolosi.) $4.95.*

A Theory of Conflict. By Brian Crozier. *London: Hamish Hamilton. 1974. 245 pp. Index. £4·50.*

The International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Analysis. Vol. 1. Edited by Peter Jones. *London: Croom Helm. 1974. 213 pp. Index. £5·50.*

Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies: Volume Two. Edited by Patrick J. McGowan. *Beverly Hills, Calif., London: Sage. 1975. 351 pp. Bibliog. Paperback: £3·50.*

Political Science Annual: An International Review. Vol. 5. 1974. Edited by Cornelius P. Cotter and co-edited by John H. Kessel, William C. Mitchell and Raymond Tanter. *Indianapolis, New York: Bobbs-Merrill. 1974. 281 pp. Bibliogs. $12.95.*

International politics and foreign policy. Prepared by James Barber, Josephine Negro and Michael Smith for the course team.
Block 1: The Analysis of International Politics. *76 pp. £2·30.*
Block 2: Foreign Policy: The Setting. *96 pp. £2·50.*
Block 3: Foreign Policy Making and Implementation. *76 pp. £1·90.*
Block 4: Politics between States: Conflict and Co-operation. (in the press)
Block 5: Theory and Policy in International Politics. (in the press)
Milton Keynes: The Open University Press. 1975. (The Open University, Social Sciences: a third level course.)

The Nature of Foreign Policy: A Reader. Edited by James Barber and Michael Smith. *Edinburgh: Holmes McDougall in association with The Open University Press, Milton Keynes. 1974. 320 pp. Index.*

New Dimensions of World Politics. Edited by Geoffrey L. Goodwin and Andrew Linklater. *London: Croom Helm. 1975. 126 pp. £4·50.*

Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society. By Richard W. Sterling. *New York: Knopf. 1974. 648 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Borzoi College Textbooks; Consulting Ed.: Inis L. Claude, Jr.). $10.95.*

IT is a truism that we are living in a generation witnessing the transition from an international system moulded and dominated by western industrialised states to some kind of world society in which both transnational forces and new states are playing an increasingly more important part. What tense, however, is appropriate in discussing the process? Has it already taken place, are we in the midst of it, or are we merely talking about the potentialities of the future? Despite the abatement of the violent controversies of the earlier postwar decades, scholars and writers remain divided both about focus and method.

To start with the issue of *focus*. Although increasing numbers of bridging approaches are being made, we are still very far from a synthesis between the state-centred, micropolitical, and the world society-centred, macropolitical levels of analysis. The majority of writers continue to concentrate upon the foreign policies of individual states as the most appropriate focus of study of contemporary reality and also as the one most amenable to precise and rigorous analysis. The developments which are detracting from the pre-eminence of states can be accommodated in several ways. A promising linkage was indicated in the insights of the late Arnold Wolfers [1] that states pursue not only ' possession goals ' but also ' milieu goals ', *i.e.*, interests in shaping their international environment in the desired direction. Going somewhat further, one may conclude that the ' national interests ' of the individual states increasingly involve these ' milieu goals ' and that therefore there is no necessary dichotomy between the states and the international system; the problem lies mainly in a revised interpretation of national interests which would make them less narrowly selfish—not so much for altruistic, probably utopian reasons, but following a rational analysis which takes full account of the changing international circumstances.[2] The isolated attempts to establish linkages in a generalised manner are matched and greatly surpassed in volume by a growing body of functionalist analysis of the areas of social life which require and are sometimes actually subject to some form of ' international management '.

The term ' new dimensions ' of foreign policy has recently gained currency in describing attempts to incorporate anything that is entering the arena of international management as a necessary extension of the traditionally stressed strategic-political, or power-political aspects of state behaviour. Characteristically, the founding conference of the British International Studies Association, held in Oxford in January 1975, which was devoted to this theme, addressed itself to topics like international trade, oil, and the regime of the seas. It is, however, rapidly becoming clear that, while the old-fashioned power political approach is too narrow, the new one which attempts to embrace all the ' new dimensions ' is too wide. Not only is it impossible for an individual or even a team to acquire adequate expertise in all the relevant ' new dimensions ', which means something approaching the totality of human experience, but the resulting analysis, especially if it is a product of a collaborative effort, sadly lacks unity. As we are living in a transitional age, we cannot dispense either with the state-centric and predominantly political-strategic or with the global, functionalist points of view, but we must accommodate the two in some meaningful fashion. A comprehensive theory of international relations which embraces both levels

[1] A. Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: essays on international politics*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1962. London: Oxford University Press. 1965, pp. 73–77

[2] J. Frankel, *National Interest*. New York: Praeger. 1970.

of analysis, if one is at all attainable, will have to await some future time, when the situation has become clearer. Meanwhile, instead of arguing whether the state-centric or the global perspective is more 'correct', we may as well accept the utility of both—not as all-embracing theories offering adequate explanations but as alternative models of reality, each appropriate for explaining part but not all of it.

The issue of *method* is, if anything, even thornier. The broad traditional stream, still dominant in this country, can loosely be described as mainly historical-descriptive and/or philosophical-analytical. The newer quantitative approach, dominant in the United States, engages in a formal, wherever possible, quantitative analysis; somewhat confusingly, some of its adherents used to engage in rigorous general analyses devoid of any empirical contents while others diligently accumulated masses of statistical data. Already in 1965 Harold Lasswell remarked: 'it is solely a question of expediency and not of principle whether the total configuration is approached extensively or intensively . . . since either starting point draws the investigation towards the opposite'.[3] Only a decade later does the second volume of the *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies* show that this remark is fully justified. We have now reached the stage when the isolated approaches begin to converge, the assembled data are re-used, the typologies are increasingly better defined and some conceptualisations are broadly accepted, notably those of state behaviour, especially in crisis situations, of bilateral state relationships, of the relationship between domestic and foreign policies.

Focus and method constitute two major dimensions of our thinking which are sometimes insufficiently differentiated. It is easy to fall into the error of contrasting the 'traditionalism' of centring upon the state and of employing a historical-descriptive method with the 'modernism' of centring upon world society and of employing quantitative methods; in fact, as the vast majority of the relevant data available refer to states, it is with foreign policy analysis that many of the modernists are concerned. The purpose of this article is to investigate the way in which the individual books listed reflect—or fail to reflect—the issues of focus and method taken, as far as it is expedient, quite separately.

However strongly some of us may feel against the traditional, predominantly power political approach as an obstacle to our accepting the imperative necessities of a degree of globalism, the approach continues to flourish. This, one may guess, may be due not only to the traditionalism, if you wish, even the obscurantism of its proponents, but also because it continues to reflect an important aspect of contemporary reality, one which could otherwise be too readily obscured and ignored. Frederick H. Hartmann, the occupant of the Mahan Chair at the Naval War College, provides a convenient conspectus of this approach in the fourth edition of *World in Crisis: Readings in International Relations*. The quantity and quality of the current literature is shown by the fact that the editor chose his 41 fairly substantial readings from hundreds of possibilities; merely twelve of them had been included in the previous, 1967, edition. The picture which emerges is limited to the strategic-diplomatic dimensions of foreign policy and is fully state-centred: it deals with the fundamentals of the state system, the various

[3] Harold Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*. New York: Free Press. 1965. p. 24, quoted with approval by Peter Hansen in *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies*, Vol. II, 1974, p. 145.

instruments and techniques of state interaction, the issues of power and of its management, and individual great powers and continental groupings. The method is historical and institutional. Other dimensions of foreign policy, the international system, and the domestic systems of the individual states are not directly dealt with.

All of these can be squarely accommodated within the power political approach, supplementing Professor Hartmann's picture. Thus two distinguished American physicists, Frederick Seitz and Rodney W. Nichols, concentrate on technology in *Research and Development and the Prospects for International Security*. This slender volume constitutes a well-reasoned plea for long-range American R and D investment as an essential element in preserving a margin of security in deterrence. Its main interest lies in the extensive appendix which demonstrates by statistical tables based upon various indices that, contrary to prevalent ideas, the military R and D in the United States did not really pre-empt R and D for other purposes.

The state's internal security is the subject of Brian Crozier's *A Theory of Conflict*. His book is likely to put off some readers owing to three not fully related characteristics: first, his rather uncritical acceptance of the behaviouralist theory of aggression; second, his rather emotional anti-Marxism and anti-egalitarianism; and third, his prescription of an authoritarian government and of a hierarchical society, notably of a Department of Unconventional Warfare, seemingly an extension of the paradigm of the CIA. Mr. Crozier is, however, clear and shrewd in his historical-philosophical analysis of the dangers lurking in the activities of a number of individuals committed to the destruction of political, social and economic institutions in the West, and their support by international communism, and in the complacency both of government and of public opinion.

The first volume of *The International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Analysis*, edited by Peter Jones, which inaugurates a series of contemporary surveys concentrating upon the standpoints of the principal participants in the events of the year, in this case 1973, shows both the pros and the cons of the predominantly historical-institutional analysis. All the eight contributions (on the super-powers, China, the EEC, South America, India, Australia and Africa) contain a fair amount of empirical material but range from the factual treatment of Latin America and the EEC to the highly conceptualized one of China. The essays reflect the expertise of their authors and convey in brief the essence of the events with a fair amount of historical background. They do not aim at any broad generalisations or reinterpretations.

China is the odd man out in the volume—as it is in real life—both owing to Chairman Mao's highly conceptualized and clear-headed views of the world and to Michael Yahuda's treatment which does full justice to them. While all the other papers justifiably refer to the ambiguities, uncertainties, ambivalence, etc. in the policies of the states they analyse, Mr. Yahuda convincingly shows that the flexibility and subtlety of China's foreign policy stems from an extensively deep and continuing analysis of the main currents of international affairs. In the absence of similar conceptualizations, either by the statesmen involved or by the authors of the other contributions, the fundamental issues of individual foreign policies do not emerge with real clarity. As may well be expected, the notion of 'national interests' frequently recurs: each state pursues its own and is governed by their coincidences and clashes with the interests of others; conflict and

co-operation are simultaneous, both in essentially co-operative ventures, for example, China and North Vietnam, or the EEC, and in adversary partnerships, as between the super-powers and between each and China. While useful in its present form, the series could be improved by some reference to economic issues and by a more uniform format which would facilitate comparisons and generalisations.

The second volume of the *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies*, edited by Patrick McGowan, shows to good advantage the promising developments in this field, which are not limited to the United States, as four of the nine papers included stem from other countries. A comparison with the British Yearbook discussed above may be somewhat unfair, since this is a volume of research papers and not of surveys, but it commends itself for assessing the merits of each approach. To start with, there is infinitely more work behind each paper in the *Sage Yearbook*; whereas the British papers are, by and large, mere summaries of events and of work previously done, here each contribution represents substantial research work, in four cases conducted by a team, frequently supported by a National Foundation grant and/or previously presented for discussion.

The formal, sometimes mathematical treatment, does not make the *Sage Yearbook* exactly easy reading but, despite my own somewhat rudimentary mathematical skills, I failed to follow fully only one paper—on Bayesian analysis—and could still appreciate the accompanying verbal argument. All the contributors aspire to formal thinking but not a single paper lapses into futile mathematical refinements which do not lead anywhere in elucidating the political problems of real life. Most refreshingly, we are warned against the fascination of mathematics by the opening paper by Vithal Rajan (the only contributor from Britain) on 'Variations on a Theme by Richardson', which convincingly argues that Richardson's well known models of arms races, appealing as they are in their mathematical elegance, do not deal with realistic situations and hence are not useful even as heuristic devices.

The preface faithfully sums up the contributions in the light of the ambitious theoretical objectives stated, assessing their place in the development of the field, description and explanation; no paper answers the additional two objectives of prediction and evaluation. All the contributors are greatly concerned with their individual methodology, but the volume as a whole is not biased in favour of any one of them. There are several common elements: the same sources of statistical data are used or at least referred to; the issues of domestic-foreign linkages, especially in the formulation of the dilemmas between 'consensus' at home and 'compatibility' abroad recur; propositions concerning bilateral relations of states and crisis behaviour are repeated; national attributes related to the propensity to war are analysed. All in all, the contents of the volume as a whole add up to more than the sum total of its nine components and a growing convergence can be noted between the theoreticians who generalise and the empiricists who deal with detailed statistical data.

Three contributions can be especially commended to the empirically-minded reader. First of all, owing to its relevance for the analysis of the burning issue of British foreign policy, membership of the EEC, one should mention the paper 'Adaptive Behaviour of Small States' in which Peter Hansen offers an illuminating and extremely well-documented analysis of the issue of the membership of Denmark over the last fifteen years. He

arranges his argument around the theme of the growing interconnection between external change, which requires adaptation, and internal economic and social structures. The issue of membership of the EEC was fundamentally one of how best to manage ' boundary exchanges '—the anti-marketeers saw a distinct advantage in maintaining autonomous control whereas the pro-marketeers believed that membership offers the best opportunities for controlling the environment. The thirty pages of a highly structured argument elucidates the issue much more clearly than the mountains of argumentation on both sides produced for the referendum campaign in Britain.

Michael Brecher, with his ' structured empiricism ' is the shining—and so far—sole example of a theoretician who has not only consistently and systematically developed a framework for analysis but has also successfully applied it to the foreign policy of a state. His work on Israel, stretching over more than a decade, is unique in its comprehensiveness and penetration. In his paper in the *Yearbook*, ' Research Findings and Theory—Building in Foreign Policy Behavior ', he examines 51 hypotheses relating to crisis behaviour culled from the relevant literature and checks them against his data on Israel, confirming some but finding other propositions inapplicable. This is an interesting summary of the present state of the theory of crisis behaviour as well as an insight into Israel's foreign policy.

In his brief paper ' State Department Structure and Foreign Policy Decision Rules ', David Howard Davis argues that the Vietnam experience has demonstrated that the State Department must be engaged in some kind of collective decision-making, although the decisions were made unknowingly and were recognised only *ex post*. He sustains the hypothesis that inarticulate rules in such a process can be arrived at by analysing the size of the United States embassies.

The whole fifth, 1974, volume of *Political Science Annual*, edited by Cornelius P. Cotter, is devoted to a survey of work done in the field of collective decision-making. Its concern is with domestic politics but three of the five substantial papers are theoretical and the opening account of the theories of collective choice, by Kenneth A. Shepsle, is sufficiently detailed as well as clear and succinct, to initiate readers concerned with international politics into the arcana of the approach. Much methodologically refined work is being done, going well beyond the famous theorem of Kenneth J. Arrow first started in 1951 in his *Social Choice and Individual Values*.[4] Possibly, in time, some meaningful tool will emerge to study decision-making both in foreign ministries and in international bodies which have advanced beyond mere inter-governmental institutions.

A number of the academic specialists concerned with International Relations are becoming increasingly concerned with getting out of the ' conceptual jail ' of state-centred power politics. They deal rather with the problems of coming to grips with what is loosely termed ' world society ', with its relationship with the foreign policies of individual states and, ultimately, with some form of synthesis between all these.

The simplest, and therefore the most widespread, method is to retain foreign policy as the focus but to include increasingly diverse elements going well beyond the traditional conception of foreign policy as being, in the main, restricted to the diplomatic-strategic fields. This is frequently done

[4] New York: Wiley; London: Chapman and Hall. 1951.

either by expanding sections on the external environment within which foreign policies operate or by analysing ' new dimensions ' of foreign policy. Both approaches can be readily pursued simply by including elements which command the interest of the individual writers and teachers. As one may expect, this results in a great variety of individual treatments, following the differences in the interests and the expertise of the scholars. Embracing all that is relevant in the contemporary world is impossible; beyond the basic issues of international economics there is little consensus about what should be included.

The materials for the Open University course on *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, now in its final stages of preparation, commend themselves for summarising what belongs to the field today squarely rather than idiosyncratically; since several outside academics acted as consultants, in a way the course reflects some kind of collective judgment on the issue. The eclecticism of the way in which the course was organised is naturally reflected in the wide spread of the material it utilises. The four set books [5] differ both in focus and method. They range from a fairly orthodox full presentation of international politics, which starts with the outline of the international system but concentrates upon the foreign policies of states, and a philosophical-historical analysis of the roots of wars, to an exposition of the issues of world society in the vein of peace research and an introduction to the major lines of analysis within the contemporary theories of International Relations.

With the assistance of several case-studies, including an extensive one of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the course succeeds in introducing the student both to the bewildering variety of the basic elements of international relations and to the even more bewildering variety of the theoretical approaches to them; it is both reasonably comprehensive and reasonably comprehensible. With the assistance of a Reader, the specially prepared textbooks take the students through the basic concepts, the analysis of the domestic and the external settings and the processes of foreign policy; then at somewhat greater length through the spectrum between inter-state conflict and co-operation—extending to integration; and in conclusion, the textbooks introduce students to the problems arising from the differences in the ways of looking at the field. Inevitably, being both comprehensive and eclectic, the course does not aspire to unity of focus or method but merely offers the students a fairly representative selection of approaches, leaving to them the ultimate choice of the one which they may find most acceptable.

In this respect, even the most advanced scholars are not really in a much better position than the beginners. Each of the six prominent American specialists who contribute to *New Dimensions of Foreign Policy*, edited by G. L. Goodwin and A. Linklater, draws his individual new ' cognitive map ' based upon a feature of the international scheme which strikes him as sufficiently prominent to deserve becoming a focus: trasnational as opposed to transgovernmental dimensions, economic interdependencies, interconnectedness of military structures responsible for global peace-keeping, scientific and technological interdependencies, interactions between

[5] K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: a framework for analysis*. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 1972. K. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: a theoretical analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1959. J. W. Burton, *World Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1972. J. Frankel, *Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviour of States*. London: Oxford University Press. 1973.

elite attitudes and the current anti-militarism in the West and world order. Every one of the proposed perspectives is significant and the arguments for recognising them are cogently stated. Not one of them, however, offers the promise of a focus for a general analysis or the intimation of a suitable method of conducting it.

Where, probably inevitably, composite volumes cannot succeed, an individual scholar with sufficient vision has a much greater chance, as demonstrated by Richard W. Sterling in his *Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society.* The author's unexceptional starting point is that the survival and the prosperity of the globe is the necessary condition for the survival and the prosperity of the individual states. Hence he chooses as the focus of his analysis the issue of how to transcend the traditional notion that the international system is dominated by its parts—the states—and to conceptualize a new international system increasingly dominant over these parts. Professor Sterling's thesis is thus explicitly normative—he asserts that we must strive for a far-reaching global redistribution of power, wealth, education and status, as without it we cannot hope for a reasonably peaceful world society. The thesis appears to be squarely within the mainstream of peace research but, in fact, the author is much more down to earth than the majority of peace researchers; he appreciates much better than most of them the realities of power politics. He does not confuse the 'is' with the 'ought'; he fully recognises and analyses the continuing dominance of the states and he presents his argument as a desideratum arising from a rational calculation of how to pursue national interests in the changing world and not as a fully established fact.

The micropolitical world to which the first half of Sterling's book is devoted is therefore very much the traditional world of power politics, focusing upon power, force and war, in which the main moving forces are ideologies, nationalism and imperialism; diplomacy, international law and international organisation are the major elements of interstate relations. The second half, devoted to macropolitics, starts with the statement that survival, liberty, justice, wealth and peace within each state have always depended to a greater or a lesser degree upon the state's international environment. Not everybody, however, will readily or fully accept the author's contention that we urgently need a mental adjustment to a new situation in which the fate of civil society is becoming indistinguishable from the fate of international society—surely this does not, perhaps as yet, apply with equal force to all states and to all situations. Nevertheless, in its general drift, Sterling's argument is fully convincing and his analysis of the various issues of world society is cogent. Even the most hard-bitten adherents of national perspectives will find little to cavil at in his penetrating scrutiny of global economy: the scarcity of resources, the unequal division of wealth, the issues of development, of sovereignty, of transnational economy, or with his analysis of transnational society in the relations between region and globe, within the West, and between East and West. The crux of his argument is found in the concluding chapter devoted to the issue of justice in global society. It is here that the threshold of the macropolitical approach is found—until and unless we accept the basic postulate of a degree of global equality, we cannot hope to alter our traditional, micropolitical perspectives which increasingly restrain us in the pursuit of our traditional national interests.

Professor Sterling's method is philosophical-historical, probably the only

suitable one for a comprehensive treatment of this kind. His argument is exceptionally lucid and logical and is amply supported by extensive statistical data so that it should not be rejected even by ardent adherents of the quantitative scheme. The analysis is likely to appear to be objective and convincing even to readers who do not share the author's basically normative perspectives. In fact, perhaps it is precisely his normative approach and his preoccupation with global justice that have provided him with a sufficiently clear focus to look at the field comprehensively.

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

Conflits et Coopération entre les Etats: 1971, prélude à un nouvel ordre international? Edited by Jean Meyriat. *Paris: Armand Colin for the Centre d'Etude des Relations Internationales de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques. 1973. 256 pp. (Travaux et recherches de science politique no. 25.) F 63.00.*

THIS symposium on a dozen major issues in world affairs in 1971 comes from a group of specialists at the Centre d'Etude des Relations Internationales in Paris who had collaborated previously to produce three successive editions of *L'univers politique* before editorial problems caused its suspension. The editor of this book regards it as constituting a fourth volume in that series, and the quality of research and analysis characterising this publication will certainly help him to muster support for his ambition to revive the series in a modified form.

Apart from wishing to continue a series of publications, however, the contributors to this book on the issues of 1971 set out to examine how far international relations were undergoing a qualitative change during that year in particular. Of course, 1971 was clearly important in marking the diplomatic revolution in relations between the United States and the Chinese Peoples Republic which was one aspect of the American policy of movement or detente; inevitably, much of the book involves analyses of ripples around the world caused by changing relationships among the super-powers. In chapter 3 Manuela Semidei discusses the new American policy; but of greater interest is the following chapter by the eminent specialist on the communist world, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, who points to a new phase in Soviet foreign policy, moving forward from years of encouraging neutralism and non-alignment in the Third World towards a more positive search for bilateral agreements.

In so far as the book presents a coherent theme regarding changes in international relations as a whole, the case is presented by Jean Meyriat in his preface, and by Marcel Merle who in the first chapter argues that the changes brought about by the shift from bipolarity to multipolarity in world politics are being paralleled by equally important tensions within societies, so that the future survival of the nation-state is being threatened by forces generated by the new world order. This theme is well illustrated in a chapter by Roy Macridis, the only American contributor, on the problems of maintaining French independent policies as interpreted by Pompidou, and

also by Françoise de la Serre in a chapter on the British political debate about entry into the EEC, which shows by means of some of the most penetrating analysis yet published on the subject why the 'great debate' began to degenerate into a narrow concentration on the marginal profits and losses involved in hypothetical economic balance sheets, and why this approach served to mask both an absence of real dispute in principle between parties and a lack of genuine freedom of manoeuvre for Britain as a nation-state.

Apart from the theme of the book as a whole, which would have been more easily pursued if there had been an index, no doubt specialist readers will turn to chapters for their intrinsic interest. Apart from those mentioned above, there are chapters on the entry of Communist China into the United Nations, the Indo-Pakistan war, Arab affairs, relations between Argentina, Brazil, and their neighbours, the agreement on Berlin, relations within the EEC, and finally an interesting graphic presentation of international relations on demographic, economic, and military bases drawn up by Jean-Pierre Derriennic.

Altogether a symposium of a refreshingly high standard.

NEVILLE WAITES

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952. By Margaret Gowing assisted by Lorna Arnold. Vol. 1: Policy Making. *503 pp. Illus. Index.* Vol. 2: Policy Execution. *559 pp. Illus. Index. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan for the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. 1974. £10.00 per volume.*

THE United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority is fortunate in its choice of historian. Professor Gowing has produced a logical, coherent, rigorous, and yet essentially readable history of the British atomic energy project from 1945 to the first atomic test at Monte Bello in 1952. The topic is a very serious one, yet the text is enlivened by all manner of irreverences concerning people, their thoughts and interactions. Indeed, it is perhaps the character of the principal actors—Cockcroft, Hinton, Penney and 'this extraordinary collection of gifted scientists and engineers' (p. 234) that they gathered around them—which dominates the volumes, as it apparently did the project. The British nuclear programme would certainly have been retarded but for the forceful combination of the leading actors.

The first volume is concerned with policy making, and is pursued in chronological format. Although the major outlines of the atomic programme were quickly established in the postwar period, the detail of the organisation—an organisation that 'just grew' (p. 19)—was left ill defined by the politicians. Only the unique qualities of the three leaders of the project overcame this potentially dangerous situation. The other major governmental shortcoming to emerge after the war was in relations with the Americans over atomic energy. The shock of the McMahan Act, and the hope that it would be relaxed to allow resumption of the wartime co-operation, lasted throughout the period of this study. These factors led Britain to risk jeopardising its atomic relations with Canada, with the rest of the Commonwealth, and with Europe. The hope of renewed Anglo-American rapport—and the reasons for the failure to re-establish it—are

treated thoroughly. One interesting consequence of this hope was that under the McMahan Act procedures Britain was required to make unilateral disclosures of its progress, and thus the American Congressional Committees were infinitely better informed on the nature and progress of the British programme than anyone in Britain not directly concerned with the project at the very highest level—Parliament not excluded. On the whole, the Americans come out of the study badly. With a few notable exceptions, they are portrayed as arrogant and selfish, and behaving as if atomic energy was God's gift to the Americans exclusively. This attitude contrasts very markedly with that of the Canadians, who occupied the other corner of the Anglo-Saxon nuclear triangle.

The lack of any coherent body of strategic thinking in Britain also emerges strongly; amongst other things, this resulted in atomic weapons being given priority over the aircraft and missiles that were to be their delivery system. This is, perhaps, an inevitable outcome of the 'cloak and dagger' nature of the whole project, even into the 1950s—thus Penney typed his memoranda concerning the decision to manufacture an atomic bomb, and on the same topic, Lord Portal did not show his memorandum to anyone in the Ministry of Supply (pp. 180–81). The Prime Minister's obsession with secrecy on this matter pervaded the whole project, and this 'lifting of the wraps' by Professor Gowing will resolve a number of disputes; it will throw a rather different light on some of the personalities involved—for example, the roles of Tizard and Portal– and will, perhaps, rather belatedly give due credit to the northern industrial divisions for their part in the whole operation.

The second volume—which should perhaps have included the chapter on uranium from volume one—deals in a series of 'topical' chapters with the limitations on, and the execution of, policy. Inevitably this volume lacks some of the coherence and continuity of the first—the drama has already been unfolded, or so it might appear to the student of politics or history. But the minutiae of volume two are no less important and significant; for instance, the politically important issue of security, which arises incidentally throughout volume one, is here dealt with in its own right, alongside such issues as health and the participation of private industry. In as much as volume two takes up the issues raised by volume one and deals with them separately and cogently, it is an essential part of the whole. To the technologist and the scientist, the second volume may be of greater significance, for it examines in detail the role, function and performance of the various factories. It is only from studying this section of the second volume that one comes to realise the sheer magnitude of the task that was undertaken; it is an essential piece of reading for political scientists and their ilk, who tend to think in terms of decision making and not in terms of the problems of implementation.

In addition to the main text there are useful chapter-end appendices that clarify certain issues and briefly expound tangential ones. There are also helpful technical notes on the processes involved. The only minor irritations are the possible misplacing of Chapter 11 in volume one, and the fact that although the chapters are numbered consecutively through the two volumes the pagination begins again for the second volume. It is pleasing to see that the official historian's assistant is accorded recognition on the title page.

The two volumes are obviously written by a pen that is sympathetic to

the aims and objectives of the programme, and with some admiration for the principal actors, but within that orientation no punches are pulled, and the book is far from sycophantic. It will have much to offer students of many disciplines.

ROGER CAREY

British Thinking about Nuclear Weapons. By A. J. R. Groom. *London: Frances Pinter. 1975. 614 + xliii pp. Bibliog. Index. £9·75.*

THIS is a 'heavy' book, liberally spiced with quotations, some very lengthy, drawn from publicly available sources—sterner critics might suggest that the book is too much like a collection of quotations—taking the history of all shades of thinking on nuclear weapons, their development, deployment, use (both political and military), and control, from the wartime origins of the British project up to 1962. There is also a postscript on British defence policy since 1970—reprinted from the October 1973 *Round Table*.

The original study was of the 1957–62 period, to which has been added what amounts to a lengthy preface to bring the study from the origins of the British programme up to 1957. The book is organised in five sections—'The Background', i.e. the period up to 1952; 1952–57 (oddly entitled 'The *first* five years'); the Sandys five years, 1957–62; the protest movement, which chronologically tends to coincide with section three; and finally the debate over Blue Streak and its replacement as a delivery system.

Inevitably, as the author realises, there is a high degree of discontinuity where a line of thinking crosses a sectional boundary. With 'main line' arguments this may be acceptable, but to find the views of, for example, the churches in almost as many places as there are denominations, gives an impression of discord and ineffectiveness that may belie the record. By the same token, the fact that the protest movement occupies a single section of the book appears to give it added weight and coherence. This lack of chapter-by-chapter sequential development, either by chronology or by argument, is perhaps the major weakness of the book. The Conclusion is a rather unsatisfactory attempt to overcome this problem.

The Introduction is worthy of note—and, in spirit, of emulation—in that the author attempts to make overt the values upon which his historical material is selected, and also to establish the intellectual parameters within which the study is made. Whether the exercise is totally successful or in line with the contents of the book, is a matter for debate, but this rare attempt to give history a rather less subjective basis must be applauded.

The limitation of only using public sources means that the volume can reinforce only the knowledge already available to scholars. What it can also do, and does well, is to highlight the major contributions made by British thinkers to the development of Western strategic thought—indeed, it can be legitimately argued that both the doctrine of massive retaliation and that of flexible response had their origins in Britain during the early 1950s. There also emerges the fact that the 'defence community'—those commentators, MPs, journalists, and their publishers prepared to comment knowledgeably and consistently upon defence matters—was pitifully small in size. What does not emerge is the domestic and international background against which British thinking took place. For example, in dealing with Sandys, it is claimed, correctly, that a strong economic element was fundamental to his

policies, yet there is no coherent discussion of this economic element and its impact upon British thinking. The two chapters (10 and 31) devoted to the economic issue are inadequate both in conception and execution. Given the crucial role of economic factors, especially the impact of these factors upon hardware procurement and availability (and if, as chapter 30 suggests, strategies were designed to fit the available hardware), then economics becomes, perhaps, the single largest force at least in official thinking on nuclear weapons, and thus deserves rather fuller treatment than it is given in this volume.

Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the book is that although many strands of thought are exposed, little is made of this exposure. Especially lacking is any systematic assessment of the impact of the various groups on the decision-making machinery and upon each other. (Indeed, the issue of the decision-making machinery is avoided—see the caveat on p. 267.)

There are a number of minor irritations in production—for example, some quotations are inset while others, of equal length and standing, are not; and there is the almost inevitable crop of proof errors. All this aside, however, one must agree with the author that British thinking about nuclear weapons is a monumental subject (p. 555) and the excellent bibliography indicates the vast range of material upon which it is necessary to draw in order to study it. The overall result is an important work of synthesis.

ROGER CAREY

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

The Politics of Scarcity: Resource Conflicts in International Relations. By Philip Connelly and Robert Perlman. Foreword by Andrew Shonfield. *London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1975. 162 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·50.*

IN *The Politics of Scarcity*, Philip Connelly and Robert Perlman analyse the political and economic aspects of the changing relationship between exporters and importers of non-renewable resources, which has become familiar to us through the activities of OPEC. The authors rightly dismiss the idea of general absolute resource scarcity, pointing out that the important issue is not whether or not the world will exhaust its resources in the foreseeable future but whether technology (as it relates to resource production and consumption) can continue to adapt to changes in resource supplies and costs. More immediately, the industrialised countries have to learn to adjust to the increased bargaining strength of the developing resource-exporters, and particularly the power of the oil producers.

The second part of the book, which classifies countries into different interest groups and discusses their policies, is especially interesting. Connelly and Perlman start with an explanation of the policies of Third World resource exporters, concentrating on their desire to regulate markets; succinct histories of OPEC, CIPEC and the IBA are given. Other countries are classified as 'consumers', 'independents' or 'the poor'. Consumers range from relatively self-sufficient nations, such as the United States, to Japan which is virtually a pure consumer with few indigenous raw material resources; Western Europe occupies an intermediate position. The authors argue that the industrialised countries need to consider ways of reducing

the impact of restricted raw material supplies since '. . . uninterrupted access to foreign raw materials on commercial terms of their own choosing is gone in the case of oil and under strain in the case of others' (p. 100).

The 'independents', unlike the consumers, have ample resources for future economic growth and have less need of resource exports than the raw material exporters. As Connelly and Perlman point out, this group—which includes Canada and Australia, China and the Soviet Union—has a wider range of policy options than either consumers or resource exporters. 'The poor', on the other hand, have few natural resources and stand to lose most from the exploitation of bargaining power by the resource exporters: the authors give some examples from India of the drastic effect on economic development that the rise in oil prices has had.

Though the authors' analysis of the international politics of resources is stimulating, there are a number of deficiencies in their economic analysis. In Chapter 3, for example, they use some very questionable arithmetic about the future growth rates of oil supply and demand to draw some over-precise conclusions about energy being a seller's market throughout the 1970s. The authors also state what is now the conventional wisdom that new energy sources can only begin to have a major effect after 1980; they do not recognise the more subtle point that the development of new energy might have a significant effect on prices (because of its effect on price expectations) well before 1980. Similarly, in Chapter 4, many people will be surprised to read that it is 'relatively simple' to calculate the extra oil demand associated with a given rise in real GDP, and that economic theory assumes relatively 'smooth and costless' change in industrial economies.

In general, the book is an excellent survey of the politics of resources and of the broad economic issues. Economists will find it less satisfactory where it attempts to analyse the economic aspects of resource problems.

COLIN ROBINSON

The Pure Theory of International Trade. by Miltiades Chacholiades. Foreword by Harry G. Johnson. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1974. 451 pp. Indexes. £7·50.*

IN this textbook Chacholiades sets out to provide a detailed exposition of the traditional pure theory of international trade as compassed by intermediate level courses in the subject—Ricardian theory; opportunity costs, the offer curve and neoclassical general equilibrium; and the modern two good, two factor, two country analysis of trade, growth and policy. As such the book is successful and will prove useful to students wishing to acquire a thorough grounding in the models discussed. The exposition might almost be called Meadian in style as it relies on lengthy, detailed explanations of numerous alternative cases principally aided by geometrical analysis with some quite simple mathematical material. The text seems almost free of minor analytical mistakes, so that any teacher should feel quite safe in recommending it for covering the technical aspects of the standard pure theory of trade.

Unfortunately the text is seriously deficient in the broader sense of introducing the reader to the important issues in modern international trade theory. Apart from one discussion of the consequences for the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem of allowing more than two commodities, there is no considera-

tion of the difficulties and scope for generalising the standard two good, two factor model. Nor is there any reference to the effects of introducing non-traded goods, intermediate goods, market imperfections, and other such features into the model. There is a discussion of increasing returns, but this is very limited and does not lead into a consideration of related phenomena such as intra-industry trade. Quite apart from such topics as these, which occupy much of the attention of modern trade theorists, the book entirely fails to provide any perspective on the purpose and value of studying alternative models of trade. I suspect that any textbook which almost completely eschews reference to empirical material relating to international trade would suffer from this defect to a considerable extent. Nonetheless in this case it is worsened by an exclusive concentration on technical issues without discussion of why the questions might be important and in what contexts the models can usefully be applied to enhance our understanding.

GORDON HUGHES

Big Business and the State: Changing Relations in Western Europe. Edited by Raymond Vernon. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. 1974. 310 pp. Index. £7·00.*

Intercountry Income Distribution and Transnational Enterprises. By Constantine V. Vaitsos. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1974. 198 pp. Index. £5·00.*

DURING the 1960s, virtually all European governments took steps to increase their control over national industrial strategies. The British experimented with the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation; the French state became actively involved with the computer and oil exploration industries; while the Germans moved more slowly from the laissez-faire policies of Erhard to a policy of sponsoring mergers, particularly in the coal and oil industries. On the most obvious level, they were responding to an American challenge which threatened to place a whole range of European industries under North American control. At a subtler level, however, these governments were reacting to the barely-grasped fact that national markets were no longer large enough to support industries whose technologies demanded access to consumers on at least a European scale.

This volume has been carefully put together by Raymond Vernon in order to explore what really happened in this period. It consists of a series of chapters either on the individual policies of key countries (Italy, West Germany, Britain, France and Sweden), or on events in specific industries (aerospace, computers, aluminium, automobiles and steel) —with two general papers by Stuart Holland and Vernon himself. The result is a book which significantly advances our knowledge of developments in industrial policy during this period. The authors have been forced to work hard at their contributions, and they have produced a wealth of new material and references which will take all of us time to digest.

This is not to say that one wholeheartedly accepts all the conclusions advanced in the general overview chapters. Vernon is undoubtedly correct in pointing to the growing non-concurrence of national and EEC boundaries with the activities of enterprises supposedly located within them. He is also

right in pointing to the increasing use of extra-parliamentary bodies in the running of the new industrial policies, but he then seems to argue that this is a regression from some golden age in which such policies were under parliamentary control. This appears to be a somewhat odd argument, since it seems simpler to propose that, up to now, few governments have had anything but extremely rudimentary policies toward the industrial sectors, and that what we are now seeing are the initial attempts of puzzled administrators to grope towards some form of coherent policy. That this will be a messy process is undeniable; that it is a process implying the lessening of public control has to be challenged.

The other contributors are Romano Prodi, Georg H. Küster, Trevor Smith, Charles-Albert Michalet, Göran Ohlin, M S. Hochmuth, Zuhayr Mikdashi, Nicolas Jéquier, Louis T. Wells, Jr., and J. F. S. Hayward.

Vaitsos's book leaves one with mixed feelings. The author has done important work in demonstrating the irrelevance of the profits declared by some foreign investors in Latin America. He has shown how the ruthless use of the transfer-pricing mechanism can be on such a scale that, in the case of the pharmaceutical industry in Colombia, reported profits were only 3·4 per cent of the effective returns to company headquarters. He goes further in this book and produces confirmatory evidence gathered whilst working at the secretariat of the Andean Common Market. The second half of this book, however, is based on his Ph.D. thesis, which is a theoretical analysis of the transfer-pricing phenomenon. And he is, unfortunately, not particularly good at linking his important empirical work with his theory, so that one is ultimately left with more questions than answers. But he has one useful chapter on the role of governmental ignorance in the drawing up of commercial contracts, and he suggests ways of reducing this.

LOUIS TURNER

Employment Policies in Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis. By J. Mouly and E. Costa. Edited by P. Lamartine Yates for the ILO. *London: Allen and Unwin on behalf of the International Labour Office, Geneva. 1975. 251 pp. Indexes. £8·00.*

MOST people would probably consider that the biggest need in developing countries is to increase production, especially of food, to meet the needs of rapidly increasing populations. There is also (and perhaps as great) a need to provide employment for these increasing numbers, especially in view of the limited social security schemes of most developing countries. The policy objectives are outlined in Part I of this book. The pursuit of growth, it is made clear, is not necessarily incompatible with the provision of employment. All too often capital intensive techniques appropriate to advanced countries are adopted for the wrong reasons—for reasons of prestige, because decisions are taken by people familiar only with these techniques, because imported plant is made artificially cheap by over-valued currencies and because wages in some sectors may be maintained by trade unions at high levels despite the surplus of labour.

Part II deals with the promotion of employment in different sectors of the economy whilst Part III looks at the quantity and quality of the labour force. Training policies are particularly important, since there is often a serious shortage of workers with a specific skill while there is a

surplus of unskilled labour. Part IV takes a final look at the task ahead in the light of the problems that have been considered.

The authors bring out the complexity of the problems facing developing countries compared with those which faced advanced countries when they were at the same stage. The latter did not face the competition of countries at a more advanced stage of development, nor was technology changing at the same rate. In deciding what techniques to adopt, developing countries must accept the need for efficient, up-to-date methods of production in appropriate industries in order to compete with the products of advanced countries in both home and export markets. Despite low wages, production costs are often higher in the developing countries. Policy decisions are often complicated by inter-relationships between different problems. Expenditure on creating the infrastructure essential to economic growth generates income and this increases the demand for goods and services including food; thus unless food production is increased by improvements in agricultural techniques the result is a rise in prices.

The authors deal adequately with these and other problems and with the complex inter-relationships which exist. There is a wealth of illustration of both the right and wrong way of tackling particular problems, drawn from the experience of many countries. Most readers will find this a useful book. Even specialists in development economics, who will be familiar with most of the problems, will find its systematic treatment of great value.

J. M. JACKSON

West African Marine Fisheries: Alternatives for Management. By James A. Crutchfield and Rowena Lawson. Preface by Francis T. Christy, Jr. *Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. 1974. 64 pp. (Paper No. 3 in a series prepared for the Program of International Studies of Fishery Arrangements; Director: Francis T. Christy, Jr.) Paperback: $3.00.*

Organizational Arrangements to facilitate Global Management of Fisheries. By Edward Miles. Preface by Francis T. Christy, Jr. *Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. 1974. 23 pp. (Paper No. 4 in the above series.) Paperback: $3.00.*

Fisheries of the Indian Ocean: Issues of International Management and Law of the Sea. By Arlon R. Tussing and Robin Ann Hiebert with Jon G. Sutinen. Preface by Francis T. Christy, Jr. *Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. 1974. 55 pp. (Paper No. 5 in the above series.) Paperback: $3.00.*

Tuna: Status, Trends, and Alternative Management Arrangements. By Saul B. Saila and Virgil J. Norton. Preface by Francis T. Christy, Jr. *Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. 1974. 59 pp. (Paper No. 6 in the above series.) Paperback: $3.00.*

THESE four useful booklets on world fishery management problems emphasise the urgency of establishing a workable international agency to control the short-term temptations of overfishing. This is a threat in all the traditional fishing regions, and the studies stress the need to make use of alternative maritime protein sources, particularly those at lower trophic levels, and others in non-traditional areas.

The director of this programme of studies, Francis T. Christy, Jr., has gone to great lengths to avoid giving a national (i.e. American) slant to this trans-national issue. In each case study, scenarios of varying complexity are investigated. Those looked at include relatively stable areas and the far more complex ones where the whole question of technological domination by the fishing fleets of the Soviet Union, Japan, and European Community arises. This important problem does not appear to have been solved at the latest meetings of the Law of the Sea Conference.

The impact of factory ships in certain areas is made only too clear, as is the inability of protein-deficient poor countries either to compete or to control their activities. These studies appear to make a clear case for an immediate international code of conduct to prevent the short-term depletion of major fisheries, and long-term research to ensure the continuing fertility of the seas.

RICHARD HOLLAND

LAW

The Handling of International Disputes by Means of Inquiry. By Nissim Bar-Yaacov. *London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1974. 370 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Indexes. £7·50.*

THE main theme of this careful study by an Israeli professor is that enquiry is a method for the settlement of disputes, independent of arbitration, conciliation, investigation under the Bryan treaties, and fact-finding under the auspices of the United Nations. Unlike these other methods, it does not bind the parties other than by the disclosure of the truth. According to the author's definition, it should involve no application of international law and should avoid political slant or the blurring of factual issues which the adoption of a conciliatory approach might require. The success of this method has been shown, Dr. Bar-Yaacov asserts, by five nautical incidents—the *Dogger Bank*, Russia–GB, 1905; the *Tavignano*, France–Italy, 1913; the *Tiger*, Germany–Spain, 1918; the *Tubantia*, Germany–Netherlands, 1922; and the *Red Crusader*, Denmark–United Kingdom, 1962; and it was in part responsible for the successful outcome of three conciliation proceedings, the *Chaco* Commission, 1929, the Belgo-Danish Commission relating to ss. *Gorm* and ss. *Svava*, 1952, and the Franco-Swiss Commission, 1955.

The author is in danger of overestimating the success of the method. The settlement of these incidents, though praiseworthy, is by no means convincing proof that the method has been or is likely to be successful when applied to more difficult sets of facts, such as territorial disputes or the treatment of minorities, particularly where these occur over an extended period of time between states whose relations are unfriendly. As the latter part of Dr. Bar-Yaacov's book shows, the United Nations' attempts at fact-finding in the spheres of peacekeeping and human rights have foundered; first, on the complexity of the events to be investigated and the manipulation of truth by the parties concerned and, second, on the partisan attitude of those charged with carrying out the fact-finding.

These conflicting results call for closer examination of the method itself. Dr. Bar-Yaacov does this in the main by setting out the debates on the method of enquiry leading up to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1906

and those undertaken by the Institute of International Law in 1961 and by the United Nations when setting up a Panel for Enquiry and Conciliation in 1949 and a Register of Experts in 1967. There is little new here and the ground has been covered by the UN Secretary-General's Report on Fact Finding 1965–6, which the author criticises for its inclusion of any 'permanent or *ad hoc* arrangement for the supply of information as an embodiment of the method of enquiry' (p. 9), and more succinctly in Henry Darwin's essay in *International Disputes: the Legal Aspects.*[1]

But fundamental problems remain and it is a weakness of the book that it has no chapter dealing with them. Facts cannot always be ascertained with certainty, as the *Tavignano* and *Tubantia* enquiries show. Faced with such uncertainty, should a commission make use of rules of evidence relating to burden of proof and to presumptions or should it declare itself unable to find the facts? Sometimes such a declaration by the commission may encourage the parties to reach a compromise. But the difficulty should not be ignored in the naïve expectation that the truth will always out. A further difficulty occurs where the law cannot be separated from the facts. Questions of command, of the suitability and proportionate nature of measures taken in response to another's act involve issues of law as well as fact. In such situations, Dr. Bar-Yaacov advises the commission to find the facts and leave the parties to spell out the legal implications. Thus, in the *Dogger Bank* incident, the commission might have found that there was no Japanese warship and left the parties to conclude that the Russian warships' firing of their guns was unjustified. But the ascertainment of the facts involves a value judgment as to the protagonists' action and it may be wiser to state openly the legal premises than to leave them unsaid. These elements of discretion in a commission of enquiry's powers suggest that states who have continual sources of friction might be better advised to establish permanent bilateral machinery with clearly defined powers of investigation similar to those enjoyed by the United States-Canadian International Joint Commission.

This book, therefore, covers ground already researched and offers small practical assistance to the solution of today's problems. It is thoroughly executed with index, bibliography, and appendices, though regrettably few verbatim extracts from the findings of the commissions themselves. Throughout it imparts a surprising nostalgia for the historical byways of international law.

HAZEL FOX

International Environmental Law. Edited by Ludwik A. Teclaff and Albert E. Utton. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1974. 270 pp. Index. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government.) £5·95.*

THIS is a most interesting collection of essays. In the first essay, 'A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental Protection', Dr. Ian Brownlie points out that 'customary law provides limited means of social engineering, and, therefore there is a particular need for the development of new institutions, standards, and localized regimes to deal with the protection of the environment' (p. 1). In an essay called 'Concepts in Development of International Environmental Policies', Professor Lynton

[1] David Davies Memorial Institute. Report of a study group. London: Europa. 1972.

Caldwell introduces the developments which have been made in establishing a general legal obligation among states for the protection of their common interests in the environment, but he is primarily concerned with the theoretical and conceptual aspects of conservation. For a clearer exposition of the present state of treaty control we need to turn to Professor E. D. Brown's 'The Conventional Law of the Environment'. This essay is a useful and comprehensive survey of the whole of range of controls over territorial, spatial and marine environment, both at the regional and at the international level. Whilst noting that the present mass of treaties, resolutions and declarations lacks method, order and co-ordination, Professor Brown is guardedly optimistic about the future development of rational and co-ordinated control, although he recognises that the speed of development may be slow.

Among other writers, Professor Goldie argues the value of a proper system of advance reporting of the anticipated impact of mining or other operations on the environment. A concise and excellently documented account of 'International Law and the Protection of the Oceans from Pollution' is contributed by Professor Teclaff. This is a reprint of a most valuable essay. Equally valuable is the more technical paper by Professor Utton on 'International Water Quality Law', which is mainly concerned with the equitable and optimal utilisation of drainage basins.

Other essays include accounts of the United Nations environment programme by Michard Hardy; of environmental law and air and outer space by Professor Taubenfeld; and an essay by Mr. J. W. Samuels on potential legal problems as states seek to control and modify their weather patterns.

Professor Teclaff contributes a final chapter on 'The Impact of Environmental Concern on the Development of International Law'. He concludes that the impact on international law of the increasing concern felt by the international community for its environment is already considerable and will rapidly increase.

The editors are to be congratulated on welding twelve interesting essays into a valuable and cohesive volume. Well written and well presented, the book can be thoroughly recommended.

J. A. ANDREWS

WESTERN EUROPE

Economic Policy for the European Community: The Way Forward. By Alec Cairncross, Herbert Giersch, Alexandre Lamfalussy, Giuseppe Petrilli and Pierre Uri. Preface by Herbert Giersch. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan for the Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel. 1974. 245 pp. Index. £7·50.*

THE hallmark of this report, prepared under the auspices of the *Institut für Weltwirtschaft* at Kiel University, is realism. The five authors have come together to consider the future of the European Community and the nature of the economic problems it must face in the years ahead. Their hope is that by so doing they may give a fresh and constructive impulse to public discussion and policy formation. And it is precisely as a powerful stimulant to both that this study succeeds.

The authors believe that for some considerable time the Community is likely to figure chiefly as a rule-setting agency for individual members

and will be obliged to leave most economic policy issues that do not have important external implications to the discretion of member governments. Indeed, what is needed is closer political co-operation and the development of a European consensus as a preliminary to those forms of economic integration that will prove sustainable over a long period.

The Community's institutional structure is reasonably criticised and proposals are advanced for improving the workings of the European Parliament. In particular, the Parliament should hold public hearings and appoint a committee of professional economic advisers to prepare independent reports and provide guidance on technical questions relating to the implementation of economic policies. And in order to counter the tendency of the European political process to become further alienated from the 'grassroots' of public opinion, the authors propose the establishment of a chamber of regions, similar to that of the United States Senate, whose major function would be to promote an improved political balance between prosperous and densely populated regions and the rest of the Community.

In the course of the report, the authors suggest new lines of action in monetary affairs, taxation and public expenditure, regional policy, agricultural support, industrial organisation and competition, social policy, and international economic relations, and in so doing are constantly aware that, in the pursuit of European interests, the Community must improve its consideration for the interests of others lest external tensions develop that could jeopardise management of the international economic order.

On the question of economic and monetary union, the authors are no less realistic in their diagnosis and prognostication than in other areas of Community policy, conceding that the disintegrative effects of global inflation are perhaps the most important single obstacle to monetary union, with governments shouldering most of the blame for this—they have acquiesced in inflation as a social mollifier, and the form that their acquiescence has taken has been an expansion of the money supply at whatever rate was dictated by the need to preserve full employment. If monetary union were pushed through prematurely, and without complementary powers and common institutions to give effect to these policies, the result might well be needless unemployment and waste of resources. Understandably, the strategy of approaching monetary union through a progressive narrowing of exchange rate margins, as required by the Werner Report, is misguided. Monetary union presupposes considerably more than the mere locking of exchange rates—it presupposes provision *inter alia* for a single monetary policy under a central monetary authority, for collective demand management to meet agreed economic objectives, and for common debt management in the interests of monetary control, all of which are closely guarded preserves of national economic management and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The fixed exchange rate system contemplated in the Werner Plan would be far more destructive of independence in monetary policy than co-ordination through a central authority. Whilst exchange rates are flexible, interest rates can remain divergent in the various member states, and governments are free to follow differing monetary policies. And so long as the Community is not even equipped to co-ordinate short-term economic policy, the actual instruments of policy are likely to remain exclusively national.

Although suspicious of the rigidities and unreality of the Werner Plan, the authors accept the need to curtail excessive exchange rate fluctuations

and to pursue domestic policies which contribute to that end. Once world inflation has been controlled, a return to stable exchange rates between Community currencies may again become possible. For the present, with the French franc, Italian lira, and British pound floating independently of one another, joint action aiming at stability will at least be difficult to achieve. In particular, French abandonment of the sickly ' snake ' served to underline the impossibility of maintaining even a limited monetary union in the absence of common agreement on the main objectives of national trade policies.

Instead of seeking to tighten control of exchange rates between Community currencies, the authors make the novel proposal for the creation of an exchange-equalisation account to cope with capital flows. This would absorb foreign currencies when money flowed in and would sell foreign currencies to meet withdrawals. The account would hold a portfolio of currencies, including member states' currencies, possibly in the form of Europas; it would switch its portfolio to make available the currencies in demand at a steady price whilst accepting into its portfolio currencies on offer. The account would aim to stabilise exchange rates without fixing them and could serve as an eventual substitute for capital controls. However, the authors are not sufficiently specific on the management of the proposed exchange-equalisation account when they say that ' the management of the exchange-equalisation account would presumably be in the hands of the central monetary authority, whatever form that took ' (p. 44). Yet a clear definition of this would seem to be of paramount importance in order to avoid any possibility of disputes arising between a national monetary administration and the central monetary authority when the former feels that its vital interests are at stake.

On industrial policy, the authors lament the meagre achievements at Community level, especially in the field of advanced technology, and rightly stress that we are some way from reaching the state of a common industrial base for the Community. A clear example of the Community's disarray over industrial policy was the recent clash over the enrichment of uranium, with the French adopting the American technique of ' gaseous diffusion ' in competition with the Anglo-Dutch-German ' gas centrifuge '. If both projects succeed, the Community could be faced with a massive surplus of uranium by 1980, even if the demand for uranium is dramatically increased by an accelerated production of nuclear energy in response to the dramatic increase in the price of crude oil. Under such conditions, which are likely to prevail, the Community would probably be obliged to buy up the surplus uranium and stockpile it at a very high cost, with the main burden being carried by the taxpayer.

Turning to trade with developing countries, the authors insist that there should be no illusions about the generalised system of preferences. Most of the relatively labour-intensive manufactures of the poorest developing countries are in any case excluded from generalised preferential treatment, the most obvious examples being textiles, leather, and petroleum products. In the first place, generalised preferences in their present form do little to stimulate trade—they could permanently raise the growth rate of developing countries' exports only if they are assured unlimited preferential access at stable prices. In the second place, they exclude a range of manufactures which the poor developing countries are best able to export, thus increasing

the disparity between more advanced and less advanced countries of the developing world.

Finally, there are two main suggestions to guide the Community's own development policy: first, the overall amount of aid should be increased, and second, its effectiveness should be raised by improving its distribution among recipients and the uses to which it can be applied. The urgent need for fairer aid distribution should not be underrated, given that the more advanced among the Community's associates have generally received a larger proportion of EDF assistance than the least developed states. But the suggestion that in due course the Community's economic arrangements with associates in the Third World should be confined to financial and technical assistance (p. 222) is unlikely to appeal to the associates themselves, since they have adamantly pointed to the improved trade advantages which they seek from association, especially on the issue of guaranteed and free access to the Community for a range of agricultural, manufactured, and semi-manufactured products.

In the concluding part of their report, the authors write: 'With the European Community in difficulty, we have agreed on a number of proposals, conceived in our view in more realistic terms, that could serve to facilitate increased economic co-operation between member countries on the problems that have been exacerbated by inflation, commodity shortages and the oil crisis. . . In formulating these proposals we have sought to avoid political undercurrents. Our intention has been to propose nothing that could not be substantiated in economic terms'. The authors should have good reason to feel confident that in this report their intention has been more than adequately fulfilled.

NICHOLAS HUTTON

Patterns and Prospects of Common Market Trade. By George M. Taber. Preface by Roger Beardwood. *London: Peter Owen. 1974. 192 pp. Index. (The Peter Owen European Library; Gen. Ed.: Roger Beardwood.) Paperback: £2·75.*

GEORGE TABER has written a popular, concise account of the trade patterns of the enlarged EEC in the first six months of 1973. This is backed up by an account of the earlier trade patterns of the EEC written from the point of view of a pro-marketeer. This attitude leads the author into some exaggerated statements such as: 'Yet for Britain there clearly never was, or is, any permanent economic alternative to the Common Market. The Commonwealth had first been considered as an alternative, but even by the late 1950s it had lost much of its importance as an export market for Britain' (p. 68). There is little evidence to suggest that British governments seriously studied the feasibility of developing the Commonwealth as an economic community. Moreover, even as late as 1967 British exports to the Commonwealth exceeded those to the EEC (the figures being respectively in value £1,261 million and £1,041 million f.o.b.). It is, however, true that the export growth area for Britain had become the EEC, but politics influence economics too much nowadays to be ignored in this changing trade pattern. In the 1950s and 1960s the Commonwealth suffered from what might be termed non-benign neglect on the part of Britain.

Mr. Taber's figures indicate clearly why the EEC still prefers to retain Britain as a member—since it is such an easy market to sell into—despite its weak economy. West Germany remains the main trading state of the

EEC. The pull of its powerful economy is indicated also by the way in which a state such as the Netherlands now does two-thirds of its trade with West Germany. The author concludes that the first six months in 1973 show that 'the cross-values of most Community currencies are now approximately accurate' (p. 162), and that—putting aside problems such as the energy crisis—'the Community of Nine would be able to proceed smoothly through the throes of enlargement' (p. 165).

M. J. GRIEVE

The Essentials of Economic Integration: Lessons of EFTA Experience. By Victoria Curzon. Introd. by Harry G. Johnson. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan for the Trade Policy Research Centre, London. 1974. 319 pp. Bibliog. Index. £5·95.*

AT first sight, a book which claims to discuss the 'essentials of economic integration' and confines itself to the experience of the European Free Trade Area (Efta), may seem pretentious. In fact, Dr. Curzon puts forward a convincing case for her thesis that free trade associations are generally more efficient at promoting economic integration than customs unions. The story of Efta, not one noted for drama or tension, does yield many examples of amicable negotiations over the nuts and bolts of operating a free trade area: rules of origin, non-tariff barriers, the mutual recognition of tests. The brevity and occasional vagueness of the Stockholm Convention left a lot of detail for the Council to fill in at its regular meetings. As the author says: 'The Stockholm Convention not only lent itself to pragmatism, but it even made pragmatism imperative' (p. 45).

Inevitably perhaps, there are several unfavourable references, implicit and explicit, to the EEC. One cannot help feeling that the comparisons are a little unfair. In the first place, the relatively smooth tempo of Efta's progress can be attributed as much to the pre-existing relations between its members as to any inherent virtues in the free trade approach. Secondly, the EEC has a wider scope and more ambitious objectives than Efta. This is relevant to the author's charge that the EEC is overly concerned with harmonisation. 'The fact that the EEC has embarked on an ambitious harmonisation programme, and that large economically integrated areas like the United States have gone a long way towards achieving a harmonisation of conditions of competition within their limits, does not prove that harmonisation is necessary in a free trade area' (p. 222). Harmonisation may not be *necessary* but does it not enhance the opportunities for trade? The author herself gives examples of where unequal conditions of competition could distort free trade in Efta.

The author's obvious preference for the free trade approach leads her also to overestimate Efta's influence on the EEC. While we can agree with her that the existence of Efta strengthened the hand of the non-applicants in their effort to conclude free trade agreements with the enlarged EEC, it is less easy to accept that the free trade model was adopted for these agreements because 'Efta's successful demonstration of a free trade area at work helped to dispel the lingering doubts within the European Community as to the effectiveness of the technique' (p. 228). The 'doubts' about free trade which the French have expressed stem more from dislike for it as a mode of integration than from any lack of conviction about its practicality. The adoption of free trade areas in the agreements between the Efta non-

applicants and the enlarged EEC offered the best compromise to the parties concerned: the only real alternative—customs unions—would have involved both the Community and the Efta countries in obligations that neither (but for different reasons) would relish.

In sum, Dr. Curzon has written the best book on Efta yet to appear, but in considering the 'essentials of economic integration' one must be mindful of the ultimate goals to which the integrating countries aspire.

E. MOXON-BROWNE

French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur. By Edward A. Kolodziej. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1974. 618 pp. Bibliog. Index. £13·45.*

PROFESSOR KOLODZIEJ'S book is an attempt to analyse and explain the main features of French foreign policy between 1958 and 1974. Despite its great length, it does not seek to be comprehensive: Quebec appears only in an aside; Biafra is not mentioned at all. Instead, the author aims at a selective treatment of particular themes: Gaullist ideas about France and the world; France, the United States, and Nato; French economic policy and the world monetary system; France and the EEC; French relations with the Soviet Union; France and the Third World. This method of approach gives the book a firm structure, though it produces a certain amount of repetition. It also makes the whole conduct of foreign policy appear rather too orderly and systematic, with insufficient allowance for accident, muddle, and improvisation. De Gaulle liked to present himself as the Olympian architect of a grand design, but an onlooker should surely be sceptical.

Within his own brief, Professor Kolodziej presents a useful review of de Gaulle's thinking about the position of France in world affairs, with the emphasis on his faith in the nation state as the ultimate reality, and on his distrust of a system controlled by the two super-powers. The section on security contains a good passage on the *force de frappe*, explaining the advantages expected by de Gaulle in terms of technology, diplomacy and prestige—though the author scarcely gives full weight to the criticisms of French nuclear policy voiced, for example, by Raymond Aron. The chapter on the French critique of the international monetary system and de Gaulle's attack on the dollar is valuable and illuminating. In dealing with Europe, the author grapples with, without fully elucidating, what de Gaulle meant by 'l'Europe des patries'—it may well be that the task is impossible. He also argues, in an interesting passage, that de Gaulle's tough negotiations with the EEC, including a temporary boycott of Brussels, had a significant effect in slowing down the progress of the Community. The chapters on the Third World concentrate heavily on North Africa and the Middle East, rather than on Black Africa and the rest of Asia.

One of the most valuable aspects of the book is its interpretation of the change from de Gaulle's regime to that of Pompidou. De Gaulle attacked the dollar: Pompidou set out to protect the franc. De Gaulle's vision of Europe extended from the Atlantic to the Urals: Pompidou's from the Thames to the Elbe. De Gaulle dreamed of a policy for the Third World: Pompidou fell back on a policy for the Mediterranean. It is in such comparisons that the author is able to add to the excellent work of Guy de

Carmoy, whose *Foreign Policies of France, 1944–1968* * already covers much of the ground examined in this book.

Professor Kolodziej rarely uses one word if two will do, or a short word if a polysyllabic construction can be found. ' Hegemonic dictates ', ' a global grid of interwoven conflict relations '—such is the style. Greater simplicity would have reduced the length of the book, and eased the path of at least this reader.

P. M. H. Bell

The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945. By J. Néré. *London, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1975. 366 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Foreign Policies of the Great Powers; Ed.: C. J. Lowe.) £7·95.*

Of books on British foreign policy in the interwar years there is no end. Yet next to nothing has been written about French foreign policy, apart from contemporary polemics and memoirs. The main reason for the neglect of French diplomacy has been the dearth of documents. Between 1940 and 1944 many foreign ministry papers were destroyed or lost. The labour of reconstituting the archives delayed the publication of French papers for the 1930s. The first volume of *Documents Diplomatiques Français* did not appear until 1963 and the collection is still incomplete.[1] Even when it is finished, there will still be large gaps in the published record —there are no plans to cover the 1920s or 1939–1945. The French government seems set on making scholars run an obstacle race. It seems certain that the foreign ministry archives at the Quai d'Orsay will be moved to the provinces.[2] And although the principle of a thirty-year rule of access was adopted in 1970, its implementation seems designed to hinder rather than help researchers.

A study of French policy is therefore long overdue. Professor Néré's book is the first full appraisal of French diplomacy, based on the published foreign ministry papers. As the author recognises, given the deficiencies of the archives, ' a complete study ' is not possible (p. ix). The outlines of the story are well known. Barely twenty years after its victory over Germany in 1918 France was defeated and occupied. The wounds of 1940–44 have not yet healed. As for the causes of France's eclipse, Professor Néré does not offer a new diagnosis. He is content to chart the main features of the decline. The post-1918 retreat, slow at first, then rapidly accelerating after 1935, was the outcome of several factors: the psychological and material consequences of the First World War; demographic and economic weaknesses; the effects of the world economic crisis; the revival of Germany. 1918, Professor Néré stresses, was a Pyrrhic victory. An allied coalition defeated Germany and only an allied coalition could preserve the peace. The basic problem of French policy—security against Germany—was insoluble. The book is valuable for its succinct and perceptive treatment of reparations,

* Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1970. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1971, p. 414.

[1] *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1932–1939, 1-ère Série*, 1932–1936. Paris. 1964. *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1932–1939*, 2-ème Série, 1936–1939. Paris. 1963. 15 volumes have been published, 6 for the years 1932–1934, and 9 for the period January 1936 to June 1938.

[2] See *The Times Literary Supplement*, Feb. 7, 1975.

the Ruhr occupation, Briand's diplomacy, the Disarmament Conference, the Abyssinian and Rhineland crises.

Yet the book has serious shortcomings and is certainly not the equal of other volumes in this series. Chronologically, it does not quite fulfil its title, since the years 1940–45 receive only perfunctory inspection. Inadequate documentation is a major defect. The limitations of *Documents Diplomatiques Français*—not to mention the paucity of published documents for the years 1914 to 1932—make the American, British, German and Italian collections required reading. Yet the 50 documents published in the Appendix are all taken from French sources, and are very unevenly distributed. For 1938–39 we are given only one document—an extract from the wartime *Livre jaune*. I did not find a single reference in the text or footnotes to any of the major foreign collections—a truly astonishing solipsism. Given the documentary constraints, it is a pity the author did not consult the Quai d'Orsay archives for the 1920s, which have been open for some time.

At the risk of appearing churlish, other weaknesses must be listed. Although account is taken of political, economic and military considerations, almost nothing is said about the actual formulation of policy. The book is intended for students as well as specialists, but the fact that governments of the Third Republic did not keep minutes of cabinet discussions is not mentioned. The bibliography could be more helpful, especially for those undergraduates who do not read French. Relatively minor works in French are cited while important contributions in English are omitted.[3]

ANTHONY ADAMTHWAITE

Autopsie d'une Défaite: Origines de l'effondrement militaire français de 1940. By Ladislas Mysyrowicz. *Lausanne: Editions l'Age d'Homme. 1973. 385 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Collection Historica; Ed.: Jean-Jacques Langendorf.) Sw. Fr. 28.00.*

THIS book is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the organisation and strategic thought of the French armed forces that met with such a shattering defeat in 1940. It is not concerned with the detailed developments in 1940, but rather with the thinking behind French military policy and planning in the years between 1918 and 1940. The book gives considerable attention to the amalgam of attitudes and philosophies underlying military preparations, and this makes it of particular importance, coming at a time when historians are developing the thesis that the fate of France in 1940 was not determined by the inadequate quantity or quality of its armaments and fighting forces, but rather by its inadequate military doctrine: France and Germany had been preparing for different kinds of war.

Evidence is presented clearly and dispassionately in great detail, and is based on an impressive number of sources drawn from military instructions,

[3] For example, John E. Dreifort, *Yvon Delbos at the Quai d'Orsay; French foreign policy during the Popular Front, 1936–38.* Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1973. Judith M. Hughes, *To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French military preparation in the 1920's.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1971. Jon Jacobsen, *Locarno Diplomacy; Germany and the West, 1925–1929.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. London: Oxford University Press. 1972. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1973, p. 77.

military college textbooks, contemporary military polemics in books and periodicals, parliamentary debates, political party publications, the daily, weekly, and periodical press, as well as from a fairly full range of international memoirs and recent historical studies in English and German as well as in French. Thus, the bibliography constitutes the most complete guide to date to sources on French military history between the wars. The fact that nearly all the sources are published in one form or another is no reflection on the thoroughness of this book, because unpublished documentation will be hard to come by until the French military authorities at Vincennes have the resources to catalogue their important archives and to open them fully to historians.

Ladislas Mysyrowicz begins his book with an analysis of the French military's views of their First World War experience and of the lessons to be drawn from it. He emphasises a division of approach in the early 1920s between those favouring a broad scientific theory of warfare and those concerned with details of the military art in practice, explaining why there was no effective combination of the two approaches. He then examines contemporary arguments for offensive or defensive strategies based on varying concepts of French security requirements; for example, Foch insisted on the importance of keeping French troops on the Rhine as long as possible in order to permit a forward strategy, while Pétain accepted with greater equanimity the inevitable retreat from the Rhineland laid down by the Versailles Treaty, and concentrated on plans for a fortified frontier which eventually took the form of the Maginot Line (pp. 76–80).

The third part of the book examines the weapons developed to implement French strategy, explaining why French tanks and planes were generally slow and heavy, geared as they were to defence or, at best, to counter-attack. An illuminating passage is quoted from a 1939 argument against the mass production of certain types of armament lest it might jeopardise future research and development of the more advanced weapons necessary for a successful counter-attack and eventual victory in what was expected to be a long war (pp. 195–6).

Part four examines de Gaulle's arguments in 1934 in favour of introducing a professional army to develop a mobile, mechanised striking force; it explains why it proved impossible to muster sufficient support in France for either a professional army or mechanised weapons systems, one reason being that by linking the two ideas de Gaulle confused the debate about each. Issues surrounding the career of de Gaulle between the wars are, of course, already familiar to historians; but Mysyrowicz is the first to integrate de Gaulle's position successfully within the contemporary French military and political context without which the rejection of his ideas is inexplicable.

In the fifth and final section of the book, there is an evocative survey of French opinion, mainly literary and intellectual, at various stages of the interwar period, on the likelihood and nature of a future war. Although the selection of views is inevitably subjective and impressionistic, it succeeds in breaking some new ground, helping in particular towards an understanding of the currents of pacifism, caught up paradoxically in a larger tide of pessimism on the prospects of peace, and combining to create the maelstrom that was France at war in 1940.

Taken as a whole, the achievements of this book lie in its careful research, its penetrating analysis, and its sympathetic historical handling of interwar

subjects and sources too often treated dismisssively with the hindsight of 1940.

NEVILLE WAITES

France 1848–1945. Vol. 1: Ambition, Love and Politics. By Theodore Zeldin. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1973. 823 pp. Maps. Index. (The Oxford History of Modern Europe; Gen. Eds.: Alan Bullock and F. W. D. Deakin.) £6·00.*

THIS is the first of two volumes and inevitably a complete review must await publication of the second part. It is already clear, however, that this work is quite different from others so far published in the *Oxford History of Modern Europe.* Professor Zeldin has not set out to write a full and comprehensive history of France between 1848 and 1945 on chronological lines. Instead, the book is an interpretation of French history during that period, analytical in the sense of trying 'to disentangle the different elements and aspects of French life, and to study each independently and in its inter-relationships' (p. 7). The author's avowed emphasis is on understanding values, ambitions, human relationships, and the forces which influenced thinking. He admits that his book is therefore selective rather than comprehensive.

Volume One is in three parts, the first dealing with various social groups and classes. The author eschews an ideological approach, keeping in particular an open mind on class consciousness in his chapters on 'The Ambitions of Ordinary Men' and 'Workers', though he does use the terms proletariat and bourgeoisie. This may account for his emphasis on the issue of party unity rather than doctrinal purity, and an obvious sympathy for unifying influences like Malon and Jaurès, evident in the final chapter on Socialism. He concludes by referring to 'values which the socialists shared with other parties, and . . . the irrational elements in their lives, which were never expressed in official programmes. There is room for a re-classification of politicians on lines other than those which they themselves adopted. The second volume of this work will make some suggestions on this subject' (pp. 786–787). In view of this intention to develop the theme, it would be premature to judge it. Nevertheless, the open-minded approach to classes and parties is certainly most effective in chapters on loosely-knit groups such as doctors, notaries, and bankers. One might also have expected a chapter on soldiers during this period of French imperial expansion and involvement in two world wars. Lyautey, Joffre, and Foch are not mentioned at all in this volume, and it is not clear that they will appear in volume two either.

Part Two deals with family life, women, and children. The approach is again selective. For women the focus is on feminist movements, regrettably leaving aside the characters and achievements of women like Marie Curie and Simone Weil. Part Three considers various political movements as seen principally through the careers of their adherents. It is hard to understand why such a disparate movement as radicalism is treated entirely through the lives of Combes and Clemenceau, the latter being rather atypical, while Pelletan and Herriot are merely mentioned in passing despite their enormous influence on the movement. Other centre, and right-wing groups, however, are handled with considerable perception.

This is a stimulating discussion and interpretation of French history, incidentally packed with a goldmine of detailed information, and one

awaits the second volume with continuing interest. However, it does not intend to serve as a comprehensive history of France or of particular groups and movements in France during that period, and will not replace existing general works and monographs. For that reason one wonders if this book should have been published outside a series such as the *Oxford History of Modern Europe*, in order to attract the unconventional readership it deserves.

NEVILLE WAITES

American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia over Reparations. By Bruce Kuklick. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1972. 286 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·30.*

Berlin im geteilten Deutschland. By Dieter Mahncke. *Munich, Vienna: Oldenbourg. 1973. 325 pp. Bibliogs. Index. (Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Band 34.)*

Kennedy und Adenauer in der Berlin-Krise 1961–1962. By Walther Stützle. Introd. by Gilbert Ziehura. *Bonn, Bad Godesberg: Neue Gesellschaft. 1973. 253 pp. Bibliogs. (Schriftenreihe des Forschungsinstituts der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Band 96.) DM 32.00.*

Nukleare Mitwirkung: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der atlantischen Allianz 1954–1970. By Dieter Mahncke. *Berlin, New York: de Gruyter. 1972. 274 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Beiträge zur auswärtigen und internationalen Politik, Vol. 6.)*

Willy Brandt: portrait of a statesman. By Terence Prittie. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1974. 400 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. £3·95.*

Nationalbewusstsein in der BRD under der DDR. By Gebhard Schweigler. *Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann. 1973. 235 pp. Bibliogs. Index. (Studien zur Sozialwissenschaft, Band 8.) DM 25.00.*

IT is very instructive that, of all these studies of postwar Germany, the one which is based on the fullest documentation should be in many ways the least satisfactory. This is partly because Professor Kuklick has set out to sustain an extreme thesis: describing American attitudes to reparations in 1945 as ' intransigent and uncompromising ' in view of Russia's reasonable requirement for resources from the Western zones, he sets out to contend ' that a hostile and belligerent American attitude ', on the one hand, and an unrealistic attitude on the other (*i.e.* American attempts to limit Soviet self-help in the *Eastern* zone too), were responsible for ' the partition of Germany and perhaps for the rigid division of Europe ' (p. 2). This ' perhaps ' indicates that the author is aware of the limitations of his thesis; in fact his extensive researches in the State Department archives for 1945 do not succeed even in establishing its more modest first part, that of American responsibility for the partition of Germany. What Professor Kuklick *has* given us is an extremely detailed and informative picture of the *Weltanschauung* with which American policy makers approached the problems of the postwar world: the set of ideas which he usefully summarises as ' multilateralism ' —' national self-determination, free elections, liberal trading arrangements, international political and economic cooperation, and disarmament ' (p. 239). He also shows, very interestingly, with the aid of extensive new documentation, how this set of ideas, when applied to Germany, clashed sharply with Soviet interests. What he is not able to do—even though students of the period will appreciate his attempt at a new interpretation—

is to uphold his original thesis that this clash indicates American rather than Soviet 'responsibility' for the ensuing conflict. Even if the Soviet archives were open too, documentation needs to be supplemented by judgment.

Dieter Mahncke's study of Berlin gives an excellent and balanced account of the development of the Berlin question from the Allied discussions of 1944–45 to the Four Power Agreement of September 1971. In discussing the background to this agreement, which appears to have provided something approaching a solution to this intractable issue, the author has very usefully analysed West Berlin's economic prospects, as well as the more familiar questions of the legal status of the city and the political interests of the parties involved. This comprehensive analysis, which includes a collection of the main public documents, would be welcomed by a larger readership if it were translated into English.

Walther Stützle's monograph on the Berlin crisis of 1961–62 is a much more detailed dissection of a particular episode, but the job is done in a way which sheds considerable light on many of the central problems of the Western alliance. The author discusses the contrasting attitudes of Kennedy and Adenauer to the Berlin issue as a part of their contrasting approaches to world politics and indeed to life in general. With a wealth of quotations from their public statements, and evidence collected from their colleagues of the time, Dr. Stützle demonstrates the acute differences between the young leader of a super-power, concerned to transform the state of East-West relations, and the suspicious old European statesman with his obsessive concern for Germany's national problems. This book makes an extremely important contribution to our understanding not only of the Berlin crisis but of alliance politics in general.

The same is true of a second book by Dieter Mahncke, on the Federal Republic's attempts to share in the making of Nato's nuclear strategy. Although this study extends from the early years of Germany's membership of the alliance right up to the early 1970s, the main weight is inevitably placed on the attempt to establish a multilateral force (MLF) in the early 1960s. Although this story has been dealt with in earlier works (notably that of James L. Richardson [1]), it is told here with some important new material on the changing attitudes of the German political parties, especially the ruling CDU, which considerably adds to our knowledge of the whole episode. The author, who writes in the same clear and comprehensive way as in his study of the Berlin question, includes some penetrating passages on British and French attitudes to nuclear policy, and concludes with an interesting assessment of Nato's Nuclear Planning Group as a device for inter-allied consultation.

Terence Prittie, the author of an admirable biography of Adenauer, has now placed us further in his debt by producing the best life of Willy Brandt available in English. In a way, the timing of its production was unfortunate: it was completed and about to appear while Brandt was still Chancellor and enjoying the world's approval (although not that of all his compatriots) for his *Ostpolitik*, when his dramatic downfall in May 1974 led to the need

[1] *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction of Strategy and Politics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press for the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; London: Oxford University Press. 1966. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1967, p. 361. German edition: *Deutschland und die Nato: Strategie und Politik im Spannungsfeld zwischen Ost und West*. Cologne, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 1967. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1967, p. 755.

for a rather incongruous and tantalisingly brief 'Postscript'. In this, Mr. Prittie is able to say something about the complicated psychological reasons which made the 'enigmatic' Chancellor resign, but the balance-sheet is inevitably only a provisional one. The book therefore lacks the completeness as well as the depth of Mr. Prittie's study of Adenauer: however, it contains a great deal of useful information on Brandt's earlier years in exile, in Berlin and in Bonn, and one hopes for a reprint which will allow Mr. Prittie to give a fuller assessment.

Dr. Gebhard Schweigler's important study of national consciousness in the two German states is in a quite different genre, but its conclusions complement the picture of Brandt's Germany painted in more traditional style by Mr. Prittie. Originally a Harvard Ph.D. thesis, the work documents, with the aid of extensive public opinion poll data, the growth of the West Germans' readiness to accept that their provisional republic of 1949 had come to stay. The proportion of Germans still believing in reunification, and even the proportion of those originally from the East wishing to return 'home', are shown as sinking decisively during the 1950s and 1960s, until it was clear that the moment of public acceptability for Brandt's *Ostpolitik* had come. The resultant establishment of the Federal Republic as a state in its own right (accompanied by the emergence of the GDR, whose public 'legitimacy' Dr. Schweigler demonstrates by somewhat different but broadly comparable data) has had important consequences for Germany's behaviour in international affairs. The state which Brandt ten years ago called a 'political dwarf' is now developing into a political giant, and Dr. Schweigler (whose book has now appeared in an expanded version in English) [2] has very usefully illuminated one of the central dimensions of this process.

ROGER MORGAN

Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie 1890–1933. By Georg Fülberth and Jürgen Harrer. *Darmstadt, Neuwied: Luchterhand. 1974. 276 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Arbeiterbewegung und SPD, Band 1.) Paperback: DM 28.00.*

Die Sozialdemokratie von den Anfängen bis 1945: Kleine Geschichte der SPD, Band 1. By Heinrich Potthoff. Preface by Heinz Kühn. *Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Neue Gesellschaft. 1974. 229 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Theorie und Praxis der Deutschen Sozialdemokratie.) Paperback: DM 6.00.*

Die SPD vor und nach Godesberg: Kleine Geschichte der SPD, Band 2. By Susanne Miller. *Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Neue Gesellschaft. 1974. 170 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Theorie und Praxis der Deutschen Sozialdemokratie.) Paperback: DM 6.00.*

TODAY the Social Democratic Party (SPD) is regarded as a 'reformist' party. These three books explore the nature of this party's perspectives on reform and are particularly concerned with its gradual development since the 1890s from a Marxist perspective to a 'social liberal' and parliamentary party.

In the social democratic tradition it is possible to identify two basic reformist positions. Both reform views were of course 'revisionist' to the Marxists and Leninists. The 'social liberal' reform tradition seeks to

[2] *National Consciousness in Divided Germany*. London: Sage. 1975.

reconcile the interests of 'workers' with the maintenance of the capitalist economic system; indeed a successful capitalist economy is seen as a pre-condition for continual improvement of the working and living conditions of the worker. Integration is the basic theme of this tradition and is to be achieved not so much by public ownership of the means of production as by measures of co-determination which stress the equality of capital and labour, and by policies to spread the ownership of wealth. In Germany 'social liberal' reformism has always been a cross-party phenomenon which today finds its expression in the FDP and even in sections of the CDU. It can be seen as one bourgeois reaction to the development of 'monopoly capitalism', increasing state intervention and the strength of the trade union movement. The 'social liberalism' of the SPD is, however, made distinctive by the nature of its 'audience' and its language (for example, 'democratic socialism') and by the existence within its ranks of those who are not prepared to recognise a necessary relationship between parliamentary democracy and basic rights on the one hand and the capitalist economic system on the other. 'Social liberal' reformism is a complex phenomenon subject to frequent strains between its search for social justice and its stabilisation and integration function.

Whilst social liberalism finds expression in Bernstein, Kautsky represents the tradition of socialist reform. Reform is seen as a method for the gradual elimination of private ownership; Marx is appealed to but Leninism rejected decisively. In crisis situations the peculiar ambivalence of socialist reformism is apparent in the growing gap between its goals of representing the workers' interests and the means available to it. The frustrations of the search for 'parliamentary socialism' have frequently led to the formation of left wing groups within the party, or occasionally as independent organisations, which seek a combination of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary methods.

Three conditions are necessary for the dominance of social liberalism over socialist reformism within social democracy: the absence of a strong communist party; the blurring of class divisions as a consequence of economic development; and political, economic and military integration in the international capitalist system. The absence of one of these conditions can produce a strong socialist pressure perhaps allied with communist movements for basic social change. However, one should not underestimate the points of convergence between these two social democratic traditions. There are few practical differences of result between a tradition which sees 'socialism' as an ethical concept which can be realised with private ownership, and a tradition whose goal is the end of capitalism but which is attached at the same time to a collection of political means which make this task almost insoluble. Both can gather behind the concept of 'democratic socialism'.

From the 1950s to the late 1960s the SPD had little in common with the party as it had been before 1933. Particularly after 1914 social democracy had been characterised by the 'double structure' outlined above. From 1953 onwards, and ratified in the Bad Godesberg Programme of 1959, the SPD developed into a one-direction 'social liberal' party. However, the weakening of official anti-communism in the pursuit of detente and the increasing strains under which the international capitalist system was placed helped to produce a new internal party debate within the SPD from the late 1960s. Many fear that the classic 'double structure' of social democracy is being

revived and that as a consequence the old mistakes of the Weimar period may be repeated. Others see in these developments progress from an 'outworn' social liberalism towards greater tolerance for Marxist views.

Fülberth and Harrer's study of the development of the SPD's 'double structure' between 1890 and 1933 is to be warmly commended for its thoroughness. By contrast the books of Potthoff and Miller are rather traditional texts which offer little new, although they do include within them several useful documents.

KENNETH DYSON

Hitler's Rise to Power: The Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1923–1933. By Geoffrey Pridham. *London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon. 1973. 380 pp. Bibliog. Index. £4·95.*

The Hundred Days to Hitler. By Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel. *London: Dent. 1974. 245 pp. Bibliog. Index. £3·95.*

IN their different ways these books show what Hess meant at the end of the Nuremberg Party Rally in September 1934 when he enthused, 'Die Partei ist Hitler. Hitler aber ist Deutschland, wie Deutschland Hitler ist'. In other words, the growth of the Nazi Party and eventually the Nazi government would have been impossible, in the form in which it developed, without the driving force and charismatic and ideological leadership of Adolf Hitler. But as Dr. Pridham clearly shows in his thoroughly researched and detailed study, Hitler's final success also depended upon the electoral achievements of the NSDAP once it was decided to follow the 'legal' path to power in the wake of the abortive putsch of November 1923.

Manvell and Fraenkel's general study of the manoeuvres during 1932 and January 1933 leading to Hitler's appointment as Chancellor and of the appointment's immediate effects, is thus set against the background of the party's electoral success in the preceding years, especially during 1932. But the failure of the party to win an absolute working majority meant that Hitler was forced to consider a coalition government. His insistence that it would have to be one dominated by the Nazis and by himself as Chancellor caused tremendous problems in his negotiations with the conservative forces ranged around the aged President Hindenburg, by that time holding a key position in the German political system. Other difficulties came from party members like Gregor Strasser who were afraid that the NSDAP might miss the boat if Hitler did not accept a compromise, such as the position of Vice-Chancellor. Accepting the limitations imposed upon it by its 'general' nature, this is a readable account of the subject, although one could have done without over-long quotations from some documents, several running to a page or more. The authors also ought to have known better than to have rendered 'Reichsaussenminister' into 'Foreign Secretary' (p. 57).

Geoffrey Pridham offers quite a different examination of the background to the *Machtergreifung*. His scholarly study of the growth of the NSDAP in Bavaria will probably remain the standard account in English for many years to come. In his account the importance of Hitler's role is, to some extent, balanced by the vital contribution of local party workers and supporters. Once it had been decided to pursue the legal or constitutional path to power, then the problems faced by the NSDAP were, in part, those faced by any other mass political party (a point which differentiated the NSDAP from its more immediate rivals in Bavaria), i.e.

problems of local and national organisation, membership, finance, and perhaps most important of all, the nature of the party's appeal to the electorate. But beyond this lay the NSDAP's raison d'être as a revolutionary movement, a point that party speakers affirmed again and again.

In Bavaria these problems were accentuated by bitter memories, and the political consequences, of the events of November 1923, while its character as a rural and Catholic *Land* especially tested the NSDAP's organisational and propaganda skills. When, from about 1930 onwards, the NSDAP found that it was necessary to win the rural vote, characteristically careful preparations were made by the appointment of special party officials at *Gau* level as agricultural specialists (pp. 224–225). Moreover, the NSDAP could claim that it was untainted with government responsibility, especially in the years of the Depression when the rural population was particularly badly hit by low prices and high taxes. The party had less success in gaining much Catholic support, principally because of the relative strength of the ruling Catholic Bavarian People's Party (BVP); this party's strength was also closely allied with fierce regional patriotism, a point which clashed with the NSDAP's claim to be a national mass movement (p. 321). So far as other membership details were concerned, Pridham finds that while the lower middle classes provided ' the backbone of the activist element in general, the professional middle classes were more prominent at the leadership level '. Furthermore, ' civil servants formed a significant element in the party membership in Bavaria ' (pp. 190, 195).

Pridham's excellent study thus joins the growing number of similar and important investigations into the growth and organisation of the NSDAP at the local level in different parts of Germany, a vital contribution to our understanding of German history in the years before the *Machtergreifung*.

JOHN P. FOX

Le IIIe Reich et la réorganisation économique de l'Europe 1940–1942: Origines et Projets. By Jean Freymond. *Leiden: Sithoff; Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes. 1974. 302 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Collection de Relations Internationales 3.)*

WHAT sort of European economy would have emerged if the Third Reich had won the war? Freymond's book is a general survey of the historical evidence available to answer this question. It concentrates on the period from the start of the war to the defeat of the German Blitzkrieg in the Soviet Union, after which, as he quite rightly argues, the first economic priority came to be the organisation of occupied Europe for the temporary purpose of winning the war. He does, however, include a preliminary discussion of German commercial policy in the 1930s. His argument is that the plans which were discussed and sometimes put into operation in the German administration and business circles must essentially be seen as an aspect of the long-run continuity of liberal-conservative and conservative thought in Germany about the country's economic place in Europe. Liberal-conservative thought, he argues, believed that the German economy must dominate the international economic exchanges in Europe because of its relative importance, but accepted that it could only find its own domestic equilibrium by creating an acceptable and durable Euro-

pean equilibrium. Conservative ideas were more nationalist and protectionist and sought to create this domestic equilibrium by the domination of a 'greater German economic area'. Freymond analyses the influence of these ideas on the attempts of the Third Reich to remodel the European economy. He traces these patterns of thought in the Reichswirtschaftsministerium, in the firms and commercial organisations which were linked with these projects by that ministry, and in the commercial policy committee of the foreign ministry. In the actual formulation of policy in occupied Europe, as Freymond points out, these organisations had only very restricted influence, and the ideas they discussed did not necessarily have much influence on what the Nazi government actually did in Europe.

There is nothing original in Freymond's book. But it serves the useful purpose of pulling together for the first time all the recent separate specialised research on this question into a lucid summary of plans for European economic reorganisation discussed in Germany in those years, and by whom. But how full an answer does it provide to the question? The influence on policy of conservative conceptions of *Grossraumwirtschaft* was even weaker during the Third Reich than Freymond argues. There is really no economic evidence that German commercial policy towards south-eastern Europe after 1933 was motivated by such conceptions before the Munich agreements in anything but the vaguest way. Rather was German economic policy in this area the last unsatisfactory port of refuge left open to external economic policy by the absolute priority given to domestic economic policy, with everything that that implied in the way of severe trade and exchange controls. The reason why the German firms submitting plans for their future in the new German-dominated Europe (in response to the Reichswirtschaftsministerium's request) paid so little attention to south-eastern Europe (p. 161) is simpler than the author suggests: the whole area mattered very little to them once they had power and influence over the markets of industrialised Europe. There was no continuity between German commercial policy in Europe before 1939 and occupation policy in Europe after 1939 because the latter was an expression of the Reich government's priorities whereas the former was a mere device to defend those priorities.

What is more, much more, there was also a specifically fascist conception of a reorganised European economy quite apart from the more conservative ideas which Freymond discusses. Freymond does deal with Hitler's conception of Europe and shows it to have been vacillating and confused. But the ideologues of the NSDAP had their own revolutionary ideas about the continent. The author touches only very briefly on what was actually done economically in occupied Europe, and claims that policy in the Netherlands and in Norway in particular shows that the ideas and discussions he is analysing were not just froth. So it does. But it also shows that these ideas were in conflict with a set of more specifically national-socialist ideas on the reorganisation of Europe which survived the end of the Blitzkrieg. The German administration in Norway hoped to produce there a reorientation of the economy which would lay the foundations of a fascist society. And such ideas influenced policy throughout Europe. They found their expression in the continued allocation of scarce resources in 1944 for the resettlement of German peasant farmers and the continued costly extermination of several wrong 'races'. It was these revolutionary conceptions of a socially and demographically recon-

structed European economy, rather than the attempt at a different system of international payments or a tariff and monetary union, that sharply distinguished the Third Reich from previous governments. This difference had as great an influence on the 'new economic order' as the threads of continuity which link the late 19th century to commercial and economic policy under the Nazis. What sort of European economy would have emerged? One answer is, a fascist one. What that would have been like is a question to which Freymond's book makes only a small, if by no means valueless, contribution.

ALAN S. MILWARD

Heinrich Brüning: Briefe 1946–1960. Edited by Claire Nix with the assistance of Reginald Phelps and George Pettee. *Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 1974. 517 pp. Index. DM 39.80.*

THIS book is a sequel to Brüning's *Briefe und Gespräche 1934–1945*, recently reviewed in this journal.[1] If less dramatic than its predecessor, this volume also contains insights and observations of much interest to the student of contemporary history. While most of the letters were written in the United States, some originated in West Germany. The former German Chancellor revisited his home country first in 1948 when still lecturing at Harvard. From 1951 to 1955 he was professor of political science at the University of Cologne. Afterwards he decided to return to America, where he lived until his death in 1970. His postwar letters reflect the problems and worries of many Germans. Refugees from East Germany hoped to enlist Brüning's help, while old and new friends solicited his advice on questions of politics. Brüning was more impressed by the orderliness and diligence of the German masses than by the acumen of Bonn politicians. He was critical of the new municipal bureaucracy and of the petty political in-fighting. He deplored the shortlived reappearance of the Catholic Centre Party but approved of the interdenominational basis of the Christian Democrats. Opposed to the role of former émigrés in postwar politics, he refused to be nominated for a seat in the Bonn Diet and in 1959 declined to be considered as a successor to President Heuss.

Although fair, Brüning's attitude towards Chancellor Adenauer was not without reservations. He considered him to be superior to all other politicians owing to his tactical skill and vast factual knowledge. But in 1948 he judged that Adenauer was not sufficiently critical and sceptical in foreign affairs, especially vis-à-vis France. From his experiences in the First World War it seems Brüning had acquired an anti-French bias. He constantly feared that the French and Russians might come to an agreement at the expense of Germany. While Adenauer paid only lip-service to the idea of German reunification, Brüning favoured a reunited Germany with its neutrality guaranteed by the four former allied powers. He frequently hoped for an agreement between the Western powers and the Soviet Union after the model of the Rapallo, Locarno and Berlin Treaties of the 1920s.

Brüning was in touch with leading American politicians and diplomats such as Averell Harriman and, later, George Kennan, whose ideas in 1958 for a detente with Russia he much approved. On the other hand, he was opposed to such by-products of the cold war as the American-sponsored

[1] *International Affairs*, April 1975, p. 261.

Radio Free Europe in Munich. He was also averse to the European Common Market which, he felt, would be more advantageous to France than to the Federal Republic. As an elder statesman he expressed his general approach to politics clearly in a letter to Josef Zurek in November 1948: 'One cannot pursue constructive policies', he wrote, 'without firm principles based on the Christian tradition. However—and I am afraid, this is often overlooked—it is equally impossible from the standpoint of Christian principles to fix guide-lines for the details of politics. Politics is largely the talent of managing people and of doing the right thing at the right moment. Admittedly, for this moderation and patience and putting oneself second to the aims are necessary. These character qualities are certainly more to be found with positive Christians than with others' (p. 479). Neither a doctrinaire nor an opportunist, always serene, the man who emerges from these letters can be described in fairness as a conservative Christian democrat.

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

Österreich 1927 bis 1938. Protokoll des Symposiums in Wien 23. bis 28. Oktober 1972. Edited by Ludwig Jedlicka and Rudolf Neck. *Munich: Oldenbourg. 1973. 276 pp. Index. (Wissenschaftliche Kommission des Theodor-Körner-Stiftungsfonds und des Leopold-Kunschek-Preises zur Erforschung der österreichischen Geschichte der Jahre 1927 bis 1938: Veröffentlichungen Band 1.) Paperback: DM 37.00.*

THIS book, of great interest to students of post-Hapsburg Austrian history, is the record of a symposium held in Vienna in October 1972, and is the first publication by the Austrian Historical Commission for research into the period 1927–1938. The Commission itself is—broadly speaking—the child of the two big Austrian political parties, the Socialists and the People's Party (the rough equivalent of the West German or Italian Christian Democrats). The symposium was addressed both by the Socialist Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, and the People's Party elder statesman, Alfred Maleta. One of the main purposes of the whole undertaking, which had its origins in 1960 when the two parties were still governing jointly in an uneasy coalition, is to provide a basis acceptable to both parties for teaching, in schools and at higher levels, the history of a particularly controversial and painful period. As the symposium showed, this period can still arouse strong passions and sharp dispute in Austria today.

The eleven papers, presented by Austrian historians, one of whom is now Canadian, together with the discussions that followed, centred on four deeply traumatic main events: the big workers' demonstration of July 15, 1927 leading to the burning of the Palace of Justice and the shooting of at least 80 workers; the Socialist uprising of February 1934; the abortive Nazi attempt to seize power in July 1934, which resulted in the death of the Chancellor, Dr. Dollfuss; and Hitler's march into Austria in March 1938. From the symposium, some, but not very many, important new facts emerged, and rival interpretations of events were presented, though seldom—given the time available—reconciled.

One particular point of interest was the confrontation between the younger historians, who based their conclusions on detailed research of the available records, and some of the political veterans present who had actually taken part, if only in a minor way, in the big events. For instance,

Dr. Gerhard Botz, in his paper on '15 July 1927' showed, on the basis of contemporary official reports, including those of the Vienna Fire Brigade, that the police did not begin to shoot until some time *after* the Palace of Justice had been set ablaze (p. 37); while Rosa Jochmann vividly described how she had taken part in the workers' demonstration and had been shot at by the police *before* the fire (p. 49). Professor Hans Zeisel also told how he himself had been in the Palace of Justice that morning and had helped to smuggle out policemen in civilian clothes to save them from the anger of the demonstrators, who were enraged because the police had started shooting—all this *before* the Palace of Justice was burning or the Fire Brigade involved (p. 52). This direct conflict of evidence was not resolved; it raises the question of the value both of eye-witness accounts 47 years after the event and of contemporary official records of unforeseen and very confused circumstances.

Of deeper interest was the clash of attitude and interpretation between the two 'camps'—'Red' and 'Black'—which in one sense still divides Austria. On the first day of the symposium, the former Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Fritz Bock, once an official of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg 'Fatherland Front', almost threatened to quit the Commission (p. 60) because of what he saw as a concerted attempt to load all the guilt on to his 'camp'. It was true that some of the older Socialists present clearly did feel strongly that the question of guilt should be clearly stated, rather than glossed over in an Austrian spirit of compromise. However, partly because of the greater detachment and objectivity of the younger historians, calm was restored.

The fact remains that a good deal more time was spent in analysing the policies and attitudes of the Socialists than those of the 'Black' or Christian Conservative camp, which, as Dr. Bock pointed out, was one half of Austria. (Ilona Duczynska's paper on the Socialist Theodor Korner's theories of what would now be called urban guerrilla warfare was interesting in itself but of only small relevance to the main issues). Perhaps the balance will be restored in subsequent publications by the Commission. Also, as was freely admitted at the symposium, greater study is needed of the external pressures which from 1933 onwards influenced Austrian history much more powerfully and destructively than even the internal Black-Red split.

ELISABETH BARKER

Switzerland. By Christopher J. Hughes. *London, Tonbridge: Benn. 1975. 303 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. (Nations of the Modern World.)* £4·50.

THIS is an extremely welcome addition to Benn's excellent series of studies of modern nations. Its author is a distinguished expert, who has specialised for many years in the study of this small country, which has tended (perhaps to its advantage) to be neglected by historians, political scientists and journalists. The book is compact, learned, and clearly intelligible to any reader who is prepared to take trouble. There is a careful balance between history and the present day, and between political and economic problems. The last 40 pages, which consider each of the cantons in turn, are perhaps the most valuable of all.

Switzerland is interesting for three reasons of a general kind, apart from being a delightful place for a holiday. It is the oldest continuous

democratic community in the world. It may be argued that the Hellenic *polis* was democratic, if we forget about its slaves, but those city states disappeared a thousand years ago. The three original confederate cantons date at least from 1315, but Professor Hughes is sceptical about the hallowed date of 1291. He shows how the number of cantons grew, and how they were affected by the Reformation and the French Revolution, until the present boundaries and membership were defined in 1815. He explains the complicated institutions which have arisen in the course of this history, in a friendly but not uncritical spirit.

Switzerland is unique in the whole world in that it has created not only a state which works, but a multi-lingual nation, which is *not*, one must insist, the same thing as a multi-national state. Its three official languages are the languages of three of the five great cultures of Western Europe. Despite the ambitions of France, and the prolonged torments of the movements for national unity in Germany and Italy, the citizens of Switzerland who spoke these languages stuck together. Even the threats and attractions of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism did not pull them apart, although they affected some individuals. The growth of a Swiss nation was no doubt largely a matter of self-interest, but sentiment and loyalty also played their part. Thus the contemporary Swiss appear genuinely to belong respectively to the French, German and Italian cultures, yet at the same time to the Swiss nation and to it alone.

The third interesting aspect of Switzerland is its neutrality. This has had its shady sides as well as its bright, as Professor Hughes points out. It brought a steady relative increase of prosperity for the Swiss by comparison with the other Western nations who experienced two world wars. In Sweden, which gained similar advantages from its neutrality, the socialists became the dominant party; and while basking in prosperity Swedes have been strongly addicted to guilt-complexes in intellectual circles and to the denunciation of the wickedness of other Western capitalist governments. The Swiss by contrast have not only remained overwhelmingly bourgeois and conservative (with periodical small groups of extremists and occasional worries, like the recent argument about foreign workers), but appear to have had no guilt feelings about their prosperity. One would have liked to know Professor Hughes's views on why the Swiss are so unlike the Swedes. However, it is more reasonable to be grateful for what he has given us. Not only those seeking detailed information on Switzerland, but persons concerned with wider problems of democracy and of nationality, will be able to consult his book, in which they will find not only facts but wisdom.

HUGH SETON-WATSON

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970s. Edited by Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tökeś. *New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan. 1974. 401 pp. Index. (Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University.) £6·50.*

THIS book is a tribute to John N. Hazard, rightly described as 'an internationally renowned authority on Soviet law and government' (p. xi), and associated for twenty-eight years with the Russian Institute of Columbia

University. The ten writers were selected from among his former students, and their contributions were chosen to reflect Professor Hazard's major interests, viz., his concern with politics and social change in Russia, and his interest in the influence and application of the Soviet model in communist-dominated and Third World countries.

The result is a lively and refreshing volume, which brings into sharp focus the contrast between the everyday realities of life in the Soviet Union, and the ideological framework within which they operate. The chapters dealing with the position of women, the housing situation, and the study of crime, all illustrate this point.

Official dogma has it that women, who constitute over half of the working population, enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of activity. The reality is that women in Russia, as in our own and other Western societies, still hold little more than token positions in the chief economic, cultural and political decision-making bodies, and that 'equality of participation in the nation's work force does not imply equality in status and power' (p. 119). Professor Barbara Jančar accuses the Soviet government of 'dual exploitation' of women (p. 148) in the home and at work, and holds that genuine emancipation must await a change in the traditional and patriarchal views of Soviet men, a process the government does little to expedite.

Cramped, inadequate and poor quality housing contributes to rising divorce and falling birth rates, both unwelcome social manifestations to the authorities. Professor Morton gives full weight to the immense difficulties encountered by the Soviet government in housing its citizens—the poor legacy from Tsarist days, vast destruction in the revolutionary years, rapid urbanisation, and still more extensive destruction during the Second World War. But he pinpoints the main difficulty as under-investment, arising from the high priority given during all the planned periods to industrial advance. Despite ideological opposition to the 'private property mentality', over half the total urban and rural housing is still provided by private and co-operative building.

According to ideology, crime is a monopoly of capitalist societies. Nevertheless, Soviet newspapers carry reports on every type of law-breaking from juvenile delinquency to murder and rape, with alcoholism as an ever-present accompaniment. Professor Juvelir follows the study of crime from Stalin's days, when it was either ignored or repressed by brute force, to the more hopeful outlook of the 1960s and 1970s. Although there is still much secrecy in the compilation and distribution of crime statistics, the author believes that criminology is making progress, and that the 'experts' are gaining over the 'reds'. More objective study will, he thinks, have to be given to crime prevention by studying its underlying causes. These are much the same as in non-communist countries—family troubles, deficiencies in recreational facilities, school inadequacies. Again the barrier is one of priorities. Not enough money is being allocated to research, to training specialists, such as social workers and psychiatrists, to building clubs, and to other means of diverting the energies of law-breakers.

In his chapter on the influence of the Soviet development model on the countries of the Third World and communist-dominated countries, Dr. Albright follows recent authorities [1] in believing that this has shown a

[1] *Soviet-Type Economies: Performance and Evolution.* By Robert W. Campbell. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: Houghton Mifflin. 1974. *Economic*

marked decline, especially since 1959, because of the growth of a pro-Chinese outlook, disagreements between the countries themselves and the trend to put more weight on their own local conditions. He also notes a degree of disenchantment with the Soviet Union in the 'devoloping' world. Russia's success in achieving a high level of industrialisation and the consequent acquisition of a stake in world stability, along with an inclination to diminish aid in favour of its own needs, makes it look more like an 'advanced' power, and less like a shining example.

This is a stimulating and hopeful book, in that it reveals behind the mask of monolithic infallibility the capacity of the Soviet system to adjust in response to changing circumstances in the modern world, and also to altered conditions at home.

MARGARET MILLER

Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States. By Robert R. King. *Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1973. London: Oxford University Press. 1974. 326 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £8·00.*

NATIONALISM has always been something of a problem for communists Marx himself was little concerned with questions of nationality and nationalism. To him, the distinctive feature of the communist movement was precisely its non-national character summed up in the famous sentence from the *Communist Manifesto*: 'The workers have no country'. And when Marx did consider national movements, he considered them solely from their economic and revolutionary aspects. He supported Polish independence because, in his eyes, the Poles were good revolutionaries and numerous enough to set up an economically viable state. He was dead against independence for the Czechs, the Croats, and the other Slavs in the Hapsburg Monarchy because they had helped to defeat the Viennese and Hungarian revolutions of 1848–49 by aligning themselves with the monarchy. Marx similarly opposed pan-Slavism which he saw as a mere tool of Russian tsarist imperialism.

Lenin was quick to grasp the usefulness of nationalism to the revolutionary cause. But he too had reservations: the proletariat, he wrote, 'assesses any national demand, any national separation, from the angle of the working class struggle'. So some national movements were 'progressive', while others were not. In practice, Lenin's principle of self-determination for the Soviet Union's numerous non-Russians remains a dead letter to this day. When the Soviet Union took control of Eastern Europe, an area bristling with national problems, essentially the same policy was applied: the importance of national rights was recognised in theory but national conflict was banned by the Soviet Union and its client communist governments.

But, as Dr. King shows quite clearly in his admirable survey of communist nationality policy in south-east Europe since 1945, national problems have proved rather more intractable than Stalin and his successors had expected, and so below the facade of unity and internationalism, national conflicts continue to exist. Dr. King, who is a senior research analyst with

Development in the Soviet Union. By Stanley H. Cohn. Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Heath. 1970. Both reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1975, p. 101.

Radio Free Europe in Munich, examines the impact of major national minorities on relations among the communist states of south-east Europe from 1945 onwards. The problems of Macedonia, Kosovo, Dobruja, and Transylvania are all treated with admirable clarity and in great detail on the basis of official documents, eye-witness reports, and memoirs. What comes through particularly vividly is the extent to which the communists, despite their professed internationalism, have simply taken over the roles of the pre-war 'bourgeois' governments. In many cases, they have even gone further than those governments would have dared or been able to—such as in gerrymandering in the minority areas, tampering with the census, even inventing a new nationality where it suited them, as the Romanians accuse the Russians of having done with the Moldavians in Bessarabia whom they took from Romania in 1944; or as the Bulgarians (with less justification, in this reviewer's view) are accusing the Jugoslavs of having done with the Macedonians in Macedonia. To this day old national controversies continue to be the stuff of serious politics in the Balkans.

Dr. King is a reliable guide through the maze of Balkan conflicts and controversies which he treats with scholarly detachment and calm—no mean achievement in an area where prejudices and passions are still so strong. His book is extremely well-researched and refreshingly free from the usual spelling errors of strange Balkan names. In fact this reviewer spotted only one misspelling—that of the name of the Belgrade social scientist, Dr. Najdan Pašić (not Nijdan Pasić, p. 251).

K. F. Cviic

Technology in Comecon: Acceleration of Technological Progress through Economic Planning and the Market. By J. Wilczynski. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1974. 379 pp. Index. £10·00.*

In his latest book Professor Wilczynski explores another aspect of the economies of Eastern Europe. In *Profit Risk and Incentives under Socialist Economic Planning*[1] he was interested in the impact of the economic reforms of the mid-1960s on the efficiency of the enterprise and managerial behaviour. In this book he explores certain aspects of economic growth in the Comecon countries. The work bears the hallmark of a Wilczynski production; it displays an encyclopaedic knowledge of the eight Comecon countries, reveals how widely he has read both the periodical literature of the countries involved and also a wide variety of monographs in different languages. It also contains a number of intriguing insights into the operation of the economies concerned.

After a theoretical introduction in which Professor Wilczynski discusses the sources of economic growth, the relationship between central planning and technological innovation and the impact of the economic reforms of the mid-1960s, he turns to an empirical discussion of East European experiences. In separate chapters he deals with the supply of resources—labour and capital, fuel and power, research and development, etc. He then discusses the progress of innovation in the sectors of the national economy—industry, agriculture, construction, transport, etc. He concludes with chapters surveying the extent of technological co-operation between the Comecon countries themselves and between Comecon and the West.

[1] London: Macmillan. 1973. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1973, p. 285.

It is Professor Wilczynski's thesis that one can distinguish between extensive and intensive growth, that the sources of extensive growth have been virtually exhausted in Eastern Europe and that the economic reforms have, as a partial justification, the objective of facilitating or encouraging the process of intensive growth—growth through the application of technology.

The book fails to demonstrate this thesis; first because it attempts too much: to cover the development of eight economies in less than four hundred pages implies an average of less than fifty pages per economy. Inevitably the discussion of each individual economy is superficial, amounting in some places to little more than a recitation of unilluminating facts. But, more fundamentally, it fails because, as formulated, the thesis is incapable of demonstration (or rejection). The theoretical foundation of the work is too weak to bear the weight of facts accumulated. Reading the individual chapters, one loses sight of the relevance of the material being presented; they do not carry the argument forward. In the end this is no more than an accumulation of interesting material and anecdotes about the operation of the Comecon economies and the interrelationships between them. It does not cast much light on the problems of technological innovation under central planning nor on the tensions between the objective of economic policy (growth) and the institutions through which it is implemented.

A. N. D. McAULEY

A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Edited by Victor S. Mamatey and Radomír Luža. *Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1973. 534 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. $22.50. £11·80. Paperback: £4·90.*

THE history of Czechoslovakia is a sad reminder that the survival and character of small states is essentially dependent on the interests of the great powers and super-powers. Since its creation in 1918 Czechoslovakia has experienced five separate systems: the liberal democratic republic of 1918–1938; the second republic of 1938–39; the German protectorate of 1939–1945; the restored republic of 1945–1948; the communist republic since 1948. This volume is the first full scholarly history of the years 1918–1948. The seventeen chapters of the book are the work of fourteen different authors. They are a first-class contribution to the history of central Europe, which will be extremely useful for specialists and students alike. Not only are the contributions well-written and well-documented, but there is an excellent critical bibliography for the whole work. In a symposium, as indeed in the history of Czechoslovakia, centrifugal forces are always a danger. Happily, the two editors have maintained a good balance. Victor S. Mamatey supplies a thoughtful concluding summary. Of special value are the chapters on Slovakia—for a long time neglected by Western and Czechoslovak historiography.

The book effectively destroys two misconceptions about the history of Czechoslovakia. First, in the 1930s strong doubts were expressed about Czechoslovakia's viability. Internal pressures from the German, Polish and Slovak minorities, it was argued, would inevitably lead to disintegration. This line of argument was used to provide some justification for Munich in 1938 when Britain, France, Germany and Italy destroyed the inde-

pendence of Czechoslovakia. Investigation of Czechoslovak policy towards the minorities indicates that, but for the interference of the great powers, the social and economic tensions could have been satisfactorily solved. Secondly, Czechoslovak historiography in the 1950s tended to depict the liberal bourgeois state of 1918–1938 as ' bad ' and the post-1948 communist regime as ' good '. In fact, by post-1945 standards, the liberal republic had a good record in socio-economic matters. Health insurance was compulsory and subsidies were paid to the trade unions to assist the unemployed. Industrially, Czechoslovakia was the most powerful of the successor states and enjoyed considerable prosperity in the 1920s. Politically, the constitution—modelled on that of the French Third Republic—was by far the most democratic of central and eastern Europe.

ANTHONY ADAMTHWAITE

Politics in Czechoslovakia. By Otto Ulč. Foreword by Jan F. Triska. *San Francisco, Reading: Freeman. 1975. 181 pp. Illus. Map. Bibliog. Index. £4·70.*

THE author was a judge in Czechoslovakia up to the end of the 1950s, and his intimate acquaintance with the internal working of a communist government apparatus must be of great advantage to him in his present work as a writer and a lecturer at an American university. His latest book is a thorough and methodological description of Czechoslovakia's system of government before and after the invasion of 1968 up to the end of 1972, based mainly on quotations from critical voices inside the country which were able to make themselves heard during the period of liberalisation. So much, however, has already been said about the inadequacy of the communists' economic performance, the ideological sterility of both the Novotny and the Husak era, and even of the 1968 reformers' lack of terminological and conceptual clarity, that Ulč could not be expected to present anything really new. Nevertheless, his analysis is sound and richly documented, though neglecting—rather surprisingly—the operation of national insurance and of the health service, where the results are less negative than in other spheres of life. One of the gems he has unearthed is an *obiter dictum* from the end of 1969 when the old ' order ' was restored, ' Never again must Parliament be allowed to degenerate into a political arena '.

All in all, this book is a reliable guide through a series of complicated developments full of amazing volte-faces and contradictions. The sometimes rather dreary text is enlivened by the reproduction of well selected political cartoons from the 1960s, when the pent-up bitterness and disappointment of a whole generation suddenly erupted.

J. W. BRUEGEL

Dans la tourmente: Les relations hungaro-roumaines de 1940 à 1945. By Dániel Csatári. Trans. into French from the Hungarian by Aimée Martel. *Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. 1974. 419 pp. Indexes. $20.00.*

PUBLISHED in 1969 by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences under the title *Forgószélben*, and laboriously translated into French, this valuable book reveals the little-known history of Hungaro-Romanian relations in both

parts of Transylvania partitioned by the Germano-Italian Award of August 30 (not 20, as is printed on p. 39), 1940. By this machiavellian trickery Hitler and his *cafone* forced both Hungary and Romania into the anti-Soviet alliance. According to the Hungarian monthly *Látóhatár* of October 1942, quoted by Mr. Csatári, there were 1,007,168 Hungarians and 1,155,507 Romanians in the northern part of Transylvania adjudicated to Hungary.

Marshal Ion Antonescu, the *conducator* of Romania, participated in the spurious 'crusade' from the beginning with the double hope of liberating Bessarabia, annexed by Russia on June 27, 1940, and recovering northern Transylvania. Jumping into the 'Barbarossa' gamble five days later, Admiral Miklós Horthy, the regent of Hungary, hoped to obtain from victorious Nazi Germany southern Translyvania and possibly Slovakia as well. Mr. Csatári also tells us the story of how the two satellite governments had tried first to ingratiate themselves with the *Führer*, and then double-cross him. In the end only Romania succeeded in extricating itself from the Nazi clutches; King Mihai, in agreement with military and political leaders, was able to carry out a complete *renversement des alliances*, while Horthy postponed such a decision for too long—geography, it is true, was against him.

Mr. Csatári's book is based on vast research in Hungarian and Romanian official sources as well as on books and press articles written in Hungarian and Romanian during and after the Second World War. He supplies us with a rich documentation on the complex relations between the two nationalities in both parts of divided Transylvania, the persecution of anti-war and communist movements in both parts by Hungarian and Romanian police, and the attempts at collaboration between the two resistance movements.

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

MIDDLE EAST

The Modern History of Israel. By Noah Lucas. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1975. 500 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Indexes. (The Weidenfeld and Nicolson Asia-Africa Series; Ed.: Kenneth Ballhatchet.) £6·00.*

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Its History in Maps. By Martin Gilbert. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1974. 101 pp. Maps. £3·25. Paperback: £1·50.*

THE primary concern of Dr. Lucas's original and impressive study is with ideas and ideologies, and the institutions whereby their realisation is sought. Claiming that this is the first general history of Israel's evolution over the century and more since the beginnings of 'practical Zionism', he traces the growth and interrelationship of many of the impulses and doctrines that underlay the social organisation and internal politics of Jewish settlers in Palestine from the early years of this century onwards, and clearly establishes their importance in shaping the future state of Israel. The external vicissitudes of the *Yishuv* and, after 1948, the crises and problems of Israel's foreign relations, are dealt with more briefly. This is the more justifiable in that many other books have dealt adequately with these matters, and the author, in touching on them, shows that he can summarise large matters with a pithy incisiveness that is often memorable.

But Dr. Lucas's central theme is the internal development of modern

Israel, traced back to its roots. He elucidates the reasons why, and the ways in which, the nationalist ideology of 'political Zionism' (the greatest early appeal of which was to the oppressed Jewish proletariat of Eastern Europe) so quickly became permeated with co-operative idealism and socialist visions, to achieve which the various groups of early pioneers, combative and articulate, came together. He goes on to show how these groups and their rival programmes of 'labour Zionism' expanded and interacted in the period of the British mandate. In this context he has some perceptive things to say about the development of those institutions (the *Kibbutz* and other communal organisations, the *Histadrut* trade union movement with its powerful apparatus of social and educational services, the local militias that grew into the *Haganah*, the Jewish Agency, the Mapai party and its opponents, the elected assembly and its offshoot the *Vaad Leumi*) which, well before 1948, had come to constitute a 'quasi-government' that was admirably equipped to organise and win the struggle for the succession to British rule.

The last of the book's three parts, 'The Nation in the Making, 1947–67', seems in one respect rather disappointing. The author, in developing his thesis that 'the Zionist movement, having failed to transform the Jews into a nation, bequeathed to the Zionist state the mission of creating a nation of Jews' (p. 412), says little in detail about this process; the state is still very much in the centre of the stage, and the treatment of party politics and feuds may appear disproportionately full to some readers. The brief chapter called 'Foundations of National Identity' which, in accordance with Dr. Lucas's views is the last in the book, has some sharply-focused pages on the Eichmann trial, as well as discussing the problems of assimilation facing Middle Eastern Jews and the attempt, in dealing with Israel's Arabs, to 'eliminate the Palestinian identity'; but surely some treatment of literature and art, and more about archaeology, would have been useful here?

It is one of the many merits of this book that it does not gloss over the Arab side of the story, or seek to suggest that if only certain things had been otherwise Arabs and Jews in Palestine might have found some sort of common cause. That Zionism had from the first (and not surprisingly) an essentially limited and static conception of the Arabs is a point he makes explicitly and illustrates tellingly. Dr. Lucas regards Israel's retention of its 1967 conquests as a disastrous mistake—to some degree caused by the country's need to play up to a Zionist world audience—arguing that giving up the gains of the Suez war yielded ten years of comparative peace. (But his Israeli critics will no doubt ask whether the way in which that period of quiescence suddenly ended does not suggest a lesson no less relevant.) His ending strikes a sombre note.

Altogether, this is a most stimulating book, tough, tightly structured, incisive and controversial. Occasionally the style becomes opaque ('the trial of the chief Nazi executioner would be a more fertile catalyst of mature national canon'—p. 414), and there are one or two slips, like the statement that the 1939 White Paper envisaged an independent *Arab* state. The fifteen-page 'select bibliography of works in English' with the author's comments, forms a useful appendix.

Martin Gilbert's atlas reaches from Old Testament times to the disengagement on the Sinai front in March 1974. Some of the 101 pages convey information which does not very readily fit into a geographical setting—as, for example, the rather overloaded charts of terrorist outrages in Palestine

in 1937–38 and a decade later. The quotations added to many of the maps do not really help the 'dispassionate presentation' of the conflict that the book's wrapper claims; it is plain enough that the author's sympathies are very much on the Israeli side. Some of the maps have already appeared in Dr. Gilbert's 'Jewish History Atlas'. Like that and others in the series, this is a well-arranged, clear, and very usable compilation.

J. S. F. PARKER

Crisis Decision-Making: Israel's Experience in 1967 and 1973. By Abraham R. Wagner. *New York, Washington: Praeger. 1974. London: Pall Mall. 1975. 186 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government.) £6·50.*

ISRAEL'S failure to predict the Syrian-Egyptian attack of October 6, 1973, ranks as one of the greatest strategic fiascos of recent decades. It was in marked contrast to the vigilance that prompted swift reaction to Arab provocations in June 1967. The complacency of Golda Meir's cabinet, which tempts comparison with Pearl Harbour, was corrected only at great cost on the battlefield.

Abraham Wagner's book promises a comparative analysis of Israeli decision-making in the two crises. The author's access to Hebrew sources, and the numerous interviews he conducted with Israeli leaders up to the highest level, put him in an excellent position to assess rival explanations of cabinet decisions.

But the project is marred by methodological baggage which distracts Dr. Wagner from his subject. Analysis of the interplay of strategy, personality and politics is subordinated to his determination to provide 'an empirical verification of utility theory'. A quantitative evaluation of decision alternatives in 1967 leads to the conclusion that, in choosing a pre-emptive strike, 'rational decision makers did in fact select the policy option which they perceived to be in their own best interests as they saw them'.

Dr. Wagner is aware of the tautological character of this conclusion, but dismisses the difficulty by remarking that tautology is inherent in 'utility theory and rationality itself'. Why then adopt an approach which precludes systematic study of the, often 'irrational', decision-making of bureaucracies under stress? In a copious bibliography there is no reference to Richard Neustadt, Graham Allison, Morton Halperin or Irving Janis who have prised open the 'rational actor' to reveal institutional and psychological factors which contribute to diplomatic misjudgment.

Only the final chapter deals with the Yom Kippur war. It was written hastily, with insufficient editing or proof-reading. The chapter leaves open the question, begged by the Agranat Commission's official inquiry, of whether primary responsibility for Israel's unreadiness can be traced to political, military or intelligence failures. Documents which might help resolve the controversy lie sealed under the Israeli government's thirty-year rule. But Dr. Wagner does not always follow up those leads which are available. He suggests, for example, that a pre-emptive strike was ruled out in 1973 partly because Golda Meir did not want Israel again branded the aggressor by world opinion. But published sources indicate that world opinion was probably a less persuasive deterrent than the implied American threat to withhold military supplies if Israel again struck first.

The book is at its best in discussing the bargaining which led to Moshe Dayan's appointment as minister of defence in 1967. It also contains a perceptive account of the immobility which the Israeli party and cabinet system can produce at critical moments.

MICHAEL LEIGH

Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy. By Michael Brecher. *London, Melbourne, Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1974. 639 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Indexes. £9·50.*

THIS volume follows the author's *The Foreign Policy System of Israel*[1] and will represent with this and further planned volumes a project which, we are told, 'is designed to make the study of foreign policy more scientific and more relevant'. After a detailed analysis of the decisions relating to seven separate incidents in Israeli international relations, the author develops in the final chapter the underlying theme of his project. The approach is to use information arrived at through empirical research in order to develop hypotheses which may assist in analysing other situations which have not been the subject of empirical research. Such hypotheses may then qualify as 'valid building blocks for a theory of state behaviour'. Nor is the author content to rest there. The project should ultimately have practical uses. Thus if a country wishes to predict how another will behave, the application of a qualifying hypothesis may provide the answer. So there will result, the author hopes, greater rationality in international affairs and a reduction in conflict.

The seven issues of Israeli foreign policy selected for detailed analysis are the decision to make Jerusalem the official capital of Israel; the decision to seek compensation from Germany for the atrocities committed and property plundered by the Nazis; the approach to the Korean War and the Peoples Republic of China; the decisions concerning the diversion of the Jordan waters; the decision to ally with France and Great Britain in the Sinai campaign in 1956; the decision to go to war in June 1967; and the decision in 1970 to accept a ceasefire with Egypt and Jordan initiated by the United States.

Each of these case studies is an independent investigation containing a discussion of the relevant documents spiced with many personal interviews conducted by the author. Yet the form and style of presentation, conditioned by the author's research design with its elaborate code, will discourage the general reader interested in the events described. The narrative is rarely allowed to develop naturally and the code has often to be consulted for the meaning and relevance of the numerous capital letters.

The general theory of state behaviour is explored in the final chapter by testing forty-eight hypotheses (for example, 'The flexibility of an image seems to be an inverse function of the level of intensity', or 'The rigidity of the image of the decision-making elite and the time lag will be greater than in the case of the attentive and mass publics') against the decisions taken by the Israeli cabinet in relation to the events which made up the seven case studies. There are serious limitations in this exercise and the author recognises them. In the first place there is the subjective element in the

[1] London, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 1972 Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1973, p. 294.

evaluation of the results of the hypothesis testing (not to mention the subjective elements in the formulation of the hypothesis). Secondly, it may be asked why any answers to be derived from the Israeli foreign policy experience should be relevant to different states in different circumstances. Certainly it is of the essence of scholarship that valid general conclusions be drawn. The author's intentions are applauded; his over-mechanical approach, however, leaves them only partly fulfilled.

HARRY RAJAK

Arab Guerilla Power 1967–1972. By Edgar O'Ballance. *London: Faber. 1974. 246 pp. Maps. Index. £4·50.*

Revolutionary Warfare in the Middle East: The Israelis vs. the Fadayeen. By Bard O'Neill. Preface by Joseph S. Szyliowicz. Foreword by Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall (Ret.). *Boulder, Colorado: Paladin Press. 1974. 140 pp. $3.95.*

THESE are curious books dealing with one of the most intractable political conflicts of the century, written by two professional soldiers who show little interest or understanding, and no sympathy for the politics of the complex Palestine problem. Both Major O'Ballance and Major O'Neill try to examine the Palestine guerrilla movement whose aim they take to be the destruction of the state of Israel by the conduct of a revolutionary people's war. On that basis the guerrillas' performance has not been comparable to that of the Algerians or the Vietcong whom they try to emulate, and as such their attempt has met with utter failure. The two authors attribute this failure to the sound and successful application of counter-insurgency principles by the Israeli authorities which has forced the guerrillas on to the defensive, and has thus caused them to fall foul of their Arab brethren as the Jordan civil war in 1970 showed.

Nevertheless, for all their successes, the Israelis have managed only to contain the movement rather than destroy it. Their harsh and punitive measures have served as a reminder and a spur to the Palestinians, especially in the diaspora, to continue the struggle. This aspect of the movement, which is overlooked by both authors, has been instrumental in increasing the support and recognition for the PLO in international circles, which culminated in Arafat's appearance at the UN as 'the sole legitimate representative' of the Palestine Arabs. Neither author explains why the guerrillas have had this political success while remaining so ineffective in the military field. The discrepancy is really one of perspective. The authors are interested in counter-insurgency methods, irrespective of the political repercussions. Such an attitude is misleading if not dangerous in the study of a conflict such as the Arab-Israeli one which has several dimensions. It is not surprising therefore that both authors failed to foresee that the October war of 1973 would result from Israel's intransigent stand, and neither, it seems, appreciated the dichotomous nature of the politics of the Palestine guerrillas. The guerrilla movement not only seeks to displace the Jewish state in Palestine, but also to assert its right to speak for the Palestine Arabs, instead of the Arab states who have acted as their guardians since the London round table conference in 1939. Yet the liberation of their homeland is to be undertaken by an Arab rather than a Palestinian revolutionary war, especially since 1967 when some Arab states became directly involved as

a result of their territorial losses. It is this more than any other factor that has brought about the confrontation between the guerrillas and the Arab states while the dispute between Israel and these states has remained as acute as ever.

ABBAS KELIDAR

Oil, Power and Politics: Conflict in Arabia, the Red Sea and the Gulf. By Mordechai Abir. *London: Cass. 1974. 221 pp. Maps. Index. £4·50.*

PROFESSOR ABIR, or else his publisher, has left out of his sub-title the area about which he knows more about than most people, which is the Horn of Africa. A book that consists of four essays written for different purposes, and only lightly stitched together, would have been worth titling with its rarest, rather than it least novel, contributions. The former are its passages on Soviet expansion in Somalia, and the mutual and foreign help and comfort given to and fro across the southern Red Sea to dissidents in Eritrea and South Yemen. The latter are the seventy or so pages on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

For as soon as he ventures into Arabia Deserta, he suffers from two drawbacks neither of which is his fault. First, he published in January 1974—a date at which he may well have been busy on military service—a text with no reference later than the summer of 1973. So he is unable to take into account intervening upheavals that include the Arab binding-force constituted by the Fourth Palestine War, and the changed balance of power wrought in the area he discusses by the increase in the price of oil and the hazards of Egypt's tight-rope walk between the United States and the Soviet Union. His second handicap is that, as with all Israeli writers on Arab affairs, his picture amounts to a detective's photofit. Hearsay and newspaper statements, however meticulously footnoted, do not necessarily add up to fact and are no substitute for personal observation. Had he had the advantage of this last, he would not have labelled the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia 'too old to comprehend the impact of the socio-political changes taking place in his country' (p. 61); the King was not yet seventy at the date of which he writes; or Sultan Said bin Taimur of Muscat, who was only an ambulant anachronism, as "increasingly senile' before he left his patrimony in 1970.

Despite the shrewdness of some of Professor Abir's prophecies, much of his book was immediately superseded by 1974's spate of publications on kindred subjects. His index and maps are excellent (except that Tapline starts at Qaisuma, not Dhahran); his English, which he at one point claims to be 'atrocious', has been impeccably edited, his spelling of names less so. Kempbell for Campbell, Hopewood for Hopwood, Aman for Amman, and so on, would no doubt have been corrected had he been able to see his book through the press himself.

ELIZABETH MONROE

The Egyptian Economy 1952–1972. By Robert Mabro. *London, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1974. 254 pp. Index. (Economies of the World; Ed.: Nita Watts.) £3·95. Paperback: £1·50.*

ROBERT MABRO, who was brought up in Egypt, has made a brave attempt at writing an account of the modern Egyptian economy, following, and at

times departing from, the lines already struck out by writers such as Issawi, Mead and others.[1] Although the title covers the period up to 1972, most of the information relates to the 1950s and 1960s. There are two major difficulties in writing on Egypt in this period: first, a full or even a reasonably full account of inputs from other states, such as Saudi Arabia, is required and, second, there are many problems relating to the Egyptian data. It might have been better if the writer had dealt with these considerable difficulties at the outset. In the first case it is very uncertain what value to place on general statements about the growth of the Egyptian economy if we do not know the external inputs which allowed for alternative choices; linked with this is the need for a comprehensive statement of Egyptian military expenditure throughout the period. In the second case, the problem of data, the writer alludes to this repeatedly throughout the volume but does not specify the particular problems involved. An understanding of general problems of data about a developing country such as Egypt may perhaps be taken for granted, although since this volume is designed for general readers and up to the level of second-year university students even this may be unwise. But, general conditions apart, there are probably variations in the level of usefulness of the economic data by department etc., and it would have been interesting to read about this. As a result of these two problems, there is a feeling of uncertainty about the book; and the writer sometimes asks the reader to reach his own conclusions, which is somewhat difficult to do.

These criticisms apart, Mr. Mabro presents a careful and complex analysis of the difficulties faced by the new regime in Egypt from 1952 onwards. He rightly stresses the efficiency with which the Egyptians ran the Suez Canal after the takeover in 1956, despite Western scepticism. Similarly, he points out that the Aswan Dam project, which is now often criticised, was from the outset recognised as complex and likely to produce some undesired side-effects. Nonetheless the value of the Aswan Dam project to new Egypt cannot be overstressed in terms of impact on morale. Again, wisely, he often mentions the economic continuity with the past in modern Egypt but emphasises new departures, as in the drive towards nationalisation which by 1964 meant that the government 'owned most assets and means of production in the modern sector' (p. 131). Overall, it is clear that much structural change is occurring and that given freedom from the pattern of recurrent war, Egyptian citizens should gain the social and educational benefits still denied to them by the state of the economy. In this connection, we need to remember—as Mabro shows by quoting Mead—the fact that 50 per cent of all deaths in Egypt in the 1960s were still due to the "general poverty and weakness of the population making them susceptible to bronchitis, gastro-enteritis and colitis"' (p. 38).

M. J. GRIEVE

[1] Issawi, *Egypt in Revolution: An Economic Analysis.* London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the RIIA. Reviewed in *International Affairs,* April 1964, p. 334. Mead, *Growth and Structural Change in the Egyptian Economy.* Homewood, Ill.: Irwin. 1967.

The Kurds. By Martin Short and Anthony McDermott. *London: Minority Rights Group. 1975. 32 pp. Bibliog. (Report No. 23.) Paperback: £0·45. $1.50.*

THE events of recent months have brought the tragic struggle between the Kurds and the Iraqi army back into the headlines. The Minority Rights Group has followed up this renewed interest by producing a summary of the Kurdish case.

Martin Short begins the report with an outline of the geographical, economic and social position of the Kurds, followed by a survey of Kurdish political activities in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon; (brief contributions on the last two countries have been compiled with help from David Hirst). Anthony McDermott then discusses the position in Iraq, as it stood at the beginning of 1975. He concludes—somewhat unfortunately, in view of the latest developments—that 'it is unlikely that relations between Tehran and Baghdad will improve enough in the foreseeable future for Iran to scale down its support for the Kurds' (p. 22).

Impressed as they evidently are by Mullah Mustafa Barzani's determined campaign, the authors have fallen into several errors of commission and omission which rob their report of much of its credibility. Accurate Kurdish population figures are admittedly hard to come by, but their statement that 'the true figure [for the Kurdish population of Turkey] may well be above five million' (p. 7) is hard to accept, granted that the total population of the Turkish provinces shown on their own map as 'Kurdish Areas' (p. 18) is only about 4.3 million. Similarly, their claim that 'Kurds form some 30 per cent of Iraq's total population' (p. 11) exceeds even the probably inflated figures published by the Kurds themselves (mentioned on p. 5 of the report). While the authors are not slow to point accusing fingers at the governments of Iran, Iraq and Turkey, they tell us virtually nothing about the less creditable aspects of Mullah Mustafa's career. There is not a word on the bitter fighting of 1959–61 between the Barzanis and the Pishdari, Lolani, Zibari and Baradosti tribes, in which Mullah Mustafa was not above joining the Iraqi forces in attacking his fellow Kurds. Nor is there any mention of Jelal Talabani and the younger element of urbanised Kurds in the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, who have had profound disagreements with Barzani. Their failure to mention these and similar points leaves one with little faith in the authors' objectivity or thoroughness.

WILLIAM HALE

The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization. By James Alban Bill. *Columbus, Ohio: Merrill. 1972. 174 pp. Bibliog. Index. Paperback: £2·00.*

ANYONE who attempts to describe the Iranian political system is dogged by the problem that what determines its functioning is not the formal rules and institutions of government but the intricate and often informal pattern of rivalry and alliance between different sections of the political elite, and their relationships with the crown. By concentrating his attention on the political role of the professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia, Professor Bill provides us with a fascinating and generally realistic study of an important social group.

His book begins with a brief excursion into Iranian history, explaining the way in which the traditional structure of Iranian society related to the governmental system of the Safavids and Qajars. He analyses the pattern of balanced tension between key officials of the state by which the Shahs maintained control over their administrative edifice. The web of authority and obligation which governed the traditional society persists in modern Iran, as the writer goes on to explain. The intelligentsia represents a 'new class' in Iranian society and plays an increasingly important part in politics and government. Professor Bill classifies the intellectuals according to their reactions to the traditional structures confronting them. Some are followers, who are content to fit into slots the web-system allows. The more ambitious, who can use traditional relationships to further their own interests, are dubbed manoeuverers. Others seek changes in the system, either by working for reform from within (the technocrats) or by launching frontal attacks (the uprooters) The writer examines the clash between these different elements in the universities, and then in government departments and parliament. He then discusses the way in which traditional patterns have survived in the so-called White Revolution of the 1960s, by which the Shah has been able to reconstruct a general dependence on the crown while maintaining a balanced rivalry between those on whom he relies.

While accepting the value of Professor Bill's study, one suspects that his classifications are perhaps too rigid. Common experience suggests that individuals do not always fit into the categories to which he assigns them. One is also left wondering whether his concentration on the intelligentsia gives us an adequate picture of the overall process of modernisation. Granted Iran's substantial industrial growth, what role does the burgeoning class of industrial entrepreneurs play in the new order? How has steady urbanisation and the expansion of primary education affected mass attitudes? These are questions which Professor Bill unfortunately leaves unanswered.

WILLIAM HALE

Iraq and Syria 1941. By Geoffrey Warner. *London: Davis-Poynter. 1974. 180 pp. Bibliog. Index. (The Politics and Strategy of the Second World War; Series Eds.: Noble Frankland and Christopher Dowling.) £3·50.*

OF a series of books now planned, under the general editorship of Noble Frankland and Christopher Dowling, to cover, as they say, 'the reasons why the various campaigns' (of 1941, etc.) 'were undertaken' and 'the disparate strategies pursued by Britain, France', etc., and the causes and effects of these, this short but valuable book by Geoffrey Warner is the first to be published. One may hope, and may indeed be confident, that later volumes will be as good. (*Two more have been published. Ed.*)

The author, only four years old in 1941, does not write as an eye-witness of the events in the Levant or Iraq in that year, nor as an accepted authority on the peoples, conditions or languages of his chosen countries. His interest is less in what happened socially or economically to Iraqis, Syrians or Lebanese, than in the debates and disagreements, the minutes, telegrams and letters, and the conferences between European and North American foreign ministers on policies for these ever-restless and disunited, yet strategically and geographically most important, territories. The limita-

tion of his study to these aspects minimises the ill effects of a rather incomplete knowledge, which sometimes betrays itself, of the local scene, history and contemporary ways of life of the Arab countries concerned; of their current internal politics and personalities, his account is interesting.

For the general reader Professor Warner offers a picture of the daily problems of commanders-in-chief confronted by conflicting advice or orders from above, and of the atmosphere of recurring crises in western capitals faced with unexpected conditions or catastrophes: crises inescapably involving the immediate and remoter future of their own countries, and perhaps of most of the civilised world. He is able, by abundant quotation from unpublished state or military records, and from postwar publications, often autobiographical, by many of the chief actors on the world-stage of 1941, to increase substantially our understanding of decisions reached and, to some extent, of the statesmen and generals themselves who followed them by action, too often *à contre-coeur*.

There is still, for the future close student of this or that event or personality, a mass of unpublished material—and more, one supposes, which will never be published at all. But Professor Warner has worked hard and effectively and has revealed much. His papers will interest and satisfy many readers, and stimulate further research by others.

STEPHEN H. LONGRIGG

AFRICA

Essays on the Political Economy of Africa. By Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul. *New York, London: Monthly Review Press. 1973. 416 pp. $12.50. £4·90.*

THE authors of these essays are unquestionably among the foremost writers on African affairs. Their work has led to wide-ranging discussion not only amongst those who share their basic Marxist approach to economic and political questions, but also among those who differ in their fundamental orientation, but are nonetheless concerned with attempts to resolve the many problems faced by African countries striving to establish and maintain their economic and political independence. Not unreasonably then, a collection of their essays, most of which have already appeared separately, might be expected to include some reference to the discussion they have provoked, and some attempt by the authors to show how, if at all, they have been influenced by that discussion, and the ways in which their own ideas have developed since the essays were originally published. The expectation of some synthesis is heightened by the brief preface in which the authors state their belief that the best way in which they can participate in the continuing struggle against imperialism in Africa is by contributing to the elaboration of a theoretical foundation for action. They cite Amilcar Cabral in support of their belief in and as an illustration of, the importance of theory for direct action. No synthesis emerges, and no clear attempt is made in this book to postulate a general theoretical model which, however imperfect, might be applied to the wide variety of different situations prevailing in Africa. This criticism might be met by the claim that as the authors are still at a relatively early stage of thinking on the subject, they are still interested primarily in stimulating discussion. This they have

already done, and for the most part this volume adds little new to the ongoing debate.

Of the individual essays, the most interesting and valuable is the brief appendix by Saul and Roger Wood on African peasantries. These are one of the most interesting focal points of study and analysis concerning Africa today. This brief essay can serve as an introduction to the topic, and is at least of obvious direct relevance to African situations. This is unfortunately not true of all the ideas and concepts discussed or assumed in these essays.

The most disappointing feature of the book is the most serious 'failure of analytic nerve' (for all of which the authors apologise in advance)—the failure to question the validity of applying the concept of class struggle to the African situation. There is substantial evidence, in Saul's own essay on Tanzania, for example, for at least questioning that validity. In the field of development economics, there has been widespread questioning of the usefulness for African and other Third World economies of development theories based on the experiences of industrialised countries. Surely the time has come when, in the light of experience in politically independent Africa, some of the basic concepts of socialism as applied to current situations in Africa can be re-examined and modified where necessary.

S. E. KATZENELLENBOGEN

The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia. By Patrick Gilkes. *London: Friedmann. 1975. 307 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £4·50.*

FOREIGN observers have long predicted the break-up of the Ethiopian Empire once Haile Selassie died. Have his efforts to modernise the unique society and polity Britain handed back to him in 1941, after the five-year interregnum of Mussolini's colonial rule, been too cautious and gradual to satisfy the expectations of a new class shaped by foreign investment and European education? The famine of 1973 dramatically confirmed the fragility of Haile Selassie's state. An anonymous army junta then embarked on a course of mutiny—also cautious and gradual—culminating during 1974 in the incarceration of the octogenarian Negus himself and the slaughter of half a hundred ministers and public officers. The climate of foreign criticism favoured the inference that these events were a spontaneous popular reaction to oppression and rapacity in the imperial administration. Mr. Gilkes has hurried to substantiate that inference—hurried, indeed, at the cost of uncompleted sentences, innumerable misprints, and haphazard romanization of Amharic orthography.

Years ago, Dame Margery Perham, though highly critical of the imperial regime, noted, with deep sympathy over its problems, that even peasants took surprising pride in their singular system of land rights, on which the feudal imperium rested. Mr. Gilkes unsympathetically covers the ground again, adding recent information about both land reform and land-development projects. He uses Marxist terminology here and there but does not rise to a Marxist class analysis or indicate what alternative policies for modernisation were open to the Negus. The value of the statistical and budgetary information he offers is offset by captious disparagement of Haile Selassie's fiscal policy, acceptance of foreign aid, and modest industrialisation; an impartial reader might well conclude the opposite from Mr. Gilkes, namely that the Negus did better than we realised before.

Ethiopia's feudalism arose centuries ago from the throne's acquiescen in ancient regional autonomies. In 1941, Haile Selassie moved to tu subordinate rulers—perpetually 'opting out' rebelliously—into governc representing the throne, and to replace them ultimately by civil servan Has reform perhaps been too *fast*? The agony of the Eritrean province tod fulfils our worst fears of thirty years ago; but what alternative was the for either Britain or Haile Selassie? Mr. Gilkes recounts the rebellions sin 1941, linking them with 'contradictions within the (modernising) rulii class'. The panacea, he concludes, for these and all Ethiopia's dissents aı discontents is unspecified 'radical change'—concentration, presumably, all power, central and regional, in the hands of a Marxist-Leninist part But which party?—that of the new head-chopping Maoist junta or that its challenger, the Eritrean Liberation Front, a client ultimately of Moscov

DENNIS J. DUNCANSON

Politics in Zambia. Edited by William Tordoff. *Manchester: Manchest University Press. 1974. 439 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index. £6·00.*

THIS is a series of studies by six professors from different countries, wł have all at some time lectured at the University of Zambia. The book divided into ten chapters on such subjects as the popular basis for anı colonial protest, the strains and cleavages within Zambian society, parli ment, the administration, trade unions and the effects of UDI. There is al: an introduction and a conclusion.

Zambia was still culturally and linguistically divided when it becan independent; with the departure of the colonial power there was a scramb for the spoils of office, nonetheless eager because a single party had wc an overwhelming victory at the polls. In his paper on the popular basis f(anti-colonial protest, Professor Rasmussen stresses the discontent of tł rural population. There were indeed the usual grievances to exploit; gan laws, agricultural, veterinary, forestry and health regulations and poll ta but the winds which fanned these bush fires blew chiefly from the towı and even from as far away as Westminster. In fact, Mr. Rasmussen's hyp(thesis is at variance with Mr. Molteno's conclusion that 'sectionalist mov(ments are primarily the artifact of elite leaders who wish to improve the positions' (p. 106). We are also told that 'backward areas were unable 1 absorb rapidly rising capital inputs' (p. 377). Whilst it is true that tł influence of agricultural experimental stations has seldom spread to tł neighbouring villages, and that many factories started in rural areas have n(been economic, subsistence cultivators have often 'absorbed' rural develo] ment funds and farmers' loans as their cash share of the spoils of office.

The contributors point out frankly that there have been casualties in tł struggle to weld the country into a nation. Parliament largely reduced itse to a debating club and has yielded precedence to the committee of a sing] party. The cabinet proved little more stable and has to some extent give way to a number of personal advisers, some even expatriates. Cabin(ministers rank below members of the party central committee in the on(party participatory democracy. The judiciary, the press and broadcasting aı more controlled than would be acceptable in some other countries, thoug criticism of the administration is not entirely suppressed and is ofte outspoken and vigorous.

Under these circumstances it was perhaps necessary that power should be concentrated more and more in the hands of one man. That so much has been achieved in a brief ten years is due chiefly to the character of President Kaunda. If not a political philosopher of the first rank, he is humane, patient, simple-living and an extremely shrewd politician.

This book shows that on the whole Zambia's has been a success story. Some of the writing in it could have been improved; for example, on a single page we get phrases like 'potentially sectionally aware followers', 'communications variables' and 'worthwhileness' (p. 92). Political in-fighting is seldom thrilling reading, but for those seeking information this book, which has involved much detailed research, will be valuable.

JAMES MURRAY

The Lion and the Unicorn in Africa. By Frederick Pedler. *London: Heinemann. 1974. 320 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. £8·50.*

As the title of this book may mystify the general reader, it might be as well to explain that the lion and the unicorn were the symbols of two companies in West Africa, which were the remote ancestors of the United Africa Company. Those who are familiar with the use of symbols in African or Asian elections will realise that those two trade marks had great sales value—so much so that their inventors could never prevent them from being copied.

As far back as the end of the 18th century enterprising individuals from Britain set up business in West Africa; the author describes the relations between them as fluctuating between 'wild competition and ambitious combination'. In spite of the rugged individualism of those concerned, the forces making for combination were bound to triumph. The process was set in motion when George Taubman Goldie amalgamated four companies into the United African Company—not to be confused with the United Africa Company of modern times. Other amalgamations followed, but the process was greatly accelerated when William Hesketh Lever—the soapmaker with vision—entered the field early in the present century. His investment in West Africa arose not from any desire to put money into the region, but from the need to ensure the supply of his raw material. And when in 1911 the British policy of maintaining the system of communal land holding prevented him from planting in Nigeria, he turned to the Congo. This was only a beginning, and in the next two or three decades Lever Bros spread all over West Africa. In due course they bought up their competitors and formed the United Africa Company.

The author has much to say about Lever who, contrary to the general opinion, was perhaps more impulsive than a business man should be and, as a result, made a number of bad bargains through fear of missing opportunities. Nevertheless he built up a great organisation which can claim to have done much to modernise the countries in which it operated.

This cannot have been an easy book to write, for the author has had to follow many separate threads and from time to time weave some of them together into thicker strands. This he has done with skill. His background gave him a double advantage: as a civil servant in West Africa he became a distinguished authority on that region, and later, as deputy chairman of the United Africa Company, he learned at first hand how the machine was constructed. His book may therefore be warmly commended, not only

to those interested in the economic development of West Africa, but al
to students of the processes by which great business combines develop.

P. J. GRIFFITHS

ASIA

Population, Politics, and the Future of Southern Asia. Edited by W. Howai Wriggins and James F. Guyot. *New York, London: Columbia Un versity Press. 1974. 402 pp. Index. Paperback: $2.95. £1·45.*

ALTHOUGH the origins of demography lie in 'political arithmetic' and tl subject has subsequently focused largely on national populations, tl relationships between politics and population change have attracte surprisingly little attention from social scientists. Hence in Novemb 1971 the Southern Asian Institute at Columbia University convened three-day conference on 'Population, the Human Condition and Politi in Southern Asia', and the basic papers for that conference form the bul of this volume. Its aims are very macroscopic and ambitious, attemptin to examine first the basic demographic changes (one paper), then th processes and effects of urbanisation (four papers), and finally the pa ticular problems and opportunities resulting from the increased numbe of youths in the populations (four papers)—all for an area containing nearl 30 per cent of mankind. Perhaps inevitably, the aims are not fully attaine

The introduction on 'demographic change and politics' and Chapter on 'population change and development' try to set the general scene, bu there is some lack of co-ordination. Unfortunately, they conflict over th area under consideration, the first chapter excluding Iran and Afghanista while the second includes them. Moreover, both contain nearly identic tables of rates of population growth by country, but neither provides an data of population sizes—surely a matter of some political significance. Th authors concentrate so much on population growth that they say nothin about population distribution, save for the usual concern over urbanisatio as if this is the only matter of importance. Nor do they fill in the gaps le by the case studies on urbanisation and the youth cohorts. Consequentl this volume says very little about Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma Cambodia, Iran, Laos, Nepal, Sikkim, North Vietnam or South Vietnam

Part 2 comprises four case studies on the problems of urbanisation: Sydne Goldstein writing about the urban primacy of Bangkok, Aprodicio Laquia about urban tensions in South-east Asia, Shahid Burki about migratio urbanisation and politics in Pakistan, and Myron Weiner about the soci political consequences of inter-state migration in India. Although usefu papers individually, they are mixed and not very representative, and th latter two rely on 1961 census data.

Part 3, on the problems of the larger youth cohorts, is perhaps the mos interesting part of the book, looking at unemployment, disaffection an protest in Indonesia (Nathan Keyfitz, Donald Emmerson), India (Cora D Bois) and Sri Lanka (Howard Wriggins and C. H. S. Jayewardene), but th relationship between demographic and political factors is not always clea And this is no further clarified by an epilogue on 'the population crisis which scarcely mentions southern Asia.

In short, this volume is little more than a useful collection of paper

and one doubts that it will achieve the hope of its editors that policy-makers in the area will be enabled to understand better the bases for future decision-making.

JOHN I. CLARKE

Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures toward Political and Social Change in the Third World. By Joel S. Migdal. *Princeton, N.J., London: Princeton University Press. 1975. 300 pp. Bibliog. Index. $15.00. £7·90.*

Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia. Edited by John Wilson Lewis. Introd. by John Wilson Lewis and Kathleen J. Hartford. *Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1974. 364 pp. Index. $12.95. £7·50.*

THE political events of recent decades have led to the emergence of a large number of works in the social sciences on peasant revolution. In this context, considerable attention has been focused on the relative success of revolutionary groups in mobilising the apparently apolitical peasant masses in the Third World. Two recent publications offer contrasting and to some extent complementary examinations of the present state of the debate.

In *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution,* Joel Migdal examines the problem at the micro-scale and from a socio-anthropological standpoint. He reviews work carried out in a number of small agricultural communities in both Latin America and Asia, in the context of a general discussion of the pressures effecting change in the traditional economy and society. On the basis of a 'scale of external relations', which he draws up by awarding a score for each community in relation to the extent of its use of cash and of its participation in marketing and external labour opportunities, Migdal divides the villages under study into inward- and outward-orientated groups. Although the basis of division must be somewhat arbitrary, the author uses this to illustrate changes in the traditional autarchic village under the pressure of events in the wider world. He shows that the whole complex of stabilising survival mechanisms built into relations between villages and their 'lord', and between individual families within villages, have generally collapsed under the stresses of market involvement and population pressure, and that in the context of wider value systems individuals and villages with previous outside contacts and greater resources have been able to take differential advantage of the new opportunities offered.

Migdal then demonstrates, in the latter part of the book, the need for this disruption of economic structure within the traditional community to be compensated by political adjustment where the existing socio-political relationships have been destroyed. He points out that such changes can be catered for through existing political systems, but that where change is prevented revolutionary endeavour by the peasantry can result. He rejects the view that long-term participation by peasants in revolutionary institutions is the result of any immediate ideological commitment, but offers a 'deglamorizing' explanation on the basis of exchange theory, whereby the peasants commit their full support to a movement only where it can truly offer a solution to local problems.

Migdal's treatment in this book is very much in the nature of a review of other village studies and he makes surprisingly little use of examples from

his own field research. The first two sections, where the approach is rather standard and overgeneralised, serve as an introduction to the two latter parts. Here Migdal is more interesting and it is particularly valuable to read his final section alongside one of the more rewarding papers, by Jeffrey Race, in *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia.*

In this work, Professor Lewis has collected a group of papers presented at a conference in the Virgin Islands in 1973. In contrast to Migdal, the papers are orientated towards the organisational capabilities and the policies of the leadership of various revolutionary movements in Eastern Asia, with the treatment on a national, rather than local, scale. The book has three parts, of which the third, concerning town-countryside relationships in a state of revolution in China and containing papers by Meisner, Ying-mao Kau and Tilly, suffers from the general similarity of the papers. In the first section, Zagoria and Se Hee Yoo both examine the relationship between the land-tenure variable and revolutionary movements in the region, the latter with special reference to Korea. Both, and especially Zagoria, present interesting evidence correlating unrest with the extent of landlessness and tenancy at the regional level. Both point out, however, that the presence of such foci of discontent is by no means the whole story, for they have been present in the past too. According to Yoo, it is the factors of psychological motivation and political organisation which distinguish modern revolutionary movements from the peasant rebellions of the past, although at the same time they tend to make them more vulnerable to failure.

The essential message of the main group of papers in the collection is to suggest that the difference between success and failure in the recent revolutionary movements in Asia has been in the varying ability of the revolutionary leaders to relate to the problems of the peasantry. Here the example of White's coverage of Vietnam contrasts strongly with the following papers on Indonesia, Malaysia and Burma. In none of these three cases was the communist leadership able to offer an attraction capable of drawing the peasants into risk outside their traditional society. There was little understanding of the need for Race's 'exchange mechanism', nor of the extent of the difficulty, outlined by Migdal, of mobilising the peasant masses.

HARVEY DEMAINE

Afghanistan in the 1970s. Edited by Louis Dupree and Linette Albert. *New York, Washington: Praeger. 1974. London: Pall Mall. 1975. 263 pp. Maps. Index. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.) £8·00.*

IN 1963–64 Afghanistan's development passed an important watershed. A new constitution and an elected parliament provided for a dramatic dispersion of political power, hitherto monopolised by a small circle in and around the royal house. Massive economic developments were promised, to be financed from the competitive generosity (not always disinterested) of the super-powers as well as lesser donors. Within ten years, however, hope had given way to some serious disillusion. Economic growth had flagged, thanks to a severe cutback in foreign aid, mounting debt repayments and a disastrous drought during 1970–71. Parliamentary government was hamstrung by a low level of public awareness or understanding and the absence of organised political parties. Daoud Khan, the royal cousin against whom the

constitution had been largely directed, thus felt justified in removing both the constitution and the monarchy by a coup in July 1973. This collection furnishes some valuable insights into an interesting, if somewhat depressing story.

Louis Dupree begins the book with an outline of some of the main characteristics of peasant-tribal societies and their implications for political development in the Afghan case. This theme is further explored in a following chapter by Hassan Kakar, who offers a historical introduction to Afghanistan's contemporary problems. Dr. Kakar includes in his chapter an important section on tribal integration and the fluctuating political fortunes of tribal elders at different stages of modern Afghan history. Subsequent contributions by Leon Poullada and Ralph Magnus bring the story up to date by outlining postwar political developments. The constitutional experiment of 1964–73 failed, Dr. Magnus believes, because the 'constitutional coalition', which brought together the intellectuals and the traditional elite of tribal leaders and clerics, fell apart when faced with the tasks which political authority brought with it. While dogged by these domestic political problems, Afghan leaders sustained a successful policy of international non-commitment, as Richard Newell explains in his discussion of Afghanistan's foreign policy. Unfortunately, he says comparatively little about the Afghan campaign for self-determination for the Pashtuns of Pakistan, which Pakistan's current internal turmoils and the return of Daoud may bring back to the fore.

Subsequent contributions to the book explore other aspects of contemporary Afghan life. The disappointing performance of the economy is explained by Marvin Brant, while Nigel Allan examines the effect of economic development on agriculture in the Koh-i-Daman district, north of Kabul. Richard Tapper argues that, whatever political problems they pose, Afghanistan's nomads still play 'a valuable role in the national economy' (p. 138). Educational problems are discussed by William Sayres and Baqui Yusufzai. Other contributions, which your reviewer is ill-equipped to judge but which he read with interest, deal with the traditionally subservient status of women and attempts to reform it, and contemporary artistic and musical life. The collection is rounded off with a somewhat impressionistic summary by Louis Dupree's co-editor, Linette Albert. A useful compendium, though the contributions are perhaps too many, and sometimes disappointingly short.

WILLIAM HALE

Business and Politics in India. By Stanley A. Kochanek. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, Calif., London: University of California Press for the Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies of the University of California. 1974. 382 pp. Bibliog. Index $16.50. £8·25.*

STANLEY A. KOCHANEK has posed himself the fascinating question of the extent to which the business community can influence government policies in a poor, overwhelmingly rural country like India. He eventually decides that it generally cannot (at least on substantive issues), but in coming to this conclusion he has produced a volume which is a useful history of the growth of the Indian business sector, whilst also throwing light on a number of infrequently analysed aspects of Indian society.

The author of a previous book on the Congress party,[1] he tackles his problem by paying particular attention to the history of the two leading business associations; the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Assocham), which has tended to act as mouthpiece for foreign capital in India; and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), which was founded in the 1920s to represent the interests of indigenous Indian entrepreneurs. He carefully documents the way in which such apparently ' modern ' institutions have in practice been split by ' primordial loyalties ' such as family, caste, community and region. He helps our understanding of these conflicts by analysing the varied backgrounds of the leading Indian business houses, and in a useful appendix he gives a thumbnail sketch of the social and industrial history of twenty of them.

At first sight, it is surprising that the business world has not had more influence on Indian politics for, as well as possessing two of the few voluntary associations which grew independently of Congress, it played an important role in financing the party in its pre-Independence campaigns (particularly, G. D. Birla). However, since then, the ties between business and Congress have loosened. Partly this reflects the socialist ideology which runs deep in Indian public life; partly the non-commercial background of most political leaders, which reflects the traditional low status which commerce has had in the Indian caste system.

Mr. Kochanek carries out an interesting analysis of the way in which the business world is losing its inhibitions about challenging the Congress party and about taking an active role in elective politics (albeit, without much success). He traces the role it played in backing regional leaders in the 1967 elections, and he shows how business leaders are now ready to back the Swatantra party relatively openly. Finally, he points to the way in which the interests of indigenous entrepreneurs and the new wave of foreign companies are slowly converging. In fact, if there is a gap in this comprehensive volume, it lies in the relatively slight coverage given to the Indian government's campaigns against foreign business interests. However, if Mr. Kochanek does not deal with struggles like the affair of the Soviet oil imports in the early 1960s, he does include a case-study of the foreign-dominated pharmaceutical industry's twenty-year campaign against patent law reform.

He concludes optimistically, ' . . . business in India has been most successful when it has been able to reduce issues to questions of detail. . . . Business to date has been unable to affect the course of broad national movements of opinion. It can influence to its profit only the detailed content of legislation and executive policy ' (p. 316).

LOUIS TURNER

India's Development Experience. By Tarlok Singh. Foreword by Gunnar Myrdal. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1975. 458 pp. Index. £8·00.*

FEW are as well qualified as Tarlok Singh to undertake ' a study in retrospect ' (p. 387) in which India's development experience is recalled. The late Professor Hanson once said of the author that his experience of the Indian planning process was unrivalled. Indeed, from the inception of

[1] *The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One-Party Democracy.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1968. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1969, p. 98.

the first five-year plan in 1951 to the discarded outline of the fourth plan in 1966, most documents issued by the Indian Planning Commission reflected the thought and style of Tarlok Singh. Often this able civil servant had to give way to less gentle men when seeking the compromises between conflicting views without which there would have been no development policy. The author is too loyal a man even to so much as hint at the difficulties which he must have encountered at times when interpreting the wishes of Nehru, for many years the chairman of the Planning Commission, or when squaring the views of some Commission members of widely differing convictions and temperaments. About the degree of consensus and conflict without which planning cannot proceed the author reveals nothing. After the writings of the Anglo-Saxon critics, W. Malenbaum, W. B. Reddaway, G. Rosen, P. Streeten, M. Lipton and the late A. H. Hanson—the most skilled of them all—the account of an insider would have been welcome; but this is not to be had from the book under review. Instead, it provides a competent, if somewhat conventional, 'overview' of the economic and social record at national and regional levels, of the philosophy underlying Indian planning, its prerequisites and its achievements in various sectors of the economy, and some conclusions drawn from a quarter of a century of Indian development.

The author acknowledges that of the objectives of Indian planning, 'the pursuit of welfare, the search for equality, and the desire for more even distribution of economic power . . .' have been '. . . the most difficult to attain' (p. 123). In practice, economic growth and development have had the effect of widening the gaps in income and opportunities. The most critical issues of development policy are identified as lying within the rural economy, and in particular with the small cultivator and the farm labourer. The author pleads that the right of ownership be conferred on tenant-cultivators. He rejects projects designed to give merely technical assistance in place of overdue socio-political solutions, which will be needed increasingly in an era dominated by problems caused by large-scale rural unemployment. The conflict, inherent in all development planning, between economic growth and social equilibrium is ever present in this volume of reflections. In Tarlock Singh's words, 'a wide chasm has tended to separate the economic from the social objectives of development' (p. 396). Being a public servant, albeit a very humane one, the author sees success primarily in terms of economic and administrative measures. Only occasionally is there a remark which shows his awareness of the political constraints which have robbed India of much of the reward its planning deserved. Practitioners in development and students of contemporary India will, nevertheless, wish to consult this volume of recent economic history when trying to learn from the past for the sake of doing better in the future.

W. KLATT

The Transfer of Power 1942–7. Volume V: The Simla Conference: Background and Proceedings, 1 September, 1944–28 July, 1945. Edited by Nicholas Mansergh with the assistance of Penderel Moon. *London: H.M.S.O. 1975. 1346 pp. Illus. Map. Indexes. (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India.) £17·75.*

THIS is the fifth volume of a monumental series which is likely to extend to ten volumes and which will be of immense value to those students of

modern India who can afford to buy it. The scholarly reputation of Nicholas Mansergh and his new Assistant Editor, Penderel Moon, would themselves be a guarantee of accuracy and objectivity, and indeed in these respects the standard of the earlier volumes is fully maintained.

As in the first four volumes, the documents are arranged chronologically, irrespective of subject, but the index classifies them by subject in notional chapters. Thus, Chapter 5 deals with the Indian States and contains about seventy documents scattered throughout the volume. The introduction is so well written that it may tempt the easy-going student to dispense with reading the documents themselves, but the more critical reader will be able to satisfy himself of its fairness and balance.

The most important documents in this volume are concerned with the protracted debate between Lord Wavell and the British government as to the next step to be taken towards self-government for India. After the breakdown of the Cripps negotiations, Lord Linlithgow had been chary of fresh attempts to break the deadlock. Wavell, perhaps because of a soldierly preference for action, considered the risks of doing nothing greater than those of a fresh attempt to make a move. In his view it would be impossible to secure an agreed constitutional settlement until the Congress and the Muslim League had had practical experience of working together in an interim government, and he therefore proposed that such a government, representative of the principal Indian parties, should be formed. The India Committee of the Cabinet was far from happy about this proposal and considered that its implications were much wider than Wavell had realised. Throughout these discussions one is conscious that some important members of the Committee felt that Wavell was getting out of his depth. Nor were they impressed with the surprising suggestion of the Secretary of State, that control from Westminster and Whitehall should be abandoned and that India should attain something like Dominion Status under the Viceroy and his Executive Council. In the end, for fear of sending the Viceroy back 'empty-handed', they agreed that he should convene a conference and try to secure agreement to something like his original proposals. As is well known, the Conference ended in failure.

Other subjects of interest covered by these documents are the Indian food situation, the apprehensions of the Princes and the proposal for the abrogation of the clauses of the Government of India Act which prevented discrimination against British commercial interests.

Altogether this is a fascinating volume, which whets the appetite for the volumes still to come.

P. J. Griffiths

The Crisis of Indian Unity 1917–1940. By R. J. Moore. *Oxford, London: Clarendon Press. 1974. 334 pp. Map. Bibliog. Index. £2·75.*

This is a useful and carefully documented study of Indian politics between the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and the Second World War. The author necessarily writes as a theoretician, and some of his judgments might be questioned by those with practical experience of Indian administration. He is thus too apt to equate the maintenance of law and order with repression and he is not altogether fair when he writes of the government 'playing for sectional support'.

These, however, are minor defects, for the value of this book lies in its

presentation of an accurate record of facts rather than in its opinions. Mr. Moore has the gift of writing interestingly about subjects which in themselves are tedious. Few people today would want to follow the debate in Britain as to whether Irwin should or should not issue his Dominion status pronouncement. The author, however, seizes the real meaning of the debate. There was a fundamental opposition between Irwin, who wanted to tell India that Dominion status was just round the corner, and others—perhaps cooler judges—who emphasised the immense difficulties and the probability that such a declaration would exacerbate communal differences.

A second topic of interest concerns the discussions behind the scenes at the first Round Table Conference. Probably few people realise that at one stage the most important Princes were ready to support the idea of an All-India Federation, subject to certain conditions. Later, divisions began to appear amongst them and here, as over the communal issue, the conference was inconclusive. It is interesting to read that during the conference, Jinnah was one of the two 'peace-makers' who strove hard to effect a compromise between the Muslims and the Hindu Mahasabha.

The chapter on Satyagraha covers familiar ground and its interest lies largely in the fact that it brings out clearly Nehru's intransigence and Mahatma Gandhi's permanent attitude of suspicion combined with determination to strike a hard bargain. It is difficult to agree with the author in excusing the Mahatma for his refusal to attend the conference.

We need not follow the author in his account of events after the first Round Table Conference. It is enough to say that this account will be of value to students of that sterile period of Indian history. Altogether, this is a book to be commended.

P. J. GRIFFITHS

The Last Days of United Pakistan. By G. W. Choudhury. *London: Hurst. 1975. 239 pp. Index. £4·20.*

WHEN Professor Choudhury was transferred from Dacca University to research work in the foreign ministry where he came in close touch with President Ayub; on the dictator's fall he was adviser on constitutional planning to his successor, General Yahya, and from October 1969 he was a member of the cabinet. He was thus in a good position to see what was going on. His viewpoint is that of a believer in a united Pakistan, with a realistic awareness, however, of the strain that had been put on union by the 'narrow oligarchy' of West Pakistan, with its habit of viewing East Bengal 'entirely from the colonial angle' (p. 9).

Yahya emerges from this well-written account as a man of good intentions, ready to agree to a liberal degree of autonomy for the eastern wing, but neither very intelligent nor very energetic in a situation demanding statesmanship of the highest order. The three villains in this picture are General Peerzada, the worst intriguer in the military junta; his crony Bhutto, bent on gaining power for himself whether Pakistan fell to pieces or not; and Mujib, no less 'unscrupulous and inordinately ambitious' than Bhutto (p. ix). Mujib is depicted as craftily scheming to dismember the country, and is censured for refusing to modify his demands, which would have left nothing but foreign affairs and defence to hold a federation together. One may recall that the Dual Monarchy kept going for half a century with no closer links. Mujib may well have feared that any other

constitutional settlement would turn out to be no more than a scrap of paper, since army chiefs and reactionaries in the West might seize power again at any moment.

Whatever may be controversial, as Choudhury admits much still is, he leaves no doubt that the wholesale brutality of the army action launched on March 25, 1971, was impossible to condone (p. 181). He had left office, but visited Dacca during the fighting, and was horrified by what he heard and saw; also by the attitude of those in power, who thought only in terms of crushing rebels. On the international level he is highly critical of the Indian intervention, and—one of the least convincing parts of the book—believes that Mr. Nixon and the Chinese were both working for an amicable settlement.

V. G. KIERNAN

Vietnam Settlement: Why 1973, Not 1969? By Morton A. Kaplan et al. Foreword by William J. Baroody. *Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1973. 208 pp. (Rational Debate Series; First in the seventh series of Rational Debate Seminars sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute held at American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.; Moderator: Robert Goralski.) $5.75.*

War and politics in Cambodia: A Communications analysis. By Sheldon W. Simon. *Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1974. 178 pp. Bibliog. Index. $7.50.*

Vietnam Settlement: Why 1973, not 1969? is the transcript of three television programmes broadcast under the auspices of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research in February 1973. The theme of the series is evident from the title: whether the Vietnam 'peace' agreement reached in January 1973 could not just as easily have been reached four years earlier, when Mr. Nixon entered the White House, thus saving the expenditure of a great deal of blood and treasure. Each programme took the form of prepared opening statements from two speakers of opposing views, followed by an attempt by each one to rebut the other's arguments, and concluding with a question-and-answer session in which the speakers were 'quizzed' by informed members of the audience. The first programme featured two academics: Morton Kaplan and Abram Chayes; the second, two bureaucrats: G. Warren Nutter and Paul Warnke; and the third, two journalists: John Roche and Clayton Fritchey. Those familiar with the American governmental system, however, will not be surprised to learn that these distinctions are somewhat artificial. Thus, Messrs. Chayes, Roche and Fritchey have all worked in government at some time or other. Indeed, Roche and Warnke were both members of President Johnson's administration.

It would have been interesting to know which side was thought to have made the best case in the debates at the time they were televised. Two years later, there can be little doubt that the anti-Nixon camp emerges the clear winner. Abram Chayes made a good point early on when he emphasised the importance of President Nixon's abandonment of his original insistence that any settlement must be accompanied by a withdrawal of all North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam, although precisely when he made this concession was to be the subject of much dispute throughout the

debates. 'Thus', Chayes commented, 'one of the essential conditions necessary to give Thieu's government a reasonable chance [of survival], as specified by both President Nixon and General Thieu himself, has not been achieved' (p. 23). A settlement along the lines of the Paris Agreements could surely have been reached in 1969, Chayes argued, if the administration had been seriously interested in negotiating. Instead, it continued to pursue, for a while at any rate, the chimera of a military victory.

The main line of defence adopted by the supporters of the Nixon administration concentrated less on the Paris Agreements themselves than on the context in which they were concluded. Thus it was argued that South Vietnam and its armed forces were in such a shaky state in 1969 that they simply could not have survived an American withdrawal. By January 1973, however, thanks to the policy of 'Vietnamisation', the situation was quite different. As Mr. Nutter, who was assistant secretary of defence for international security affairs in President Nixon's first administration, put it in words which sound rather hollow today: 'We have trained them. We have provided them with sufficient stability. We have provided them with equipment. We have gotten them an agreement that says they can sit down at the table with the other party and work out the conditions under which there will be elections, that there must be unanimity, and so on. Therefore, we have given them the opportunity for self-determination' (p. 117). At the same time, he was careful to hedge his bets about the future. 'We have given them everything that anybody can give them', he said, 'except the will to achieve self-determination. Whether they have that will or not remains to be seen' (*ibid.*). John Roche, who also spoke in favour of the Nixon administration's policy, entered a more typically picturesque caveat. '[A]nyone who is optimistic about Vietnam', he said, 'should be instantly sent off for psychiatric observation' (p. 163).

It is, of course, far too easy to shuffle off the blame for the failure of American policy in Vietnam on to the South Vietnamese lack of will to achieve self-determination. Indeed, many would argue that the chief culprit is the United States itself, which has made a whole series of blunders in its Indochina policy since the early 1950s. At the tactical level, John Roche provided a graphic illustration of this with his searching critique of the McNamara strategy for 'winning' the war in Vietnam (pp. 135–56). In contrast to President Johnson, Walt Rostow and others, Roche, who was on the White House staff at the time, is firmly convinced that the United States was losing the war in 1968 (p. 182). At a more fundamental level, Paul Warnke questioned the need for the United States to have become involved in the first place. 'As I see it, there is not and never was any security interest that justified our going to war in Southeast Asia. The shifting rationalisations that have been employed to justify American military participation confirm my view. None has withstood the test of time. . . .We wish freedom for the world, but we should know now that American bombs do not spread freedom. They only destroy the native soil in which it can take root. Our firepower can protect us from attack. It cannot save alien societies from themselves' (p. 84).

In one of his typical asides, John Roche described Sihanouk's Cambodia as 'not a state, but a gun-running syndicate which issued postage stamps' (p. 157). Sheldon Simon's book is an analysis of the conflict which has ravaged Cambodia since the prince's overthrow as seen from the viewpoint of the Lon Nol government, Sihanouk's National Front, North Vietnam,

China and the United States. The sub-title, and an Annex entitled 'Evaluative assertion analysis of Prince Sihanouk's messages to the Khmer Nation' (pp. 160–65), suggest that it is going to be one of those heavy-handed 'behavioural' studies of international politics so beloved by a certain school of American academics, but despite the occasional use of obfuscatory jargon, the book is, in fact, a fairly traditional one. Professor Simon does use a crude form of content analysis to isolate certain themes in the 'media output' of the various participants in the Cambodian imbroglio, but he supplements this with the more usual stock-in-trade of the academic commentator on current affairs, such as press reports and interviews with officials.

There are some useful things in the book. The dilemmas of the Lon Nol regime and the reasons for its loss of support are well set out in Chapter 3. There is an interesting analysis in Chapter 4 of the differences between the Khmers Rouges and the Sihanoukists, although Professor Simon might now (his book was completed in August 1973) want to modify his suggestion that the former are 'essentially an extension of Vietnamese communist interests' (p. 67). That some caution was desirable in this respect even at the time of writing is indicated by his own conclusion regarding North Vietnam's attitude towards the war: 'The Sihanoukists and Khmer Rouge, then, appear to be clearly subordinated in Hanoi's public treatment to the concept of an Indochina-wide liberation movement, implicitly led by the VPA. Little was said of Sihanouk's own national goals or operations of the FUNK in the "liberated areas". When the Cambodian people's forces were mentioned, it was usually for the thinly disguised purpose of discussing the most effective military strategy for dealing with South Vietnamese troops and American air power, initially within Cambodia but by projection in Vietnam as well. In short, neither Sihanouk nor his RGNUC merited significant North Vietnamese interest. They provided a veil of legitimacy for VPA operations but little more (p. 88). If the Khmers Rouges were merely 'an extension of Vietnamese communist interests', one would have expected some more specific and detailed endorsement of their actions and policies inside Cambodia.

The trouble is, of course, that so little is known, even now, about the Khmers Rouges and the nature and extent of their indigenous support. Unfortunately, Professor Simon did not even use what meagre information was available to him in 1973. There is, for example, no reference to Charles Meyer's *Derrière le sourire khmer* [1] or to Jean-Claude Pomonti's and Serge Thion's *Des courtisans aux partisans: essai sur la crise cambodgienne* [2] both of which were published as long ago as 1971. This failure to consult basic sources extends to other areas as well. While Prince Sihanouk's *My War with the C.I.A.: Cambodia's Fight for Survival* [3] (written in collaboration with Wilfred Burchett) may well have appeared too late for Professor Simon to use, this was surely not the case with the revealing interviews which Jean Lacouture had with the prince and which were published early in 1972 under the title, *L'Indochine vue de Pékin*.[4] Similarly, in the case of American policy, Professor Simon makes no reference to Peter Poole's

[1] Paris: Plon.

[2] Paris: Gallimard.

[3] Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin. 1973. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1974, p. 334.

[4] Paris: Editions du Seuil.

valuable monograph on the Nixon administration's decision to invade Cambodia, although it appeared in 1969.[5]

Even more important than the gap in sources, however, is the failure to discuss some issues, notably the question of whether or not the United States was in any way involved in the overthrow of the Sihanouk regime. In short, while Professor Simon's book does offer some valuable insights for the consideration of the specialist, it is very far from being a comprehensive account of the events it purports to describe.

GEOFFREY WARNER

Electoral Politics in South Vietnam. Edited by John C. Donnell and Charles A. Joiner. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Lexington Books, Heath. 1974. 198 pp. Index. £6·80.*

CONSIDERING how persistently successive governments in the Republic of Vietnam have been condemned by the foreign press as 'authoritarian and repressive',[1] it is surprising that psephologists should continue to find material for book after book describing their elections for president, legislature, and local government. A Vietnamese contributor to this book holds uncomprehending foreign comment to blame in part for the failure of government-and-opposition politics to develop in recent years. Two or three of the nine American contributors (whose ten essays began as discussion papers for a seminar of the Asia Society) write from concern over 'legitimacy'; but another (Stephen Young, a former United States adviser) believes that the government's problem has been how to engage the masses in democratic processes while the communists' 130-mm. shells were whistling over their heads. The same author dismisses the notion that the electors are an exploited and oppressed peasantry and that social grievances have made much difference to how they vote.

There is abundance of statistical information here, and a mass of direct observation of events by contributors. Of the three most controversial issues in regard to South Vietnamese elections, two are covered very fully. The first is the unopposed return of Nguyen-van-Thieu in 1971, after he had won the 1967 presidential election as majority candidate with only 37 per cent of the vote. The foreigners' common choice for South Vietnamese president in 1971, General Duong-van-Minh, gets full cover in the book but cannot escape the charge that he deliberately stood down at the last moment—avoiding electoral defeat—in order to get the otherwise victorious Thieu a bad name abroad. The second issue is the restraint on the formation of parliamentary parties: by what ideal electoral rules can freedom to stand be reconciled with the need to get parties elected that will be big enough to shoulder parliamentary responsibility? Mr. Ta-van-Tai and Mr. Silverman weigh the considerations fully; in Siam, a general election without such limitations has returned representatives to parliament from *forty-two* parties. The third issue—why, before the 1973 ceasefire, communists were excluded by law from standing—is hardly touched on; but it is salutary to recall that, under the only alternative electoral process available in Vietnam, only candidates selected by committees of the communist party are eligible to stand.

DENNIS J. DUNCANSON

[5] *Cambodia's quest for survival.* New York, American-Asian Educational Exchange.

[1] *The Times*, Jan. 2, 1975.

Uncertain Passage: China's Transition to the Post-Mao Era. By A. Doak Barnett. Foreword by Kermit Gordon. *Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1974. (Distrib. in UK by Allen and Unwin.) 387 pp. Index $9.95. £5·00. Paperback: £2·00.*

MR. BARNETT'S book is designed as a guide to the future. It contains an analysis under five main headings of those forces which are most likely to influence events in China during the crucial years when Mao Tse-tung has finally disappeared from the political scene. It ends with a statement of the implications for American policy of probable developments in China, and with broad recommendations to any United States administration. Mr. Barnett's prognosis, based in part on what he was able to see in China during the winter of 1972–73 and hedged about with a large number of prudent reservations, is that pragmatic economic and foreign policies are likely to prevail in China; that China will take a long time to reach super-power status, and will have difficulty in keeping up economically with its own probable increase of population; that there will be no return to a Sino-Soviet alliance and no implementation of an actively revolutionary policy in the Third World; and that China's 'joining of the world', while likely to be combined with greater than normal economic and political self-sufficiency, is a process unlikely to be reversed. His advice to American policy makers is essentially to increase their general understanding of and contact with China, and to let nature take its course as predicted.

This summary sounds unexciting and does not do justice to Mr. Barnett's work. This is based on wide and deep scholarship, relegated to notes at the end. The book itself is written clearly and unpretentiously for the comparatively general student of foreign affairs. Mr. Barnett's analyses of conflicts of political values, institutional stability, civil-military relations, economic and developmental problems, changes within the political leadership and Chinese relations with the outside world since 1949, all contain illuminating passages and often provide admirable historical summaries for the general reader.

My principal criticisms stem from the form of the book. This involves a good deal of duplication between the chapters discussing the various main issues (and indeed on occasion within the individual chapters). It is plain, for example, that conflicts of political values (Ch. 1) will affect the course of Sino-Soviet relations (Ch. 5), the position of the military leaders (Ch. 2) and the main questions of economic policy (Ch. 3). In treating these subjects separately, Mr. Barnett is inevitably involved in much repetition, and his book exemplifies in acute form the historian's dilemma of choice between chronological and thematic treatment of his material.

Again, each chapter ends with a prognostic section, and each section has to say that, for example, the main lines of China's economic development or defence policies will depend largely on the state of Sino-Soviet relations and the nature of the balance among the Chinese leaders after the death of Mao. One is too often reminded of the cautious conclusions of so many Foreign Office despatches: 'What the future holds, time alone can show'. While caution is entirely justifiable, duplicated and interrelated cautions become tedious.

All in all, however, Mr. Barnett has written an excellent book, and one which (though this is not its object) goes half-way towards providing a good popular history of Mao's China.

DUNCAN WILSON

Workers and Employers in Japan: The Japanese Employment Relations System. Edited by Kazuo Okochi, Bernard Karsch and Solomon B. Levine. Preface by Bernard Karsch. *Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press: Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1974. 538 pp. Index. $20.00. £10·50.*

The Politics of Labor Legislation in Japan: National-International Interaction. By Ehud Harari. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 1973. 221 pp. Bibliog. Index. $10.00. £4·75.*

Workers and Employers in Japan is a useful collection of essays. It would have been more useful if it had been published in 1968 when even the most recent one was written, but not all the essays are of the kind that date. Sumiya's historical introduction, for instance, retains its value, pointing up, as it does, some of the features that led to the creation (*not* just unthinking carry-over from tradition) of Japan's unique employment system. The value of Okamoto's essay on management organisation and ideology also lies chiefly in its careful tracing of historical developments. Ariizumi's survey of the legal framework retains its relevance for a different reason; because (with one exception: see below) the institutional framework of Japan's employment system is relatively stable; it is not subject to drastic reshaping every few years like Britain's. Some of the other essays—on labour markets, wages, disputes and social security—date rather; the scene *has* changed somewhat in the last seven years.

But broadly in which direction? The Japanese authors of these essays—and a major virtue of the book is that it *is* Japanese views for a change, not those of Western commentators, that it offers us—are in little doubt that Japan is moving towards Western patterns of greater mobility and 'rationality'. The editors are not so sure: there are 'important signs' that it might happen, but 'the situation remains highly fluid'. The system is not 'invariant and inflexible', but *some* features 'will no doubt remain distinctive'—and, they finally hint, some of those distinctive Japanese innovations may well invite our imitation.

That would be a new thought for the Japanese, who are much more accustomed to the notion that *they* should do the imitating—so much so that foreign examples have constantly been used to coerce political opponents and shame them into a sense of their own backwardness. Mr. Harari's study provides an excellent illustration. It focuses on the right of public service unions to bargain and to strike, the major outstanding issue concerning the institutional *framework* of Japanese industrial relations, and the source of some of the sharpest conflict in recent years. The Japanese unions' appeal to the ILO, and the ILO's subsequent intervention—with ambiguous consequences—provide the focal interest of this useful and interesting study. The reader has to pick his way carefully through the narrative to follow Mr. Harari's conclusions about the light these events throw on the structure of the Liberal Democratic Party and the significance of its factional divisions; but he sheds a clear light on the intricate way in which a concern for Japan's international standing interacts with domestic politics—both in the early years of the century covered in his brief introduction, and more recently. His book is also worth reading for what it tells us about the internal politics of the ILO itself.

R. P. DORE

Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931–1941. Edited by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto with the assistance of Dale K. A. Finlayson. *New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1974. 799 pp. Index. (Studies of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University.) Paperback: £3·95.*

To digest some 800 large pages of smallish print is a formidable task, but to anyone interested in the crucial period covered in this volume, it is well worth the effort. This book consists of twenty-six papers read and discussed at a conference held in Japan in July 1969 with the aim of obtaining a balanced assessment of the rights and wrongs of the actions and policies of the two countries during the decade ending with Pearl Harbour. Fifteen of the papers were presented by Japanese and eleven by American scholars, each one dealing dispassionately with a separate aspect—the parts played by the principal Japanese and American organs of state, by the fighting forces, political parties, business and industry, the press and so on.

Inevitably, there is some overlapping at times, but the general standard is high and there are many revealing passages. A few statements are open to question, but they are of no great importance and do nothing to detract from the value of the papers in which they occur. It is perhaps a little surprising that, apart from a passing reference to the Sian Incident in December 1936, no account is given of the incident itself, or of how it forced Chiang Kai-shek to turn from his long succession of 'extermination campaigns' against the Communists and emerge as leader of a Kuomintang-Communist alliance against Japan. Had it not been for this, Japan's 'undeclared war' against China, which paved the way to Pearl Harbour, might never have occurred. Sian was such a crucial turning point in Sino-Japanese relations and, through them, in American-Japanese relations, that rather more attention to it might have been expected. Against this omission, however, must be set the well-balanced accounts of other important developments leading to the outbreak of the Pacific War and the depiction of the main personalities and circumstances involved.

In one way or another, all the principal developments during the ten years discussed in the book, and their consequences, are amply covered. So, too, is the bearing on these developments of significant earlier events, such as the institution of the Monroe Doctrine, the Triple Intervention, the establishment of the Open Door principle, the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Washington Conference, American anti-Japanese legislation, the rise of Chinese nationalism in the 1920s, and the London Naval Treaty of 1930.

The Monroe Doctrine, in particular, crops up constantly in connection with attempts by the Japanese to justify their actions. If America claimed the right to intervene in Latin America in order to safeguard its interests and to maintain peace and order, why, they argued, should not Japan have similar rights in the Far East? If some agreement on these lines could have been reached, Pearl Harbour might never have happened; but with Washington inflexibly set on forcing Japan to observe the principles of the Nine-Power and Kellogg pacts, and with Japan being driven more and more into the hands of the extremists by American and League actions, any such recognition was out of the question.

Without in any way condoning Japan's actions, what is brought out time and again in these papers is the way in which Roosevelt and others were so convinced that Japan would climb down under pressure that they

completely ignored the warnings of their ambassador in Tokyo and of other well-placed Americans. The warnings ranged from pointing out the folly of under-rating the Japanese armed services, of driving the Japanese government into extremist hands, and of driving Japan into seizing Indonesia in order to ensure its oil supplies, to the incredulity expressed when a member of the Embassy staff in Tokyo said in November 1941 that Japan might well embark on war out of sheer desperation. A warning that Japan might attack Pearl Harbour was brushed aside; it might attack the Philippines, but certainly not Hawaii. Complacency in Washington was only equalled by British complacency in Singapore. As one of the papers indicates, the distorted image and consequent distrust which each side had of the other, and the inflexibility of both, were the main obstacles to a friendly understanding and, therefore, to a peaceful outcome.

MALCOLM D. KENNEDY

NORTH AMERICA

The Rise and Fall of the Pax Americana: United States Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century. By C. J. Bartlett. *London: Elek. 1974. 204 pp. Index. £6·95.*

DR. BARTLETT'S book meets a definite need. Aside from Foster Rhea Dulles's *America's Rise to World Power, 1898–1954*,[1] which was written over twenty years ago, there has long been no suitable history of American foreign policy since the turn of the century which could serve as the basic text for undergraduate courses in British universities. American texts have been either massive and forbidding factual surveys, or interpretative essays written with recent events too much in mind. *The Rise and Fall of the Pax Americana* eschews any over-arching synthesis of a 'legal-moralistic', 'legal-bureaucratic', or 'economic-imperialist' kind. The result is a shrewd and discriminating summary, a judicious and readable interpretation which also manages to include all the essential facts. The notes provide an up-to-date and well-selected bibliography.

Writing at a time when 'an era has ended', Dr. Bartlett can be classified with those whom he describes as 'moderate intellectual critics of American foreign policy'. Like Morgenthau, Kennan and Fulbright, he believes that belief in the superiority of American values has 'had a dangerous and distorting effect on American perceptions of the world', diminishing 'the objectivity and critical sense of the policy-makers' (p. 182). At the same time he is critical of those radicals who 'have succumbed to the myth of American omnipotence', exaggerating American exploitation of other states and assuming 'a freedom of choice in the making of foreign policy that did not exist' (p. 180).

The author's comments are perceptive and well-considered. Only one or two judgments can be called into question. It is not self-evident, on the basis of the statistics alone, that '[f]oreign trade has represented too small a percentage of the national income to sway policy as it has, for instance, in Britain' (p. 7). Notwithstanding Keynes and Lloyd George, and contrary to Roy Jenkins and Isaiah Berlin, what evidence is there that before 1939

[1] London: Hamish Hamilton. 1955. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1956, p. 128.

the New Deal was 'an exciting alternative', that '[m]ore than at any other time since Lincoln the model which Americans aspired to provide for others was being accepted by them' (p. 58)? But these are a reviewer's quibbles. On the whole, this book is an excellent resumé which deserves a prime recommendation on university reading lists. It is perhaps regrettable that it will increase the number of essays in which Tocqueville appears as 'de Tocqueville' but one's only major misgiving is that at £6·95 it may have priced itself out of its natural market.

D. J. S. MORRIS

"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy. By Ernest R. May. *New York, London: Oxford University Press. 1974. Paperback ed.: 1975. 220 pp. Index. £3·15. Paperback: £1·75.*

THIS book is clearly another product of the disillusionment of the American intelligentsia with their country's involvement in Vietnam. Understandably exasperated by the facile historical analogies employed by the spokesmen of successive administrations to justify that involvement, Professor May, who is one of the leading authorities in the field of 20th century American diplomatic history, has written a provocative study which attempts to show, by means of a number of case studies, that such analogies have played an important and often crucial role in the formulation of American foreign policy since the Second World War, and urges that policy makers should be more discriminating in future. Professor May argues his case with considerable force and elegance, but he is far too good an historian to fall completely into the pit he has so carefully dug for himself. Thus, while he claims that President Truman's decision to intervene in Korea in 1950 was ultimately determined by his 'set of beliefs about recent history' (p. 80) and, in particular, by his attitude towards the appeasement of fascist aggression in the 1930s, he also cites other factors which the impartial reader may well regard as more important, such as '[t]he abstract, almost mathematical logic of containment and deterrence' (p. 77), the need to convince America's allies in the new North Atlantic alliance that it could be relied upon in the case of armed conflict, and the domestic political situation arising out of the 'loss' of China. Even in the case of Vietnam, which, as I have suggested, is the point of departure for the entire book, Professor May is not unaware of the more immediate reasons for the American commitment, notably the perceived need to counter 'wars of national liberation' (p. 104).

It is also somewhat disconcerting, in a book which purports to be critical of American policy making, to find the author continually hedging his bets about the policies themselves. 'The evidence that American official thinking was dominated by a single historical parallel is not so clear as it is for post-war planning during World War II', he writes of the origins of the cold war in 1945–47. 'And it is even harder to express a judgment that, if this was the case, the results deserve criticism. The "revisionist" view of the Soviet government as preoccupied with its own recovery and security rests on no better evidence than the traditional view that Stalin aimed at conquering for communism as much territory as he could seize without involving his nation in a new world war' (p. 51). 'Once again', he writes of Korea in 1950, 'it has to be emphasised that no one can judge whether or not a different decision by Truman would have had happier consequences. . . . [A] quick

success in Korea might have emboldened "hawks" in the Kremlin. Also, American failure to react might have prompted Japanese, Southeast Asians, and people elsewhere to conclude that safety lay in coming to terms with the communists. Events thus set in train might have brought the Soviet Union and the United States to an inescapable confrontation. Even at a remove of two decades, one cannot confidently second-guess Truman's decision' (p. 83). If this is so, one cannot help wondering what all the fuss is about.

Indeed, the reader would probably do better to ignore Professor May's overall thesis and concentrate instead upon the detailed analysis contained in the various case studies. In particular, the section in Chapter 2 on the role of the State Department professionals in influencing President Truman to adopt a criticial view of the Soviet Union in 1945 (pp. 22–29) is quite brilliant. These seven pages alone justify the book's presence in any bibliography of postwar American foreign policy.

GEOFFREY WARNER

American Political Institutions in the 1970s. Edited by Max Beloff and Vivian Vale. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan for Government and Opposition. 1975. 194 pp. £7·00.*

THIS unpretentious (though not cheap) little book will for a few years be extremely useful to teachers and students of comparative government, for it helps to fill that familiar and exasperating time-lag between the occurrence of political change and its appearance in the literature. Seven of these eight essays were papers for a conference at Manchester in November 1972, and five of them, together with Professor Beloff's brief and stimulating introduction, were published shortly afterwards in *Government and Opposition*. All seven are reproduced here intact. The long delay, however, has been put to good use, for Vale in the eighth essay, besides reporting on the conference discussions, deals with the main subsequent developments up to the very eve of Nixon's resignation. The book thus gives a reasonably full account of the major aspects of American politics on the eve of the Watergate revelations, supplemented by a very brief but very useful note of the impact of that crisis.

The essays cover the obvious topics: Presidency, administration, Congress, parties, pressure groups, cities and the Court. As usual in collaborative works, the authors' approach and style vary widely. Pear, on the Burger Court, conveniently summarises its major decisions and shows that the conservative shift has been slight. Vale points out the limited impact of some new administrative devices and the continuing problems of congressional interference with the executive. Gould, on pressure groups, has a variety of suggestive comments: the advantage to conservative interests of working through administrative agencies or state governments; the preponderance of governmental influence in the military-industrial complex; the role of the foundations in encouraging the new public-interest lobbies. Lees made in 1972 some strikingly accurate predictions about likely changes in both houses of Congress that have brought in a new generation and new procedural arrangements and strengthened liberal tendencies.

The other three essays are somewhat more ambitious. Madgwick gives a carefully balanced account of the urban crisis, avoiding the fashionable role of a prophet of doom. He has perceptive comments on the way in

which American (unlike British) governmental arrangements tend to worsen inequalities between areas, and on the mayor's often neglected advantages in building the executive-centred coalitions on which American politics so often turn. But it is doubtful whether his relative optimism about the cities, carefully measured though it is, can survive a 40 per cent unemployment rate among young male blacks. Fotheringham compiles a great deal of useful information about changes in the parties and their shifting regional bases, concluding astonishingly (p. 147) that the Northern Democrats are in steady decline, whereas his own figures show them to be making steady progress (outside the South and Border the Republicans' median lead in the House was 85 seats in 1946–56, eight in 1958–72, p. 89). Nicholas, in the outstanding contribution to the book, argues provocatively that the President's growing detachment from the executive departments and from his party, in Congress and especially in the country, insulates him from the real world outside the White House and leaves him dangerously irresponsible. He sharply illuminates the high road to Watergate (with only a sidelong glance at the low road which began for so many in the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency), but casts perhaps too deep a pall of gloom over possible ways back, along which, as the conclusion shows, a good many steps have already been taken.

P. M. WILLIAMS

Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia: 1921–1923. by Benjamin M. Weissman. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1974. 247 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Hoover Institution Publications 134.) $7.95.*

BENJAMIN M. WEISSMAN tells us that his book is 'about a moment in history when the lives of millions of people seemed to depend on the ability of men to transcend political animosity in a common interest'. He hopes that 'it may cast a light on the problems that arise when leaders of antagonistic countries decide to collaborate on a great humanitarian undertaking' (p. 15). His hopes are sufficiently realised for the book to be obligatory reading for all those interested in relations between the super-powers, particularly for optimists who believe that joint collaboration on humanitarian undertakings is as possible as separate preparation for mutual annihilation. The difficulties confronting the first co-operative enterprise would have been more fully comprehensible if Weissman had given more emphasis to the circumstances that America shared the responsibility for bringing about the famine through its encouragement of Kolchak and other Whites in the civil war and through its participation in the Intervention—the first reminder of the second contribution is an excerpt from one of Khrushchev's speeches on p. 190. True, he does tell us of Hoover's support for Yudenich's attack on Petrograd and of his threat to withhold food relief as a weapon in the overthrow of Bela Kun's Red regime in Hungary. The suspicion of the Russians combined with their already well-developed bureaucracy to make negotiations and supplies difficult. Here individuals such as Hoover himself and Georgi Chicherin played an important part, the foreign commissar allegedly pointing out at the Riga negotiations in 1921, for example, that world revolution was a policy 'used by the government in the first few months of its existence and then only as a war method, the same as both sides used propaganda to weaken their enemies' (p. 68). Some of those involved on both sides hoped that the ensuing agreement would lead to happier relations on

a more permanent basis. Weissman reflects an important aspect of the reasons for the failure of such a sunny forecast in his analysis of the Soviet image of the event, which became more gloomy as the years went by. It is a pity that he did not place this analysis more firmly in the wider context of American animosity towards Russia in the interwar and cold war periods.

PAUL DUKES

LATIN AMERICA

Latin America, the Cold War and the World Powers 1945–1973: A Study in Diplomatic History. By F. Parkinson. *Beverly Hills, Calif., London: Sage. 1974. 288 pp. Bibliog. Index. (Sage Library of Social Research, Vol. 9.) £5·00. Paperback: £3·00.*

Now that ' detente ' is no longer just a fashionable surprise, but seems to be becoming a habit, the cold war can be declared at an end. It is now time to stand back and look at the period clearly. What is striking is the degree of detachment with which Dr. Parkinson, in his long-awaited study of Latin American diplomatic history during this period, has done so. Dispassionately he picks his way through a wide range of conflicting authorities, sets down the gist of his argument in great detail, and presents us at one and the same time with a formidably accurate document and some conclusions which are likely to bring wry smiles as their accuracy is recognised.

Dr. Parkinson begins by showing how the Latin American governments unwittingly involved themselves in the cold war by invoking United States co-operation between 1945 and 1947. When in 1947 they became aware that their interests might diverge from those of the United States, they found themselves already regarded only as puppets by the Soviet Union, whose interest in and understanding of the area were both weak. Only with the onset of the Korean War did they recover freedom of diplomatic manoeuvre, and by then they were ill-prepared to take advantage of it. So the immediate result was the establishment of the system of bilateral military aid from the United States which aligned the smaller states of the region with that country at the cost of leaving the greater ones either independent or indecisive.

Direct participation in the cold war, however, was initiated only as a result of endogenous developments in Guatemala, and, subsequently, in Cuba. Dr. Parkinson argues that the Cuban Revolution was both endogenous in character and autonomous in its subsequent development. The Latin American countries varied in their attitudes towards it according to their perception of danger and the extent to which their own social structures had already undergone modification. It was the Cubans themselves who, by their tactics towards the other Latin American states, dispersed the governmental sympathies they had originally had. The importation of nuclear missiles to Cuba once more narrowed the range of policies open to the Latin American states and left them flexibility only in the range of ingenious excuses made for sudden and sometimes irreconcilable changes of course.

The concept of ' ideological frontiers ' which dominated the decade of the 1960s, though apparently strengthened in the wake of the missile crisis by the OAS response to Cuban belligerence, received a severe set-back in 1965 from the intervention of United States forces in the Dominican Republic; this undid a generation of diplomatic effort. On the other hand,

Cuban support for the wave of guerrilla movements in the area did not enable Cuba to break out of its isolation, and it brought about serious splits in the Left. It was, in short, only the rapprochement between the principals in the cold war itself and the accompanying ' low profile ' policy of the Nixon administration that permitted the formation of a ' new diplomacy ', characterised by ' ideological pluralism ' on all sides.

Dr. Parkinson permits himself by way of prophecy only two suggestions; that in the near future intra-Latin American issues are likely to be of greater importance, and that the diplomacy of the area will resemble that of the 19th century rather than that of the 20th.

PETER CALVERT

Mexico and the United States 1821–1973: Conflict and Coexistence. by Karl M. Schmitt. Foreword by Robert A. Divine. *New York, London, Sydney, Toronto: Wiley. 1974. 288 pp. Bibliog. Index. (America and the World; Ed.: Robert A. Divine.) £5·80. Paperback: £2·35.*

KARL SCHMITT has written a useful survey of Mexican-American relations. It is presumably aimed primarily at the North American student market: certainly it offers the specialist little more than an abridgement (though a competent abridgement) of secondary sources; and the European reader might demur at being told that, in the 1850s, ' a nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte had seized power in France and crowned himself Emperor Napoleon III ' (p. 78).

However, for the student or general reader who seeks a reliable, essentially narrative account of Mexican-American relations, the book has a good deal to recommend it. Schmitt steers his way skilfully through the vicissitudes of this fraught relationship; he shows deftness at unravelling vexatious diplomatic knots (such as the 1920s oil controversy), and an ability to précis complex internal developments succinctly and accurately—an ability which is especially valuable on the Mexican side where, the author stresses, internal political problems regularly touched off conflicts with the United States. Thus, the Mexican-American War, the War of the Reform, the political system of contemporary Mexico (pp. 195–7) are all neatly summarised. On the American side Schmitt (a Mexicanist) is less at home, and has less to say; while he rightly plays down the importance of Mexico (even revolutionary Mexico) as a live issue in American politics (p. 122) he goes too far in neglecting the attitudes and influence of interest groups within the United States (such as the Catholic Church and the border states) and he never suggests how the United States contrived to appoint, as diplomatic representatives in Mexico, such a succession of outstandingly tactless blunderers—from Poinsett through Rosencrans to Lane Wilson. Did the spoils system operate particularly disastrously south of the border?

On matters of fact Schmitt is usually reliable (though Agustín Iturbide no more called himself Iturbide I, as on p. 42, than Napoleon called himself Bonaparte I; and Woodrow Wilson would hardly have called his 1919 presidential campaign tour a *gira*, p. 154). And granted this reliability, the two concluding chapters, which bring the narrative from 1945 up to the present day, are particularly welcome; here the author assimilates, supplements and brings up to date existing standard works (such as Cline's) and draws on newspapers, theses, and other sources to provide an interesting and informative survey of contemporary issues—*bracerismo*, water rights, broad-

casting, aviation, narcotics control, trade and investment. Nowhere, however, do maps assist the reader.

But on general questions of interpretation the book is disappointing. The two themes enunciated at the outset—the genesis of economic dependency and the correlation between Mexican instability and American intervention—tend to get lost in the narrative, only to be briefly retrieved at the end. In themselves, they are scarcely original; and the cursory treatment they receive is superficial and predictable, though not necessarily convincing. The divergent patterns of Mexican and American development after colonial emancipation, for example, are attributed to the presence or absence of 'consensus'—which explains everything and nothing (p. 70). The Revolution of 1910 is invested with excessive nationalist content and (more important) excessive nationalist effects (p. 158): James Wilkie's strictures on the conservatism of the 1920s regime are not applied here. Finally, Woodrow Wilson's Mexican policy (the high point, at least in the present century, of American involvement with Mexico) is subjected to an unsympathetic and often unrealistic treatment, which reveals uncritical (and, at time, encomiastic) attachment to Grieb, Quirk and others.

However, while this recycling of received opinions might deter the specialist looking for originality, it should not prevent the book from establishing itself as a useful, factually reliable summary which will suit the needs of its intended audience.

A. S. KNIGHT

The Communist Tide in Latin America: A Selected Treatment. Edited by Donald L. Herman. Preface by Martin C. Needler. *Austin, Texas, London: Texas University Press. 1974. 215 pp. Index. $7.50. £3·75.*

The Tupamaros: Urban Guerillas in Uruguay. By Alain Labrousse. Trans. by Dinah Livingstone. Introd. by Richard Gott. *Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin. 1973. 168 pp. Index. (Pelican Latin American Library; Gen. Ed.: Richard Gott.) £0·40. A$1.35. NZ$1.35. $1.65.*

Peasant Rebellion in Latin America: The Origins, Forms of Expression, and Potential of Latin American Peasant Unrest. By Gerrit Huizer. *Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1973. 183 pp. Bibliog. Index. (The Pelican Latin American Library; Gen. Ed.: Richard Gott.) £0·40. A$1.35. NZ$1.35.*

El Salvador. By Alastair White. *London, Tonbridge: Benn. 1973. 288 pp. Maps. Illus. Index. (Nations of the Modern World.) £3·75.*

EACH of these four books examines a particular aspect or a particular area of Latin America. *The Tupamaros* deals with one aspect of recent developments in Uruguay. All four contribute to a greater knowledge of the area.

The Communist Tide in Latin America is a useful book. Its greatest value lies in the many facts that it assembles about a subject that still lacks a comprehensive and objective study. Like all anthologies it is of uneven quality. Apart from the editor, Professor Donald L. Herman, there are three principal contributors, Professor J. Alexander on the 'Impact of the Sino-Soviet Split on Latin-American Communism', Professor J. Gregory Oswald on 'Soviet Diplomatic Relations with Mexico, Uruguay and Cuba' and Professor John W. F. Dulles, who examines 'The Brazilian Left: Efforts at

Recovery, 1964–70'. The editor contributes an invaluable introduction tracing the development of communism in Latin America up to about two years ago, a study of the 'Left Wing and the Communists in Mexico' and a brief article 'Looking Ahead'. A preface by Professor Martin C. Needler includes a passage worth quoting:

> Traditional anti-Communist rhetoric and attitudes still condition United States policy toward Latin America, the unspoken premise continuing to be that Communist and near-Communist movements are inevitably part of a worldwide conspiracy directed from the Soviet Union and aimed against the United States (p. 8).

Of course, the sad truth is that a Russian student might write much the same in reverse about the activities of the CIA. Professor Needler is rightly not concerned with that aspect of the situation, but he goes on to say, 'In my view, this is far from the truth' (p. 8). Where the book is less valuable is in its attempt to theorise. Thus Professor Herman writes 'If one is to understand the full meaning of Communism in Latin America, he must view the phenomenon as a dynamic process rather than a static entity' (p. 25).

This sort of ponderous and turgid statement mars what could have been a study of some distinction. Professors Oswald and Dulles assemble a great deal of information and are less self-indulgent in theoretical generalisations. Professor Dulles's study of how left-wing politics have fared under the military dictatorship in Brazil reveals how lack of unity has reduced the capacity of the Left to oppose the repressive measures of the government; he too resists the temptation to theorise. On the other hand Professor Herman, in his study of communism in Mexico, which he confines to the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas from 1934 to 1940, seems to wish to cast doubt on the theory that it is the liberal and social democratic Left which 'can offer the strongest resistance to the influence of Communism' (p. 116), and concludes that '. . . the findings under the Cárdenas government of Mexico indicate that the theory must be utilised with a note of caution' (p. 131). Professor Herman avers that the communist movement in Mexico began to wane in 1939; those who have studied the activities of the Russian ambassador Oumansky during the presidency of Avila Camacho may doubt this.

The book suffers from the fact that it was written just before the fall of Allende in Chile and the return of Perón in Argentina. There are copious notes, a useful list of abbreviations, irritatingly 'in order of appearance' rather than alphabetical, and a most competent index.

The student of Latin America has much to be grateful for in regard to the Pelican Latin American Library, which includes many books packed with invaluable information; it has made French scholarship available to the English speaking world, and American scholarship accessible to the British student. *The Tupamaros* (which was originally published by Editions du Seuil in 1970 and has been brought up to date by Richard Gott) is an example of the first and *Peasant Rebellion in Latin America* of the second. But there is one general criticism which may be made: they too often reveal a bias to the left. Those on the left are always the goodies, and those on the right the badides. Alain Labrousse, for example, makes the assumption that the guerrillas are inevitably admirable. Commenting on Raúl Sendic, founder of the *Tupamaros*, he writes '. . . his merit was to have been the

first to see the possibilities of a type of action which had seemed bound to fail ' (p. 35). In other words it was admirable of him to have incited violence and to have started a movement which had no scruple in subjecting, for example, Geoffrey Jackson to fear and hardship for months on end. The fact that there are abuses and exploitation which need correcting is undeniable but it is open to question whether those who pursue this aim by violence do not often ultimately do their cause more harm than good. For the rest, Labrousse tells an absorbing story and his translator, Dinah Livingstone, has served him well. The book has some useful appendices and is well indexed.

There can be no doubt that the peasant population of Latin America has suffered exploitation since colonial times and possibly even before. In the first chapter of *Peasant Rebellion in Latin America*, Gerrit Huizer mentions (p. 5) the great rebellion in Peru and Bolivia led by Gabriel Condorcanqui, who took the name of Túpac Amaru in 1780; another was the revolt of the *Comuneros* in Socorro, Colombia, a year later. Curiously, in the light of his field experience in El Salvador, the author makes only the briefest mention (pp. 19 and 145) of the violent and brutally repressed peasant rising which began in the village of Izalco in 1932; it was a case in which the *machetes* of the workers were no match for the machine guns of the army and at least 15,000 lost their lives. Equally curious is the absence of any reference to the successful strike of 40,000 land workers in Honduras on the banana plantations of the United Fruit Company in 1954. But, perhaps rightly, the author is more concerned with the situation today than with the past. And in that respect he covers the ground pretty well. His book will add much to the general awareness of the internal stresses in Latin America. No one who knows the field will quarrel with his final conclusion: ' From past experience it is clear that the more resistant the Latin American elites are to change, the more radical the demands of the peasantry —and their means of struggle—will become ' (p. 162).

There is an admirable bibliography and the book is well indexed.

In his comprehensive and well documented study of El Salvador, Mr. Alastair White comes to much the same conclusion as Mr. Huizer. In his final chapter he writes of the need for the ruling classes to realise that their power is waning, and he continues: ' If they attempt to preserve the *status quo* unmodified, then tensions are bound to grow and to lead to a long period of strife, such as has occurred in neighbouring Guatemala ' (p. 257).

It is perhaps strange that Ernest Benn should choose to include the smallest country on the American continent in their *Nations of the Modern World* series, when they have not yet included, for example, Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, but Mr. White has wholly justified their choice. He devotes the first three chapters, about a third of the book, to the historical background which is admirably done. He examines the economic structure, the international relations of El Salvador and the country's situation in the context of Central America. His treatment of the political situation is refreshingly free from any pretended omniscience. The relevant chapter begins ' Unfortunately the most important question of Salvadorean politics is closed to investigation: namely the nature of the relationship between the military officers in direct control of the state, and the civilian elite ' (p. 192).

Nevertheless he makes a pretty shrewd analysis of how the alliance between the army and the wealthy oligarchy (said to consist of fourteen families) is maintained. His coverage of economic and social development

and his final chapter on 'The Outlook' are shrewd, objective and balanced. There are copious notes, useful appendices, a brief bibliography and a competent index.

J. A. CAMACHO

A Geography of Brazilian Development. By Janet Henshall and R. P. Momsen, Jr. *London: Bell. 1975. 305 pp. Maps. Index. (Bell's Advanced Economic Geographies: B. Regional Studies; Gen. Ed.: R. O. Buchanan.) £6·50. Paperback: £3·60.*

THE publication of detailed, soundly researched studies has not generally kept pace with the growing interest in Latin America. Messrs. Bell are therefore to be congratulated on extending their excellent and well established series of Economic Geographies to include the continent.

The current Brazilian 'economic miracle' has attracted considerable interest and this book provides a timely portrait of the emerging spatial patterns resulting from this 'miracle'. The approach is a judicious combination of a traditional, systematic examination of the economy, with appropriate use of the fruits of the quantitative revolution in geography, and of spatial concepts derived from development economics.

The introductory section includes a rather compressed discussion of the physical environment, consideration of the historical and spatial evolution of the economy, and a delimitation of Brazil's macro-economic regions. The core of the book discusses in turn agriculture, mining, manufacturing and infrastructure, providing a comprehensive summary of the geography of Brazil's development in the early 1970s. Two important themes recur—the tendency for the benefits of economic progress to accrue to the 'heartland' of Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Guanabara; and the persistence of a dualism between modern and traditional sectors with considerable economic and geographical significance. The concluding section deals with some implications of development for the people of Brazil, in terms of social under-provision, population mobility, urbanisation and, most important, government attitudes to regional inequalities and programmes aimed at countering them.

The book contains a few small errors and internal inconsistencies and some more significant omissions. Discussion of the pastoral economy is limited; the formulation and strategy of Brazil's development model and the wider role played by the state in recent development are not explored. Most crucially, the service sector, which absorbed 'the greater part of the labour released by agriculture' (p. 228) between 1960 and 1970, is ignored. This sector is undeniably the least documented and most difficult to analyse, but its rapid expansion, coupled with the rise of the 'tertiary refuge' sector of casual and marginal employment, does reflect the failure of the Brazilian 'miracle', despite its achievements in increased production, to provide commensurate employment opportunities or significant income redistribution.

These points notwithstanding, the study is a most welcome addition to the Latin American literature. It provides an excellent text for students of Brazil's economic geography and a valuable guide for other social scientists interested in the spatial dimension of Brazilian development.

JOHN P. DICKENSON

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

European Political Facts 1918–1973. By Chris Cook and John Paxton. *London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1975. 363 pp. Index. £10·00.*

It would be necessary to consult long runs of many reference works to obtain the vast amount of information and statistics which is so clearly set out in this fascinating new compilation. The first chapter is on international organisations to which European countries have belonged or do belong. Then follow chapters on the political and economic organisation, judicial and educational systems, defence and treaties, population, trade union structure and the press of thirty-five countries from the Atlantic to the Urals. Within each chapter, countries are arranged alphabetically and a short bibliography is provided. In a matter of moments one can find the name of the Bulgarian finance minister in 1923, the number of votes cast for the Norwegian Agrarian Party in 1961 or the circulation and political affiliation of a Paris newspaper. The editors, Chris Cook and John Paxton, are director of the Historical Records Project at the London School of Economics and editor of the Statesman's Yearbook respectively.

D.H.

European Parliament Digest: Volume One 1973. General Editor: Mary Edmond. *Lewes, Sussex: New Educational Press. 1974. 212 pp. Indexes. £6·50.*

The European Parliament meets for three or four days each month, either in Luxembourg or Strasbourg, and reports of its proceedings are published as substantial annexes to the *Official Journal* of the European Community. This digest is a first attempt to bring the debates to a wider public in the English speaking world. Unfortunately, the name and subject indexes, which are essential for its use, are somewhat confusing. For example, it is not made clear that the reference 90b is not to paragraph 90b but to the right hand column of page 90.

D.H.

Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights: The European Commission and European Court of Human Rights. Vol. XV, 1972. Introd. by A. H. Robertson. *The Hague: Nijhoff. 1974. 792 pp. Bibliog. Index. Fl. 175.00.*

The fifteenth issue of this Yearbook follows the pattern of earlier volumes. Part I contains the basic texts; Part II information on the work of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, and of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe; and Part III relevant extracts from debates in the national parliaments and a list of decisions of domestic courts referring to the Convention. Appendix I gives details of Council of Europe documents, and Appendix II is a select bibliography of books, articles and dissertations concerning the Convention.

D.H.

Africa South of the Sahara 1975. Fifth Edition of a survey and reference book of all the countries south of the Sahara Desert. *London: Europa. 1975. 1137 pp. Maps. Bibliogs. £15·00.*

ALTHOUGH its price has increased, this annual, now in its fifth edition, gives excellent value for money. The articles in the first part provide a general introduction to the area, part two deals with regional organisations and part three is a country by country survey and directory. All the articles are signed, and biographical information about the contributors is given. Patrick Gilkes's account of events in Ethiopia 1963–1974 and Richard Brown's piece on the recent history of Rhodesia are particularly worthy of note. Part four includes a hundred-page who's who and a list of research institutes concerned with Africa.

D.H.

The World of Learning 1974–75. Twenty-fifth Edition. Volume One: 1. International. 2. Afghanistan–Puerto Rico. Volume Two: Rhodesia–Zambia. Index. *London: Europa. 1975. 1976 pp. £18·50.*

THERE exists no other directory which gives such detailed and up-to-date information on the academies, research institutes, learned societies, museums, libraries and universities of the countries of the world from Afghanistan to Zambia. It also contains the addresses, aims and objects of over four hundred international organisations with the names of their principal officials. A full index of all the institutions described appears at the end of volume 2.

D.H.

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THE OPEN UNIVERSITY

The Open University. Third level course on International Politics and Foreign Policy. First Series, February 1975. The Arab-Israel Dispute. Prepared by James Barber, Josephine Negro, and Michael Smith.

ANYONE who twiddles his television or radio at odd hours in search of instruction knows that the Open University uses both media, as well as print and its correspondence courses, to feed its students with raw material. The use of all four channels is of especial importance for its new venture into foreign policy, for this aims to teach not only theory but practice; if every student is to be his own foreign secretary, and is to peer into the unknown as well as to look back to past events of which he knows the outcome, he needs to be cheered on his way by newsreels and broadcasts that know as little about the future as he does. The process should appeal not merely to students who have already taken courses on decision making by statesmen, or politics within the state, but to anyone interested in the psychological process whereby men, tribes and nations make up their minds.

The theoretical part of the course dwells on the ingredients of policy; it directs attention to pressures from potential enemies, or from allies, or from home opinion, as well as to urges generated by the wish to defend, capture or recover assets, and by military capacity. The writing of a short dissertation on the foreign policy of a single power seems to belong to this sector, and the power chosen has to be Britain on grounds of the accessibility of raw material to students who are not within reach of a library. Since each course, in order to canalise attention and interest, is going to concentrate on a single dispute, and one of ' ongoing importance that shows little sign of being successfully resolved in the next few years ', writers of dissertations are virtually forced to fall back on British history, for in all current disputes except, possibly, that over Rhodesia, British policy is neither here nor there.

The practical sector that concentrates on the Arab-Israel dispute calls for excursions into realms of thought where guesswork is not only permissible but inevitable. No one can be right or wrong for sure, and the final examiners' job will be puzzling. The choice of this particular dispute entails one handicap which the team that runs the course will have to work hard to offset, and that may not apply to subsequent ' on-going topics ' such as the Cyprus dispute or the American role in East Asia. Study of the subject of Palestine in particular is liable to imbalance, especially in the field of television run on a limited budget by camera teams who have to snatch at what they can contrive in a day or two; for one side—Israel—is an ace at presenting its case, while the other—the Arabs—consists of several governments and even more factions not all of which agree about what to emphasise or say. Given two days in Israel, important interviews and visits to relevant sites are immediately laid on. In Damascus, Cairo or Amman similar benefits are never so quickly available. (' He has gone to Beirut '. ' The office shuts at three '. ' It is Friday.') Given these handicaps and the complications of covering four capitals, the Palestine Liberation Organisa-

tion, and a plethora of publicity offices not all of which sing in tune, an; programme is inevitably more crisp on the Israeli than on the Arab case Moderate Arab opinion, in particular, is difficult to cover; moderates ar reticent in public, preferring not to pit themselves against the demagogues

The corrective to imbalance as between the contestants may well be th broadcasts by academic specialists who are advertised to students a criticising, and possibly attacking, the University's own presentation. Ther is not much to attack in Professor J. P. Barber's admirable single pag 'programme notes' on the domestic sources of Israel's foreign policy, bu elsewhere there are some gaps in the printed and television matter tha broadcasts could fill. More ought to be said, for instance, about Egypt' demographic problem, or the value to the Arabs of marrying Egypt' technical competence to Saudi Arabia's money, or the degree to whicl France's Algerian problem affected its conduct in the Suez crisis. Some o the literature published by the Institute of Conflict Studies and the Institut of Strategic Studies, not in the initial bibliography, is cheap and might b worth recommending.

But all told the venture is a happy and stimulating one. 'Do not becom bogged down', says the course guide, and the course team will deserv full marks if it saves from despondency students of a subject that has bogge down plenty of us for at least a generation.

ELIZABETH MONROE

(Some further discussion of the Open University's course on Internationa Politics will be found in J. Frankel's Book Review article in this issue.)

CORRESPONDENCE

From Mr. W. Horsfall Carter
To the Editor, *International Affairs*

Madam,

I am at a loss to understand how Dorothy Pickles's perceptive and very sensible article in your April 1975 issue came to be entitled 'The *Decline* of Gaullist Foreign Policy'. As she points out, there is now general acceptance in France of the principal features of that policy: the national nuclear deterrent; France's detachment from Nato; its self-exclusion from the test ban and non-proliferation treaties; and the fact of a standstill in the European integration process.

Moreover, President Giscard d'Estaing and the Chirac government have continued to pursue the aim of detente and co-operation with the Eastern *bloc*, have continued to seek an enhanced status for France in the Mediterranean—and, above all, have affirmed and strengthened France's traditional influence in the Middle East, specifically with the Arab countries, the policy which President de Gaulle set in train and President Pompidou timidly sought to develop.

French foreign policy these days is perhaps less spectacular than in the days of *le grand Charles* but scarcely less 'ambitious'. I for one do not accept the familiar charge of its 'contradictions and unreality'; but that is a personal view. Anyway, I see no evidence of any decline either in the impetus and drive or the Gaullist content of that policy.

Yours, etc.

W. HORSFALL CARTER

Mrs. Pickles writes:

No doubt the title of the article can be interpreted in different ways. It was an attempt to summarise the argument that (i) French foreign policy remains in essentials Gaullist, in that it has Gaullist ostensible aims and attitudes, but that (ii) its scope is reduced since de Gaulle's death, both by developments outside France and by the disappearance from the political scene of the features enumerated by Mr. Horsfall Carter himself (in para. i) and of others.

I differ from him in believing that there is not only a decline in activity as a result of these factors, but also a decline of interest in foreign policy. It is, as he himself notes, less 'spectacular'—i.e. less interesting. It is also necessarily less ambitious. Mediterranean and Arab preoccupations are no substitute for the (mythical) Gaullist 'world role' in detente that has had no credibility since 1968.

BOOKS REVIEWED, JULY 1975

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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EUROPE AFTER THE REFERENDUM

Stanley Henig

'The Community as such and the political co-operation system . . . are the two corner stones of the European Union towards which we are now moving.[1]

ON June 5, 1975 the British electorate, voting in its first nationwide referendum, ended for the moment speculation on the geographical boundaries of the European Communities. Nine countries are to remain locked in the European integration system with the prospect of any further enlargement well in the future. Just three weeks afterwards, in pursuance of decisions made at the summit conferences in Paris in October 1972 and December 1974, the Commission produced a 'Report on European Union'[2] as a contribution towards discussion of the future direction of the Community of Nine.

At the Paris conference of October 1972 the member governments 'set themselves the major objective of transforming, before the end of the present decade and with the fullest respect for the Treaties already signed, the whole complex of the relations of Member States into a European Union'[3] and requested the institutions of the Community to prepare a report for consideration at a summit conference to be held in 1975. At the Copenhagen Conference a year later it was resolved to speed up the process of defining the European Union, although it could 'now be seen that in this preliminary stage of work on the European Union each institution is going ahead with preparing separate interim reports'.[4] Finally, at the second Paris Conference the heads of government declared 'that the time has now come for the Nine to agree as soon as possible on an overall concept of European Union.'[5] The Commission, Assembly and Court of Justice were asked to bring their reports forward to June 1975 whilst the Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans, would prepare a comprehensive document based on these reports and other consultations.

[1] *Eighth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities.* European Commission: Brussels and Luxembourg. Feb. 1975. Cf. also statement by M. Sauvagnargues to European Parliament, Oct. 16, 1974.
[2] *Report on European Union.* Commission of the European Communities COM (75) 400 June 25, 1975.
[3] *Sixth General Report on the Activities of the Communities.* European Commission: Brussels and Luxembourg. Feb. 1975.
[4] *Bulletin of the European Communities,* No. 2. 1974.
[5] *Eighth General Report, op. cit.*

This article is not primarily intended to be a detailed exposition of the arguments about European Union. However, in considering the question of developments in the immediate future the latest Commission document offers a valuable starting point. Occasionally diffident and frequently turgid, the *Report on European Union* offers an updated version of European federalist thinking and a fresh presentation of a traditional, and successful, strategy which has frequently been employed in the integration process. It is worth considering both the details of the Commission's proposals and the strategy it seeks to employ because they offer a coherent and consistent, if improbable, blueprint for the future development of the Communities.

The Commission postulates two broad alternative systems which could enshrine a Union. One would be a single over-arching organisational mechanism covering all facets of the joint activities of the member-states —it would be coherent, homogeneous and a legal unity. As an idea, this probably goes right back to the draft statute for a European Political Community produced by the European Assembly in 1953.[6] By way of contrast the alternative model has a striking kinship to the old British Grand Design,[7] visualising the Union as a generic term covering a collection of agreements, involving different institutional arrangements and even different geographic coverage. Such an essentially functional approach is immediately discarded by the Commission with a clear-cut advocacy of the first model: union means unity. Perhaps in this choice, however, the Commission is itself a victim of circumstances: kings usually opt for monarchies rather than republics!

Before dealing with the detailed institutional machinery for the projected European Union, the Commission discusses the question of competence. It proposes major extensions in the present scope of integration so that economic union may be achieved. The major economic weapon of the Union will be monetary policy over which it will acquire in due course exclusive competence. A growing central budget will also be an instrument of structural policy, whilst through interaction with monetary policy it will be possible for the Union to begin to have some impact on demand management. General legislative powers will permit the Union to play an increasing role in overall economic policy as well as in the social sphere—employment and the elimination of social inequalities. The Commission also proposes the involvement of the central authorities

[6] *Documents of the Consultative Assembly*. 1953. Doc. III. Also A. H. Robertson, *European institutions: co-operation, integration, unification*. London: Stevens for the London Institute of World Affairs. 2nd ed. 1966. pp. 258–261; and Ernst B. Haas, *The uniting of Europe: political, social and economic forces, 1950–1957*. London: Stevens for the LIWA; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1958. pp. 106–107.

[7] See, for example, A. H. Robertson, *The Council of Europe: its structure, functions and achievements*. London: Stevens for the LIWA; New York: Praeger. 2nd ed. 1961. pp. 102 *et seq.*

in areas not covered by existing treaties, particularly in the foreign and defence spheres. There should be co-ordination in all spheres of traditional diplomatic activity, the formulation of joint positions on all matters of European interest and wholesale delegation to the Union in the sphere of foreign economic policy. A forceful assertion that 'the security of each State shall be identified with that of the Union as a whole' acts as prologue to the section on defence policy. References to existing arrangements involving non-members of the Communities are few, while it is asserted that 'alignment of the Member States' defence policies would be desirable even outside the framework of the Treaty of Union and might even facilitate the creation of the Union'. Without wasting time in arguments about carts and horses, the Commission argument then undergoes a speedy volte-face and, in recognition of the likely difficulties, it produces the notion that perhaps the Union could initially come into being without covering defence. It would be an area of 'potential competence' to be delegated ultimately under a special procedure which would involve the institutions of the member-states. This implies either a major derogation from the institutional provisions of the Union or the total exclusion of defence until a later, and rather different, treaty is signed. Either way it is an exception to the unitarian approach of the Commission.

There has been a considerable history of argument about the nature of the institutions appropriate for political union or political community. When the Fouchet-Cattani committee was working on the problem in 1961-62 the French government argued that the institutions for political union should be more inter-governmental and less supra-national than those of the Communities, over which they would assume a directing role.[8] Such a downgrading of the existing institutions would have particularly threatened the position of the Commission, and part of the response of the other five was to assert that nothing in the new arrangements should derogate from the competence of the European Communities.[9] It is worth noting that even now the machinery for 'political co-operation' is less comprehensive and institutionally weaker than what the French were proposing more than a decade ago, whilst formal institutional separateness has not really saved the Commission from an effective diminution of its political role during that period. In many ways the Commission's latest proposals would have seemed more akin to the spirit of the age if the political balance within the Communities were the same as it was when the Fouchet committee commenced its work.

[8] See text of First Draft Treaty as submitted by M. Fouchet on Nov. 2, 1961, reprinted in *Towards Political Union*. Political Committee, European Parliament. Luxembourg. January 1964.

[9] See Treaty draft as produced by other five delegations after meeting of the Fouchet committee on Jan 18, 1962, reprinted *ibid*.

The basic assumption behind a great deal of the Commission's report is that the institutional arrangements of the present functional Communities will be appropriate for European Union provided they are developed in the kind of way which was in vogue during the golden age of integration.[10] It is asserted that ' European Union means nothing if it does not involve the development of a European governmental executive ' which will be comparable with national governments in being responsible to a directly elected Parliament. The Commission makes the hypothesis that such an executive might emerge in one of three ways. It could develop out of the existing Council, implying the down-grading if not the disappearance of the Commission [11]; it could be a totally independent body, replacing both the Council and Commission (although the new body would in fact look very much like the old Commission with a federalist up-grading); or there might be a hybrid with the new body co-existing with something like the Council of Ministers as originally conceived in the Coal and Steel Community. In choosing the second model as being best suited for the needs of a full Union, the Commission does not preclude use of the third for an initial period.

The federalist origin of many of the Commission's ideas is paralleled by the strategy they reflect. Whilst recognising that its own document can only be a contribution to wider discussion, the Commission is seeking to rally political support for the strategy of emerging from current problems through a large and visionary leap forward. The precedent lies in the 1950s when in the aftermath of the European Defence Community debacle the ' Europeans ' produced a scheme for a European Economic Community going well beyond the limited sectoral scope of either the ECSC or the mooted Euratom. Paradoxically, at first sight it might seem that this approach would have been more appropriate if the British had voted ' no ' and thrown Europe and themselves into turmoil! On the other hand, it can be argued that the Community is in a state of malaise; that during the last five years it has been deepened but not widened [12]; and that it has managed to conceal this truth by excessive concentration on enlargement—negotiation, transition, renegotiation. Whilst some of the dynamic, as distinct from static, implications of enlargement may still have to be effected in the shape of new Community policies, this will hardly carry the scope of integration much further now

[10] A term sometimes used to cover the period from the presentation of the Monnet scheme for the ECSC to the casting of de Gaulle's first veto on British entry.

[11] Little consideration is given to the notion of a tenth seat—a political authority based on the Council, with the Commission as a member in its own right. See ' The Federal Trust Papers ' in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. XII, No. 4. 1974.

[12] ' Deepening ' may be defined as the completion of existing common policies, whilst ' widening ' involves the extension of the integration process to new sectors; together with ' extension ', they form a kind of tryptich for developments after 1969. See *La France et les Communautés Européenes*. Paris: Pichon et Durand. 1975.

that the Lomé Convention has been negotiated and a regional fund established.

Progress—step by step or bold leap forward?

On the assumption that the member-states are progressing towards integration, then two contrasting views may be taken of the rate of that progress. One, which may be described as 'progressive incrementalism', visualises the Communities making gradual progress from one common policy to another until ultimately economic and political union are reached. This view of Community developments is not really affected by any decision to use different types of machinery as in 'political co-operation'. There has been considerable ebb and flow in the respectability of this approach. At one time, especially during the 'golden age of integration', its major mechanistic instrument was 'spill-over'. Each new and successive common policy would itself create problems, the only solution to which would lie in further new policies—thus free trade may beget regional policy, producing a larger budget with fiscal and demand management implications. Since the mid-1960s interest in spill-over as a magic wand for integration has diminished, although it can be argued that during those years when the Communities seemed to be falling victim to a recrudescence of nationalist spirit, some sort of spill-over was the means by which limited progress was achieved. 'Europeans' often praise spill-over 'whilst seeming to condemn the notion of the package as a reversion to more traditional diplomatic methods, but in terms of integration function or teleological purpose the differences are not that great and either may produce creeping incrementalism. The second broad view makes the contrasting assumption that no amount of incrementalism will ever produce a politically united Europe. Expressed mathematically, the numerical sequence $1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8}$ betrays a declining rate of progress: the total will never quite reach 2, let alone 3. From time to time a conscious decision must be taken from the outside, that is by the member governments, to inject a new rate of progress through a qualitative leap forward. Expressed mathematically, the sequence would run $1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} \ldots + \frac{3}{4} + \frac{3}{8}$, etc. Governments may do this in response to all kinds of stimuli—external threat, internal political action or even Commission proposals. Perhaps this offers a psychological rationalisation for growing use of the summit, although its assimilation to more regular Council machinery [13]—advantageous from other points of view—may conceivably limit this effect. One can argue that in the aftermath of enlargement, concern with European Union—and the nature of the

[13] At the Paris conference in December 1974 it was agreed that in future the heads of government would meet at least three times a year 'in the Council of the Communities and in the context of political co-operation'. *Eighth General Report*, *op. cit.* The subsequent Dublin meeting was thus a 'Council at heads of government level'.

Commission's proposals thereon—betray a general rejection of the first view of the progress of integration and acceptance of the second.

In any discussion of the course of developments within the European Communities, it is desirable to try to formulate some long-term objectives. One of the most useful things Britain may gain from the cross-fertilisation of ideas and thought with other European countries concerns direction and goal. At best British government is adept at producing within a traditional and almost inviolable constitutional system, specific institutional responses to demonstrable needs: to most problems there is a pragmatic response. In contrast France, in particular, and to some extent the Communities, have been particularly good at defining overall objectives as a guide and framework for individual policy. Discussion about the long-term political future of Europe is valuable if only because it has not hitherto formed part of the political agenda, Britain's sole concern apparently revolving around the question of its own participation.

The United Kingdom and Denmark both joined the Communities after long internal debate and without any of the original commitment held by the founding Six to long-term integration.[14] The aspirations of the founder governments when the Communities were established were quite different from what they are today and alien to anything which any British government has been prepared to contemplate. Those governments considered the unification of Europe to be a goal of major, possibly supreme, national interest. The Communities were a step towards the attainment of that goal, and problems along the way would be solved through a mixture of institutional device and resort to the underlying common unity of purpose. That purpose was based on shared historic experiences reinforced by a palpably threatening international environment in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Changes in that environment made it relatively easy for de Gaulle first to resurrect, and then ensure the imitation of, the national principle. The Communities which Britain and Denmark joined are considerably different to those they refused to join in the 1950s: they feel politically secure, economically affluent and they are no longer self-consciously on the path towards unification. The Communities today are an institutionalisation—useful, civilised and relatively efficient—of a large part of the business traditionally carried on between the member-states. On this 'minimalist' view, spill-over is relevant and important as successive policy areas are deemed suitable for the elaboration of joint policies for the good of all. If in the long run political union is a historic inevitability, so be it, but meanwhile incrementalism may serve valuable purposes without being placed in the framework of any over-arching commitment.

[14] The position of Ireland is rather different in that once the British attitude was known, there was much less internal controversy.

The above view has majority support in the British government; it is closely associated with those who undertook the major role in renegotiation and it is, in the circumstances, not unsatisfactory to those who voted ' no '. It seems virtually inconceivable that the present British government will feel able, even if it were willing, to contemplate further commitments to binding political arrangements of the type envisaged by the Commission. Equally, the Danish position seems unambivalent. Against a background of minority governments or multi-party coalitions and a recent weakening of the traditional major parties, Danish governments have been under constant pressure from the Danish Parliament to take no action within the Community without first submitting it to national endorsement. This attitude would make the effective functioning of any non-autonomous central institution extremely difficult. At this juncture no Danish government could contemplate a European Union as conceived by the Commission, whilst the attitudes exemplified by the Danish Parliament would make quite unworkable any Union institutions falling short of a fully autonomous executive responsible to a European Parliament.[15]

Although the attitudes of the other seven members are likely to be intrinsically less hostile to a far-reaching European Union, there is likely to be only limited support for a major boost of the supra-national elements at the expense of the inter-governmental. One weakness of the Commission's approach is to postulate two corner-stones for the European edifice and then assume that one is some kind of accident or aberration. Given the importance the governments clearly attach to the institutionally separate machinery for ' political co-operation ', it is unrealistic to suppose that they will now agree to it being superseded by further Community-type machinery of a kind they are implicitly rejecting in the political sphere. National governments are very much more confident today of their own unique role in looking after the interests of their own citizens than was the case twenty years ago, whilst the kind of mechanisms acceptable in the early stages of economic integration are unlikely to be considered appropriate for major political developments in areas of high policy.

Rational analysis of the state of integration amongst the Nine should be based on the European system as a whole, that is the Communities and the ' political co-operation ' machinery. The major characteristics of this system are that it is neo-federal and inter-governmental. It is neo-federal in that there is a division of powers between different specified central institutions and local, *i.e.*, national authorities, but so long as the former lack any real autonomy from the latter even in their

[15] For a major discussion of the relationship between Danish institutions and those of the Communities, see Auken, Buksti and Sorensen, ' Denmark and the European Community ', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. XIV No. 1. 1975.

own areas of legal competence, it is palpably not a federation.[16] It is inter-governmental in that the Council of Ministers meeting in different guises in the twin sets of machinery has become the dominant organ. It directs political authority within the Community and its mode of internal operation reflects not crude treaty requirements of unanimity or majority voting but rather a new pattern for traditional inter-state relations within a Community network. It is that network which inhibits crude use of the veto on the model of the Soviet Union in the Security Council, whichever view one takes of the so-called Luxembourg agreement.[17]

The member governments will not willingly renounce their leading roles unless confronted by *force majeure*. This could be in the form of a major crisis, internally or externally engendered, although the argument has been much criticised since the disarray into which the Communities were thrown by the 1973 Middle East war and the consequent energy crisis. It may just be worth making the point that under other circumstances the result might well have been a new leap forward in the integration process, but in 1973 there was a new Community entity—with nine members—only just beginning the process of coming to terms with itself. This Community was also under-institutionalised in terms of being able to respond with speed to the challenge: there was no framework for an energy policy and the 'political co-operation' machinery was at a more rudimentary stage than is now the case. Moreover, individuals can be relevant to historic developments, and the then political leaders of the Nine—not one of whom still holds such high office—were arguably simply not the right kind of group to respond in a positive integrationist manner to the crisis. It remains at least conceivable that a fresh external crisis—a further war in the Middle East, a re-appraisal by the United States of security relations with Europe—might provoke a more *communautaire* response, but in any event one cannot build up a rational pattern of expectations based on the unexpected.

For the moment there is no chance whatever of the Commission's proposals for European Union gaining general support or even some improbable political majority within the Nine. The current initiative can be no more than a 'provocateur' in discussion about long-term Community developments, whilst forming part of a discussion framework in which short-term policies may be elaborated. Even if circumstances are not ripe for a major breakthrough—European Union, Economic and

[16] According to Paul Taylor, *World Politics* 1975, the Communities are now in a confederal phase. The term 'confederation' is sometimes considered a recognisable form with set characteristics. This is denied by K. C. Wheare in *Federal Government*. London, New York: Oxford University Press for the RIIA. 4th ed. 1964. I have chosen the term neo-federal as less ambiguous.

[17] See *Ninth General Report on the Activities of the Community*. EEC Commission: Brussels. June 1966.

Monetary Union—it remains in the interests of all members to continue to develop the Communities through the establishment of further common policies and by making them work more efficiently.

What the Community should do next

The central tasks which face the Community during the next few years would seem to be the following: one, to complete the process of enlargement to nine—this has not necessarily been terminated by renegotiation; two, to evolve common policies in areas proximate to existing Community policy, especially where the latter need re-inforcement; three, to tackle a number of new areas where national action has proved inadequate and there is support for the notion of joint policies; four, to complete the re-orientation of the existing gamut of external links into a more comprehensive world outlook; five, to pursue, in the light of this, the co-ordination of foreign policy in general; six, to bring a greater degree of legitimacy to the European institutions themselves; and seven, to develop the institutional capabilities of the Community so that they may be more capable of sustaining the greater load which would be inherent in any move towards European or Political Union.

Completion of enlargement involves both the carrying out at the appointed time of various national adjustments by the new members and the formulation of policies in those areas where the Treaty of Brussels produced no more than an agreement to agree. Developments since January 1963, some in the context of renegotiation, have filled in some details in the missing policies, but there is still a need for a fisheries policy and a long-term arrangement for New Zealand dairy produce. In addition, the Community may have to formulate further criteria under Article 237 of the EEC Treaty for dealing with fresh applications for membership. During the next few years these are most likely to come from the Community's southern flank where potential candidates are economically weak and politically unstable. It is possible to argue that the Community gave some indirect help in the re-establishment of a parliamentary system in Greece and that, acting judiciously, it could have a similar influence in Portugal. On the other hand, there are dangers inherent in allowing such countries to become full members too rapidly. The Nine have all felt constrained to give some welcome to the current Greek application, although it was not foreseen in the association as being a likely development before the end of the 22-year transition period (1985) and can hardly be warranted by progress in economic harmonisation so far.

Obvious areas for progress proximate to existing common policies lie in the spheres of industrial policy and social policy. In view of the major concerns of the Community, it is slightly surprising to find industrial

policy, with the exception of the competition sector, relatively underdeveloped. There is room for more intensive work on the projected European company law, whilst considerable material gains could accrue from the belated development of common research and technological programmes. The current social action programme [18] is itself a recognition that progress towards economic integration has not really been matched on the social side. Now that the social aspects of agricultural policy have themselves been reinforced by the development of a regional fund, there is no reason why the Community should not make a more concerted attack on structural unemployment and retraining problems. In addition, the gradual exchange of comparative information being facilitated by the Commission should make possible some programmes for harmonising upwards the various social services offered in the member-states. Given the limited political salience of at least some of the issues involved, an increase in the European budget for these purposes ought to be acceptable.

Areas where national action has proved inadequate and where there is a clear demand for initiative by the European institutions are prices, protection of the environment and energy. In the most recent series of opinion polls undertaken on behalf of the Commission in all member-countries,[19] respondents were asked to assign degrees of importance to ten current issues. In the Community as a whole, 89 per cent. considered the struggle against rising prices to be important or very important, whilst 77 per cent. gave such ratings to the environment issue and 72 per cent. to guarantees of energy supplies. By way of contrast only 61 per cent. ascribed such importance to regional policy with the figure for a unified European currency as low as 50 per cent. A second series of questions asked whether particular problems would be best solved by European or national action. European responses were 71 per cent. on prices, 70 per cent. on energy (53 per cent. in Britain) and 67 per cent. on environment compared to 53 per cent. for modernising agriculture and 51 per cent. for regional policy. Although different national interests in the energy sphere may continue to inhibit common policy on supplies, it should be possible to stabilise prices. Heavy involvement in primary produce, through the common agricultural policy, ought to facilitate thinking on Community schemes for the stabilisation of prices of both home production and essential imports, possibly through some kind of deficiency payments scheme. This could add a much needed consumer dimension to Community activity. With regard to environment and pollution, a major difficulty is that these problems take no account of geographical boundaries and the Community is often likely to be too small

[18] See *Report on the Development of the Social Situation in the Community in 1974*. European Commission: Brussels and Luxembourg, March 1975.

[19] Euro-barometre, No. 3. European Commission: Brussels. June–July 1975.

to formulate effective policies. But unlike certain other international organisations, the Community does have teeth. There could be two dimensions to joint policy: first, the harmonisation of attitudes and the taking of such measures as may be effective even if limited to the confines of the Community; and second, use of the Community's weight in the wider international organisations to galvanise them into activity.

The two areas for development in the external field are complementary. It should be of some interest that the recent Commission polls [20] found only 46 per cent. of respondents attaching much importance to a common aid policy as against 65 per cent. showing similar concern about arriving at a common European front in discussions with the super-powers. No less than 67 per cent. thought the latter a task more appropriate for the Community than for national governments. With the signature of the Lomé convention the Nine have now largely multilateralised their relations with the developing world, although little has been done about relations with the Indian sub-continent. Refusal by the African countries to term their relationship an 'association' might act as a catalyst for reconsidering the notion that there is some kind of natural, special and exclusive relationship between the two continents. There are obvious dangers in the developed world dividing the under-developed into new, continental spheres of influence. At the same time the increasing identity of interests between Community members could be the basis for a gradual, mutual assimilation of activities in the sphere of traditional diplomacy. Joint embassies of member-countries in many parts of the world as well as to various international organisations would be a logical and non-contentious rationalisation which would also save economic resources.

So far the Community countries have had little success, although it may well be commensurate with the effort made, in establishing any kind of common policy towards the super-powers. In view of existing links in a variety of institutions, this is particularly serious with regard to relations between the Nine and the United States. Europe's response to Dr. Kissinger's suggestions of a dialogue was feeble in the extreme. Links within the Western world and the more equitable sharing of economic and defence burdens are likely to figure on the American political agenda during the next few years and it is essential that Europe should be in a position to make an appropriate response. This implies considerably strengthening the machinery for 'political co-operation', with a degree of permanence for its support services—either a Secretariat or almost continuous meetings at the level below political directors. The time may also be ripe for the inception, on an informal basis at first, of equivalent links between defence ministers and officials.

[20] *Ibid.*

The above represents one aspect of the necessary strengthening of the institutions. Work carried on through the European system—Communities and 'political co-operation' machinery—will increase. Although the Council has made some attempts to improve its efficiency,[21] more needs to be done to streamline the decision-making process. The dominant role of the ministerial organ makes it increasingly necessary for it to acquire some of the corporateness and permanence of traditional executives.[22] Too much obloquy has been cast on the notion of European Ministers. The concept will have to be resurrected in some form if Europe's prime political authority is to grow out of the Council. Meanwhile greater permanence might be given to more of the sub-committee's working within the Council's aegis.

Finally, progress should be no further delayed in seeking to give much greater legitimacy to the European institutions in the eyes of those whose lives will be affected by their decisions. This must involve direct elections to a European Parliament and some degree of co-decision in legislation. Developments in this direction may also be the only way to head off the Danish syndrome—the seeking of national endorsement before all Community decision-making—widespread imitation of which would inhibit the possibility of ever developing institutions strong enough to sustain a political or definitive phase of the integration process.

Little of the above is particularly original or particularly exciting and it is probably not the stuff which would engender a massive popular campaign of support for the European ideals. However, it is all a part of the process of European construction. The last twenty-five years have witnessed a formidable catalogue of achievements for European integration. The next few years can best be used as a period of consolidation before more striking advances may be made.[23]

[21] *Eighth General Report, op. cit.*

[22] See *Federal Trust Papers, op. cit.*

[23] While this article was being prepared and written, many other organisations—including the European Parliament—produced reports on European Union. It nonetheless seems probable that as the debate proceeds the Commission's report will assume an importance second only to the overall document now awaited by M. Tindemans, the Belgian Prime Minister.

MONETARY AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN THE EEC

Vittorio Barattieri and Anthony Thomas

Institutional arrangements in the EEC

THE institutional machinery of the Community is deceptively simple: the EEC Commission (the bureaucracy), the Council of Ministers (the decision taker), the European Court of Justice (the final interpreter of the Treaties) and the European Parliament (the genesis of democratic control). In fact it is a complex, kaleidoscopic system buffeted by political pressures. In economics and money, the subject of this paper, the EEC Council of Ministers and the EEC Commission interact with each other and are influenced by inter-governmental committees, including the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), the Monetary Committee and the Steering Committee. Another layer has been added by the decision of heads of government of the Nine in Paris in December 1974, to hold at least three summit meetings a year. At these meetings, which have been rebaptised European Councils, prime ministers and presidents, afraid of the bad political fallout of failure, sketch out superstructure agreements. It is left to the lower orders—ministers, national government officials and the Commission—to do the bricklaying, carpentry and plumbing.

The Commission has a small staff of about 7,000 (some 1,600 fewer than the Scottish Office) of which only 2,000 are in the highest grades. Until the mid-1960s it was in the centre of the EEC stage, pushing the implementation of the basic provisions of the Treaty in such matters as the customs union, the common agricultural policy, external trade and, with more mixed success, the harmonisation of laws, regulations and administrative practices. But it ran into trouble trying to nudge the Community towards greater economic integration, a contentious issue of national sovereignty. This provoked the unanimity rule of the famous Luxembourg compromise of 1965. Demanded by France, which insisted, with tacit support from others, on having a power of veto, the Luxembourg compromise saved a member-state from being outvoted and forced to submit to the majority will on issues touching on what it saw as vital national interests.

A consequence of this, and of the fading of the vision of a federalist Europe, has been a weakening of the Commission's power of initiative. The entry of sovereignty-conscious Britain and Denmark has made its

job still harder and it is under pressure to make only proposals easily acceptable to all. This means aiming at the lowest common denominator. When the Commission disregards this unwritten rule its proposals are pigeon-holed. While its diminished importance is largely caused by a decline in the commitment to supra-nationalism, the Commission has not been without its faults. Like the pterodactyl it has failed to adapt itself to a new environment. The mills of bureaucracy grind exceedingly slow the world over, but perhaps nowhere more slowly than in an international institution like the Commission—which is not altogether surprising, given the range of issues it deals with and the problems of bringing together nine often truculent member-states.

But the Commission is not wholly, or even mainly, to blame. A deeper reason for recent EEC failure is the way ministers of the Nine insist on prescribing policy in detail and so cramp the negotiating flexibility of senior officials. Political ping-pong between meetings of ministers and committees of officials is the result, with the ball far too often cracked but still in play. A by-product of this politicisation of technical monetary and economic issues is that inter-governmental committees are pushing the Commission on to the sidelines.

The cumbersome EEC procedure now usually works, or does not work, in the following way. The Commission determines the agenda of the Council of Ministers by putting in short technical papers for each item. New or amended proposals made by ministers at the meeting are then usually sent to one or more committees: Coreper (the ambassadors of the Nine to the EEC), the Monetary Committee, the Committee of Central Bank Governors. They are then reshaped and reshaped again until the Council of Ministers is finally ready to strike a compromise. After a decision is reached, the Commission is given the task of overseeing its execution. The involvement of ministers in the details instead of the broad thrust of negotiation has meant that minor technical issues appear on the agenda of ministerial meetings. That ministers become bored and irritated is the predictable consequence.

Take, for example, the long negotiations about a new European unit of account to reflect the reality that currencies now have floating, not fixed, exchange rates. The French Finance Minister, M. Jean-Pierre Fourcade, proposed a new unit at the September 1974 meeting of the EEC Council of Finance Ministers; it was referred to the Commission and the Monetary Committee and the latter asked its alternates to draft a report. This report suggested that a new European unit of account was premature and that the aid to be provided by the Nine to forty-six African, Caribbean and Pacific countries through the European Development Fund should be denominated in Special Drawing Rights. This solution was strongly opposed by the Commission and M. Fourcade, who

blocked it at the December meeting of the Council. The issue was sent back to the Monetary Committee which immediately began to negotiate an entirely new EEC accounting unit. It was not until the middle of March that the Council finally approved a new unit of account made up of a 'basket' of all Community currencies, the weights of which reflect members' GNP and intra-EEC trade. At first glance it would seem that a minor technical issue kept several Community bodies busy for too long. However, the new unit of account could have broad financial implications. The unit used in the Community budget is still based on fictitious par values which grossly overvalue the pound and lira and undervalue the Deutsche mark. The new unit of account may well be applied eventually to the EEC budget and also used for other EEC external transactions as well as the EDF. So six months is not an over-long period for negotiating a unit of account which some people think of as a forerunner of a European currency, the 'Europa'.

Still greater timelags, and complications, have occurred when the Council has referred the same issue to more than one committee. Different proposals emerge which ministers are incapable of resolving in the course of a meeting since they lack both the time and the technical expertise. It is thus not altogether coincidental that the interchange between the Commission, the inter-governmental committees and the Council of Ministers has become stilted and the decision-making is now shifting another rung up the ladder to EEC heads of government at the European Council meetings.

Sometimes it is necessary for decisions to be taken at the highest political level. Examples are the changes in the EEC budget rules, made at Britain's insistence, which were a compromise on the hitherto accepted principle of the Commission's 'own resources', and the Regional Development Fund, which involves a transfer of real resources from the richer members, such as Germany, to Italy, Ireland and Britain. But in many other cases summitry is a reflection of the way the nature of decision-making has changed in several member-countries, so that what would once have been considered fairly trivial issues to be dealt with by inter-ministerial committees now require high-level meetings.

Pessimists in Brussels tend to feel that regular meetings of the heads of governments will emasculate Community institutions; optimists discern the creation of an embryonic European Cabinet. A more sensible middle view is that since in an increasingly politicised EEC neither the Commission nor the finance ministers have much negotiating leeway, European Councils should provoke faster, more constructive agreement than less elevated institutions have done recently. Although the experience of the first European Council, at Dublin Castle in March 1975, was disappointing, some useful work was done at the second in Brussels in July 1975.

European Council meetings could yet provide a new motor for a stalled Community, particularly if they are preceded by bilateral contacts between the important EEC capitals (and Washington) to narrow in advance divergent views, and if the Nine carry out their Paris summit promise to interpret the unanimity rule more flexibly.

Against this backdrop, the importance of Coreper has increased enormously over the past few years. When ministers cannot agree, and that happens more often than not, the issue is now usually despatched to Coreper, unless it is considered too technical, in which case the Monetary Committee and the Governors' Committee are told to study it further first. Since Coreper's members are senior diplomats, whose training has traditionally eschewed economics in favour of politics, the committee's discussions have a bias towards the purely political perspective of a problem. Also, the permanent representatives feel obliged to resist further encroachment on national sovereignty and are thus loath to concede any new powers to Community institutions. Still, Coreper does fulfil an important liaison role between the Commission and the Council. Since the Commission's proposals are rarely negotiated at length with member-states to make sure they are politically realistic, it falls to Coreper to hammer out a compromise acceptable to the Nine.

Less political and more technical is the work of the Monetary Committee. Its members, four from each EEC country, are senior Treasury and Central Bank officials. They meet nearly every month to examine current problems and also occasionally seize the chance to review economic developments in one or more EEC countries. The Monetary Committee is the committee normally asked to advise the Council of Ministers on monetary and economic issues. Although its discussions are often soporific, most agree that it does an important political and technical job well.

First, it gives the Nine a chance to learn how the policies of their partners are evolving and this, of course, is an essential prerequisite of European economic policy co-ordination. Second, it is a competent, broad forum which the Commission can sound out to discover whether its proposals are at variance with political reality. Third, together with the Governors' Committee, it is the place where the finer details of economic and monetary initiatives—ranging from Economic and Monetary Union to the new unit of account—are negotiated. Fourth, it does the groundwork in preparing a common EEC position on international economic issues. This has been ever more evident since August 1971 when President Nixon severed the link between gold and the dollar and introduced unilaterally an import surcharge. The Monetary Committee was involved from the beginning in preparing EEC countries for the Smithsonian Agreement, for the monetary reform negotiations

in the now defunct Committee of Twenty and for oil deficit financing through the IMF and the new Financial Support Fund of the OECD.

A chief weakness of the Monetary Committee—a weakness too common in EEC committees—is that its position rarely takes the form of an agreed paper, however brief. Participants often depart with very different impressions about what was agreed at their meeting. This source of confusion and delay could easily be avoided if the Monetary Committee adopted the procedure used by the Executive Board of the IMF whose agreements are recorded in official minutes and normally embodied in a written decision.

The other mainstay of economic and monetary co-operation within the EEC, the Committee of Central Bank Governors, is becoming virtually a carbon copy of the Monetary Committee. Membership is overlapping since Deputy Governors are members of both committees. As the influence of Central Banks has declined markedly against that of Treasuries over the last decade so has that of the Governors' Committee. Its ideas are now rarely turned into proposals or agreements until vetted by the Monetary Committee.

The Council of Ministers now often refers an issue to both the Governors' Committee and the Monetary Committee and, to avoid needless duplication, these committees have begun to co-operate through joint working parties of the alternates of the Monetary Committee and of the Governors' Théron group. (The latter is no longer chaired by M. Théron, a Frenchman, but by M. Héyvaert, a Belgian.) Set up in 1971, the Théron Group quickly became prominent as the EEC vigorously pushed the idea of economic and monetary union. Under instructions from central bankers, it rapidly produced reports on the narrowing of the margin of fluctuation between EEC currencies and on debt settlement through the European Monetary Co-operation Fund. Since then, with the slackening of the drive toward economic and monetary union, its importance has diminished and the pace of its output has slowed down.

There are two other significant committees dealing with economics and money, the High Level Steering Committee to Co-ordinate Short-Term Economic Policy and the Economic Policy Committee. The Steering Committee, which dates back to March 1972, is supposed to be a meeting place where the most senior Treasury officials, one from each member-state, can exchange opinions on economic developments and consult on imminent policy decisions. It is an inter-government rather than a Community institution and its secretariat comes from the EEC Council of Ministers. Meetings are infrequent and the senior officials have become ever more junior so that consultation now amounts

to little more than notification of decisions already taken in national capitals.

Equally disappointing is the Economic Policy Committee, formed in February 1974 through the merger of three committees; the Budgetary Policy Committee, the Short-Term Policy Committee and the Medium-Term Policy Committee. In the best bureaucratic tradition these three committees have somehow managed to survive under the new guise of sub-committees. Although the Economic Policy Committee meets more often than the Steering Committee, it has had little success in fulfilling its mandate, which is to promote co-ordination of the short and medium-term economic policies of the Nine. In present circumstances, however, this is a Sisyphean task.

True, 'Government by Committees' is now a fact of life, but the Community's committee system is less cumbrous than that in most international institutions, including the United Nations. This, however, ought not to be used as an excuse for delaying reform. Tight birth control of committees, and euthanasia for those that have outlived any usefulness they may once have had, are badly needed. The demotion of the Commission from a political activist to a technical secretariat may also have gone too far. Ministers of the Nine, through national civil servants on inter-governmental committees, are doing housekeeping chores which could be more conveniently left to the Commission's staff. In repelling the Commission's hopes of running the EEC's economic and monetary household, the Nine have not only relegated it to the servants' quarters but have decided to do the dish washing and the dusting themselves.

The unsuccessful attempt to create an Economic and Monetary Union

When the twelve-year adjustment period provided for by the Rome Treaty was coming to a close in the late 1960s, the Community was rudderless and in dire need of new political directives. In 1969 the Commission met the challenge, sending to the Council of Ministers two papers, called the Barre plans after M. Raymond Barre, the commissioner responsible for their drafting. These proposed immediate moves toward full economic and monetary union (EMU). In December of that year, shortly after General de Gaulle's retirement, the EEC heads of government met in The Hague and reached broad agreement on an 'own resources' budget for the EEC, on opening negotiations with Britain and other applicants for membership, and on a statement of principle for quickening progress toward EMU. The Prime Minister of Luxembourg, M. Pierre Werner, was commissioned to study how to bring EMU about and in 1970 two Werner reports were issued, proposing a three-stage approach to EMU by 1980. This programme was agreed by the Council of Ministers in February 1971.

Only the first stage was set out in detail, the others being left deliberately vague so that they could be filled in on the basis of experience and circumstances. The first stage, to be completed by the end of 1973, centred on the so-called snake in the tunnel. Exchange rate fluctuations between EEC currencies were to be halved by co-ordinated central bank intervention in the foreign exchange markets. This was the snake, and it slithered between the upper and lower limits of a then fixed dollar (the tunnel).

The foundations were to be provided by short and medium-term credit to members in balance-of-payments difficulties. This was to help the Six (and then the Nine) to keep in step in their monetary and exchange rate policies. A European Monetary Co-operation Fund (EMCF) was to be established to multilateralise intra-EEC settlement, to administer a new short-term monetary support mechanism and, most important, to regulate the Community exchange rate system, ultimately by intervening itself in lieu of member-countries. The wide powers to be given to the EMCF were intended to make it a rough EEC equivalent of the Federal Reserve System in the United States. Later stages envisaged major institutional changes to fix irrevocably EEC exchange rates, to unify capital markets, to increase substantially the role of the EEC budget, to pool official reserves, and to empower the EMCF to determine the Community's monetary policies and the value of the snake against outside currencies.

A bold programme, with the monetary cart put before the economic horse, it was doomed from the start; and not just because the governments were sceptical and agreed on the arrangement mainly to impress public opinion. The quick elimination of exchange rate flexibility was impossible in a Community with very different rates of inflation, which caused intra-EEC balance-of-payments disequilibria. Even if rates of inflation were to converge because of growing integration of factor and product markets, imbalances were still likely to occur because of structural causes and different income-elasticities of imports. Highly integrated product markets already existed in the Community, but the same could not be said of factor markets, especially labour. Indeed, the expectation was that labour mobility within the EEC was likely to diminish as unemployed labour pools dried up as a result of the industrialisation of poorer areas.

On the other hand, the more open the EEC economies became the less effective would exchange rate adjustments be in modifying relative prices within the Community. But however reduced in effectiveness, there was no doubt that intra-EEC exchange rate changes would remain for long an indispensable instrument of economic policies. The reason is obvious. If governments were to be deprived of this tool of economic management, they were left with two highly disagreeable policy options

in case of difficulty. They could resort to savagely deflationary policies or, alternatively, seek massive borrowings from members in surplus, either directly or through the pooling of reserves. This was an unrealistic ambition likely to fail its first hard test. What made its chances of success even slimmer was that the commitment to EMU, and implicitly to more rigid exchange rates, coincided with the strong international drift to floating exchange rates.

The introduction of a fixed exchange rate system threatened to cause a major weakening of the capacity of the EEC governments to control domestic monetary conditions. This could have been compensated by the transfer of much of the existing powers of taxation and expenditure to the Community, with the EEC budget and the Regional Development Fund emerging as efficient regulators of demand. But, given the small degree of political integration, it was absurd to expect significant fiscal authority to be turned over to the Community by the EMU deadline date of 1980.

A further handicap was the unfortunate timing of the much boosted ' relaunch ' of the Community. The ink on the Hague communiqué was not long dry when the Deutsche mark was floated in May 1971. Then in August the dollar's largely theoretical convertibility into gold was stopped by President Nixon and a period of generalised floating followed. Four months later, in the Smithsonian Agreement, fixed parities were restored, but with margins of fluctuation more than doubled.

The EEC snake was hatched into this harsh world on April 24, 1972, with the currencies of the four applicant countries—United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway—joining shortly afterwards. The maximum spread between any two member currencies was set at 2·25 per cent., or half the size of the new tunnel. Continuing monetary crises completely disrupted this EEC exchange rate system. By early 1974 it had lost its tunnel and was floating against the dollar. It had also diminished into what virtually amounted to a Deutsche mark zone. The currencies of Italy, the United Kingdom, Ireland and France had floated away. This left it with five EEC members—Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark—plus two associates, Norway and Sweden, and Austria as a hanger-on. Since then France has made a prodigal return and Switzerland has asked to join.

The EMCF is an idea whose time has, at any rate temporarily, gone. Formally established in April 1973, it was, after long and sometimes angry haggling, based in Luxembourg with a liaison office in Brussels. It still has no staff and its secretariat is provided by the Bank for International Settlements, which also acts as the EMCF's agent. The central bank governors and the Commission make up the board of the EMCF which, since June 1973, has met regularly in Basle, with central

bankers briefly taking off their BIS hats and donning EMCF hats to talk about EMCF business.

The financing of snake-related interventions and the settlement of debit and credit positions arising from these have gone through the books of the EMCF since June 1973. Settlements are, at the option of the debtor, in the creditor's currency or in proportion to the debtor's assets in SDRS and IMF position and to its foreign exchange reserves. The countries associated with the snake arrangements have subscribed to a series of bilateral agreements with EEC members to settle debits and credits in dollars.

The most important activity of the central bankers through the EMCF so far is a short-term monetary support system, which was created in February 1970 and has been enlarged twice since, in August 1973 and again in February 1974. The EMCF is the shell used for this intra-central bank mechanism in which quotas are now set at 600 million units of account for Germany, France and the United Kingdom; 400 million for Italy; 200 million for Belgium (plus Luxembourg) and the Netherlands; 90 million for Denmark, and 35 million for Ireland. Central banks can be called upon to lend up to twice their quotas. This means a member can borrow up to twice the quotas of the other members (for example, the maximum available to the United Kingdom is 4,250 million units of account if it is the only borrower). Loans are for three months and may be renewed only once at the borrower's request. There is, however, a loophole. Further renewals can be ' offered ' by the others to the borrower.

The short-term monetary support system is the Community's equivalent of the $20 billion swap network centred on the Federal Reserve of the United States. The only country so far to borrow through the EMCF is Italy, which drew 1,562·5 million units of account in March 1974. The loan was rolled over until late 1974 when Italy was granted a three and a half year loan for the same amount under the Community's medium-term support mechanism (with the British component remaining a three-month loan on a rollover basis).

The short-term monetary system dovetails into the medium-term system which was created in March 1971 and which is inter-governmental. The quotas in the medium-term system are the same as those in the short-term arrangement but loans cannot exceed the collective size of the quotas (*i.e.*, there is no doubling arrangement as in the short-term system). While short-term loans are granted without conditions, medium-term ones are subject to economic policy conditions which bear a close resemblance to those of the IMF. In Italy's case the central discipline to achieve balance-of-payments and other targets in both the IMF and the EEC medium-term loan is a ceiling on the increase in total domestic credit, in both the public and private sectors.

Another important agreement at the 1969 Hague summit was to establish an EEC budget, switching from contributions from national budgets to an 'own resources' system in which customs, farm levies and a percentage of value added tax collections flowed automatically to Brussels. It was to start getting phased-in from 1975 for the six founder members of the EEC and 1978 for the three new member-states. The main aim was to provide the Commission with its own sources of finance and so free it from relying exclusively on appropriations from the national budgets of the Nine. But the EEC budget is still puny in relation to the Community GNP, less than one per cent., while national budgets of members are some 30 per cent. of national GNP. On present trends it is projected that the ratio of the Community budget to the EEC GNP might at most rise to a little over one per cent. by 1980. This is a fraction of what would be needed for it to fulfil an important economic stabilisation role.

Despite the smallness of the medium-term support system, EMU might just have been workable had there been a huge Regional Development Fund, involving a large transfer of real resources from EEC surplus countries (and that means mainly Germany) to deficit countries like Italy, Britain and Ireland. But the Regional Development Fund is a palliative, not a cure. Agreed at the Paris summit last December, after two and a half years of often acrimonious debate, it amounts to only £540 million over three years and provides further evidence, after the dropping of the second stage of EMU which was due to begin on January 1, 1974, that the commitment to economic and monetary union has weakened. This was acknowledged implicitly in the December 1974 Paris summit communiqué which reaffirmed EMU as an EEC ambition but dropped the 1980 target date. As Mr. James Callaghan, the British Foreign Secretary, has commented, EEC countries also remain committed to complete disarmament and world peace, but do not expect to achieve that soon either.

Economic and monetary co-operation after EMU's demise

The death of EMU has taught the Community a useful lesson. Policy makers are less mesmerised than they were by the idea of a grand master plan. Instead a pragmatic step-by-step approach to co-operation is apparent. While recognising that rigid plans hamper more than they help, broad collective agreement on where the Nine are and where they are going is still needed. Otherwise, Community economic and monetary programmes risk being a hodge-podge of initiatives by separate agencies. The abandonment of the strategy of the 'Great Leap Forward' to economic and monetary union should not lead to

the other extreme. But so far post-EMU co-operation suggests a welter of unco-ordinated programmes rather than a coherent framework.

A main EEC aim has always been to co-ordinate economic and monetary policies. This, however, means different things to different people. The European federalists look for steady progress towards a common EEC economic and monetary policy; others for closer co-operation between member-states. The Community has disappointed even the least ambitious. So far co-ordination amounts to little more than ministries of economics and finance swopping ideas, keeping each other informed about imminent policy changes and, at the Council of Ministers' level, agreeing to anodyne commitments to allow surplus countries to pursue more stimulative policies than deficit countries. There is usually, too, a line or two about a balanced determination to deal with inflation and unemployment. Even the much ballyhooed economic revivalism for Germany, France and the Benelux countries agreed by finance ministers of the Nine in Venice in August 1975 was rightly termed by Mr. Denis Healey as 'a coincidence of policies rather than a co-ordination of policies'.

The consequence is that all members of the Community strive simultaneously to achieve or to sustain balance, or better still surplus, on the current accounts of their balance of payments. Member-countries, too, habitually over or under-shoot targets since stimulatory and deflationary measures are not orchestrated. The Italian brass may play Friedman while the British strings play Keynes.

This lack of co-operation of economic policies, especially monetary policies, between the Nine and between the Nine and other industrialised countries has deepened, widened and lengthened the 1974–75 recession. Unless teamwork improves there is a high risk that in trying to get back to growth through renewed expansion of aggregate demand the EEC countries will let loose new wild inflationary forces even before the existing ones are properly tamed.

The central problem, so far unsolved, is that Community members disagree on the inflation/unemployment trade-off. How can the EEC harmonise policies when Germany frets about a six per cent. rate of inflation while Britain has an inflation rate of over 20 per cent? Who adjusts to whose policies?

Often neither does. Instead community debates are polarised between those who stress the social costs of unemployment and those who argue that these are outweighed by the long-term gains to be had from stabilising prices. The split is ever more damaging since the business cycles in major industrial countries are tending to move in tandem, so that a country in recession can no longer rely on stronger demand in the economies of its trading partners to help drag it out. Thus export-led expansion for a country with a slack economy, or needing to put its

balance of payments right, is hard. Italy, for example, has experienced an uphill struggle to narrow its deficit during a time when its EEC partners have soft economies and the volume of world trade is shrinking by 5 per cent. or more in 1975.

The need for informal arrangements to harmonise trade policies so that countries in high surplus (Germany and the Netherlands) make correction easier for countries in deep deficit (Italy, Britain and France) is obvious, but in practice the burden still falls on the deficit countries. Harmonising policies and time paths of adjustment is not sufficient. Greater attention has to be paid to the policy mix used. Both fiscal and monetary policies affect aggregate demand and the authorities must worry not only about its level but also about the 'inter-temporal' capacity to prevent short-term as well as long-term inflation. The policy mix for short-term recovery has to forestall future inflation by increasing capital outlays, thus avoiding the bottlenecks of insufficient industrial capacity when demand revives. Yet the need for monetary ease to stimulate investments in the production of non-OPEC energy, in less energy-intensive goods and in the export sector to pay for the higher oil bill has not so far led to any serious attempt to de-escalate interest rates in the Community.

So policy co-ordination in the Community has largely proved an empty box. It is not simply a matter of technical difficulties, though these ought not be ignored. In Western democracies the overriding interest of governments is not to harmonise policies or to strive for optimal policy mixes, but to win the next election. If booms and elections are charted, there is a striking correlation. Nonetheless at the level of economic co-ordination the deficit countries have had some influence (small and hard to measure but real all the same) in persuading surplus Germany to reflate, and since then the Schmidt government has helped to persuade the Ford administration to do the same, though the weaker economies of the Community believe not enough has been done.

The Community, too, influenced Italian policies when late in 1974 the EEC short-term loan to Italy was consolidated into a three and a half year credit. The EEC Commission attached conditions aimed at restoring internal and external balance to the Italian economy. The Italian authorities wanted to obtain adequate leeway to reflate the economy in 1975. The Commission feared that unduly expansionary policies might prevent the indispensable improvement in Italy's woeful balance of payments. Italy was already committed by an IMF standby to restrain the expansion of total domestic credit for the twelve months ending on March 31, 1975.

The Brussels compromise machinery ground out fairly quickly an agre[illegible]ent limiting Italy's *domestic* credit expansion in the year ending [illegible] [illegible]700 billion lire, as against 22,400 billion under

the IMF stand-by. The policy has worked, but at a high cost in terms of production foregone. The big turn-around in the Italian balance of payments, beginning late in 1974, permitted Italy, just before Easter 1975, to abolish the import deposit requirement introduced in May 1974 and to bring in a carefully balanced expansionary programme.

Also important is the agreement to use the collective credit worthiness of the Nine to try to borrow, if needed, up to $3,000 million in 1975, mainly from members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Such loans were first proposed by the Commission shortly after the January 1974 meeting of the Committee of Twenty agreed in principle to an IMF oil facility to recycle petrodollars to countries in balance-of-payments difficulties as a result of the fourfold increase in the price of crude oil. After the customary to-ing and fro-ing between the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the Monetary Committee, the Council finally gave the go-ahead in October 1974. The Commission will raise the money with the guarantees provided by each member of the Community for up to twice its percentage share of the EMCF.

As guarantees cover both capital and all interest payments—a rather unsophisticated system—the amount that could be raised by the Commission and re-lent to one or more EEC member-states is roughly $2,000 million (*i.e.*, $1,000 million of the $3,000 million maximum represents interest). Of course, the Council of Ministers could extend further guarantees—which require parliamentary approval in some member-states—if the present ceiling proves too low.

But these are timid moves toward economic co-ordination, not the big confident moves needed. And the EEC budget is no substitute for the orchestration of economic and monetary policies since it can have little influence on regulating the aggregate demand of the Community. Outside the farm sector, where it has helped to slow the drift from the land to the cities to a tolerable pace of social change, the EEC budget remains on a piggy bank scale. Suggestions have been made for the switching of certain expenditures from the national to the Community level and it is at least arguable that the EEC's quarter of a billion-odd citizens could benefit if this was done. But there is no sign of movement on this, and ideas that have been floated and then punctured include a common employment fund, fiscal benefits for poor regions, joint investment of part of social insurance funds, investments in the energy sector and, most controversially of all, defence expenditures (which would be difficult since Ireland is not even a member of Nato and France not as integrated into the Atlantic Alliance as the rest).

The blunt fact is that the political will to transfer significant fiscal authority from the Nine capitals to Brussels does not exist. Nor is there enthusiasm for allowing the Community to print money in its own right.

So the Community budget is small and will remain small for the foreseeable future.

The proposal of the Werner report to harmonise tax structures and rates in the Community is also gathering dust in the Brussels archives. This is true not only for individual and corporation taxes but also for value added tax. When VAT was introduced it was with the goal of having a single rate throughout the EEC. It does not now look as if the Nine are even trying to get the ball into this net. Instead the Community is floundering toward a ' shadow ' VAT system for all members in which a certain percentage of the ' revenue ' collected would accrue to the EEC budget no matter how the funds were actually raised. This would represent a decisive break away from the ' own resources ' ambition to a system of direct contribution to the Community budget.

A still bigger flaw in the Community budget is the principle of ' juste retour', under which each member-state receives back roughly the same amount of money it has contributed. This principle was underwritten during Britain's renegotiation of its membership terms when the British government was not brave enough to push for root and branch reform so that members with above average GDP per capita were net contributors and those with below average GDP per capita net recipients. Instead, it merely demanded, and finally got at the Dublin summit in March 1975, a change in the EEC budget system so that a country whose share of the EEC budget exceeds its share of the Community gross national product can qualify, under conditions, for a refund on ' overpayments '.

By a process of elimination this leaves the EEC Regional Development Fund (RDF) as the most sensible hope for reform. Pushed by the British government under Mr. Edward Heath before and after Britain signed the Rome treaty, it lost its main sponsor when the Labour party came to power early in 1974. The Wilson government decided to campaign in Brussels for a ' correcting mechanism ' for the EEC budget and was determined not to be fobbed off with a promise that EEC spending in Britain through the RDF would help eventually to reduce Britain's net payments into the EEC budget.

Italy and Ireland, however, continued to carry the ball forward and got the others, including feet-dragging Germany and France, to commit themselves in advance to accept the RDF at the Paris summit in December 1974 when they threatened that the alternative was empty chairs in Paris behind the labels Italy and Ireland. True, the RDF is small, but then its establishment came when Europe was undergoing its worst economic recession of the postwar period and governments were understandably tight-fisted. Also, since the RDF will be used to promote investment in the poorer areas, the actual volume of investment will be much higher.

So defenders of the fund are hardly exaggerating when they say that the agreement on it is the most important decision taken by the EEC since the Six became Nine. For the first time it makes real the pledge by the EEC members in the preamble to the Rome Treaty ' to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions '.

The three member-states with the lowest gross domestic product per capita are getting nearly three-quarters of the money: Italy 40 per cent., Britain 28 per cent. and Ireland six per cent. plus six million units of account deducted from the share of the other member-states except Italy. That leaves only 26 per cent. for the remaining six—15 per cent. for France, 6·4 per cent. for West Germany (mainly for spending on areas bordering on East Germany), 1·7 per cent. for the Netherlands, 1·5 per cent. for Belgium, 1·3 per cent. for Denmark and 0·1 per cent. for Luxembourg. In effect, the richer members of the Community have conceded that they have a responsibility to help Italy, with its chronically under-developed Mezzogiorno, the United Kingdom, where 19th century industrial adolescence is this century's senility, and Ireland, the only country in the world whose population actually fell in the first fifty years of this century.

Lengthy negotiations have changed the original doctrinaire proposals of the Commission into a flexible tool fitting in with the very different regional development policies of the member-states. The old proposed rule that all investments aided would have to preserve existing jobs or create new ones has gone. Instead, Britain can use money from the RDF to help slow down redundancies as old industries are slimmed down to survival weight (an extension into industry of the main thrust of the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy).

The present size of the RDF, £541·6 million stretched over a three-year experimental period, is not enough to dent the major economic disparities between the Community's regions. This century's experience is that the rapid pace of technological innovation and the equally rapid shift in demand patterns, coupled with rigidities in the factor markets, make for depressed regions which stay depressed even when governments try hard, and spend freely, to redress the balance.

Traditional policies towards the backward areas have not been successful and it is totally unrealistic to imagine that an RDF of some £540 million will change this. It is, however, only a start and it may be that the Regional Policy Committee created at the same time as the RDF will be seen in retrospect as a move forward in the evolution of Nine European national states into a European Community.

In this committee very senior regional planning officials from the Nine, and Eurocrats, will meet often ' with a view to contributing to the

co-ordination of the regional policies of the member states'. With goodwill, this could prove the genesis of a common, or at least a less uncommon, approach to the problem of helping the worst-off areas of the EEC, and co-ordination of policies towards the less developed areas of the Community could slowly evolve into co-ordination of the overall economies of the Nine.

The European Parliament has helped to make this more likely, and made the European public more aware of the RDF, by using it as the vehicle of its campaign to increase its control over the EEC budget. Stung by criticism that it is little more than a talking shop, the Parliament has tried to push the RDF into EEC law under the heading of 'non-obligatory' rather than 'obligatory' spending. The language is opaque, but the challenge is clear. The Parliament has more influence over non-obligatory, or discretionary, spending than over obligatory, or non-discretionary, spending like the Common Farm Fund whose outlays are largely dictated by movements in world agricultural prices. Also Parliament can take spending decisions on its own initiative on the basis of a ceiling set by a formula tied to a percentage share of that part of the EEC budget described as non-obligatory spending.

The Council of Ministers has not yet conceded Parliament's right to change the definition of the RDF to 'non-obligatory' spending and a constitutional tussle is possible. Nevertheless, the struggle has given Parliament a vested interest in the success of the RDF and this could be important if it becomes a more influential body. Direct elections could help to strengthen its authority and the only two member-states still equivocal on this are Britain and Denmark.

The RDF does not stand alone. Two other EEC instruments work in parallel, the European Social Fund and the semi-autonomous European Investment Bank in Luxembourg. The ESF began operating in 1960 with the intention of promoting employment as well as the geographical and occupational mobility of workers. Its activities were severely curtailed both by the very small level of help (less than £5 millon a year) it could offer and by the limitation that the ESF could only refund *half* the resettlement and retraining costs of workers who had lost their jobs. Most important, the ESF had no power of independent initiative and had to wait for requests for help from member-states. In 1972 this was reformed. The ESF's role is no longer an entirely passive one. It can actively seek to ease the economic and social hardships caused by industrial change and its financial resources—£180 million for this year—are much greater than before.

The European Investment Bank was established in 1959, and has since lent 4,500 million units of account, with more than a fifth of this total advanced in 1974. Most of the money goes to member-states but associated countries, especially Turkey, also benefit. About two-thirds

of EIB's loans are at present earmarked for projects coming under the umbrella heading of regional development. The EIB can nimbly shift its lending towards members in difficulties. It did this in 1974 when it substantially increased its credits to Italy (290 million units of account as against 182 million in 1973) and to the United Kingdom (154 million units of account as against 67 million). Also at a time when the Community was running a huge oil deficit, the EIB was able to raise over half its money from Middle East oil countries, thus helping to recycle petrodollars.

Less directly, the competition office of the Commission is also crucial to the economic integration of the Community. The EEC has already eliminated tariff barriers to trade between its six founder members and the three new members are 60 per cent. of the way toward phasing into the customs union. Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) remain, but are being steadily eroded by Mr. Finn Gundelach, the EEC Commissioner for the internal market. In swearing off 'harmonisation for harmonisation's sake', he has concentrated on getting rid of those NTBs which act as a protectionist impediment to intra-Community commerce.

This has made it tempting for those companies which find it more profitable to collaborate than to compete to negotiate agreements with 'rival' companies to carve up the EEC market. Despite its small staff, the competition office has made such restraints of trade ever harder by doggedly building up a body of case law before the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg on cartels, price fixing, market sharing, takeovers in abuse of a dominant position and the exploitation of trade mark and patent licences. Most of the judgments have come under articles 85 or 86, the main anti-trust provisions of the Treaty of Rome.

Monetary co-operation between the Nine, and between the EEC and the United States, has progressed far this year. The theological dispute over gold has receded now that there are less doctrinaire governments in power in France and in the United States. In Washington in January 1975 the United States and EEC reached a compromise over their differences when they agreed both to an IMF oil recycling fund and an OECD safety net.

This compromise would probably have proved impossible to reach if the Nine had repeated the sorry performance they gave at the Washington energy conference in February 1974, when M. Michel Jobert, the then French Foreign Minister, quarrelled in public with his country's EEC partners. The Nine, or at least their finance ministries, betray signs of drawing the correct conclusions from that debacle. Before going to Washington, the EEC finance ministers met at Lancaster House in London to agree on a common position and then chose Mr. Denis Healey, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, to present it to the non-EEC members of the Group of Ten.

Europe's politicians having shied away from a Hegelian conception of the Community, EMU is now little more than a gleam in the eyes of ardent Europeans. The recent report of the study group under M. Robert Marjolin, a former vice president of the Commission, said as much in finding that Europe is no nearer to EMU now than it was five years ago; 'in fact if there has been any movement at all it has been backward: national economic and monetary policies have never in 25 years been more discordant, more divergent, than they are today'.[1]

The Marjolin report ascribed failures to three main factors. First, unfavourable events, such as the international monetary crisis which has shaken the Western world since the end of the 1960s and the financial crisis brought about by the sharp rise in oil prices in 1973; second, lack of political will by governments, in consequence of which these crises, instead of triggering a 'leap forward', have produced a general loss of nerve, each government doing its best to find its own way out of trouble; third, insufficient understanding, whereby efforts have been started to move towards EMU without any precise idea of what was being undertaken.

The authors of this paper do not disagree with the Marjolin conclusions, but would put more stress on the fact that integration is being held up not by a lack of capacity to devise solutions but by the very different perception member-states have of where their self-interest lies. This is supported by deep social attitudes moulded by history which, for example, make the German public tolerant of a high rate of unemployment to pull back a rate of inflation which would be regarded as an excellent price performance in Italy or Britain.

Also the Marjolin report is too bleak. Since they formally recognised that economic and monetary union by 1980 is an absurd ambition, the EEC countries have opted for the more sensible course of co-ordinating policies. This will become ever more important as autonomous integration of EEC economies continues. The higher the ratio of trade to GNP the less effective are national fiscal and monetary policies (because there is more leakage). Intra-EEC trade is now over 10 per cent. of Community GNP, and growing.

Finance and economic ministries are slowly getting the message and it seems inevitable that the multi-layered inter-government and Community consultation procedures will have an increasing influence and impact on the bread and butter policies of member-states. The pace of progress, however, will stay slow and halting unless the EEC expands soon its short and medium-term financing arrangements. Until Italy pays back its medium-term loan in 1978 that cupboard is almost bare, and there is a constant danger that a balance-of-payments crisis will

[1] *Report of the Study Group 'Economic and Monetary Union 1980'*. European Commission Brussels, March 1975.

exert such downward pressure on the currency of a member-state that it will feel compelled to introduce import controls. That could wreck the customs union and the common external tariff. But so long as the will is there to develop the EEC's financing arrangements, this is not in itself a Herculean task. The Community already has most of the instruments, including short and medium-term credit arrangements, the European Investment Bank, the Social Fund and the Regional Development Fund.

The EEC budget needs to be expanded so that it can fulfil an important stabilisation role. The best way of doing this is by greatly increasing spending through the Regional Development Fund when it is refurbished after 1977. This could help right the top-heavy imbalance of the EEC budget toward agricultural spending, which accounts for about three-quarters of total outlays.

There is also a need for a large Community reserve fund along the lines suggested during the March 1973 foreign exchange crisis that brought about generalised floating by the Italians and the British. It would intervene to stabilise Community currencies against major outside currencies. The snake arrangements must also be liberalised. The experience of the last fifteen years is that fixed rates do not bring monetary stability in their wake. The stage should now be set for co-ordinated floating along lines similar to those proposed over the last two years by the Italians, British and French, in which Community currencies would float around a predetermined, though flexible, point of reference under a set of rules tougher than the weak IMF guidelines for floating.

More grandiose ideas, like a common currency called the 'Europa', ought to be pigeon-holed for the time being since much greater economic integration is needed before this becomes a sensible ambition. The new basket unit of account of the Community is a good reform and ought to be used as widely as possible for budgetary and accounting purposes and perhaps even as an increasingly convenient numeraire for loans floated on the money market. It could then gradually evolve into a currency running alongside national currencies and then perhaps gradually squeeze out the dollar within Europe and, eventually, European currencies as well. But this is all in the future. The need now is for agreed solutions to 20th century problems. The Community would move ahead further and faster if Eurocrats and other ardent Europeans took their eyes off the distant horizons and kept them instead on the rocks, puddles and pitfalls that lie ahead.

LEGAL CONFIGURATIONS OF INTEGRATION IN EASTERN EUROPE *

W. E. Butler

AT times there seems to be a curious, almost dialectical relationship between community-building in East and West.[1] The initial organisation formed in the East, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), was an explicit response to the Marshall Plan and incipient projects for West European unity. When in 1955 the members of the European Coal and Steel Community resolved to pursue a broader economic union in the aftermath of the European Defence Community debacle, Comecon also was searching for means of revitalisation after an extended period of dormancy. Early in 1958, shortly after treaties founding the European Economic Community and the European Community of Atomic Energy had entered into force, economic integration acquired a new dimension in the East with the resolve to pursue actively a socialist international division of labour (the principles of which were adopted in 1962)[2] and a harmonisation of long- and short-term planning techniques. And in 1969, when the three European communities were further fused in accordance with a ' Merger Treaty ' and when the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway had lodged applications for membership, the socialist countries commenced the preparation of a Comprehensive Programme for the Further Intensification and Improvement of Co-operation and the Development of Socialist Economic Integration of Comecon member-states, which was approved in 1971.[3]

Other developmental parallels are also noteworthy. Both communities must cope with substantial disparities in the economic level of their constituents. For the East that means not merely the overwhelming economic power of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis all other members but also the disparity between Mongolia and, say, the German Democratic Republic. Political will to pursue integration at the expense of state

* The present article is a revised version of a public lecture delivered at University College London in October 1974.

[1] The political and institutional history of Comecon and its sister entities has been discussed extensively in the literature. The most recent comprehensive legal analysis is J. Calliot, *Le C. A. E. M.: Aspects juridiques et formes de coopération économique entre les pays socialistes*. Paris: Librarie générale de droit et de jurisprudence. 1971.

[2] An excerpt appears in M. Kaser, *Comecon: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies*. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the RIIA. 2nd rev. ed. 1967. pp. 249–254.

[3] The full text is translated in *Soviet and East European Foreign Trade*, VII. White Plains. New York: International Arts and Sciences Press. 1971–72. pp. 187–305.

sovereignty, and consensus over what direction and at what pace integration should be pursued, are not uniform in either community nor is such consensus likely to be readily achieved.

But the two communities nonetheless represent very different models of integration. The European communities contain a strong dosage of supranationality, their founders entertaining the expectation that a fabric of economic and institutional co-operation would lay a base for political community on a higher level. Designed with a federation in mind, the EEC possesses legislative, executive, and judicial organs. Although its Parliament, the Assembly, still consists of members appointed by national legislatures of the respective member-states, one day it may yet exercise its prerogative to establish direct suffrage. For the moment, it remains essentially a political consultative body.

The EEC Council of Ministers, where government representatives sit, and the Commission, composed of nationals of member-countries, have approximate analogues in Comecon and its sister entities. But the Court of Justice is without parallel in the East; the Court's powers to interpret both the Treaties and the acts of community institutions and bodies and to ensure the supremacy of Community law over the municipal laws of member-states are ingredients deliberately excluded from integration undertakings in the socialist countries.

The international entities comprising the socialist economic community have been founded on contrary premises, in theory an Englishman's dream: the preserving of state sovereignty while simultaneously pursuing a more rational 'internationalisation of productive forces'. The search for effective means wherein both objectives might be accommodated has thus far produced an embryonic but interesting legal model illustrative of the interrelationship between socialist legal systems and an external legal order; it is also a model of some importance for public international law and the law of international institutions. This essay undertakes to identify some features which seem to derive from or are adapted to distinctively socialist legal principles or experiences and to speculate about the role that law may assume in the process of community-formation.

Socialist international organisations: a profile

We shall not dwell here on the organisational and political history of Comecon and its sister entities, which in any event has been extensively chronicled, nor indeed shall we undertake to describe the present complement of these institutions, which multiply at an astonishing rate. A profile of the range and types of organisations, their functions and powers, and the concept of integration at present espoused, will suffice for our purposes.

It is not easy to know where to begin: with the organisations or with

the integrative concept, for unlike the European communities, which were created in a context disposed toward an eventual supranational community, socialist international institutions were founded not merely on a contrary premise but they also reflect willy-nilly the particular doctrines or approaches to integration prevalent at various periods since 1949.

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance existed for eleven years without a constituent instrument. The communiqué announcing its formation in January 1949 disclosed that the organisation's object was to promote 'wider economic co-operation' between the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, as they then were, and laid down principles that have been embodied in the charters of most of the other socialist international organisations, namely: (1) membership is open to all countries sharing the principles of the organisation; (2) each member-country is to enjoy full and equal representation; (3) decisions are to be taken only with the agreement of 'interested countries', a term of art which is the subject of juridical controversy; (4) meetings are to be held periodically in respective member-countries, in turn, with a rotating chairman.[4] To these the 1960 Comecon Charter added the right of member-countries to withdraw from the Council upon appropriate notification of the depositary, the right of Comecon to enjoy the requisite legal capacity on the territory of each member for the performance of its functions, and the extension to Comecon personnel of the status of international civil servants.[5] With minor variations, these principles are equally to be found in the charters or statutes of Comecon's sister organisations.

Comecon has four principal organs: the Session of the Council, an unusual expression which somehow conveys an ad hoc element and produces the peculiar result that one must speak of the 'session' or 'meeting' of the Session; the Executive Committee; a series of permanent commissions; and a Secretariat. The highest of these is the Session, consisting of delegations, usually headed by a deputy head of government, from all member-countries who meet at least once a year to discuss and adopt recommendations or decisions in regard to questions within its jurisdiction.

The Executive Committee is the executive organ; it normally meets

[4] The author has edited an extensive collection of documents relating to Socialist international organisations in Volume XI of *Soviet Statutes and Decisions* (1974–75; published quarterly White Plains, New York: International Arts and Sciences Press). Most of the agreements, statutes, charters, protocols, and rules of procedure are to be found there

[5] The full text of the Charter appears in *Soviet Statutes and Decisions*, XI. 1974. 5–18, but does not include an amendment to the Charter of June 21, 1974. The USSR ratified this amendment on October 29, 1974, but as of September 1975 it apparently had not entered into force. See *Vedomosti verkhovnogo soveta SSSR*. Moscow: Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. 1974. no. 45, item 743.

quarterly to perform such tasks as directing the work connected with performing the organisation's functions and supervising the execution of Council recommendations; directing the co-ordination of national economic plans and of specialisation and production co-operation among member-countries; working out basic aspects of the international division of labour for key branches of production; and directing the Secretariat of the Council and permanent commissions. Representation on the Executive Committee is at deputy head of government level.

The Executive Committee may itself create organs necessary for the performance of its functions, and has done so recently in connection with the 1971 Comprehensive Programme. One is a special committee concerned with co-operation in planning activity; the other, a committee for scientific and technical co-operation. Their principal functions are to identify problems obstructing co-operation in major sectors of the national economy and to recommend solutions to the Executive Committee. The committee on planning, for example, is comprised of the chairmen of national planning agencies who meet at least twice annually; it has its own working organ and makes proposals to the Session or the Executive Committee or adopts recommendations of its own. The jurisdiction of the committee embraces such important areas as fuel, energy, and raw materials problems, advanced technology, transport, economic forecasting, joint planning by particular countries of individual branches of the economy, the preparation of draft multilateral agreements on co-operation in production, and supervising the fulfilment of recommendations adopted by the committee or at its instance.

These special committees are attached to the Executive Committee and are in addition to the principal organs referred to above.

Permanent commissions are the third type of principal Comecon organ. There are over twenty of them, organised primarily on a sectoral basis to develop economic links and co-ordinate sectoral planning among member-countries. Each has the services of a Secretariat and may form its own working organs when necessary. Representation is again by country, although the level of representation is not specified. Their headquarters are distributed in various capitals of the member-countries.

The Comecon Secretariat services the Council and often performs secretariat functions for other Council organs and permanent commissions. It is staffed by nationals of member-states who possess the 'requisite theoretical training, practical work experience, organisational skills, and satisfactory knowledge of the Council working language'. International lawyers are included in the personnel establishment. Among the Secretariat's legal duties are the notification of member-countries about bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded within the Comecon framework, the keeping of a register of Comecon recommendations and decisions, the preparation of draft proposals for the

Comecon Executive Committee and permanent commissions, and acting as the depositary of multilateral agreements.

Also within the Comecon framework is a grouping of permanent entities, which, by the way, are not mentioned in the Comecon Charter, bearing the curious appellation of ' Meeting ' or ' Convocation '. They serve as a forum, respectively, for ministers of foreign trade, for directors of state labour agencies, for directors of chartering and shipowner organisations, for directors of water conservancy organs, and for legal experts of Comecon member-countries. The Meeting of Representatives of Comecon Member-Countries on Legal Questions, for example, was instituted in December 1969 to help improve the legal bases for co-operation by studying and resolving legal issues arising in the course thereof. It is empowered to draft or organise the drafting of multilateral agreements, conventions, or uniform rules and statutes regulating economic, scientific, and technical co-operation and to deal with legal issues or documents relating to Comecon operations or to Comecon relations with non-member countries or organisations. The Meeting is also to seek means of extending the uniform applications of international legal rules governing Comecon co-operation, to further the harmonisation of the domestic law of member-countries, and to arrange for exchanges of legal information and opinions relating to Comecon operations. The powers of the Meeting are far more limited than the organs previously discussed, which may approve decisions or recommendations in a formal sense for subsequent adoption by member-countries. The Meeting may submit proposals to appropriate Comecon organs or actually ' reach agreement ' on questions within its rather specialised competence; in the latter instance, member-countries are to give effect to agreements reached in accordance with the established procedure in those countries. All Meetings submit annual reports to the Comecon Executive Committee on their activity.

The Comecon family also embraces two research institutes which prepare recommendations, respectively, for the unification or creation of national standards and for exchanging information and co-ordinating research on economic problems of the world socialist system.

Outside the Comecon family but nonetheless closely linked to it by bilateral and multilateral agreements are a number of other socialist international organisations, often called ' production-branch organisations ', which were also formed to promote socialist integration: The Joint Institute for Nuclear Research; the Organisation for Co-operation in the Bearings Industry; the Organisation for Co-operation of Railways; the Organisation for the Co-operation of Socialist Countries in Tele- and Postal Communications; the Common Pool of Railway Goods Wagons; the Organisation for Co-operation in Ferrous Metallurgy; the

International Centre for Scientific and Technical Information; the International Branch Organisation for Co-operation in Small-Tonnage Chemical Production (Interkhim); the Central Despatch Administration for the Combined Power Systems; ' Agromash ', an organisation furthering co-operation in the manufacture of certain types of agricultural equipment; and a new organisation called ' Interelektro ' formed in December 1973 about which little is known.

All these organisations have certain distinctive features—for example, Interkhim arranged in 1972 to become a specialised agency of Comecon; membership in many organisations is smaller than that of Comecon—but we need not dwell on these matters here. For our purposes suffice it to note that each enjoys legal personality, acts according to its own charter or statute, and takes decisions on essentially the same basis as other socialist international organisations. Their legal status and privileges are specially treated in a multilateral agreement granting them exemption from direct taxes, charges, and customs duties, inviolability of archives, premises, and documents. Their property is not subject to confiscation or administrative distraint, and their officials are accorded a number of functional privileges.[6]

Two international banks service the financial needs of economic integration. The International Bank for Economic Co-operation was founded in 1963 to facilitate bilateral and multilateral transactions between member-countries in transferable rubles, to extend credit for the foreign trade operations of the bank, and to provide finance and credit for joint industrial enterprises that may be established by member-countries. Share contributions to charter capital are assessed on volume of Comecon export trade, but each member-country has one vote on the Bank Council and all decisions are to be taken unanimously irrespective of any ' interest ' criterion. The International Investment Bank, formed in 1970, grants long- and medium-term credits for the implementation of measures connected with the international socialist division of labour, specialisation and co-operation in production, expenditure on the expansion of raw material and fuel resources, and other such purposes. It is intended to further economic integration and indeed may by agreement with Comecon participate in deliberations relating to capital investment aspects of national economic planning. In other respects the Investment Bank follows the essential pattern of the International Bank of Economic Co-operation.

In accordance with the 1971 Comprehensive Programme, international economic combines are being established as a form of joint venture to produce such items as, for example, textile machinery. Their coming into

[6] The special convention governing the legal status and privileges of international branch organisations for economic co-operation appears in *International Legal Materials*, XI. Washington, D.C.: The American Society of International Law. 1972. 468–469.

being raises fascinating juridical issues that are only in the very early stages of consideration.

This, then, is a brief sketch of socialist international organisations. Their formal procedures for decision-making strongly resemble the classical forms of international institutions, where policies are determined by duly empowered representatives of member-countries who are under instructions from their governments and can take decisions by unanimous vote of either all members or of all members who have not declared a non-interest in a question under consideration. To be sure, meetings of ruling communist parties of the member-countries add a consensus-forming ingredient lacking in other institutional frameworks. But insistence on the classical institutional model and a disposition to create new entities to assume new tasks instead of enlarging the capacities of existing organisations have thus far enabled the socialist states to avoid the debate over the ' inherent ' or ' implied ' powers of Comecon and its sister entities.

Before turning to consider what one socialist jurist has called ' the legal system of socialist economic integration ',[7] a further word should be said about the concept of economic integration now prevailing in the socialist community. Earlier reference was made to the stages in the development of socialist international institutions and the tasks these organisations were created to perform. Movements toward integration are regarded in socialist doctrine as being part of a general historical process based on societal laws. By co-ordinating national economic planning, encouraging specialisation of labour, expanding mutual trade, increasing exchanges of technical and scientific information, jointly investing in multinational projects or firms to exploit resources or production potential of mutual benefit, harmonising or unifying legal norms, standardising production specifications, jointly planning branches of industry, and other related measures, it is anticipated that economic growth will be accelerated and rationalised to the mutual benefit of all concerned. At the moment we are said to be witnessing ' organised integration ', which means that economic rationality is to be pursued while retaining state sovereignty; total integration into a single political and economic community is not being held out as a natural concomitant of ' organised integration '. That ultimate stage is related to the indefinite future.

The legal effect of recommendations of socialist international organisations

A Hungarian economist commented recently, and his views are doubtless shared by many others frustrated by the obstacles to economic

[7] See O. Kampa, ' O iuridicheskoi kvalifikatsii neposredstvennykh sviazei mezhdu promyshlennymi ministerstvami stran-chlenov SEV ', in E. T. Usenko (ed.), *Mezhvedomstvennye sviazi v usloviiakh sotsialisticheskoi ekonomicheskoi integratsii*. Moscow, 1973. p. 44.

integration, that the existence of national states and the movement towards an 'internationalisation of productive forces' are in basic contradiction with one another.[8] Since socialist international organisations are precluded from 'legislating' for their constituents, the question arises of what importance their recommendations and decisions have for member-countries. Before the adoption of the 1960 Comecon Charter, there was a body of opinion which held that Comecon recommendations were of moral and political significance but created no legal obligations for member-states. This implied that measures such as the 1958 General Conditions for the delivery of goods, which sought to lay down uniform rules in this domain, might be treated as recommendatory, thereby defeating even rudimentary efforts at co-operation. Others suggested that the General Conditions were binding on member-states by virtue of municipal acts giving them effect, usually an order of a ministry of foreign trade introducing the General Conditions into force in a given country, but this could allow individual countries to modify them at their pleasure, again defeating their purpose.[9]

The 1960 Comecon Charter empowered the Council and its organs to adopt binding decisions only in respect of organisational and procedural matters. Moreover, adoption is not sufficient; the decision does not take effect until the protocol of the meeting is signed by the member-countries in attendance. Other questions within the competence of Comecon may be the subject of recommendations, which are communicated to member-countries for consideration. All members must agree to the recommendation or decision, each member reserving the right to declare its non-interest in a particular instance, whereupon its agreement is no longer essential. Thus the sole legal duty of the state to which a recommendation is addressed is to consider it and notify the adopting organisation of its decision, usually within a designated period. No sanction apparently attaches to failure to consider in a timely manner. The prevailing view now seems to be that two kinds of recommendation emerge from Comecon and its organs. Some impose rights and duties on states and, once they are approved by them, such recommendations are the equivalent of an international treaty. Sometimes called 'qualified' recommendations, they are transformed into municipal rules by the decrees of member-countries approving and introducing them into effect. The international organ adopting the recommendation is not itself party to the 'treaty', though some suggest that the recommendation giving rise to the agreement retains importance as a form of legal tie between the organisation and member-countries in respect of the treaty (suffi-

[8] S. Ausch, *Theory and practice of C.M.E.A. cooperation.* Budapest: Akadémiai. Kiadó. 1972.

[9] See L. Popov, 'Pravovaia priroda rekomendatsii SEV i ikh rol' v unifikatsii uslovii mezhdunarodnykh postavok tovarov', in Usenko, note 7 above, pp. 80–92.

cient, for example, for the organisation to comment if the treaty were violated?). Not all recommendations contain rights and duties. In that case they are termed ' incomplete recommendations ' inasmuch as supplemental agreements must be concluded among interested states in regard to questions left open in the recommendations.[10]

But consensus on the issue is not complete. The treaty theory is challenged in some quarters on the ground that acceptance of Comecon recommendations by member-states merely makes the recommendation binding and does not transform it into an international treaty. Others are sceptical whether recommendations can be ' transformed ' into municipal law; what occurs in their view is a literal incorporation of an international text into a municipal enactment, thereby giving it binding effect.[11] The juxtaposition is hardly that between supranationalists and proponents of a classical international organisation, but there are nuances to the various positions which could conceivably bear on the pace of economic integration and are of great relevance to the 1971 Comprehensive Programme.

The Comprehensive Programme is perhaps the most important single document to emanate from a socialist international organisation. It was formally approved by the highest organ of Comecon and, in individual member-countries, by joint decree of the central committee (or politburo) of the ruling party and the council of ministers or state council: this is the normal procedure for Comecon recommendations although not commonly at such a high level of party-government organs. Some proponents of the treaty have labelled the Comprehensive Programme a treaty *sui generis*, stressing the Programme's continued link as a treaty with the recommendation which created it. This link is to serve several purposes. It obliges member-countries to inform Comecon about progress in executing treaty obligations and enables the Council to assist members to carry its terms into effect, particularly when members conclude supplemental agreements to modify or elaborate provisions even though Comecon may not be a direct party to these supplements.

As a treaty *sui generis*, questions are already being posed about the applicability of the general law of treaties. Should treaties *sui generis* be subject to reservations? Should states have the right to withdraw? When do they enter into force? Whatever the answers, such treaties are not deemed to be self-executing. They create no rights for ministries, departments, or state economic organisations except as provided by domestic implementing legislation.

The Comprehensive Programme does, however, call for an expansion

[10] See A. N. Talalaev, ' Sotsialisticheskaia ekonomicheskaia integratsiia i voprosy teorii mezhdunarodnogo dogovora ', in Usenko, note 7 above, pp. 63–79.

[11] See N. V. Mironov, ' Iuridicheskaia priroda mezhdunarodnykh mezhdvedomstvennykh soglashenii,' in Usenko, note 7 above, pp. 24–42.

of direct links between ministries, agencies, and other government organs, as well as economic, scientific research, planning, and design organisations of Comecon entities. The most advisable means, according to the Programme, for recording agreements reached on such matters is the *dogovor*, a term which may be translated either as ' treaty ' or ' contract ' and in a general sense refers to any document recording the agreement of particular subjects of law relating to the establishment, modification or termination of their mutual rights and duties. In the past Soviet jurists in particular have been at pains to distinguish between the state as a sovereign bearer of international legal obligations and state-owned juridical persons as subjects of civil law relations. The Comprehensive Programme will blur these distinctions in some cases and greatly increase the number of international treaties contracted between or among state organs within the Comecon framework. Each member-country is left with the problem of resolving the capacity of its organs to conclude treaties, bearing in mind the general propositions that norms of interdepartmental treaties may not modify internal legislation enacted by other state agencies superior to the organ concluding the agreement nor imperative norms established by domestic law. The possibility of conflicts is substantial, and the rule of international law that a treaty is considered to have been concluded by a state through its duly authorised organ acting within its competence as defined by municipal law is not all that helpful. It is not difficult to imagine the multifarious agencies of Comecon member-states quite accidentally binding their governments to agreements inconsistent with those concluded by other agencies or with internal legislation. Moreover, the status of particular organs in a socialist state is subject to a surprising degree of instability which could itself change the equation of the agreement. One Soviet jurist has proposed that a hierarchy of international legal norms be fixed with regard to the level of state agency participating in its formation, a proposal which would if accepted be a startling innovation in international law. Others favour the conclusion of a special multilateral agreement or the passage of appropriate legislation laying down principles for resolving conflicts of this sort.[12]

Since July 1970 a procedure has been in operation for transmitting copies of bilateral and multilateral agreements on economic, scientific, and technical co-operation (including trade, payments, finance, credit, and technical assistance agreements) concluded by Comecon member-countries within twenty days after entry into force to the Comecon Secretariat. A register is kept of these, together with agreements to which Comecon is a party or acts as depositary, and extracts are circulated to

[12] See E. T. Usenko, ' O pravovoi prirode neposredstvennykh sviazei po linii ministerstv i vedomstv stran-chlenov SEV ', in Usenko, note 7 above, pp. 7–23.

member-states monthly. A treaty collection is published from time to time including all documents except those designated by the parties as 'not subject to publication'.[13]

Domestic legislation and socialist international organisations

Up to this point we have been concerned with the relationship between Comecon recommendations and the means of giving them effect in the domestic legal order of the member-countries. All member-countries are obliged by the Comprehensive Programme to carry out significant changes in their national legislation, unifying and harmonising legal rules and institutions and thereby enlarging the 'common core'. The areas in which the socialist countries find themselves not sufficiently in step are perhaps surprising to those who imagine that a high level of uniformity has already been achieved in socialist legal systems, at least in respect of the national economy. Reforms in civil legislation will be required to regulate the legal status of the new economic combines and the contracts which are concluded directly with foreign juridical persons. Sharper and more uniform lines will be needed to demarcate the jurisdiction of state and economic organs in the domain of economic and scientific-technical co-operation, areas where many East European socialist countries give greater latitude to enterprises than does the Soviet Union. National economic planning, capital investment and carriage of goods will be principal objects of concern. Labour codes must be amended to take fuller account of nationals of one member-country who work in another. Even environment legislation is to be the object of concerted reforms. On the international level the various Comecon General Conditions for the delivery of goods, for assembling items, and for technical services—highly regarded by Western jurists as an advanced unification of rules relating to private international law—require improvement. Progress has already been made in the area of foreign trade arbitration. In a convention concluded in May 1972 Comecon member-countries brought civil law suits arising out of economic, scientific, and technical co-operation—suits heretofore settled through administrative channels—within the jurisdiction of foreign trade arbitration tribunals and unified some rules of procedure for hearing such disputes.[14]

Perhaps this account of the domestic legal anomalies that beset movement towards integration can best be concluded by considering 'diagonal' relations. This term is applied to situations in which a particular

[13] For the text of the document laying down this procedure, see *Soviet Statutes and Decisions*, XI. White Plains, New York: International Arts and Sciences Press. 1974–75. pp. 129–132. From January 1975 Comecon has published a bi-monthly *Bulletin* of Comecon materials, *Ekonomicheskoe Sotrudnichestvo stran-chlenov Sev.* Distrib. in UK by Collet's.

[14] See *International Legal Materials*, XIII. Washington, D.C.: The American Society of International Law. 1974. pp. 5–12.

question falls within the jurisdiction of a state organ in one country and an economic organisation in another. It is, of course, a common occurence in East-West commercial relationships and gave rise to a network of foreign trade combines structured to operate in a civil legal capacity in foreign markets. In their own interrelationships Comecon countries will regard contracts between economic organisations and state organs as civil law contracts and seek over time to adjust the organisational disparities.

Conclusion

To what extent, then, does this ' legal system of socialist integration ', relying upon the classical model of limited international organisations and upon the permissively supple international law of treaties, further the notion of a socialist family of legal systems? Economic integration assuredly must enhance community-consciousness, and although delegation of real authority to independent institutions would be in derogation of what one jurist has called a rule of *jus cogens* of socialist economic integration, member-countries do of course limit their sovereignty in agreements whose observance is required by international law. The areas in which changes are sought, either by incorporating or transforming norms agreed in recommendations of socialist international institutions or by multilateral or bilateral treaty, are those which a decade or two ago would have been singled out by comparatists as distinguishing socialist legal systems from their continental and common law counterparts: economic and administrative rules regulating state ownership of the instruments and means of production and a planned economy. Those who regard the growth of the public sector in the West as reducing these distinguishing features from one of quality to one of degree may see the movement towards harmonisation and unification as further confirmation of their view. The key may lie in the ultimate extent to which socialist economic integration does require in its present institutional framework a shaping of traditional principles of treaty law. Some socialist jurists are already thinking in terms of ' treaties of a new socialist type ' whose object of furthering socialist integration must be subordinated to all other elements of international treaties and institutes of the law of treaties. Should this come to be the pattern, we will see not a new legal order, as is envisaged by the European communities, but a modified international economic legal order applicable within the framework of socialist international organisations. One hesitates to describe it as a regional legal order, for its patterns of legal behaviour within the institutions may not appear so different in the larger context of the law of international organisations.

It follows, of course, for students of East-West relations that the

juridical developments and trends outlined in this essay mean that institutional, economic, and political studies of Comecon and its sister entities can no longer adequately treat the activities of those bodies. Just as the domestic economic reforms in Eastern Europe injected a greater element of legal regulation in place of administrative fiat for the management of national economies, so too is law rather belatedly being summoned to the service of international economic integration. How directive a role law can be expected to assume remains to be seen. The impetus towards regional practices is undoubted and the impact upon general international law uncertain.

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT

Michael Leifer

EVER since the decline of the ancient Khmer Empire, geography has combined with politics to shape the fortunes of the Cambodian state. Indeed, there have been a number of occasions in the past when internal political changes were either conceived, confirmed or corrected by external parties with a tangible interest in its system of rule. Thus, it was not any remarkable quality of prescience which prompted the ousted head of state of Cambodia, writing from his place of exile in Peking, to assert that ' Sihanouk's fall in Cambodia will not have had the same consequences for the United States and its " camp " as Sukarno's fall had in Indonesia, for it must not be forgotten that Cambodia is not an island far removed from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of China: my country is their next-door neighbour '.[1] By the time Prince Sihanouk had pointed to the geo-political circumstances of Cambodia, external influences had already engulfed the country and in their interplay with competing domestic interests had served to govern the course of a violent conflict. Indeed, what has been so striking about the brutalising experience of Cambodia over the five years between the deposition of Prince Sihanouk and the investment of Phnom Penh by Khmer Rouge forces has been the very manner in which domestic and international political factors have interacted. The purpose of this article is to consider the role and impact of those international or external factors which came into play as a direct consequence of domestic political change.

It would seem logical to begin an analysis of this kind by discussing both the international significance and the repercussions of the deposition of Prince Sihanouk on March 18, 1970. The actual displacement of Sihanouk was inspired by reasons essentially internal to Cambodia. Indeed, one would not wish to quarrel with the view that ' To dwell on the issue of external involvement in the coup of March 1970 is to diminish the all important fact that Sihanouk fell in the final analysis because of the disenchantment and finally the open dissidence of opponents *within* his state '.[2] Nonetheless, it was the manner and the fact of the deposition

[1] Norodom Sihanouk, ' The Future of Cambodia '. *Foreign Affairs*, October 1970. p. 9.

[2] Milton Osborne, *Politics and Power in Cambodia*, Camberwell, Australia: Longman. 1973, pp. 108–9.

of Prince Sihanouk which served to transform the international associations of Cambodia and to recast its international position. In addition, it would seem that although the mode of overthrow of Sihanouk did not follow any preordained plan,[3] the degree of preconceived design which preceded it took into account some of the likely international consequences of his enforced exit from office.

Without accepting at face value the accusation by Prince Sihanouk that the CIA master-minded his overthrow,[4] there is evidence which not only indicates prior plotting by General Lon Nol but also contingency planning which took into account the probable hostile reaction of the Vietnamese communists for whom Cambodia had become a major military facility. This evidence points to a collusive association, beginning in August 1969, between Lon Nol, who had just resumed the office of prime minister, and the long-standing antagonist of Sihanouk, former Prime Minister Son Ngoc Thanh, then in exile in South Vietnam.[5] Thanh, who was of Cochin-Chinese origin, had for many years led a dissident movement against Prince Sihanouk, and to this end had secured access to a force of ethnic Cambodians (Khmer Krom) from Cochin-China trained by Americans and fighting as Special Forces in South Vietnam. It would seem that Lon Nol was interested in obtaining the services of these forces in the event of a coup, to meet the danger of counter-action by either Sihanouk loyalists in the Cambodian army or Vietnamese communists entrenched in the eastern provinces of the country. Whether this indication of prior planning by Lon Nol involved a connection with some branch of the American intelligence ' community ' is not as important in the context of this article[6] as the probability that Lon Nol, either acting alone or with Prince Sirik Matak, his principal government deputy, had a clear awareness that the removal of Sihanouk would be more than just a domestic affair. In the event, a number of ethnic Cambodians serving with South Vietnamese Regional Forces were moved across the border before the deposition of Prince Sihanouk, while there occurred a concurrent rallying or surrender to the Cambodian army of ethnic Cambodians from the dissident Khmer Serai movement led by Son Ngoc Thanh. Actual units of Khmer Krom Special Forces were not identified in Cambodia until May 1970.

[3] T. D. Allman in *The Guardian*, March 21, 1970.

[4] See Norodom Sihanouk and Wilfred Burchett, *My War With the C.I.A.: Cambodia's Fight for Survival*. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1973.

[5] See Milton Osborne, ' Effacing the God-King—Internal Developments in Cambodia since March 1970 ', in J. J. Zasloff and Allan E. Goodman (eds.), *Indochina in Conflict*, Heath: Lexington, 1972, p. 61. Osborne writes on the basis of an interview with the brother of Son Ngoc Thanh. See also the interviews given to T. D. Allman by Son Ngoc Thanh published in *The Guardian* in 1971.

[6] Osborne has suggested that there is reason to believe ' that the South Vietnamese military authorities and through them United States military authorities, must have had some advance notice of the intended confrontation (and subsequent coup), in Cambodia.' *op cit.*, p. 77, footnote 14.

The actual removal of Prince Sihanouk was justified largely on the grounds that his exclusivist practice of foreign policy had facilitated a major and intolerable Vietnamese communist intrusion into Cambodian territory. In seizing upon and openly exploiting this issue, irrespective of the threat posed by the intrusion, his opponents inevitably established a firm junction between domestic and international politics. This was a direct consequence of the way in which internal changes effected within Cambodia were perceived and interpreted by external parties who possessed a critical interest in the course and outcome of the conflict in neighbouring South Vietnam. This was very much the case with the Vietnamese communists who, since the military failure of the Tet offensive of January 1968, had become increasingly dependent on the facilities provided by and through Cambodia for the prosecution of war in South Vietnam.

The particular manner and circumstances in which the internal challenge to Sihanouk was manifested provided the initial link between the domestic and the international dimensions of politics. The inspired sacking of the two Vietnamese communist diplomatic missions in Phnom Penh and the ultimatum that all Vietnamese communist military units be removed speedily from Cambodian soil may have been useful for a domestic political purpose but they made the subsequent deposition of Prince Sihanouk an event of international significance. It marked the end of a tenuous political accommodation by posing a direct challenge to the interests of the Vietnamese communists whose military presence was deployed between two sets of hostile forces, if of unequal capability. Lon Nol had been a party to past negotiations and secret agreements with the Vietnamese communists and well understood—or at least, should have understood—the importance which they placed on the continued and unhindered use of Cambodian territory.[7] In addition, as a former Commander-in-Chief of the Cambodian armed forces (and Minister of Defence), he knew full well the extent of deficiences in numbers, arms and experience which made them a less than suitable instrument of countervailing power against any military threat from the Vietnamese communists. As such, it is possible to suggest that he exploited the issue of the Vietnamese communist presence for a domestic political purpose either with no thought for the consequences or with a sense of confidence in the prospect of external support.

These alternative, if tentative, conclusions lead on to a consideration of another international contextual circumstance of Prince Sihanouk's deposition, namely the 'secret' American bombing of the sparsely-

[7] In what was intended to be his political testament Lon Nol has claimed: 'At the end of Autumn 1966 with the consent of Sihanouk, the invasion of our country by the Communist North Vietnamese was consummated'. *Le Neo-Khmerisme*, Phnom Penh, 1974. p. 76.

populated eastern border areas of Cambodia from March 1969. This became full public knowledge in July 1973 as a result of testimony by the American Defence Secretary, James Schlesinger, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, although it was obviously known to the Vietnamese communists from the outset. The actual background to this bombing can be surmised, although the precise details of the agreement which made it possible are not known.

The Vietnamese communists in Cambodia

In the latter part of 1967, both the South Vietnamese and American governments had reiterated charges that the Vietnamese communists were utilising Cambodian territory as an active sanctuary. Indeed, the United States government let it be known that its forces in South Vietnam might be obliged to engage in acts of hot pursuit across Cambodia's border should its territory continue to be used in such a way. Prince Sihanouk's initial angry response to this prospect gave way to sad realism. Not only did he declare himself prepared to receive an envoy from the American President to discuss the matter of active sanctuary, but he also expressed a willingness to tolerate hot pursuit by United States forces where Vietnamese communist units had illegally entered outlying border regions. On January 8, 1968, Chester Bowles, then United States ambassador in New Delhi, arrived in Phnom Penh to begin discussions with the Cambodian government, which at the time was headed by Prince Sihanouk as Prime Minister. Circumstantial evidence suggests that these discussions led to a tacit understanding whereby Prince Sihanouk would not object publicly to American bombing, which may well have been suggested as the alternative to a direct invasion of the kind which occurred in May 1970.[8] It is of some interest to note that the 'secret' American bombing occurred concurrently with the onset of public criticism by Prince Sihanouk himself of the extent of the Vietnamese communist military presence within Cambodia and of an initial closure of the port of Sihanoukville to the entry of supplies which sustained that presence.

Lon Nol as former Commander-in-Chief of the Cambodian armed forces, and as the man chosen subsequently by Sihanouk to become Prime Minister, was almost certainly privy to any understandings which preceded and permitted the American bombing as well as to the arrangement revealed in March 1970, whereby the Americans provided intelligence on Vietnamese communist dispositions to the Cambodians. The fact of an American military intervention against the Vietnamese communists in Cambodia which, although unpublished, had been under way for a full year before the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk, would seem to

[8] See Laura Summers, 'Cambodia: Model of the Nixon Doctrine', *Current History*, December 1973, p. 255, footnote 7.

indicate that there was a basis for any expectations of external assistance by those who went out of their way to challenge the interests of the Vietnamese communists. In other words, the deliberate exploitation of the issue of the Vietnamese communist military presence for a domestic political purpose and the attendant risk of the international repercussions of such a course of action may well have been undertaken because the prior engagement of the United States indicated a ready recourse to strong countervailing power. What went so terribly wrong for those who probably acted on the basis of such calculations was the failure to foresee the force and impact of the Vietnamese communist response to such a challenge and the inability of American material assistance and military might to underpin a government whose political resources were so limited from the outset.

It has been suggested so far that those instrumental in the deposition of Prince Sihanouk were not only conscious of some of the general international implications of such an act but also that they engaged in prior contingency planning to take account of them and that, in addition, they probably drew comfort from the undoubted prior military engagement of the United States. Their attention was directed primarily to the two external parties who possessed the most direct interest in the consequences of political transformation within Cambodia, namely the Vietnamese communists and the United States in association with its ally, the government of Saigon. Cambodia was perceived by both these parties as linked to the struggle for South Vietnam to the extent that whoever commanded the territory of Cambodia, let alone its government, would be in a position to threaten or protect that entity.

From the outset, and especially given the nature of preceding events, the removal of Prince Sihanouk was construed by the Vietnamese communists as a major challenge to their interests. It is possible that any initial testing of the prospect of achieving a practical accommodation through negotiations in Phnom Penh—not with Sihanouk, then abroad—was less than serious on their part.[9] In any case, those negotiations came to an early deadlock and took place concurrently with signs of military co-operation between South Vietnamese and Cambodian forces. More significant for the Vietnamese communists was the fortunate prospect, on the morrow of the coup, of finding a basis of legitimacy, both domestic and international, for the continuing military use of Cambodia and for sponsoring an organised challenge to a government whose very manner of deposing its head of state indicated an intolerable threat.

The Vietnamese communists were undoubtedly helped by the fortuitous arrival in Peking of Prince Sihanouk the day after his deposition.

[9] See the discussion in Peter Poole, *The Expansion of the Vietnam War into Cambodia*: Athens, Ohio: Ohio State University, Center for International Studies, 1970. pp. 15–16.

The Chinese government, eager to outbid the Soviet Union in competition for the political affections of those in power in Hanoi and probably awake to the opportunity of influencing the eventual political shape of Indochina, assumed the roles of broker and patron. Its leaders pandered to the affronted Sihanouk and the day after his arrival in Peking from Moscow brought him together with Pham Van Dong, the North Vietnamese Premier. The outcome of this sponsored meeting was the creation on March 23, 1970, of a Cambodian National United Front under the titular leadership of Prince Sihanouk and with a form and programme which were in the tradition of previous revolutionary front organisations sponsored by the Vietnamese communists within Indochina. It was the National United Front which was to provide the facade of national liberation for the armed propaganda teams of Vietnamese communists —and not the still fragmentary forces of the Khmer Rouge—who began to penetrate deeply into Cambodia from the end of March and who from the outset severely tested the capability of the army and administration of post-Sihanouk Cambodia.

Given the public expression of ostensible support for the cause of Sihanouk from both the government in Hanoi and its provisional revolutionary counterpart, it does not seem likely that negotiations with the Lon Nol government after March 23 were based on any serious expectations of restoring the *status quo ex ante*. From that day the die was cast, and this was confirmed initially by the withdrawal of all Vietnamese communist diplomats from the Cambodian capital on March 26, and subsequently by the convening at the end of April under Chinese sponsorship of an Indochinese People's Conference at which Pham Van Dong reaffirmed Vietnamese communist support for the revolutionary cause in Cambodia.[10]

It cannot be asserted with enough forcefulness that it was the initial Vietnamese communist military penetration of Cambodia which overwhelmed an enfeebled Cambodian army and created the administrative vacuum which enabled the Khmer Rouge to become a political and military reality. Certainly they had not been the beneficiaries of major external support until after the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk.[11] Indeed, it is ironic to note his judgment, expressed before his removal but published after it, that ' These " reds " would present no great danger if they did not receive orders, weapons and supplies from abroad '.[12] There is no denying that from the outset of the dry season of 1972–73 the Khmer Rouge assumed an increasing military independence in the confrontation

[10] *Signal Victory of the Militant Unity of the Three Indo-Chinese Peoples*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1970, pp. 48–57.

[11] See David Brown, ' Exporting Insurgency: The Communists in Cambodia ' in Zasloff and Goodman, *op. cit.*, pp. 125/6.

[12] Norodom Sihanouk, ' How Cambodia Fares in the Changing Indochina Peninsula ', *Pacific Community*, April 1970, p. 346.

with the forces of the Lon Nol government. However, it was the Vietnamese communists who took on the vanguard role for them by establishing within Cambodia an iron curtain behind the security of which they could be nurtured to become an interposing force able to pursue their own interests and to lend protection to the extensive logistical network in north-east Cambodia which underpinned the military challenge to Saigon. In assuming this vanguard role, the Vietnamese communists (despite the tensions which emerged between them and their Cambodian counterparts) were evidently much more successful in bridging the significant ethnic divide in Indochina for political purposes than the forces of the government of Saigon, whose mode of intervention into Cambodia was no asset to the cause it purported to be defending.

The prime interest of the Vietnamese communists in Cambodia related to military objectives in South Vietnam which have now been accomplished. A residual matter of some controversy is the extent to which they possess a more general interest in establishing some form of political hegemony within the whole of Indochina arising out of a sense of cultural superiority and a long-standing proprietary role in the sponsorship of revolutionary movements within the peninsula. In the early aftermath of the fall of Phnom Penh and Saigon, and with the political success of the Pathet Lao in Laos, such an interest has not manifested itself openly. What is evident is that the Vietnamese communists have facilitated the establishment of a government on their south-western flank unlikely to permit access to an external power capable of challenging their control of the whole of Vietnam. Whether a communist Cambodia will be a fully compliant neighbour remains uncertain given the strong tradition of antagonism between the Cambodian and Vietnamese peoples which is no longer subsumed by complementary revolutionary purposes.

The American involvement

In the case of the United States, involvement in Cambodia became an entangling association with an embarrassing outcome. Unlike the Vietnamese communists, who sponsored a viable and successful client, the United States government assumed an obligation to an administration which within months of seizing power showed itself to be increasingly feckless, incompetent and corrupt and incapable of a basic cohesion. Its leader was eventually persuaded to abdicate apparently only after being assured of one million dollars deposited in his name in an American bank.[13]

The United States's ground military intervention into Cambodia, which did not take place until nearly six weeks after the deposition of Prince Sihanouk, was an undoubted product of its policy in South Vietnam.

[13] *International Herald Tribune*, April 18, 1975, and *The Times*, May 9, 1975.

The timing of the military action (undertaken jointly with South Vietnamese units) would not seem to indicate collusion at government level to inspire the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk in order to locate and destroy the ever-elusive communist ' Pentagon ', known as COSVN (Central Office for South Vietnam). The decision to invade Cambodia was no doubt governed by the perceived prospect of despatching COSVN, but it was determined by circumstances which manifested themselves in the wake of the deposition, in particular the crumbling military position of the Lon Nol government towards the end of April 1970. President Nixon explained his decision by claiming that the Vietnamese communists were encircling Phnom Penh and that ' If this effort succeeds, Cambodia would become a vast staging area and springboard for attacks on South Vietnam along 600 miles of frontier—and a refuge where enemy troops could return from combat without fear of retaliation '.[14] While he was to justify continuing American military involvement from the air in Cambodia, after the ground force disengagement by June 1, as ' a concrete illustration of Nixon Doctrine Principles ', he was also quite explicit about the purpose of that involvement: ' The objective of all our activities related to Cambodia remains constant: to bar the re-establishment of secure Communist base areas that could jeopardize allied forces in Vietnam '.[15]

The initial purpose of the United States in sustaining the Lon Nol government was to utilise Cambodia as a buffer through which to fend off the Vietnamese communists and dislocate their logistics network and so facilitate the related programmes of military disengagement and Vietnamisation. A major consequence of this involvement in a wider war was to feed its furnaces within Cambodia and to inflict considerable devastation through aerial bombardment[16] until this mode of military action was suspended through Congressional pressure in August 1973. It has been argued in relation to the experience of Cambodia that events there have disproved the belief that revolutions only succeed if sustained by a popular cause.[17] Without entering into debate about the utility of Prince Sihanouk as a symbol of revolutionary legitimacy or the conditions of rural unrest which expressed themselves in Cambodia from February 1967, it can be argued that the American intervention into and

[14] *President Nixon's Address on Southeast Asia Situation*, U.S.I.S., American Embassy, London, May 1, 1970, p. 2. Such a claim was confirmed by Prince Sihanouk who asserted ' We had already succeeded in encircling Phnom Penh and it was on learning this that Nixon launched his barbaric hordes against our people.' *The Times*, May 6, 1970.

[15] *Richard Nixon, United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace, A Report to Congress, February 25, 1971* (Washington, D.C. 1971), p. 68.

[16] Note the observations of Jon Swain on the effects of American bombing in his remarkably graphic report on the fall of Phnom Penh in *The Sunday Times*, May 11, 1975.

[17] Dennis J. Duncanson, ' The Conquest of Indochina ', *The World Today*, June 1975, p. 227.

sustained bombing of Cambodia visibily served the interests of those who claimed to be leading a popular cause. It provided the Khmer Rouge with concrete evidence of the indiscriminate evil wrought by an identifiable external foe against whom the insurgents could unite. And it underpinned their claims that the Lon Nol government was only a puppet regime.

American involvement in Cambodia, according to the American President, was intended to illustrate the principles of the Nixon Doctrine. In the event it served to expose the fundamental weakness of that doctrine on two counts: first, the chronic inability of the Lon Nol government to assume adequate responsibility for its own defence despite the provision of material military assistance; and secondly, the failure of the American government to guarantee the sustained projection of countervailing striking power from the air in the face of the obduracy of Congress. However, having committed itself to the Lon Nol government, the United States found itself ultimately not only in a position in which it was unable to discharge that commitment adequately, but also from which it was unable to disengage. This Scylla and Charybdis experience derived directly from the underlying premise which shaped the American approach towards a settlement throughout Indochina. It was expressed implicitly by President Nixon when he announced in February 1971 that 'The right way out of Vietnam is crucial to our changing role in the world.' It was articulated more euphemistically in the maxim 'Peace with honour' which was identified closely with the Paris Agreements of January 1973. By this was meant that the United States government could not tolerate the visible and violent overthrow of governments to whom its prestige had been committed because of the likely effect on its credibility as a global power. It is in the light of this consideration that the American military intervention shortly after the fall of Phnom Penh, to retrieve the merchant vessel *Mayaguez*, has to be viewed. Initial expectations by Dr. Kissinger at the time of the Paris Agreements that it would be possible to effect a compromise solution in Cambodia [18] similar to that to be worked out in Laos, and which would serve the cause of 'Peace with honour', foundered on the facts of the balance of forces within the country and the apparent unwillingness of the United States government to enter into direct negotiations with Sihanouk. In the event, the Khmer Rouge dictated the political solution through demonstrable military superiority.

American involvement in Cambodia arose to a large extent from the imperatives of the war in South Vietnam, but it was sustained in its ineffectual form in part as a consequence of the United States's adversary

[18] Dr. Kissinger stated on January 24, 1973: 'We can say about Cambodia that it is our expectation that a de facto cease-fire will come into being over a period of time relevant to the execution of this agreement.'

relationship with the Soviet Union. For both the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic, however, the Cambodian issue related directly to their bitter mutual conflict. China's patronage of Prince Sihanouk, its brokerage role in promoting the National United Front and in sponsoring the Indochina People's Conference have already been noted.[19] Although its government did not formally recognise Prince Sihanouk's government-in-exile until May 5, 1970, suggesting perhaps some desire for compromise, its previous conduct indicated an undoubted willingness to exploit any opportunity for national and ideological ends. Thus, it was concerned to place the Soviet Union at a disadvantage, and to establish a claim to be taken into account in shaping the political future of Indochina. In this latter respect support for Prince Sihanouk became less than consistent when it became apparent that there existed an authentic Khmer Rouge leadership whom he had once sought to eradicate. Thus in April 1974, when Khieu Samphan visited Peking, he was given a reception reserved normally for heads of government and then sponsored on an overseas tour of eleven countries. The degree of deference extended to the insurgent leader by the Chinese indicated the extent to which Khieu Samphan had come to overshadow Prince Sihanouk, whose role was to become increasingly ceremonial. What has been unique about the nature of Chinese involvement in the Cambodian conflict, irrespective of the balance of interests between placing the Soviet Union at a disadvantage and checking the influence of the Vietnamese communists within Indochina, is that in providing asylum for Prince Sihanouk after May 5, 1970, it was the first occasion on which a government-in-exile has been permitted to establish itself in Peking; an interesting development for a state which has sought continuously to discredit another government-in-exile since October 1949.

Russia's ambivalent policy

If China consistently backed the winners in Cambodia, the Soviet Union pursued a far more ambivalent policy which provoked the open hostility of Sihanouk. Although critical of the American and South Vietnamese military invasion of Cambodia, the Russians did not break diplomatic contact with Phnom Penh when Sihanouk's government-in-exile was formed. It maintained its mission in the Cambodian capital headed by a chargé d'affaires until he was withdrawn after the Non-Aligned

[19] In the case of China it should be remembered that the reappraisal of its relationship with the United States was not yet complete at the time of the deposition of Prince Sihanouk. In a statement on April 28, 1970, the Chinese government asserted that the coup 'aimed at turning Cambodia into a colony of the United States and using its lackey the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak Rightist clique to coordinate with the U.S. aggressor troops and puppet troops in South Vietnam in its scheme to stamp out the Vietnamese people's war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. . . .' Signal Victory etc., *op. cit.*, p. 81.

summit in Algiers in September 1973, in expectation that the Lon Nol government was about to lose its seat in the United Nations. From the outset, the Soviet Union sought to square the circle by refusing to receive an ambassador from Lon Nol, while it recognised the former Cambodian ambassador, who had rallied to Sihanouk but as the representative of the National United Front and not of the government-in-exile in Peking. At the same time a representative of the Lon Nol government was permitted to occupy rooms in a Moscow hotel and to maintain links with other diplomatic missions but not formally with the Soviet government.

Such an ambivalent policy gave some satisfaction to Lon Nol, eager to sustain a claim to non-aligned status, but none at all to Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge. The Soviet Union was motivated by a deep resentment of Peking's patron role in relation to the government-in-exile, headed by Sihanouk, and the forces of liberation in Indochina.[20] For a period, the Soviet government toyed with the idea of sponsoring a so-called third force within Cambodia, but this expectation was dashed by the internal conflict and the Russians found themselves obliged to affirm full support for the government headed by Prince Sihanouk only shortly before the fall of Phnom Penh, to the great pleasure of the Chinese media which fully exploited the sense of embarrassment in Moscow.

It has been suggested that a further reason for the Soviet Union's reluctance to break diplomatically at the outset with the Lon Nol government was a concern not to alienate non-communist governments in South-east Asia with whom it sought conventional relationships in competition with Peking.[21] An additional international consequence of the deposition of Prince Sihanouk was that it drew a number of South-east Asian governments into providing strong diplomatic support for a cause which eventually failed. Apart from direct military support from South Vietnam and of a less obtrusive kind from Thailand (in addition to its provision of base facilities for American bombing), the lead in diplomatic initiative was taken by Indonesia which sponsored a conference in Jakarta in May 1970, ostensibly ' to restore peace and security ' to Cambodia [22] but in fact to sustain the post-Sihanouk status quo. The occasion was compromised by the refusal of the South Asian neutral states to participate after the denunciation of the conference by Asian communist states which also refused to attend. The actual conference was compromised further by the prior American and South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and by the presence at the Jakarta meeting of the Cambodian Foreign Minister. As a diplomatic occasion, the Jakarta con-

[20] See J. L. S. Girling, ' Russia and Indochina in International Perspective ', *International Affairs*, October 1973, p. 610.

[21] Bernard Gordon, ' Cambodia's Foreign Relations: Sihanouk and After ' in Zasloff and Goodman, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

[22] See the Indonesian aide-memoire of April 28, 1970 in *Conference of Foreign Ministers Jakarta, May 16-17, 1970*. Jakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1970, p. 10.

ference was a failure, but it marked the onset of sustained support by the five states of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the legitimacy of the Lon Nol government which they upheld in concert when it was challenged within the United Nations. This position was sustained up to the fall of Phnom Penh when there was a swift reappraisal and a collective recognition of the authority of the Khmer Rouge government as an initial adjustment to the dramatic changes within Indochina. The ASEAN countries represented an exception in their common attitude, since eventually the vast majority of Third World countries came to acknowledge the government of Prince Sihanouk in exile as legitimate. They were not prepared to treat Cambodia as a special case separate from South Vietnam, given the scale of American involvement on the side of Lon Nol from May 1970. And in September 1973, at the Non-Aligned Conference in Algiers, Prince Sihanouk received formal endorsement of the position he claimed.

Up to the fall of Phnom Penh in April 1975, the Cambodian conflict gave rise to various international repercussions. Its domestic expression took on an international significance through the involvement of the Vietnamese communists which was intended to serve interests in South Vietnam but had the most far-reaching effects within Cambodia itself. It involved the United States for reasons of regional expediency and global imperatives neither of which were in fact well served. It facilitated the interests of China within Indochina and in its antagonism with the Soviet Union. It demonstrated the rigidity of Soviet policy and underlined problems of political choice for non-communist regional neighbours of Cambodia. But with the fall of Phnom Penh, the international significance of Cambodia changed considerably because of the clear resolution of conflict and the end of American involvement and interest, apart from the global implications of the momentary military intervention to retrieve the merchant vessel *Mayaguez*. Nonetheless, there remain a number of international considerations of interest, if different to some of those discussed above.

The internal conflict within Cambodia has centred on the nature and identity of the Khmer state. Its new masters appear determined, whatever the human cost, to reshape that state on social revolutionary lines, but the new domestic identity of Cambodia is only a partial indication of its international position. With the fall of Phnom Penh, Cambodia was deliberately sealed off from conventional international dealings. All diplomatic missions were closed and foreign personnel excluded. The principal emphasis was placed on internal change and for several months the once Buddhist kingdom assumed a monastic isolation. Indications of its international outlook have come primarily from radio broadcasts, despite the beginning of external contacts in August. Nonetheless it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions. For example, congresses held

by the victors before and after the fall of Phnom Penh affirmed a commitment to a policy of non-alignment and stressed a determination to prevent all forms of foreign interference in Cambodia's internal affairs.[23]

This is hardly a precise indication of Cambodia's international position. But, taken together with more tangible evidence, it is possible to suggest that Cambodia may be a less than compliant neighbour of the Vietnamese communists and that a significant international consequence arising from the change of government in Phnom Penh has been to underline tensions amongst communist states in Asia. In this respect, it is of interest to note the public expression of gratitude of May 10, 1975, by the new Cambodian administration to those who helped its cause. Solidarity between the Cambodian and Chinese peoples was singled out as 'a radiant model of international relations based on sincere support and mutual respect', while the Vietnamese, Lao and Korean peoples were described collectively as 'three other close comrades-in-arms'.[24] This rather pointed distinction, together with the constant reaffirmation of the claim that 'Cambodia is not a satellite of any foreign nation' and also the report of a fierce military clash between Cambodian and Vietnamese forces along their common border,[25] suggests that with the resolution of internal conflict, traditional ethnic antagonisms have re-emerged to challenge the primacy of ideological affinity. Indeed, it would also seem as if taat feature of Prince Sihanouk's foreign policy, whereby good relations were cultivated with China as a counter to Vietnamese communist influence, has become a constituent part of the policy of those in Cambodia committed to the same kind of radical social change as their communist neighbours in Vietnam. In so far as this is the case, exemplified in China's role in mediating the return of Sihanouk to Phnom Penh in September, then one long-standing feature of Cambodia's international position has been reinstated, despite the radical internal changes brought about as a result of the course of events which began with the deposition of Prince Sihanouk over five years ago. The striking irony of all this is, of course, the transformation in political circumstances of the man who fashioned such a policy.

[23] *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Part 3. The Far East. FE 4890/A3/2. Note also the pointed emphasis of the article 'Les fils et filles du kampuchea sont déterminés à défendre l'intégrité territoriale de la patrie bien-aimée, coûte que coûte' in Mission Du Gouvernement Royale D'Union Nationale Du Cambodge, *Bulletin D'Information*, Paris, July 4, 1975.

[24] FE 4902/A3/9. Note also the stress by Radio Phnom Penh on the importance of friendly relations with Thailand. FE/4943/A3/6.

[25] *The Times*, June 14, 1975. For an indication from Cambodia of such a clash see FE 4941/A3/6.

BOOKS

THE GREAT ENGINES: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF A NUCLEAR AGE

Ian Smart

AS I begin to write, it is exactly thirty years since Nagasaki was devastated by a single bomb. Reflecting upon it, the monstrous force unleashed, there and at Hiroshima, conjures up the memory of Henry Adams's warning almost a century before:

> Man has mounted science, and is now run away with it. The engines he will have invented will be beyond his strength to control. Some day science may have the existence of mankind in its power, and the human race commit suicide by blowing up the world.[1]

Whether or not global suicide was then thought imminent, nothing, it seemed in August 1945, could ever be the same again. Military manoeuvre, national policy, international affairs: all were to be viewed, designed or conducted thenceforward in the deep shadow cast by the clouds above Japan. As Raymond Aron has pointed out, the effect was not only to cause a general trauma but also to reinforce the particular prejudices of separate schools of thought: the optimists foresaw perpetual peace, the pessimists inevitable apocalypse, the realists (who were perhaps the most optimistic of all) a victory for the inertia of continuity.[2] All, however, agreed that a new era—the 'nuclear age'—had come.

I have been reading or re-reading a group of nine books and booklets, all published within the last two years and all, although otherwise selected apparently at random, having nuclear weapons as their major theme.[3] By

[1] Quoted in John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age*. New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1959. p. 3.

[2] Raymond Aron, *On War*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1968, pp. 1–2.

[3] *The Superpowers and Arms Control: From Cold War to Interdependence*. By Walter C. Clemens, Jr. Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: D. C. Heath. 1973. 180 pp. £7·35.

How to Think about Arms Control and Disarmament. By James E. Dougherty. New York: Crane, Russak for the National Strategy Information Center. 1973. 202 pp. (Strategy Papers No. 17.) $5.95.

MIRV and the Arms Race: An Interpretation of Defense Strategy. By Ronald L. Tammen. New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1973. 162 pp. £5·95.

The U.S.–U.S.S.R. Nuclear Weapons Balance. By Edward Luttwak. Beverly Hills, Calif., London: Sage for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington. 1974. 66 pp. (The Washington Papers, Vol. II, No. 13.) Pb: $2.50. £1·00.

The Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance. By Albert Legault and George Lindsey. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1974. 273 pp. £7·25.

The Superpowers in a Multinuclear World. Edited by Geoffrey Kemp, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Uri Ra'anan. Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: D. C. Heath. 1974. 300 pp. (International security studies program series, No. 1.) £7·30.

Nuclear Arms Control Agreements: Process and Impact. By G. W. Rathjens, Abram

almost any other standard, they are various. Some deal with the technology of nuclear weapons, others with their control and limitation, yet others with their political effect. They include the long and the short, the sober and the provocative. Some are well produced; one or two are larded with editorial aberrations. While none is either indispensable or execrable—despite near misses at both ends of the spectrum—they vary also in their intrinsic quality. It is not my purpose, however, to list what I might take to be their individual graces or grotesqueries, or even to compare them in order to reveal their differences in detail. What interests me is rather their similarity. For all are similar in making or reflecting a single assumption: that the presence of nuclear weapons in the world has been and is a factor of enormous, if not pre-eminent, importance to the conduct of international relations—that we live, indeed, in a 'nuclear age'. Is that assumption, however, still valid?

To speak of a 'nuclear age' or an 'atomic age' is to beg a question. If the phrase is not mere rhetoric, then it must signify a conviction that there is some essential characteristic of the period which can only be conveyed by the use of that adjective. Certainly, the mere fact that nuclear weapons exist is not enough to justify the term. When we delimit a period as the Age of Reason or the Steam Age—or even as the Age of Gunpowder—we do not mean that no man has used his reason before or since, that steam power subsequently fell into disuse or that gunpowder was thereafter abandoned—any more than we believe that the Ice Ages had a monopoly of ice or the Dark Ages a monopoly of ignorance and misery. Many such terms indicate, of course, a period in which some process reached its highest pitch of activity. More significantly, however, all such terms reflect a perception that, within a defined period, the course of events was so clearly dominated by some particular force that the period must be named for the force. Few periods earn such titles; through much of history, the interplay of forces is too complex and its outcomes too uncertain to encourage or support so simple a form of characterisation. Nor can any such title stand up to pedantry; it is always easy, if futile, to demonstrate that the popular description of some sections of history as 'ages' bears little relation to complex reality. As so often, the pedantic sneer misses the point. The tags in question have their origin and basis not in analysis but in intuition. The 'nuclear age' is so called because there has existed a widespread intuition that nuclear energy—or rather, and more specifically, nuclear armament—has exerted a dominant influence over human and international affairs.

There is no lack of evidence pointing to the nature and extent of the intuition, since 1945, that nuclear weapons are uniquely influential in international politics: that they impose decisive limits on the scope for political action, even though they do not dictate all action within those limits. Evidence is scattered liberally through the world's press of the last thirty years and appears in literally hundreds of works by academic authors.

Chayes and J. P. Ruina. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1974. 72 pp. Pb. $1.00.

The Moscow Agreements and Strategic Arms Limitation. By Hedley Bull. Canberra: Australian National University Press for the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1973. 50 pp. (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence 15.) Pb: A$1.95.

Return from the Nuclear Brink: National Interest and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. By Lloyd Jensen. Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: D. C. Heath. 1974. 150 pp. £6·10.

In the Preface to the American edition of his *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations,* Raymond Aron spoke in 1966 of 'the diplomatic universe in which we live: co-extensive with the limits of the planet, dominated by thermonuclear weapons, mainly possessed by two giant states', and again of 'the question that dominates the diplomacy of our epoch: how to use the thermonuclear weapons diplomatically so that they will never have to be used militarily?'[4] Karl Deutsch, in presenting a textbook in political science, wrote in 1968:

> An introduction to the study of international relations in our time is an introduction to the art and science of the survival of mankind. If civilisation is killed within the next thirty years, it will not be killed by famine or plague, but by foreign policy and international relations. We can cope with hunger and pestilence, but we cannot yet deal with the power of our own weapons and with our behavior as nation states.[5]

The books I have just been reading echo, each in its own way, those judgments. Above all, they do so by their choice and treatment of nuclear weapons as a subject, for all the authors concerned palpably believe themselves to be writing not about some topic of esoteric interest and limited significance but about a subject of urgent importance for international affairs at large. Some make one or another aspect of the assumption explicit. 'In assessing the powerful states in the international system', says Lloyd Jensen, 'it must be apparent to the nonnuclear state that having nuclear weapons is a virtual prerequisite of great power status'.[6] K. Subrahmanyam, in the volume edited by Kemp, Pfaltzgraff and Ra'anan, writes of 'the subtle correlation between dominance [in international affairs] and membership of the nuclear club'.[7] Hedley Bull argues that both bilateral Soviet-American agreement to control strategic nuclear arms and a wider comity of all nuclear powers are required for 'the security of international society as a whole'.[8] Edward Luttwak, in measured terms, says only that 'strategic-nuclear power remains a crucial variable of international politics.'[9] Albert Legault and George Lindsey refer to the possibility that 'the experience of living in the shadow of the [nuclear] Apocalypse' may generate sufficient fear to provide 'the motivation to reorder the way in which the nations carry on their international affairs'.[10] And James Dougherty, in the most evocative phrase of all, asserts that 'In the absence of a world peacekeeper, the atom, like a Hobbesian sovereign, holds governments in awe of its power.'[11]

Having assumed the general importance of their common subject, these books approach it from different angles, concentrate upon different aspects and direct themselves to different audiences. Five of them, by Clemens, Dougherty, Rathjens, Chayes and Ruina, Bull, and Jensen, are primarily concerned with efforts to control the acquisition, deployment or use of

[4] Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations.* New York, Washington: Praeger, 1968, pp. xi, xvi.

[5] Karl Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations.* Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968, p.v.

[6] Jensen, *op. cit.*, pp. 35–36.

[7] Kemp, Pfaltzgraff and Ra'anan, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

[8] Bull, *op. cit.*, pp. 33–34.

[9] Luttwak, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

[10] Legault and Lindsey, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

[11] Dougherty, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

nuclear weapons. (Dougherty deals ostensibly with all forms of disarmament and arms control, but almost three quarters of his text are, in fact, focused upon *nuclear* arms.) The remaining four, by Tammen, Legault and Lindsey, Luttwak and the contributors to the volume edited by Kemp, Pfaltzgraff and Ra'anan, look principally to the weapons themselves, their technology, their competitive acquisition and their role in politics and strategy.

Within the former group, primarily about nuclear arms control, James Dougherty writes a simple primer for 'the informed layman' and Hedley Bull a brief and largely factual pamphlet. Lloyd Jensen makes a somewhat uncertain attempt to use a particular set of arms control negotiations in order to illuminate ideas of national interest and international bargaining, basing himself, in part, upon a content analysis of all speeches about the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1968 UN General Assembly (an undertaking calculated, one would think, to make anyone re-examine the purpose of human existence). George Rathjens, Abram Chayes and Jack Ruina attempt less but achieve, within a short space, rather more, including one of the most thoughtful discussions I have seen of the sociological and psychological pressures to comply with arms control agreements once reached. Walter Clemens attempts more and, although his book retains some of the character of a collection of separate working papers, largely achieves it. He is concerned especially to explain Soviet attitudes to arms control negotiations, and does rather less to illuminate the sometimes equally mysterious attitudes of the United States, but he adds, in compensation, a distinguished discussion of the principles upon which attempts to control arms might usefully be founded in the future.

Within the latter group, focused upon nuclear weapons themselves, there is again a primer, by Albert Legault and George Lindsey, and a pamphlet, by Edward Luttwak, although the primer includes a useful elaboration of the attempt originally made by G. D. Kaye in the early 1960s to create a graphic model of nuclear deterrence, while the pamphlet offers an unusually perceptive discussion of the problems of calculating any sort of nuclear 'balance'. The volume edited by Geoffrey Kemp, Robert Pfaltzgraff and Uri Ra'anan is a different matter: a collection of conference papers, including an appendix of technical notes. The quality is inevitably uneven, and the aggregate chiefly notable for the spirited advocacy of American strategic superiority by two of the contributors (John Erickson and Uri Ra'anan) and the retrospectively fascinating, if indirect, dialogue between two Indian commentators on their own country's military nuclear aspirations: Bhabani Sen Gupta, coolly sceptical but conscious that 'weak political leadership and a dangerous drift in the shape of internal politics are the two principal phenomena that may still put India into the bomb decision within this decade',[12] and K. Subrahmanyam, bitterly warning that India will not stand idly by 'as the five nuclear powers (or will it be six with the inclusion of Japan?) try to run [the] international system as a self-appointed board of management.'[13] Ronald Tammen's book is different again. A member of that well-known species, the university dissertation revised for publication, it irritates by its acronymic affectations ('ARP' for 'action-reaction phenomenon', 'BOT' for 'balance of terror', 'BOP' for 'balance of power'). It also, however, offers an absorbing and very

[12] Kemp, Pfaltzgraff and Ra'anan, *op. cit.*, p. 121.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 138.

valuable account of the origins, development and bureaucratic management of one major American strategic weapons programme: the programme which added multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) to the nuclear arsenal.

So much for the separate characteristics of these books. Their common assumption, that nuclear weapons are important, remains. Yet the assumption is not singular. For it becomes clear, on examination and reflection, that these authors are making several distinct, although connected, judgments about the quality wherein the importance of nuclear weapons resides —and that, in doing so, they are typical. Granted that this is called the 'nuclear age' because there exists an intuition that nuclear weapons exert a dominant influence over international affairs, it is still useful to be clear about the nature of that influence and the means by which it is brought to bear.

* * *

Explicit or implicit in one or more of these works, there seem, in fact, to be at least three different judgments about the contemporary utility and effect of nuclear weapons. They are worth noting in turn. Any one of them, if widely shared and ratified by experience, might justify the advertisement of a 'nuclear age'. They might also, however, imply rather different conclusions both about the character of that age and about its probable duration.

The first judgment is that nuclear weapons provide the nation to which they are available with an infrangible guarantee of its independence and physical integrity. They may be available either as the sovereign possession of the nation itself or through some appropriate alliance with another state which itself possesses them. In either case, to the extent that any potential aggressor must expect nuclear weapons to be used against him if he seeks to deprive the nation of its independence or territory, they support an apparently absolute confidence that he will not so act. They do not, of course, ensure that actions of other kinds may not be directed—and successfully directed—against the interests of the nation in question. Nor, by this token, do they offer any assurance that the policies pursued by the nation's own government, inside or outside its national borders, will prosper or succeed. They are, in fact, not a source of flexible power but an insurance policy against ultimate international disaster. Indeed, they appear to some as the only such insurance policy available to a state in this 'nuclear age'. 'In today's world', says James Dougherty, 'nuclear weapons alone seem to provide the ultimate guarantee of a country's independence and territorial integrity in the absence of effective international peacekeeping machinery or a reliable alliance bond.' [14]

The second judgment is, in a sense, an extension of the first: that, as between states whose political relationship is reciprocally antagonistic, the mutual possession of nuclear weapons ensures that the expression of their conflict will be contained within certain limits. Nuclear weapons are thus linked to the 'cold war', to the ideological dichotomy between East and West, and especially to the bilateral relationship, within that context, of the United States and the Soviet Union. If the first judgment implies that nuclear weapons in the possession of a single state have a deterrent utility *à tous azimuts*, the second focuses upon their role in establishing a relation-

[14] Dougherty, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

ship of mutual nuclear deterrence between two states (or alliances) both of which possess them. More particularly, in concentrating upon the place of nuclear weapons in the Soviet-American relationship, it reflects a widespread conviction that the limitation of conflict in that relationship is itself of critical importance to all other nations. Hedley Bull, for example, is characteristically lucid: 'The United States and the Soviet Union in co-operating to control the central balance of strategic nuclear power, are promoting not only their own interests, but also the primary interest of international society as a whole in the avoidance of nuclear war between them.' [15]

The third judgment reverts to the significance of nuclear arms for the individual states which possess them, rather than for relationships between such states. It is the judgment that the national possession of nuclear weapons is an important criterion of general rank within the international community: that, to quote Jensen again, 'having nuclear weapons is a virtual prerequisite of great power status', or that they are, to quote Harold Macmillan, a 'ticket to the top table'. Tacitly, if not explicitly, most of the works I have been reading reflect that view. Hedley Bull appears to do so, for example, when he describes 'a comity of nuclear powers' as essential to the security of international society as a whole, just as K. Subrahmanyam does when he states that 'if nuclear weapons continue to be a status symbol in the eighties . . . India, too, along with a number of other countries, may think of exercising the nuclear option'.[16] Some observe that last corollary in order to deplore it. 'So long as governments and peoples believe their prestige and influence depend primarily upon military—especially nuclear—power, the chances are low for limiting the spread of nuclear arms.' [17] None appears to challenge the contemporary validity of the premise.

These three judgments of nuclear armament, scattered unevenly through the books I have been reading, could well be argued to justify, individually or collectively, the characterisation of our period as the 'nuclear age'. It is immediately noticeable, however, that this is not the same set of judgments which prompted the original use of the term. The intuitions originally expressed in advertisements of a 'nuclear age' were themselves various, but they were, in general, simpler, more direct and founded less upon views of the political role of nuclear weapons than upon an apprehension of their physical effect. In the period immediately after August 1945, it was, not surprisingly, the impression created by the actual use of nuclear weapons, rather than by their potential availability that was preponderant. Robert Boothby, as he then was, was not speaking only for himself when he wrote in the *News of the World*, 'The atomic bomb means the end of war or the end of the human race.' [18] Others disagreed, either because they believed that men would inevitably be persuaded by the very enormity of nuclear power to outlaw its exploitation in any form or, in a few cases, because they believed that nothing could be so powerful as to enforce such a choice. The fact remains that the original 'nuclear age' was an age of wonder, of vague awe or even of catharsis—an age, one might say, of nuclear superstition. Moreover, the object of that superstition was not the influence of nuclear weapons upon some particular and possibly

[15] Bull, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
[16] Kemp, Pfaltzgraff and Ra'anan, *op. cit.*, p. 129.
[17] Clemens, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
[18] Quoted in Gordon Dean, *Report on the Atom*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. 1954. p. 16.

ephemeral situation in international politics but the apparently supernal character of the nuclear weapon itself.

The original 'nuclear age' probably came to an end in 1949, when the Soviet Union demonstrated that it had also developed nuclear arms. There followed a period when, for the first time, it was not the intrinsic character of nuclear power that inspired awe but the prospect of nuclear war. That fear was qualified, in turn, by public adaptation to the idea of mutual deterrence, encouraged from 1951 by the development of thermonuclear weapons or 'H-bombs'. The fear of war—or at least of general war between the two *blocs*—receded until, lecturing in early 1956, the late Patrick Blackett could say:

> I will start the detailed discussion of present-day problems by assuming that a strategic atomic stalemate is already in existence, and consequently that all-out total war between East and West is highly unlikely.[19]

Only shortly thereafter, the revelation of the ballistic missile with intercontinental range resurrected fears that nuclear war was imminent. For many, those fears were enhanced by the development of nuclear weapons in additional countries: Britain, France and then, in 1964, China. By that last date, however, the Cuba missile crisis had entailed a new catharsis and a substantial change in the popular interpretation of the 'nuclear age' itself. In particular, once the shock of being 'eyeball to eyeball', to use Dean Rusk's phrase, had faded, belief in the efficacy of mutual nuclear deterrence between the super-powers was greatly strengthened. The official acknowledgment of that phenomenon implicit in bilateral Soviet-American arms control negotiations from 1962 served to ratify the popular intuition. But the earlier intuition—that nuclear weapons would abolish wars, and especially wars involving their possessors—had perished in the interim, falling victim to conflicts in Korea and then in Indochina. There remained the fact that no war had occurred *between* the possessors of nuclear weapons or between their major alliances. Nor had the domestic territory of any nuclear power been subject to attack. Empirical foundations thus remained for the judgment that nuclear weapons are an ultimate guarantee of national independence, at least against external aggression, as well as for the judgment that they equip a relationship of mutual strategic deterrence between the states which have them. Nevertheless, when James Dougherty describes nuclear weapons, in 1973, as a Hobbesian sovereign, he seems to strike an anachronistic note. As Raymond Aron had said seven years earlier:

> But the destructive capacity the giants possess does not correspond to a proportional capacity to impose their wills upon the other states. Never have weapons been so terrifying, never have they inspired so little terror in those who are not equipped with them. . . . It is as if military strength can be translated into diplomatic power only with great difficulty when the so-called supreme weapons are so monstrously inhuman.[20]

Aron, in fact, placed his finger on what, by the later 1960s, had become the central paradox of the 'nuclear age': on what Ronald Tammen has

[19] P. M. S. Blackett, *Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956, p. 5.

[20] R. Aron, *Peace and War*, p. xiv.

in mind when he writes that: 'The great unresolved dilemma of nuclear weapons is how to use them aside from deterring an all-out war.'[21] During the 1960s, as conflicts in Asia, Africa and Latin America smouldered or blazed, to the detriment of the policies of nuclear powers, and as social and economic problems, domestic as well as international, loomed larger, it became increasingly reasonable to ask just what influence nuclear weapons *did* exert on international affairs beyond the elimination, except *in extremis,* of nuclear war itself. To use Thomas Schelling's terminology, they appeared to have utility for a specific type of 'deterrence' but little if any utility in terms of 'compellance'; their possessors might have some guarantee against conquest by a foreign state, but they seemed to have but scant additional ability to induce any foreign state to act in accordance with their own desires. Superstitious awe in regard to nuclear weapons themselves had been supplanted by fear of nuclear war and then by a confidence in nuclear deterrence. The application of that confidence had itself, however, become progressively more narrowly focused as the 'nuclear age' became an age of nuclear sobriety.

It is easy to forget the extent of the change which this process of intuitive evolution has entailed. It can, however, be illustrated. In 1960 the chief editor of a justly celebrated special issue of *Daedalus,* the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, in introducing the issue, wrote:

> One idea stands out very clearly in these papers: the general consensus that civilization is faced with an unprecedented crisis . . . an ever increasing likelihood of a war so disastrous that civilization, if not man himself, will be eradicated.[22]

Fifteen years later, introducing the next special issue of the same journal on the same subject, one of the Guest Editors writes, 'The military focus is on mutual nuclear deterrence, and the actual fighting of a war with nuclear weapons appears increasingly as a last, desperate, and suicidal act'.[23] It is, of course, not only—or even primarily—the proximate effect of familiarity with nuclear weapons which has caused that striking change of tone. Above all, it is the alteration in the political relationship between the two strongest nuclear states, and thus between their alliances. Whether or not detente is a justified term, it is apparent that the naked hostility which marked Soviet-American exchanges in the 1950s and early 1960s has greatly diminished. The mutual deterrence founded upon nuclear weapons may have played its part in that process. Certainly, negotiations concerning the control of nuclear weapons have provided one of the most important opportunities for the exploration and elaboration of a less tense relationship between the super-powers. In any case, the result has been to relegate nuclear weapons themselves, at least in the popular intuition, to a less important role in international affairs than they have seemed to play at any time since 1945. That is not to say that the deterrent utility of nuclear weapons has ceased to be an essential component of the existing international order, such as it is. It is to say that nuclear weapons, as a deterrent

[21] Tammen, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

[22] Jerome B. Wiesner, 'Foreword to the Issue "Arms Control"', *Daedalus,* Vol. 89, No. 4 (Fall 1960), p. 678.

[23] F. A. Long, 'Arms Control from the Perspective of the Nineteen-Seventies', *Daedalus,* Vol. 104, No. 3 (Summer 1975), p. 8.

of military attack, no longer seem to most people to exert a *dominant* influence on the course of international events.

An additional reason for the relative devaluation of nuclear weapons in the 1970s has, of course, been the elevation of other international issues to a higher relative priority. In 1962, the late John Strachey wrote:

> Twenty-five years ago the decisive issues were economic. Either our highly-developed, industrialized societies would surmount their economic problems or they would fall into decay. Today the threat of nuclear war is the decisive issue. A failure to surmount this new crisis would lead not to decay but to summary destruction. So much will perhaps be readily agreed.[24]

The words read strangely in 1975, when most people probably consider that it is exactly the economic problems of industrialised societies that present the most urgent and least tractable threat, at the international as well as the domestic level.

* * *

It is tempting in these circumstances—and may even be logically justifiable—to declare that the 'nuclear age' is over. Some of the authors whose works I have been reading seek themselves to look beyond it. Walter Clemens, in his impressive and closely argued final chapter, calls for an integrated foreign policy designed, in concert with like policies, to encourage transition from an international effort to control nuclear weapons to an attempt to construct an 'affirmative interdependence' at all levels.[25] Rathjens, Chayes and Ruina suggest the possibility 'that in the decade ahead political and military leaders will realise that nuclear war and preparations for it are largely irrelevant to the settlement of international differences'.[26] At the same time, none of these authors seem inclined to argue that nuclear weapons retain that dominant position in international affairs which they appeared to occupy even ten years ago. Nuclear strength may continue to be, as Edward Luttwak says, 'a crucial variable', but, if so, it is one of several such, and by no means obviously the most important. After all, nuclear weapons have not prevented war, have not even reduced the incidence of violent conflict in the world. Nor have they enabled their possessors to impose their will, except in a narrowly limited way, upon others. Meanwhile, other issues in international affairs—issues of natural resources, of monetary stability, of commercial or social order—become more pressing. Is the 'nuclear age' then ended, and the 'age of inflation' or the 'age of resources' perhaps begun?

Two doubts may stand in the way of publishing, if not of writing, an obituary for the 'nuclear age'. One is a doubt about nuclear proliferation, the other a doubt prompted by the third of the judgments formulated earlier: that nuclear weapons are still seen to constitute a symbol of national status. The doubts are obviously connected to each other. Less obviously, they are enhanced by the very process which generates rumours that the 'nuclear age' is over. As hostility between the super-powers diminishes and as their own nuclear capabilities, articulated and defined in arms control agreements, become more closely matched, both the incentive and the opportunity for other states to seek the status which nuclear

[24] John Strachey, *On the Prevention of War*. London: Macmillan, 1962, p. vii.
[25] Clemens, *op. cit.*, pp. 105–26.
[26] Rathjens, Chayes and Ruina, *op. cit.*, p. 69

weapons ostensibly provide may be increased. The effect of detente or ' strategic parity ' on the formal and informal alliances to which super-powers are party is a complex subject—on which Hedley Bull has thoughtful things to say in his pamphlet—but it is, at least, plausible that one effect is to cast doubt not only on the political willingness of super-powers to guarantee other states against aggression but also on their strategic ability to do so. Whether or not the doubt is justified—and I am personally inclined to think it is not—it clearly exists. At the same time, there exists an even vaguer impression, itself reinforced by the bilateral character of super-power negotiations about nuclear weapons, that the countries which possess such weapons have arrogated to themselves a separate and superior position in international politics. The fatuity of the impression is obvious; when the governments of existing nuclear powers have been so unsuccessful in many of their attempts to influence non-nuclear states or to secure their own objectives in international or domestic affairs, it is difficult to see what their alleged superiority means. Unfortunately, the governments which control nuclear weapons have frequently helped to create or sustain that fatuous impression: by foreign policy statements or, more often, by efforts, in their domestic politics, to obtain votes or financial resources for defence. In part, therefore, they are themselves to blame for the views now heard in countries such as India, where the acquisition of nuclear weapons may seem to offer a cheap and easy road to greater international prestige.

If the world is, indeed, fated to witness the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more countries, whether because of genuine apprehension or pathetic ambition, the effect will not be automatically to regenerate the ' nuclear age '; nuclear weapons will not regain a dominant influence over international affairs at large simply because more states possess them. Indeed, one effect might be to erode finally the judgment that nuclear weapons bestow some general status on their possessors. It is neither particularly difficult nor particularly expensive to develop a simple nuclear weapon, and their development by a succession of states with no greater claim to be recognised as ' advanced ' or prosperous would be likely only to demonstrate the poverty of the achievement.

Such proliferation would, however, be calculated to increase the danger of nuclear war: not because the governments of the countries concerned would be less ' responsible ' than those which now control nuclear arms but for quite different reasons. On the one hand, several of the states which might most readily acquire nuclear weapons are locked in regional or local conflicts of a kind which could well provoke their use. On the other hand, any new nuclear force is likely, in its earlier stages, to be both small and vulnerable to pre-emptive attack in a crisis: factors which greatly enhance the incentive to use it at an early stage. In terms of international politics at large we may well be witnessing what future historians will view as the closing days of the ' nuclear age ' that began in 1945. In that sense, the assumption common to the books I have just been reading may be of dwindling validity. It is at least possible, however, that there will follow a period in which, as the fears, superstitions and pretensions which have surrounded nuclear weapons fade, the pursuit of their shadow by additional countries in search of security or status will create a greater probability of nuclear weapons actually being used than at any time since Nagasaki was destroyed.

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

The United Nations in a Changing World. By Leland M. Goodrich. *New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1974. 280 pp. £6·50.*

Leland Goodrich is one of the world's best-informed students of the United Nations. He was a member of the International Secretariat of the San Francisco Conference which gave birth to the Organisation in 1945, for many years he served on the Board of Editors of *International Organization,* and made Columbia University (where, in 1968, he formally completed a distinguished academic career) a major centre of research into the United Nations. Throughout this period he produced authoritative books and articles on his main subject of interest, and has continued to do so during his 'retirement.' This latest book is a general survey of the development and activities of the United Nations up to the early 1970s. (The Preface is dated January 1974 but there are signs that the manuscript was completed two years earlier and subsequently received only minimal up-dating.) It deals with such topics as the United Nations' changing structure of power and influence, the maintenance of international peace and security, the protection of human rights, and the way in which the United Nations has responded to the demands of modern technology. Like all of Professor Goodrich's writing, it is careful, cautious, down-to-earth and sensible. Abstract discussion of theories and concepts and complex tables and graphs find no place here. Nor is the book over-burdened with detail or footnotes. Rather it is a clear and straightforward account of what has happened to and at the United Nations and, as such, is an admirable introduction to the Organisation for students, whether or not they intend to go on to study it in greater depth. It is earnestly to be hoped that a paperback edition will soon appear.

In his assessment of the United Nations, Professor Goodrich often finds himself unable to give the Organisation full marks. He fears that on account of the increase in its size and the distribution of its non-permanent seats on an equitable geographical basis, the Security Council may become as impotent as the League Council. He warns against the General Assembly's pursuit of large voting majorities without much apparent attention to the effectiveness of such resolutions. He says that the United Nations' record in peaceful settlement is disappointing and that peace-keeping is under a cloud. He observes, critically, that in the field of human rights the United Nations has been selective and highly political. Frequently, however, he returns to the point that these failings, like the Organisation's successes, are not to be

attributed simply to 'the United Nations' but to the member states, particularly the major powers, for it is they who decide the uses to which the United Nations is put. The future of the Organisation, likewise, is in their hands, especially those of the United States, whose best interests would be served, the author believes, if it offered strong and responsible leadership. In any event, Professor Goodrich thinks that the United Nations is now an essential part of the structure of international society. It is not as important as some would like or as unimportant as others assert. But so 'long as the state retains its primacy as a form of social organisation, international organization in some form will be necessary for dealing with matters of common concern that cannot be satisfactorily handled by individual state action' (p. 2).

University of Keele ALAN JAMES

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Problems of a World Monetary Order. By Gerald M. Meier. *New York, London, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1974. 305 pp. Pb: £2·90.*

Strains in International Finance and Trade. By Fred H. Sanderson and Harold van B. Cleveland. *Beverly Hills, Calif., London: Sage for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 1974. 70 pp. (The Washington Papers, Vol. 2, No. 14.) Pb: $2.50. £1·00.*

The World Monetary Crisis. By Peter Coffey. *London: Macmillan. 1974. 115 pp. £4·95.*

PROFESSOR GERALD MEIER has hit upon, and realised, an excellent idea, for which students of international economic relations will be most thankful: he has written three 'conducted tours' in three basic sectors of international economic relations—trade, money and co-operation for development. In *Problems of a World Monetary Order* he takes his reader, presumably a graduate student, through the most important events that have characterised the history of the postwar international monetary system, and the gravest problems that have beset it, the sterling problem and the dollar problem. His method consists in brief introductions, followed by copious and very skilfully chosen excerpts from official, scientific and newspaper literature, which are in turn followed by concluding remarks, lists of questions and basic bibliographies; events and problems are 'linked' to one another by his short bridging notes. The result is excellent. The reader is offered an overall view of events and problems, carefully balanced opinions, and—through the questions—a 'guide' to reflect on them. The success of Professor Meier's initiative seems assured.

In this contribution to the Washington Papers, *Strains in International Finance and Trade,* Fred Sanderson and Harold van B. Cleveland talk, respectively, about trade and finance. These are extremely compressed essays, which sweep very broadly two complex fields. In 'Economic Strains in the Atlantic Partnership' Mr. Sanderson laments the lack of cohesion among the Atlantic partners in facing the 'Arab Challenge' (which Mr. Cleveland, in his essay, indulges in calling a 'Jehad,' as many others have done before and as many will do after him). Mr. Sanderson also deplores the agricultural protectionism of the European Community. The EEC is scolded for putting

up barriers against American agricultural exports. Mr. Sanderson is attached to the idea of Europeans raising livestock on American cereals. In view of the fast advancing world famine one may ask him whether it has not, after all, been a good thing that the EEC has remained in cereal production. Cereals produced in the United States will be free to go to feed people in the fourth world, rather than beef in Europe. Who will pay for that is another matter, which has nothing to do with the Common Agricultural Policy.

Mr. Sanderson also proposes that, in reply to the Arab challenge, the West should co-operate to develop alternative energy resources in the United States. Europe and Japan should put up the money, and the United States the technologies and raw materials. On this he cannot expect much enthusiasm from those who are given the role of 'silent partners.'

In his essay 'The Prospects for International Monetary Order,' Mr. Cleveland encounters historical and analytical difficulties. Not unlike other American writers, he seems to think that the international monetary problems induced by American deficits were not serious before 1968. Perhaps he ought to ask Mr. Robert Roosa and Mr. Douglas Dillon.

He also falls a prey to another common delusion, that of splitting the history of the international monetary system into two structurally different phases, 'Before 1914' and 'After 1914'. The structural difference between the two is, in his opinion, the shift from a sterling-centred world to a dollar-centred world. This is incorrect: before 1914 the United States was almost as much a problem for international equilibrium as it was after the First World War; the American economy was already too big and unstable, and American monetary policy was already capable, with its erratic gyrations, of wrecking the precarious international monetary balance. The mere establishment of the federal reserve system in 1913 was not enough to change all this, and the system was in any case responsible for a lot of economic turmoil between the wars. Its grip on the American financial system has never been very firm, even in recent years, and it was definitely most uncertain between the wars.

Nor can we agree with Mr. Cleveland when he calls the postwar system a 'dollar standard'. The whole problem was, and is, that it was not. It was, again, a gold-exchange standard, a close relative of old-time bimetallism, only with the role of silver played by the dollar and, to an ever decreasing extent, by sterling. Only since August 1971 have we been on a world *cours forcé*, as the dollar has been inconvertible. To forget that the dollar could be, and, alas was, exchanged into gold, is to tear out one of the main leaves from the postwar international monetary book. Equally incorrect is to abet, as Mr. Cleveland does, the favourite American setting of the *dramatis personae* in the 1960s, as 'General de Gaulle versus the US'. Behind the broad back of the late general hid the whole of the West. Germany could not play the dollar-conversion game too openly, nor could Italy and Japan; hence the meteoric rise of the Euro-dollar market, which was, in the course of that decade, the cesspool of unwanted officially-held dollars. I agree with Mr. Cleveland's identification of the Vietnam war as a turning point but I must insist that it determined only an unbearable aggravation of an old, and grave, problem, and not—as he would have it—the emergence of a new one.

Mr. Coffey's book, *The World Monetary Crisis* is a rambling exposition of basically sound view-points. Mr. Coffey's heart is in the right place, and I also think he knows why; but he does not seem to consider logic a very

important discipline. This very often weakens the force of his—I repeat—almost always sound points, and lowers them to the level of loose table-talk.

University of Siena and Chatham House MARCELLO DE CECCO

The New Mercantilism: Some problems in international trade, money and investment. Papers presented to Section F (Economics) at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. Edited by Harry G. Johnson. *Oxford: Blackwell. 1974. 151 pp. (British Association Series.) £5·00.*

International Monetary Policy: Bretton Woods and After. By W. M. Scammell. *London: Macmillan. 1975. 262 pp. £7·95. Pb: £3·95.*

The New Mercantilism is a collection of essays presented to the 1973 meetings of Section F of the British Association. The theme was chosen by the Section's President, Professor Harry Johnson, who contributed the main essay in this little book. To readers of Harry Johnson's writings, and to students who have attended his lectures, this choice will not come as a surprise, since it can be fairly said that throughout his distinguished academic career mercantilism, old or new, has been the windmill at which he has most enjoyed tilting. Here he regrets that the old bogey 'despite its intellectual routing by *The Wealth of Nations*, carried on subsequently in the main body of economic theory . . . has remained a potent force in popular and political thinking ever since.' Professor Johnson finds this persistence 'scientifically and socially regrettable, but thoroughly understandable in terms of the nature of scientific enquiry and progress, especially in the social sciences.' 'For the social sciences [he believes] man is his own environment, and his brief mortality means that he is perpetually recreating his environment and with it his own pre-scientific primitive ideas about it.' He ought to have been born in France in the 18th century and contributed to *l'Encyclopédie*. Such belief as he displays in the progress of the Economic Science surely deserves an intellectual atmosphere as pure as that of 18th century Paris (or Edinburgh). Unfortunately for him, he is condemned to live in the Europe of the Common Market or in the Chicago of Big Business, surrounded by mercantilism, protectionism, monopoly, oligopoly, and where free competition and free trade are not much in evidence. Professor Johnson also affirms in his essay his conviction that the understanding of economic policy theory was in a rudimentary state in the crucial years of the 1930s. He must obviously think it has progressed since. In view of the mess made by his colleagues in charge of economic policy in the main Western countries in the last ten years, this sounds a bit far-fetched. He also believes that 'the older type of mercantilism is . . . still represented academically in Britain and has exercised considerable influence on British economic policy in the person of Professor Kaldor, who steadfastly continues to propound the naive idea of the German nationalist tradition that all manufacturing is economically beneficial and all non-manufacturing activity is a second-class economic citizen.' But he must know that Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who invented and propagated that 'naïve idea,' were not German nationalists.

He is also of the opinion that 'the European Economic Community represents the epitome of modernised mercantilism' whose main aim is to protect its members against 'the most dangerous competitor, American

industry.' This is particularly surprising, in view of the unqualified backing given to the EEC by all American governments from 1947 to the middle 1960s, and of the positive exhortations to join the EEC given by American leaders to Britain at all times—the US governments perhaps knew what they were doing.

Of the several other essays in this book, those by Jack Revell on 'Financial Centres, Financial Institutions and Economic Change' and by J. F. Chown on 'Fiscal Consequences of British Membership of the E.E.C.' are learned, down to earth, factual and very restrained.

W. M. Scammell's *International Monetary Policy—Bretton Woods and After*, is another well written and useful book. It is not meant to be particularly original, and it goes through the well-known paces of showing the Bretton Woods system's weaknesses, and its final demise, in a safe, traditional manner. It is certainly not an exercise in political economy.

University of Siena and Chatham House MARCELLO DE CECCO

Copper: The Anatomy of an Industry. By Ronald Prain. *London: Mining Journal Books. 1975. 298 pp. £8·75.*

FAR too much current debate on North-South relations or, more specifically —as the unlovely diplomatic jargon of 1975 apparently has it—on 'Con-Prod' relations, is at such a level of gassy generalisation or empty rhetoric that it holds little interest for anyone seriously concerned with international politics and economics or indeed with the problems of economic development in the Third World.

Do not, therefore, be put off by the apparently rather specialised subject-matter of this book. Copper may occupy quite a small sector of the whole world economy; but here are found in microcosm many of the real issues of international economic interdependence. For instance, how are producers to get a fair deal, or consumers some security of supply; who is to bear the risks and who to enjoy the profits; where is tax due and to whom; and who is to safeguard the environment or the interests of posterity?

Do not be put off, either, by the title and position of the author. As chairman for over twenty years of the Roan Selection Trust, Sir Ronald is an eminent capitalist. And it turns out, he is a good deal more sympathetic than Henry Kissinger to the fears, the aspirations and the discontents of the developing countries in which his company has operated. (He also writes a crisp, clear, economical prose that some academics should envy.) He does not, for instance, find nationalisation an unreasonable goal. And he discerns some community of interest between his industry and the poor countries. For, as rich countries' demand for copper levels off, the industry's continued growth and prosperity depends directly on the rate of economic growth in the developing countries. Sir Ronald therefore approves of the United Nations (or some other international agency) assisting the less-developed countries to search for new copper resources. He is also much concerned with the question of how future growth may be achieved without the violent oscillations in price for which copper is notorious. The issues are fully explained and explored and there are valuable chapters on the functioning of the commodity exchanges and on the politics and economies of CIPEC.

A particularly interesting observation is that the Club of Rome's gloomy warnings on the limits to growth may be right—but for the wrong reasons.

Given continued technological progress, it is less likely that physical resources will be exhausted than that their exploitation will be limited by the availability, cost and input of energy.

Chatham House SUSAN STRANGE

Swedish Economic Policy. By Assar Lindbeck. *London: Macmillan. 1975. 268 pp. £8·00.*

Bargaining without Boundaries: The Multinational Corporation and International Labor Relations. Edited by Robert J. Flanagan and Arnold R. Weber. *Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1975. 258 pp. £7·25.*

Competition Policy: European and International Trends and Practices. By A. E. Walsh and John Paxton. *London: Macmillan. 1975. 196 pp. £8·00.*

THE fact that governments all round the world are being increasingly sucked into the detailed management of national economies makes the study of comparative industrial policies particularly stimulating. Some of the OECD nations have moved further ahead than others, but there seems to be a general progression from the days when authorities first experimented with contra-cyclical policies, to a situation in which the targets of government policy have become so complex that some simple economic tools like the manipulation of the tax rates and exchange rate manipulations have become devalued.

Assar Lindbeck's book can be read profitably by anyone interested in these issues, despite the fact that it is solely about Swedish economic policy since the Second World War. He does not write about the political disputes which surounded each policy change, but about the intellectual battles which took place within the Swedish economic community, which included people like Bertil Ohlin, Gunnar Myrdal, Gösta Rehn and Bent Hansen. As Lindbeck argues, many of the controversies are relevant not only to Sweden, but to most high-employment market economies.

Admittedly, Sweden has a somewhat atypical economy; it has benefited from over 150 years of peace, and since the 1930s has been controlled by a series of social democratic governments. But Lindbeck traces an historical pattern of growing involvement by these administrations in the management of the economy which is to be found in broad outline in most of the other countries within the OECD framework. Thus the 1950s saw a shift from selective, administrative regulations to a general use of monetary and fiscal policies, approximately following the policies proposed by economists like Erik Lundberg. During the 1960s, the emphasis shifted toward selective incentives, particularly in the area of labour market and location policies, with some emphasis on problem industries such as textiles and glass manufacturing. The author follows the debates in Sweden over universal problems like the need for price and wage restraints, the seemingly inevitable climb of total tax and social insurance payments, the growing concern with income distribution and social equity, the demands for greater worker participation in day-to-day industrial affairs, and the need for some form of central planning capability.

Lindbeck always remains clear and stimulating in his analysis, so that one can apply it to the experience of other Western economies. A British

reader, for instance, can only be struck by the scale of the labour market policy followed by the Swedes since the late 1950s. By 1971, the Labour Market Board, which is in charge of retraining, had about one per cent. of the GNP as its budget, and was catering for 1·5–2 per cent. of the labour force, compared with 0·5 per cent. in the early 1960s.

Lindbeck gives only a brief mention of Swedish policies toward foreign private investment and to anti-trust policies, the subject of the other two books under review. Flanagan and Weber present the proceedings of yet another conference on multinational companies and the trade union movement, and one is reluctantly forced to conclude that this topic is very much subject to the law of diminishing returns, in that there are far too many people chasing far too few significant developments. So various papers cover well-worn themes such as the role of international unions in Canada, the attitudes of American unions to the jobs which American multinationals are allegedly exporting abroad, and recent developments in Europe. However, none of these papers goes very deep, few new facts are produced, and the participants raise interesting questions only to pass on.

There are, however, some good papers. John Gennard discusses the impact of foreign-owned subsidiaries in Britain, suggesting (amongst a number of points) that they tend to be relatively innovative in their industrial relations, at the apparent expense of a relatively bad strike record. Peter Gabriel contributes a convincing paper on the growing interaction of multinationals and governments, in which he firmly plays down the alleged power of these companies.

Finally, Walsh and Paxton have written an analytically weak study of comparative competition policies (primarily concentrating on the EEC). They run through the relevant clauses of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, but political scientists interested in the dynamics of the institutions involved will learn very little. They do usefully list the bulk of the cases decided by the EEC Commission and the Court of Justice from 1962–1974, but they conclude with such a weak chapter on monopoly and competition around the world, that one's confidence is reduced in what has gone before.

Chatham House LOUIS TURNER

The Golden Hordes: International Tourism and the Pleasure Periphery. By Louis Turner and John Ash. *London: Constable. 1975. 319 pp. £5·00.*

SOME books interpret and illuminate, some use their subjects as targets. This book belongs to the second category. Tourism has already received salvos from these authors, notably in Turner's writings on multinational companies. To them John Ash has added what he has discovered in his study of decadence and tourism in literature. The mix was further seasoned by what the authors have read, heard and experienced themselves.

The outcome is a readable, often perceptive, and a highly polemical view of that aspect of holiday travel known as international tourism. The bulk of the world's holidays are taken within people's own countries; this book is, therefore, concerned in the main with what is still a minority pursuit. But it is international rather than domestic tourism that lends itself to the colourful and emotive treatment it receives in *The Golden Hordes*. That tourists and residents can respect and benefit each other, without conflict, manifests

itself in thousands of communities in many parts of the world, where tourism is the main source of livelihood and prosperity. Here and there Turner and Ash grudgingly admit this, as well as the positive contribution of tourism to economic development and to conservation.

But the focus of this book is on selected examples of overdevelopment and other excesses, to illustrate the authors' thesis that tourism is 'a device for the systematic destruction of everything that is beautiful in the world' (p. 15). Their painful search has resulted in locating enough casinos, corruption and prostitution. Social and political tensions, with many and varied causes, are seen to be generated and exacerbated by tourism. The tourist himself is suitably warned against cars, sex, drugs and other dangers. He may be gunned down at the airport or trampled to death by elephants. Whether he flies, drives, or just walks, 'even if the tourist does not die in transit, he will be robbed and cheated upon arrival' (p. 238).

What should one make of the following? On page 53 the authors note that 'tourism has proved remarkably ineffective as a promoter of equality and as an ally of the oppressed.' On page 82 the sun tan craze is seen as 'a phenomenon of white, bourgeois, capitalist states.' In chapter 10 the authors see tourism as an opiate with a dulling effect on class consciousness. In chapter 13 the governments of Eastern Europe are forewarned that tourism will bring them troubles and will be a major destabilising force.

The story concludes appropriately with a photograph of Richard Nixon as sunbelt politician and with some exhortations to host countries not 'to lie back and be raped without a struggle'. It offers little advice on how many of them might earn their living and it can hardly be expected to concede that being host can be an honourable way of doing so.

University of Surrey S. MEDLIK

Money and Empire: The International Gold Standard, 1890–1914. By Marcello de Cecco. *Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1975. 254 pp. £6·00.*

THIS is the most interesting and challenging book about the pre-1914 international monetary system written in recent years. British banking historians almost invariably touch their forelocks in a most respectful manner when writing about the 'City.' Marcello de Cecco has no such inhibitions. He takes an entirely fresh look at an old subject, employing every now and then his quite formidable talent for the caustic turn of phrase with devastating effect. Part of the book is concerned with the operation of the London money market, and here de Cecco discards entirely Bagehot's view of the City as a myriad of highly specialised houses, dominated by the Bank of England. Instead he points to the growing power of the joint stock banks who eventually were able to suffocate the inner circle of the Bank of England and the merchant houses. Inevitably the commercial banks acted solely for their own private interests; only a dedicated Governor and Chancellor, keeping them in the dark, prevented them from destroying the rescue of Barings in 1890 by intensifying the rush for their own liquidity. The final chapter, based on hitherto unused papers in the Public Record Office, shows how ruthlessly they used their bargaining power in the crisis of the summer of 1914. The detailed story amply bears out Keynes's opinion

that they aggravated the crisis rather than the more charitable one that they were just reacting to justifiable fears of a public run on their reserves.

Nevertheless, the true interest of the book centres on its view of the working of the international gold standard. There is an interesting account of the shift from silver to gold in the middle years of the century. The debate was everywhere essentially one between debtors and creditors. Gold was not adopted so as to arrive at an automatic system of adjustment, a form of ' international economic meritocracy ' based on differences in prices and interest rates. It was adopted and abandoned for reasons of expediency. There was nothing very special or permanent about it as a monetary system. After 1870 it offered Europe a defence against the slump in the price of silver and it suited the great lending countries. In South America the ruling classes derived their incomes mainly from exports and had a vested interest in currency depreciation. Consequently the attempts by foreign bond holders to have the gold standard established met with very limited success in such countries.

London's great problem was the American account. The United States had no central bank and used London for the purpose, depositing the greater part of its seasonal surpluses there. In this sense it was still acting like a colony but in a most independent fashion, causing the City a lot of problems as well as bringing in a lot of income. London had to stand the strain of all the oscillations in the Americans' demand for money, and above all feed their huge appetite for gold. Here India played a vital role; a country with a large export surplus but depending heavily on Britain for imports, it generated the surplus London so badly needed. This to de Cecco is one of the keys to the operation of the old system and he adds as a bonus a particularly interesting chapter on the Indian financial mechanism.

In the decade or so before 1914 the system became more precariously balanced. Nations doubled their lines of defence, holding foreign currency and assets as before, but increasing their pure gold reserves as a form of treasure for the war they all were anticipating. The old system was to be dropped the moment it ceased to serve immediate needs. It was no symbol of a stable era. It was something that served its purpose for just long enough and the attempts to revive it after the war were for that reason alone utterly irrelevant. All this is argued with enough technical expertise to make it persuasive, and yet the book remains eminently readable. It is indeed an important and enjoyable contribution to the literature.

University of Edinburgh S. B. SAUL

The Practice of Politics and other Essays. By K. W. Watkins. *London: Nelson. 1975. 141 pp. £3·95.*

A collection of essays full of good sense and sound principle by a self-confessed political economist who sees common themes as well as interaction between domestic and international political economy. The title essay is especially recommended for an economy of style which compresses a lifetime's political philosophy into two tight-packed pages.

Chatham House SUSAN STRANGE

LAW

Suez 1956. By Robert R. Bowie. *148 pp.* **Cyprus 1958–1967.** By Thomas Ehrlich. *164 pp.* **The Cuban Missile Crisis.** By Abraham Chayes. *157 pp. London: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the American Society of International Law. 1974. Pb: £1·00 each.*

THESE monographs are part of a series, sponsored by the American Society of International Law, to consider the role of law in particular situations of international conflict. The pattern of each is similar: an analysis of the chosen situation and its evolution through relatively short periods of crisis, with documentary appendices in the cases of Cuba and Suez and independent comments by one or more lawyers or political scientists.

The monographs are written with a high degree of objectivity and care for fact, and in the case of Cuba with the authority of one who was legal adviser to the US State Department and actively involved in the evolution of the crisis, and much illumination can be had from them. But what is perhaps most significant is that the three situations of conflict chosen are still with us after more than a decade, unresolved by law, diplomacy, or political good sense: the Suez Canal, reopened after eight years' closure and in economic decline, is still a focal point in Middle East conflict; in Cyprus the old conflicts, unresolved by independence, are intensified, the Treaty of Guarantee, invoked by Turkey to justify intervention in 1964 and 1974, having never been fully implemented; and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, no longer merely sited in the obsolescent 'singles' match between America and Russia, but within the reach of many countries large and small, and even perhaps of the 'terrorists,' is of growing and universal concern.

It would be a mistake then to suppose, as too many do, that there is in international conflicts a polarity of law and power, and to suppose either that power, exercised through diplomacy or coercion prevails while law is in the end irrelevant—the embittered Dean Acheson view—or that treaty obligations or general principles of international law can be decisive in government action—the World Peace through World Law naiveté. These monographs expose these simplistic fallacies; they show that the exercise of power is usually, if only for tactical or 'public image' reasons, cast in a legal framework and may even be influenced by a sense of legal right or obligation; that there is for law, as Professor Linde in his comments observes (*Cyprus 1958–1967*, p. 152) 'a spectrum of roles or functions, within which some are more "law" than others'; and that law comes into play in international conflicts at many interacting levels of private law, constitutional law, customary international law, and applicable treaties, all being relevant to, for example, the takeover of the Suez Canal in 1956, the removal of Greek troops from Cyprus in 1967, or the stopping of freighters with missile cargoes on the high seas in 1962.

J. E. S. FAWCETT

Law and Civil War in the Modern World. Edited by John Norton Moore. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1975. 648 pp. £12·50. Pb: $8.95. £4·50.*

THE editor of this substantial work describes it as 'the culmination of the Civil War Project of the American Society of International Law Panel on

the role of International Law in civil wars' (p. ix). It is in fact a volume of wide-ranging studies on the subject of intervention. It consists of twenty chapters, each of which is written on the scale of an article and contributed by a leading scholar in the field of international law and its related disciplines. The twenty chapters are divided into six parts. Part 1, composed of two chapters, is provided by the editor with an opening paper entitled 'Towards an applied theory for the regulation of intervention.' This is designed to set the framework for the ensuing nineteen chapters. In his conclusions he complains that 'A principal shortcoming of the work to date on revolution and intervention—whether that of international lawyers, political scientists or international relations theorists—is the lack of a commonly accepted framework (incorporating all the intellectual tasks) for relating individual effort' (p. 37).

The other chapter in Part I is contributed by Dr. Bowett under the title 'The interrelation of theories of intervention and self-defense.' Although brief, this is one of the most stimulating contributions to a complex subject. Both for students of international law and for those with a general interest in international affairs, the issues are stated with compelling lucidity. He has no time for the extended theory of collective self-defence, *i.e.*, 'if state A attacks state B, the latter has a right of self-defense and any other state may come to the assistance of state B pursuant to the right of collective self-defense.' This thesis he describes as 'palpable nonsense.' Unfortunately, this idea has commanded considerable support among American jurists and has not failed to play a part in decisions by the United States government to resort to armed force. Likewise, Dr. Bowett gives short shrift to the view of many leading jurists that the consent of the incumbent government renders legitimate an otherwise unlawful intervention. This is an important assertion and marks a major change in the thinking of international lawyers during the era of the United Nations. Dr. Bowett condemns the argument for legality of intervention on the basis of the consent of the incumbent government on two main grounds. First, it rests on the subjectivity of recognition in that the intervening state is free to recognise whichever party to the internal struggle it wishes to support. Secondly, such intervention is in conflict with the principle of self-determination of peoples, 'regarded by many states as one of the most fundamental and peremptory norms of contemporary international law' (p. 42). In the light of the imprecise legal implications of the principle of self-determination of peoples, and the inherent difficulties as to its nature, this second contention may be open to some challenge. Dr. Bowett is not prepared to accept the validity of unilateral intervention by a state to assist a struggle for self-determination, but considers that any intervention for such a purpose should be confined to cases where the denial of the 'right' to self-determination has been confirmed by the Security Council or the General Assembly, and the intervention authorised by one or other of those organs of the United Nations. Dr. Bowett's transition from the 'principle' to the 'right' of self-determination within the space of two pages illuminates part of the difficulty in handling the pervasive but amorphous conception of 'self-determination of peoples.'

Part II deals with 'The relevance of theories of modernization, internal violence, and the international system' and contains four chapters. In a paper entitled 'The relevance of behavioural theories of the international system' by John W. Burton (ch. 5), it is sobering to find the following demotion of law: 'The rule of law is a Western concept and falls short of the needs and interests of society in its present stage: the rule of consensus

is an Eastern concept and is open to the influence of ideological and emotional excesses; the rule of sociological analysis avoids the static features of the one and the transitory features of the other ' (p. 104). One wonders, after such an *ex cathedra* pronouncement, whether there is anything left to be said.

In Part III, ' The relevance of domestic constraints,' there is an excellent historical analysis by W. Taylor Reverley III of ' Constitutional aspects of United States participation in foreign internal conflicts.' In the light of the United States experience in this area, not least in the Vietnam conflict, the author proposes that Congressional authorisation should be required whenever more than 5,000 men are sent: (1) into combat, or (2) into the territory of another state without an invitation from its government, whether or not fighting results.

In Part IV, ' Special Problems,' Dr. Brownlie and Professor Lillich both write on ' Humanitarian Intervention ' (chs. 10 and 11). The former will have none of it as being contrary to the current law of the United Nations Charter governing the use of force, which he considers is, for most lawyers, the general international law on the subject. Professor Lillich takes sharp issue on this not unimportant matter and argues that precedents have established the right of humanitarian intervention. His argument is somewhat debilitated by a failure to distinguish between the gross maltreatment of nationals and of non-nationals. Likewise, there is a tendency to blur what the law is with what the law ought to be in a better world.

In Part IV we also have two penetrating analyses of Soviet and Chinese theories and practice of intervention presented by Jerome Cohen and W. E. Butler, respectively (chs. 14 and 15). Although these two states have distinctly different approaches to the legitimacy of intervention, they both suffer from the inherent dichotomy posed by the competing demands for support for revolutionary movements and a traditional distaste for intervention. They also share a depressing failure to undertake analytical thinking about law and a preoccupation with individual incidents seen in their political colour.

Part VI is concerned with the ' Role of international institutions ' (chs. 16–18). It contains an incisive paper by Stephen M. Schwebel on ' Wars of Liberation—as fought in U.N. Organs ' (ch. 17), wherein he has little hesitation in finding that the two doctrines of wars of liberation and of ' just wars ' are equally incompatible with the fundamentals of the United Nations Charter.

Professors Taubenfeld and Baxter contribute to Part VI, ' The Regulation of Hostilities ' (chs. 19 and 20). The latter gives a succinct and controlled account of the developments leading to the current diplomatic conference on the humanitarian law of armed conflicts which has now completed its second session (1975) in Geneva. At this conference it is intended to establish two protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the first of which is to deal with international armed conflicts and the second with internal armed conflicts. Neither of these attempts to resolve the complex difficulties attending internal conflicts in which third states have intervened on one side or the other or on both. What has transpired, since Professor Baxter wrote, is that ' national liberation struggles ' have found a secure place in the protocol dealing with international armed conflicts. This has not led to a heightened interest in the second protocol, the fate of which is as yet uncertain.

The book closes with Part VII in which the members of the panel comment on the preceding chapters. The debate is lively and the fissures of opinion are wide. The comments of the late Professor Friedmann will repay study. He points out, with his accustomed breadth of vision, that 'A weak legal system has a minimum of legal prescriptions, and a correspondingly wider spectrum of moral prescriptions, which may eventually harden into legal precepts as the legal system widens its ambit and becomes more effective. In terms of authority and enforceability the contemporary international legal order is still weak and primitive' (p. 578).

All in all this book is a solid, if composite, work of scholarship. The lack of consistent strands of thought is more than compensated by the richness and variation of a deliberately inter-disciplinary approach to a crucial phenomenon of our time, the interplay of intervention and revolution.

University of Sussex G. I. A. D. DRAPER

The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court. By Dharma Pratap. *London, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1972. 292 pp. £6·00.*

The Advisory Function of the International Court in the League and U.N. Eras. By Michla Pomerance. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1973. 440 pp. £8·35.*

THE advisory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice has received relatively little use or attention in recent years. This being so, it is a remarkable coincidence that two books on this subject should have been published within a period of twelve months. There appears to have been no common source of inspiration. Dharma Pratap did his basic work under the supervision of Sir Humphrey Waldock (now a judge of the Court) in preparation of a thesis for a doctorate at Oxford. Dr. Pomerance seems to have been moved by a desire to explore the potential of the Court's advisory function and the reasons for its disuse. No doubt the debate in the General Assembly of the United Nations at its twenty-fifth session on the item 'Review of the Role of the International Court of Justice' served as a spur to her enquiry. As Dr. Pomerance says in her introduction, 'the prospective cures will have to be found in awareness of the causes of the past malaise.' Her aim is to make 'a modest contribution to such awareness in relation to the Court's advisory function.' Dr. Pratap's objective is a systematic exposition of the 'jurisdiction' of the Court (using that term in a broad sense).

Superficially, the two books have much in common. They both deal with the Permanent Court of International Justice and its 'successor' the International Court of Justice. They both trace the history of the advisory jurisdiction of the Court and consider the same cases. They carry the story as far as the advisory opinion on Namibia—the first given by the ICJ in response to a request by the Security Council—although Dr. Pratap, who was writing a little earlier than Dr. Pomerance, had to cover that important opinion by a postscript. Neither was able to take into account the General Assembly's request for an opinion concerning the Western Sahara, which is of interest because as regards the ICJ (as contrasted with the PCIJ) it raises for the first time issues in dispute between states relating to sovereignty over territory. The contrast between the 'disputes' character of requests to the PCIJ and the 'organisational' character of requests to the ICJ is a

point that emerges from Pratap and is much stressed by Pomerance. Could this latest request be a turning point that will lead to a revival of the use of the advisory procedure for the purpose of the settlement of disputes?

The contents of the two books look much alike. Apart from the historical aspect, they are both concerned with the process of requests for advisory opinions, the jurisdiction (in the strict sense) of the Court, the substance and nature of the opinions given, and the reception given to them. Nevertheless, they are complementary to one another. Pratap is mainly concerned from a lawyer's point of view with the question 'How?' Accordingly, he has a substantial chapter on 'The Advisory Procedure' which is not paralleled in Pomerance. On the other hand, Dr. Pomerance is concerned with the questions 'Why?' and 'With what result?' Accordingly, she has a long chapter on '"Stillborn" Requests'—a subject with which Dr. Pratap does not deal.

The main differences between the two works lie in their purpose, method and style. *The Advisory Jurisdiction* is a methodical presentation of law and procedure. It is clearly written without excessive detail. It would be a useful handbook to any lawyer not already well acquainted with the exercise of the Court's advisory jurisdiction.

The Advisory Function is built on case studies and an examination of the records of debates in organs which either did or, in certain cases, did not request an advisory opinion. Whether this method of search for the motives of governments is really successful may be open to doubt. But Dr. Pomerance makes a genuine attempt to discover the truth and, in the absence of more direct evidence of the true intentions of governments, makes good use of the materials available to her. Her study of 'stillborn' requests and the effectiveness of advisory opinions is particularly illuminating for the purpose of assessing the value of the advisory function. In the latter respect, the record of the League of Nations was good but that of the United Nations has not been so good. Nevertheless, the present reviewer can only agree with her conclusion that the rejuvenation of the advisory function should not be sought by hasty or extreme measures.

King's College, London FRANCIS VALLAT

The Strategy of Treaty Termination: Lawful Breaches and Retaliations. By Arie E. David. *New Haven, Conn., London: Yale University Press. 1975. 324 pp. £10·00.*

THE underlying theme of this book is a forceful one—that international lawyers have never squarely faced the problem of termination of treaties, that they have invented the *clausula rebus sic stantibus* as a means of unilateral revision and either openly or tacitly, by the imposition of meaningless subjective tests of 'fundamental change,' 'essential basis,' 'change not foreseen by the parties,' have conceded that its operation is political, based on power rather than consent.

In his first section the author offers a giddily superficial review of the European balance of power in the 18th and 19th centuries and claims that the *clausula rebus sic stantibus* provided a safety valve for revision in a system dependent on the strict sanctity of treaties. When a collective security system was adopted under the League of Nations and later the United Nations, the necessity for a more flexible method of revision, balancing the mutually dependent interests of contracting states, arose, and in his second

section he illustrates this by a number of case studies. The German rearmament in breach of the Versailles Treaty, the Berlin Crisis, 1961, and the French-American dispute over American military bases in France, 1966, are examined at some length, and there are shorter references to many other disputes—the Panama and Suez Canals, Guantanamo, Gibraltar, North Vietnam reprisal raids, the Beirut airport raid. It is a pity that these studies, all based on secondary sources, are presented with such a lack of historical perspective as to divert the reader by minor inaccuracies or false assumptions from the main theme of the book.

In the third section there is an analysis of the detailed manoeuvring and strategy in which states engage when terminating treaties. There is stimulating matter here but the thread of the argument is sometimes difficult to follow for those not fully at ease with American sociological jargon. The author states that the legal criterion of evaluation on unilateral termination is the formal breach of a stipulation—from this viewpoint, the claimant state is wrong, the objecting state is right and any alteration in position consequent upon the claimant state's unilateral denunciation is noted as a debit to the objecting state and a credit to the claimant state, regardless of the secondary gains which, by spin-off effect or expansion to other treaties, the objecting state may enjoy. He argues, relying heavily on Ikle's theory of tacit bargaining and shifting criteria of evaluation in diplomatic negotiations, that a wider sequence of events must be taken into account in any treaty termination and that lawyers should abandon the *status quo* test, which gives disproportionate importance to the breach of the treaty studied in isolation, and look for a more empirical test. In this connection, the author equally condemns the jurists, who classify the operation of *clausula rebus sic stantibus* as political, and the drafters of the narrow tautologies of Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties. Instead he examines the test of good faith, referring to the practice of the US National Labour Board, to see whether a similar obligation in treaty termination might not be evolved, requiring both states to negotiate and to formulate proposals on which a settlement might objectively be reached. In the light of such a standard, he welcomes the more flexible approach in Article 65 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties which prohibits unilateral action in treaty termination and requires settlement by peaceful means and failing this, by conciliation. He would shorten the time limits, making conciliation obligatory within twelve months of the dispute, and would prefer to see a conciliation panel available to supervise the dispute, particularly the commission of *faits accomplis*, from its initial outbreak. An alternative test which he elaborates in the final section. in the course of discussing expiative and reciprocal punishment and international law's regulation of retorsion and reprisals, would be a system of reprisals proportionate 'to the deviation from treaty provision and to general stability of expectation.'

Spanning the disciplines, this book runs the risk of satisfying none. The international relations student will discover much derivative work, more lucidly stated elsewhere; the historian will dislike the superficial and arbitrary use of historical material, and the international lawyer, bemused by the style, will turn to the passages on Articles 62 and 65 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties and pass over the rest. Nonetheless, the book has a very relevant message to international lawyers to abandon the platitudes about *pacta sunt servanda* and to define with particularity the modes, substantive and procedural, for treaty revision.

HAZEL FOX

The Law of the Sea: Current problems. By René-Jean Dupuy. *Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana; Leiden: Sijthoff. 1974. 210 pp. Fl. 42.00.*

PROFESSOR DUPUY has provided an account of some of the political ideas which have been expressed about some of the problems of the legal regulation of the regime of the seas. His fundamental postulate is the dialectic confrontation between the old law of movement, to sail in trade or in fishing, and the new law of appropriation, to exploit the living and natural resources of the sea. Professor Dupuy makes it clear that he has little regard for the old law, in its laissez-faire application, 'the right of the great was licence, that of the poor was submission.' That the rational exploitation of the resources of the sea needs new rules, almost all states would agree, but it can scarcely be said that these rules exist. The dialectic is not between two sets of legal rules but between one set of such rules and new *claims* of appropriation, some of which may be validated by the conferences of Caracas and Geneva and by subsequent events. There is a real danger that the clamour for reform will eat into and in some cases destroy the old freedoms. The freedom of navigation will remain for most states a more significant economic factor as the means of transport of their foreign trade (in whichever flag bottoms it be conducted) than the right to exploit resources off their coasts. Equally, and however much Professor Dupuy may deplore it, the military uses of the seas will remain of huge consequence, albeit only to a few states, and those uses brook little limitation.

Some of the material has been published before (and remains a long way out of date—for example, Chapter 1 of Part III was written before the Stockholm Conference on the Environment in 1972): much of the remainder relies heavily on the debates in the Sea-bed Committees. There are some apparently irrelevant remarks (pp. 149–157) on the participation of foreign companies in off-shore exploitation, but no consideration of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons, etc., on the Sea-Bed in the section on military uses of the seas. There are several small errors, some of which can probably be laid at the printer's door (although hardly describing the 1958 Treaties on the Law of the Sea as the 'Vienna Conventions').

These days, there is too much to read on the law of the sea. On any scale of priorities, Professor Dupuy's curious little book will not rate very high.

University of Durham COLIN WARBRICK

New Directions in the Law of the Sea: Documents—Volume IV. Compiled and edited by Robin Churchill and Myron Nordquist. *London: The British Institute of International and Comparative Law; Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana. 1975. 544 pp. £10·50. (4 volume set: £33·00.)*

THIS volume brings forward in time the invaluable collection of documents, maps and other information, on the law of the sea, prepared by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law. It is essentially a continuation of the first two volumes of the set, the third volume having been devoted to analytical studies. Notable documents included are the Norway-UK Agreement on Transmission of Petroleum by Pipeline from the Ekofisk Field (1973), the Baltic Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources (1973); Quota Arrangements for 1973 and 1974 for North West Atlantic Fisheries; the Convention on International Trade in Endangered

Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973); and the Statement on the Malacca Straits (Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore) (1971). Also included are the judgments of the ICJ in the *Fisheries Jurisdiction (Iceland) Case* and numerous bilateral agreements.

These three volumes of documents are an outstanding contribution to international law by the British Institute, marked by the excellence and thoroughness of the choice of materials, and their practical and systematic presentation.

J. E. S. FAWCETT

WESTERN EUROPE

From Free Trade to Integration in Western Europe? By Christopher Saunders. *London: Chatham House; PEP. 1975. 107 pp. (European Series No. 22.) Pb: £1·75.*

Negotiating on Non-tariff Distortions of Trade: The EFTA Precedents. By Robert Middleton. Foreword by Bengt Rabaeus. *London: Macmillan for the Trade Policy Research Centre, London. 1975. 195 pp. £7·00.*

SURVEYING the conditions of almost universal free trade in industrial goods which prevail in Western Europe today, Professor Saunders argues that new initiatives will be needed if the momentum of the past twenty-five years is to be sustained. Saunders proceeds from two assumptions: one is that the benefits of free trade are now virtually achieved and the other is that the recent rises in commodity prices are likely to be a permanent feature of the international economy.

This diagnosis implies a number of revisions in current orthodoxy. First, the author advocates the maintenance of the Common Agricultural Policy as a form of insulation against high world prices. There are, he says, 'even stronger arguments than at present for a CAP directed much more firmly towards the selective promotion of efficient agricultural output in the member states and less towards a social service system for the weaker European farmers' (p. 68). More startling, perhaps, is the idea that it would be 'British agriculture, relatively efficient within Western Europe, which would stand to gain both in the home market and, even, in exports' (p. 69). Secondly, he urges an expansion of the tenuous trade links between Eastern and Western Europe so that the traditional complementarity of these economies can reassert itself and, in particular, the energy resources of the East can be tapped by the West in exchange for much-needed technical know-how. Thirdly, and consequentially, Saunders reckons it is time for the Community to think less about mere free trade and move towards positive integration, especially in the fields of joint production and investment. 'The change required is a redirection of Community action from the creation of a *common market* which is essentially a free trade concept and which is well on the way to accomplishment, towards positive action to bring about a more deeply *integrated production structure* among member countries' (p. 86).

Economically, this all makes good sense since no one doubts that the fragmentation of Europe denies to its inhabitants the advantages of production on a continental scale. But like many economic arguments, it ignores political realities; and these are not likely to fade away. Saunders himself refers to the 'increasing commitment of governments to the promotion and support of certain national industries' (p. 38). Sensitive areas of the

national economy—aircraft, computers, agriculture—are deliberately protected and fostered. 'The old "infant industry" exception to free trade principles has been magnified beyond recognition' (p. 38). How much less are governments likely to consider joint investment or production projects on a continental scale, however beneficial the outcome. A continental division of labour does make good economic sense, but are the nation-states ready for it?

Saunders' contention that there is little more to be gained from free trade in Europe places Middleton's book on the verge of obsolescence. But only in a European context, since Middleton argues that the freeing of trade in other parts of the world is likely to follow the EFTA model and not the Community pattern: thus the detailed analysis of EFTA's record in removing non-tariff barriers to trade has relevance for the Community's external relations as well as for the various embryonic free trade areas in the Third World. Even so, one cannot help feeling that the relatively harmonious operation of free trade in EFTA owed as much to the pre-existing relations between the members as to any inherent virtues in the method itself.

Queen's University of Belfast E. MOXON-BROWNE

The New Europe and the United States: Partners or Rivals. Edited by Gerhard Mally. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Heath for the Atlantic Council of the United States. 1974. 462 pp. £8·50.*

THIS substantial volume of essays by both political practitioners and academic analysts is designed to complement Professor Mally's earlier study, *The European Community in Perspective*.[1] It deals with the main issues in Atlantic relationships which were topical during 1973—the so-called 'Year of Europe.' Unfortunately, it now seems rather dated, since it provides a variety of snapshots of the pre-oil crisis world which was so different from the world of today. Most of the contributions are excerpts from, or reproductions of, speeches, articles or official statements made during 1973. They therefore leave the reader with a strong impression of *déjà vu*, particularly those signed by one Richard Nixon, now politically deceased.

As Professor Mally argues in his introduction, the state of Atlantic relations prevailing in 1973 could best be described as 'one of ambivalence involving a partner-rival syndrome' (p. xv). This is made very clear in the first part of the book dealing with the politics of Atlantic relationships, notably in Dr. Kissinger's now notorious 'Year of Europe' speech of April 1973 and in some of the European responses to it. It is also apparent in some of the contributions to the Europe-America Conference, organised in Amsterdam in March 1973, which have been reproduced in this volume. As things turned out, one of the perhaps unintended uses of this conference was to provide some material for Professor Mally's book.

The second part, which deals with the economic issues dividing the European Community and the United States in the 1970s, is the most interesting and thought-provoking section of the book. It brings out all the key issues of economic inter-dependence, such as international trade and

1 Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books; London: Heath. 1973 for the Atlantic Council of the United States.

payments, energy supplies and agricultural policy; and demonstrates very clearly how all of them go beyond the Atlantic area and concern all nations both developed and developing. For example, in one of the most imaginative contributions, Henry Fowler points out that 'our planet is but a spaceship and we are all its passengers' and argues that 'the future requires a global system that will intensify international co-operation and interdependence' (pp. 203–216).

The third and final part of the book deals with the security aspects of East-West relations and ends, perhaps rather predictably, with its American contributors calling upon their European partners to bear a greater share of the common defence burden, and the Europeans responding with detailed and sometimes devious rationalisations of their own dependence. However, it does contain one or two original contributions, notably Robert Hunter's excellent paper entitled 'Beyond Bi-polarity and Confrontation in Europe' in which he argues that 'real European security within Western Europe must be based increasingly on the economic and political co-operation that is emerging in the European Community; real European security across the line of confrontation must increasingly be based on non-military factors; and Atlantic aspects of security must tackle the difficult problems of competition and possible economic conflict between the United States and its European allies' (p. 329).

In a summary at the end of the book, Professor Mally repeats his view that the new Europe and the United States are likely to remain both partners and rivals—a conclusion which he makes it difficult to avoid after listing five major factors on each side of the argument. Students of international relations who make use of this wide-ranging and expensive volume, may well be more appreciative of its collection of basic documents—particularly in the extensive appendices—than of its rather banal judgments and conclusions.

NIGEL FORMAN

The Labour Movement in Europe. By Walter Kendall. *London: Allen Lane. 1975. 456 pp. £10·00. Pb: £5·00.*

IT must be said at the outset that the title of this book is misleading. It deals in fact with the labour movements of the six major industrial countries in the EEC. With nothing on the Scandinavian countries, it cannot be regarded as even a book on labour movements in the West European democracies. Within its more limited field, however, it is a book which many readers will find useful. After three introductory chapters, there are individual chapters dealing with the labour movements of France, Germany, Italy, Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands. The author is concerned with the development of both political and trade union movements. It would be impossible to summarise these chapters. What the author has tried to do is to show how the labour movement has evolved in each country. No two countries are alike. They differ in the date at which the Industrial Revolution occurred, at the power of the Church and the monarchy, and in the degree of national unity. (Belgium has a sharp division between the Flemish and Walloon areas, whilst until comparatively recent years industrial development in Italy was limited to a small northern triangle.) In more recent years, the histories of the six countries have been very different, especially in regard to such features as the overthrow of democracy in

Germany and Italy, and the experiences of occupation by a foreign power in the case of France, Belgium and the Netherlands.

Chapter 10 deals with the emergence of international trade unionism. The discussion is disappointing. Whilst there is a great deal about institutional arrangements, there is little about the role of international trade union organisations. This is remedied to some extent by Chapter 11 on the European motor industry. Undoubtedly a big problem for trade unions in the future is likely to be the multinational company, and in the car industry especially so. Although there appears to have been some degree of international collaboration over the low wages at the Ford Genk plant, really effective international unionism on a large scale is probably further away than the author implies.

The final chapter looks to the future. The author suggests that 'parliamentary gradualism alone will [not] succeed in the future where it failed in the past' in transforming society, and Leninist-Stalinism 'despite all its boastful claims abroad, lacks the confidence even to put them to the test of a single free election at home.' The author suggests that what is needed is aggressive unionism encroaching on entrepreneurial authority. What he does not ask is the extent to which the working classes are really behind the militants who claim to speak for them.

University of Dundee J. M. JACKSON

Health Care in the European Community. By Alan Maynard. *London: Croom Helm. 1975. 284 pp. £6·95.*

ANYONE who has experienced the difficulties involved in obtaining detailed information about social welfare provisions in other European countries will appreciate this volume. Its 284 pages are packed with facts about the arrangements made for receiving medical care in the EEC countries—for the most part, interesting and useful facts. There are chapters on each country with a common format: a brief historical introduction is followed by sections on the administrative framework of medical care, the coverage of public and private schemes, the conditions members and their dependents must meet in order to qualify for benefits, the contributory arrangements, the income and expenditure of the schemes, the benefits derived from social and private insurance and from means-tested assistance, and key facts about medical personnel and hospitals. At the end of the study the facts are juxtaposed in a chapter of 'comparative analysis' and there is a concluding chapter which the book's cover rather curiously describes as highlighting 'some common problems and mischievous solutions to these problems.'

All this is highly informative. The range of material is impressive and, as far as this reviewer can judge, the data is reasonably accurate—with an important exception. The foreign language references contain an appalling number of errors, particularly in the German section where there are more than 40 mistakes. One finds, for instance, *Gemainder* for *Gemeinde*, *Knappeschaft Uche* for *Knappschaftliche*, and *chefartze* for *Chefärzte*. Though he does not admit to it, this may have been one of the author's 'mischievous solutions' to the problems of harmonisation. If it was not this, then he or the publishers or both have done a shabby injustice to a book which in most other respects deserves praise as a useful reference work.

It is a pity too that the author was not more ambitious in his approach to analysis. As an exercise in comparative analysis, or even as an attempt to assess the relative merits of the different arguments about current or future trends in medical care, the study is weak. In his concluding paragraphs the author seems to suggest that this was deliberate: 'At present there is a need to be cautious because the present state of knowledge is such that agnosticism is, perhaps, the best policy' (p. 272). Oh for a little faith!

University of Southampton ROGER LAWSON

British Foreign Policy 1945–1973. By Joseph Frankel. *London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1975. 356 pp. £6·95.*

THE title of this work is perhaps misleading: rather than being a study of British foreign policy, 1945–1973, it is an exercise in 'praxeology' (p. 8). 'Praxeology' is not listed in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, but presumably it derives from 'praxis,' defined as 'a means or instrument of practice or exercise in a subject; a practical specimen or model,' and, before its recent revival, was last used in 1800. Professor Frankel seemingly sees such an activity as being valuable in that it helps to prepare the ground for 'a fuller and more relevant historical analysis'; any patterns discerned are a 'gross simplification of complex reality' but apparently 'enable us to arrange all the confused evidence more systematically' (pp. 5–6). The work of the so-called social scientist is thus preparatory to that of the historian.

Professor Frankel, at the outset, acknowledges the interrelationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. This could be seen as placing him in the tradition of major historians like Arno J. Mayer, who helped to pioneer this approach in the 1950s, or of Rosenau's American school of so-called 'linkage politics.' The approach is evident in the first examination of the theme in the section on 'the political system.' British foreign policy appears to have been based on consensus and continuity: models of bureaucratic politics like those of Professors Allison and Neustadt do not apply, but 'public opinion' is seen as exercising a negative influence by imposing constraints. When discussing 'economic and psychological factors' Professor Frankel concludes that 'Britain's socio-economic system was simply not geared to rapid economic growth' (p. 51). The Suez 'debacle' in 1956 is seen as 'the turning point' both in 'Britain's postwar power status and in her psychological outlook' (p. 62). The panacea for low national morale and poor economic performance is apparently the EEC (p. 69).

There is some analysis of Britain's 'power, influence, and capability,' all apparently much diminished and undermined by the 'liability' of sterling. It was only with the Heath government that an era was inaugurated which 'may lead to a fundamental revision of British perceptions, with the focus of attention shifting decisively to Western Europe' (p. 97). Britain's 'national style' in foreign policy is characterised by pragmatism, continuity, ideas of the 'balance of power,' and a concern with problems of morality and international law greater than that of most other states. But the fundamental flaw in the performance of Britain's world role has been the 'dispersion of interests,' the preoccupation with Churchill's idea of the three interlocking circles of the United States, the Commonwealth, and Europe. This 'diffuse global policy' has now been replaced by 'a regional, Western European

orientation; economic growth and social welfare rather than self-preservation have become the major national aspirations' (p. 173).

These 'praxes' are then illustrated by some discussion of Britain's major 'policy areas' since 1945, both in connection with that country's relations with the United States, Russia, the Commonwealth, Western Europe and, speculatively, the United Nations as another alternative, and also with regard to international economic and defence policies. Illuminating as the examples are, some of the detail is not always accurate: to endorse Professor Neustadt's reconstruction of Eden's thinking at Suez (p. 219) is perhaps questionable in the light of Macmillan's published diary material.[1]

Professor Frankel concludes with a section on futurology. He finds that the ideas of the great Arnold Toynbee on the rise and fall of civilisations do offer 'a fruitful, although only partially applicable framework for explanation.' There are interesting partial parallels between postwar Britain and renaissance Venice: 'Not only is it a case of two maritime powers engaged in a choice between maritime and continental orientations, but both of them lived on myths' (p. 324). For Britain, joining Europe could 'play the role of the Toynbeesque "challenge"' (p. 335).

This work is probably of interest to social scientists concerned with 'paradigms,' 'parameters' of action, and 'saliences.' Its value to historical scholars is more limited.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth R. OVENDALE

Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914–1964. By Partha Sarathi Gupta. *London: Macmillan in association with the Managers of the Cambridge University Smuts Memorial Fund for the Advancement of Commonwealth Studies. 1975. 454 pp. (Cambridge Commonwealth Series.) £10·00.*

IN this well-documented study of British Labour policy in the field of foreign affairs, Mr. Partha Sarathi Gupta has set out to refute the Leninist accusation that the absence of revolutionary ardour in Western socialist parties was due to their imperialism. As far as Britain is concerned this is almost a case of setting up an Aunt Sally to knock it down again, for few people can seriously associate the British Labour Party with imperialism. To most observers it would seem that, until the Second World War, the party was almost wholly obsessed with domestic issues and, if it had a bias at all, it was against the capitalism which it regarded as the foundation of empire. British left-wingers have in general been 'Little Englanders,' and even amongst moderate members of the party it came to be held that 'reformist social democracy neither needs nor could afford an imperialist policy.' Bevin, as Mr. Gupta points out, believed that the British standard of living depended on Britain's global role in imperial defence, but he was one of a small minority. Attlee at one time attached importance to a British presence east of Suez, but according to the author this was more a matter of prestige than of economic advantage.

In his rebuttal of the Leninist thesis, the author takes us rather laboriously through the different phases of Labour policy. After the First World War, Labour opposed protectionism, but was prepared to ban the import of

[1] *Riding the Storm 1956–1959.* London, Melbourne, Toronto: Macmillan, 1971. pp. 133–37. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1971, p. 608.

goods produced by sweated labour. This, however, was presumably because of its determination to maintain the British worker's standard of living and it did not lead the party to take any very positive interest in the economic development of backward colonies. As the author puts it, its interests were still domestic and its perspective European.

India provided an exception to the general Labour indifference to imperial questions, and although Macdonald was lukewarm about Indian nationalism, most members of the party strongly supported the Indian demand for independence. The Attlee government's transfer of power to India and Pakistan in 1947 was consistent with that line of thought. On other colonial questions the attitude of the party was a combination of paternalism and indifference. The African colonies did not seem ready for independence, but there were no signs that the party wanted Britain to cling on to empire wherever possible.

The author in fact has little difficulty in proving his case, but it must be confessed that his book makes rather tedious reading—this, however, is the fault of the subject rather than of Mr. Gupta.

P. J. GRIFFITHS

The Political Economy of North Sea Oil. By D. I. MacKay and G. A. MacKay. *London: Martin Robertson. 1975. 193 pp. £4·95. Pb: £2·35*

IT is not surprising that one of the first rigorous studies of the implications of North Sea oil and gas discoveries should be by two Scotsmen, since all the oil so far found in British waters lies in the area defined as Scottish by the Continental Shelf (Jurisdictional) Order of 1968—thus falling under Scots, not English, law. Given this fact, the MacKays have produced a book which is partly designed as a contribution to the debate north of the Border on where Scottish oil should fit into separatist strategies. The bulk of the work, however, is written for a wider British audience, although it will be disappointing for readers of this journal that the emphasis on Scottish worries has meant that there is very little coverage of events in other North Sea waters, such as those of Norway or the Netherlands. In addition, although it is fair to describe the book as a work of political economy, the authors are much stronger economists than political commentators. One does not, for instance, learn anything particularly new about the cross-pressures on British administrations over the last decade as they struggled to formulate policies on licensing, boundaries and taxation. The impact of the Norwegian example on British thinking during the 1970s, or the history of the British National Oil Corporation's development from the Labour Party's original proposals for a National Hydrocarbons Corporation await a much more politically-orientated study.

These reservations aside, this is a useful book, giving one a clear picture of the impact of North Sea oil on the wider British economy and balance of payments, while also examining what these finds will do to specific regions and industries in Scotland. Their estimates of likely reserves and production tend to be conservative, but they are careful to indicate that there are different views in existence (like Peter Odell's) and they generally explain why they have chosen to ignore them. They do, however, drop their conservatism in one crucial calculation of what the 'oil' balance of payments will be for Britain, assuming that we will achieve a production rate of over three million barrels a day by 1980—a figure which could well be fifty per

cent. too high. But the value of their book is that, even if one disagrees with any of their specific assumptions on things like operating costs or level of reserves, their analysis is clear enough to allow one to work out easily what impact such variations in assumptions will have on their final conclusions. On their figures, they see the British 'oil' account moving into the black in 1979, with a £6,230 million turnaround (from 1974) in the country's balance of payments on oil a year later.

Finally, however, they come back to the potentially vast impact this oil could have on Scotland. 'To put it bluntly,' they conclude, 'present policies offer the Scots altruism and relative poverty. Unless some viable intermediate position can be found, they are likely to prefer avarice and relative affluence' (p. viii).

Chatham House LOUIS TURNER

Ireland in the War Years: 1939–1945. By Joseph T. Carroll. *Newton Abbot: David and Charles: New York: Crane Russak. 1975. 190 pp. £4·50. $10.75.*

MR. CARROLL'S revealing book is an excellent contribution to our knowledge of the diplomatic processes of the Second World War and to the concept of neutrality. It is based upon the heavily 'weeded' British archives, and the published German and American documentation. The Irish records probably no longer exist. This is not too surprising since there is much to hide about the extent of Anglo-Irish collaboration and dependency, as Mr. Carroll shows. Irish neutrality, he maintains, was permitted because 'the invasion of Ireland never became a vital interest' of either Britain or Germany. The British certainly planned for the event, but the Germans could not invade in the face of local British air and sea superiority and the British therefore did not need to. They wanted the Irish ports, which they had 'unconditionally' returned in 1938, but they attempted to obtain them first through unenthusiastically playing the 'Irish unity' card and then through crude economic warfare. The details of all these events are based on original research.

The author is, not unnaturally, sympathetic to the Irish predicament. De Valera knew that the Germans would have flattened the unprotected towns of Ireland if he had traded reunification for alliance in 1940. The British could have done nothing; even in 1943 'Britain felt unable to give Ireland the necessary supplies and protection.' The incredibly incompetent 'American note,' of February 1944 demanding 'as an absolute minimum' the removal from Ireland of Axis diplomatic representatives who might obtain information on D-Day planning, enabled de Valera to use an Anglo-American invasion scare, plus an internal 'Red Scare' to recoup his party's losses in the May 1944 election. He crushed the IRA ruthlessly; the neutrality policy rested upon draconian censorship and loss of constitutional rights. This facilitated the secret but extensive military and security co-operation between Britain and Ireland, the blind eye turned to the greater number of Irish than Ulster volunteers in the British forces. All these points emerge from Mr. Carroll's account, although they might have been more succinctly presented and more extensively covered in a separate chapter upon Irish domestic politics. 'Who are we neutral against?' some Irish

asked. Since 'Ireland's whole source of pressure' was 'the threat to withhold supplies of Guinness from Britain,' the answer was never in doubt.

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

Europe from Below: An assessment of Franco-German popular contacts. By John E. Farquharson and Stephen C. Holt. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1975. 218 pp. £6·00.*

THE development of Franco-German relations since the Second World War is inevitably a fascinating subject for any student of West European politics or of European integration. After generations of rivalry and conflict between the two countries, the postwar period has witnessed a deliberate effort by their governments to engage in more constructive collaboration, both bilaterally and within the European Communities. Most studies of this trend have concentrated on the strategies of governments, the aspirations of statesmen and the activities of elite groups, with only passing references to other contacts. It is, therefore, particularly valuable that Dr. Farquharson and Professor Holt have directed our attention towards the links between the French and German peoples at the grassroots. In this book they have set out to catalogue the growth of formal and informal contacts, some stimulated by government policy, others a product of diverse cultural, economic and political factors, or of individual initiative.

The authors admit that 'how different nations regard one another still largely depends upon the relationships existing between their respective governments' (Preface, p. i). Yet, they argue, it is necessary to explore contacts at other levels too, in order to discover how far cultural policies can foster changes in public attitudes, and to assess the relevance of those attitudes to the deliberations of governments. These questions are of particular relevance in the light of the efforts made since the signing of the Franco-German Friendship Treaty of 1963 to improve the two peoples' mutual awareness and understanding. The evidence in terms of volume is impressive. The study plots the growth of youth exchanges, academic exchanges, commercial contacts and trade union links. Perhaps the most fascinating chapter is on twin towns, where the increase in numbers since 1963 has been startling, and the motivations expressed by those involved have become progressively more 'European.' The problems of stimulating more teaching of German in French schools, or, worse still, French in German schools, illustrate the practical difficulties of implementing cultural agreements, especially for the Germans with their decentralised system of government in the field of education.

The book is useful as a pioneering exploration of a diverse range of grassroots contacts. The authors are themselves sceptical about their importance and hesitate to evaluate the effect of contacts on popular attitudes, except to insist that significant changes will occur only in the longer term. The weakness of the book is that it fails to assess the relative weight of different types of contact, or to identify their relevance for the policies of the two governments towards each other.

University of Manchester HELEN WALLACE

The German Dilemma: The Throes of Political Emancipation. By Karl Dietrich Bracher. Trans. by Richard Barry. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1975. 332 pp. £8·00.*

PROFESSOR BRACHER has added to the attractions of his book by setting his readers a detective problem. For he nowhere explains the application of the term 'dilemma' by which he seeks to bind together seventeen essays written at different times between 1961 and 1971. If one were to go by two of the three occasions on which the word appears in the actual text, it would indicate the question of compatibility between the rival policies of rearmament and reunification in the 1950s. But as a third of the book deals with the period before 1945, this inference would clearly be false. The only other mention of the word is in connection with the problem facing the Weimar Republic as to how any state can survive as a democracy when the preponderance of its leading social strata are opposed to it on principle. Yet though this application comes nearer the mark, it also has too limited a time-reference. What really seems to be concerning the author is the way in which, as he says on his opening page, throughout German history up to 1945 the organisation and efficiency of the state was given priority over the needs and desires of the individual. How, in short, can you have a democracy without democrats? Yet how can you train people to be democrats except in a democracy? It is a dilemma of which British and American critics of Germany and policy towards Germany have often failed to take account.

Professor Bracher considers that the anti-democratic habit of mind is more deeply seated in Germany than might appear. It has shown itself in widespread hostility to the idea of party as a divisive force in society. Many Germans who would honestly claim to be democrats (including some leaders of the anti-Nazi *Widerstand*) not only failed to appreciate the value of diversity inside an overall unity, but failed to understand that conflicts are so inherent in political life that a constitution should be aimed at channelling them into ways which will facilitate their resolution rather than at suppressing altogether a source of weakness.

Yet the Germans who believed that calm was the first duty of a citizen in a crisis were right to the extent that, without a predominating agreement on first principles, diverging views do become irreconcilable and society incapable of government by discussion. The present reviewer has suggested [1] that, because in Western Europe government was well-established over wide areas, political theorists tended to emphasise freedom and individual rights whereas in Central and Eastern Europe, where the defects and dangers caused by division were easier to see, they gave priority to order and the rights of the state. The author is tenacious in his insistence on freedom to differ. He doubts, for example, whether any provision for emergency legislation is compatible with democracy. Yet he is clearly worried by the challenge presented to the state by left-wing extremism. His latest comments, however, stop at 1969. An epilogue to the English edition could with advantage have told us whether his misgivings have been lessened by the record of the progressives in power and whether the support given them by the population does not justify a belief that West German democracy is now more than a 'fair-weather' system.

MICHAEL BALFOUR

[1] *West Germany.* London: Ernest Benn. 1968. p. 29.

Agreement on Berlin: A study of the 1970–72 quadripartite negotiations. By Dennis L. Bark. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University. 1974. 131 pp. Map. (AEI-Hoover Policy Study 10, August 1974 Hoover Institution Studies 45.) $3.00.*

Weltstadt in Krisen: Berlin 1949–1958. By Diethelm Prowe. *Berlin, New York: de Gruyter. 1973. 359 pp. (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Komission zu Berlin, Band 42; Ed.: Christian Schädlich.) DM 86.00.*

DENNIS BARK'S analysis of the negotiations which led up to the signing of the Four Power Agreement on Berlin in September 1971 is short, concise and manages to explain enough of the complexities of the negotiations without being overwhelmed by their details. For novices, Bark surveys (Chapter 1) the development of Berlin from 1944 to 1969; he also supplies a text of the Quadripartite Agreement and some of the accompanying documents.

The author is well aware that the Berlin negotiations were only part of the general development of detente. However, his main concern is to 'focus specifically upon the Berlin negotiations in an effort to adopt to some extent a West Berliner's point of view' (p. 4). Thus, while praising the practical benefits which the agreement has given West Berliners—the ability to visit East Berlin and East Germany, the end of harrassment on the Access Routes and the recognition of the city's ties with West Germany—Bark warns of the problems ahead. The practical benefits were bought, he feels, at the price of concessions which may contain the seeds of future disputes. For example, the author draws attention to the fact that the agreement stipulates that 'the existing ties between the Federal Republic and the Western Sectors of Berlin will be maintained and developed' (p. 102). However, the Russians and the East Germans can use another sentence in the agreement, namely that 'the situation which has developed in the area (i.e. Berlin) . . . shall not be changed unilaterally,' to oppose, if not veto, the development of those ties they do not like. Bark's prophecy—written shortly after the conclusion of the agreement—has been borne out by events since then.

Another concession which worries the author was the decision to allow the Soviet Union to open a consulate-general in West Berlin. He records that the Western Powers feared that a Russian representative in West Berlin would tend to validate the old Soviet thesis that Four Power rights are, since the far-reaching integration of East Berlin into the GDR, restricted to West Berlin (pp. 90–91). Bark goes on to mention Egon Bahr's ingenious arguments which were supposed to allay this fear. Interestingly, Bark adds that the United States was the last of the Allies to agree to the establishment of the consulate-general. Here the author is in sympathy with those leading members of the American Mission in Berlin who have claimed, in private, that if the West had been tougher, the Russians would not have insisted on the consulate-general as a pre-condition for an agreement.

The discussion of the consulate-general is almost the only instance where Bark indicates that there were serious differences of opinion among the Allies, and between them and the West Germans, not only over what concessions the Allies should make, but also over the pace of the negotiations. It is a pity that the author has not used the many reports over these differences in the West German and American press (the main source, incidentally, of his other material) to provide further examples. A closer

analysis of the differences among the Western powers, and of the different foreign policy goals which lay behind these differences, would have better explained the international context of the Berlin negotiations.

Diethelm Prowe's book fills those largely neglected years of West Berlin's postwar history from 1949–58, from the blockade to the Khrushchev ultimatum. Prowe describes the development of the twin pillars of the city's security, the Allied guarantee and the ties with the Federal Republic. Today these pillars are taken for granted, at least in the West. In 1949, after the lifting of the blockade, the future was less certain: the Allies were rather confused, having made no plan for the post-blockade era. They had failed to realise ' that the decision to defend West Berlin on the basis of ideological values also meant that the confrontation with the East would have to continue, and that a stable political and economic involvement on the part of the West in the city was unavoidable ' (p. 16).

At the time, West Berlin's most pressing need was economic: a quarter of the working population was without work; the city was on the verge of bankruptcy. Yet at first the Allies failed to see that, although West Berlin was no longer cut off from its new hinterland in the West, it was still gravely isolated from it. Indeed, the American Mission in Berlin, thinking that the crisis was over, suddenly cut its relief subsidies to the city. Prowe describes what the Americans did, once they had realised their mistake. He then records in great detail the joint struggle of the city's Mayor, Ernst Reuter, and the Allies to get economic assistance from Bonn. They had to overcome objections stemming not only from Adenauer's scepticism about Berlin and his fear of Reuter's rivalry, but also, until the advent of the ' miracle,' from West Germany's own economic diffi ulties. Finally, however, they succeeded in getting financial assistance on a permanent basis. This, the most important of the ties between the city and the Federal Republic, led to the development of the Federal presence in West Berlin.

Prowe's book is a useful reminder that there were also attempts to develop contacts with the East Berlin authorities before Willy Brandt became Mayor. He records the practical arrangements which civil servants from both sides of the Sector Boundary were able to make whilst Otto Suhr was Mayor (pp. 242–3). This sort of detail is typical of many other facts and insights which make Prowe's well-written book so stimulating. He has not only done a lot of original research but has also bothered to talk to politicians and officials of the period.

W. TREHARNE JONES

Godesberg und die Gegenwart: Ein Beitrag zur innerparteilichen Diskussion über Inhalte und Methoden sozialdemokratischer Politik. *Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft. 1975. 69 pp. (Theorie und Praxis der deutschen Sozialdemokratie.) Pb: DM 8.00.*

SPD und nationale Sicherheit: Internationale und innenpolitische Determinanten des Wandels der sozialdemokratischen Sicherheitspolitik. 1959–1961. By Joachim Hütter. *Meisenheim am Glan: Hain. 1975. 244 pp. (Studien zum politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band 10.) DM 32.00.*

THESE two books are somewhat different in style; one is rather polemical (an example of ' militant moderation ' which many in the British Labour Party would welcome), the other is a piece of cautious social science

research which, unlike many German social science publications today, avoids dogmatic and predictable conclusions.

Godesberg und die Gegenwart represents a contribution to the debate within the SPD about that party's fundamental values and long-term perspectives. It is at the same time a defence of the ideas incorporated in the Godesberg programme of 1958 and an attack on those socialists who doubt its value and its contemporary relevance. Whilst the programme can claim to be the basis for later SPD political successes, there is truth in the criticism that many of the party's contemporary problems are the product of the leadership's failure to pursue theoretical discussion and of a neglect of the basic programme which led to growing doubts about the real purposes of the party. The major themes of this little book are a celebration of pluralism and of decentralisation in political and economic life; a rejection of the language of class warfare and socialisation; and, above all, a modest view of the ability of government intervention to achieve premeditated objectives.

Hütter's book is an analysis of the international and domestic determinants of changes in the SPD's policies of security in the important period from 1959–61. In 1960 the SPD changed from rejecting the Federal Republic's alliance system to supporting it, thereby disengaging reunification from the goal of security of the Federal Republic. Two major aspects of the domestic situation are explored: the adaptation of SPD security policies to public opinion, particularly to anti-communism and rejection of the DDR's economic system, and the change of security policy as a precondition for coalition with the CDU/CSU (the strategy of embrace). The explanation of the change in party security policy is to be found partly in a calculated decision by the SPD with reference to electoral and coalition prospects, partly in Hanrieder's view of the Federal Republic as a 'penetrated system' whose decision-making processes are decisively influenced by external events. The decisive 'penetration' was, however, at the time of the Federal Republic's origins, the occupation regime and integration in the Western bloc under American leadership. This study argues that in the 1960s, and even in the 1950s, the degree of penetration was less than Hanrieder suggests and that internal political actors and their perceptions of domestic political problems and prospects were significant factors in their own right. The key problem for the author's analysis remains the lack of empirical research on the political parties themselves and internal party relations. He can at least take comfort from the fact that empirical substantiation for Hanrieder's thesis likewise remains inadequate.

University of Liverpool K. H. F. Dyson

The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945–1949. Edited by Jean Edward Smith. Two volumes. *Bloomington, Ind., London: Indiana University Press. 1975. 1210 pp. Index. £17·50.*

Mr. Smith has presented us with 746 documents comprising cables and letters sent by General Clay, as American Military Governor in Germany, to Washington, as well as recording many of the teleconferences between him and his military superiors, in order to tell 'a story much of which has never been told.' The operative word is 'much' and the question arises as to whether this refers to detail or to general outline. The documents range over the whole complex range of problems which engaged Clay's attention:

reparations (showing that all three Western powers attempted to take unaccounted reparations from Germany), the creation, and development of Bizonia, the formation of a West German state, currency reform, the Occupation Statute and control of the Ruhr. All of these involved Clay in bitter conflicts with Britain and France and with the State Department. The main issue with Britain was over financial provisions for Bizonia. The French exasperated him over central German agencies, the Saar, Berlin currency, trizonal fusion and the occupation statute.

Clay's attitude to the Soviet Union fluctuated with American policy. In November 1945 he took 'sharp issue with the point of view that it was the USSR which was failing to carry out' the Potsdam Agreement, and gave very interesting evidence in support of his view (Document 56). He was forced into the role of a leading cold war warrior through the economic needs of American capitalism in relationship to Europe in general. It does not seem coincidental that in 1947, the year of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the Soviet Union virtually disappears from the Clay Papers, while the importance of the Western zones to European recovery, as well as the attempt to secure an American political predominance in Bizonia commensurate with the United States' financial stake, becomes ever more marked. This process plus the need for a currency reform ensured Clay's full conversion and a different view of Russian objectives when the issue was forced through the Berlin blockade. He did not expect war with the Soviet Union over Berlin and this resounds through his teleconferences and cables at the time of the blockade. Nor was he greatly concerned that, with the airlift functioning at its maximum capability, there was any likelihood that the Western powers would be forced out of Berlin if they were intent upon staying. After September 1948, the blockade became just one problem, of declining importance, out of the many dealt with in his cables.

The Clay Papers tend to fill out the details and remind one of the generalities, rather than revise one's view of the events. Clay's own tight-lipped account stands up very well from the point of view of information,[1] and most of the general points have been well covered by Gimbel's study.[2] Moreover much that might have been new has already been covered by the State Department publications.[3] Mr. Smith uses them for cross-referencing for 1945–47, while neglecting to note that more than 30 of the 309 documents presented for this period have already been published in the various volumes either verbatim or paraphrased by Clay's Political Adviser. He does not and probably could not use these volumes for 1948–49. However, one must note that at least 50 of the 313 documents for 1948 appear in the relevant State Department publication; most of them are substantial and tell 'much' of the 'untold story.'

Although Mr. Smith claims that the cables to which Clay was responding 'have been described in headnotes or endnotes and their substance paraphrased,' this appears to be more honoured in the breach than the observance, particularly for 1948–49. There are other examples of shoddy

[1] Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*. London, Melbourne, Toronto: Heinemann; New York: Doubleday. 1950. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1951, p. 97.

[2] John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: politics and the military 1945–1949*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1968.

[3] *Foreign Relations of the United States:* 1945, Vol. III; 1946, Vol. V; 1947, Vol. II; 1948, Vol. II; 1945, *The Conference of Berlin* (2 vols.). Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (for US Department of State) 1960–1973.

editing: Documents 297, 516, 545 are wrongly dated and their appearance out of order creates confusion; Documents 302 and 729 are duplicates of 286 and 722; Documents 71 and 330 refer the reader to papers (not printed), which are in fact printed as Documents 65 and 329.

In short it must be concluded that this valuable collection could have been presented more cogently and concisely and probably more cheaply. Its full value will be better ascertained when it has been used in new studies of American foreign policy and of course the German Question in 1945–49.

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

Die Weizsäcker-Papiere 1933–1950. Edited by Leonidas E. Hill. *Berlin: Propyläen-Verlag. 1974. 684 pp. DM 68.00.*

THIS massive, carefully edited volume is a product of historical revisionism. Ernst von Weizsäcker (1882–1951) was a German career diplomat and from 1938–1943, as *Staatsekretär* under Ribbentrop, was Number Two in the German Foreign Ministry. In 1947 he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment by an American Court at Nuremberg in the Wilhelmstrasse trial on a 2:1 verdict. After an appeal the sentence was reduced to five years and Weizsäcker was released in October 1950. The main point of the prosecution was that he had, as head of the Office on International Law in his ministry, acquiesced in the deportation of many French Jews to Auschwitz where they had perished. The dissenting judge accepted the argument of the defence that Weizsäcker 'could not be regarded guilty for not having voiced a protest, when this was definitely forbidden by his superiors and was a case of measures carried out by other offices over which Weizsäcker had no control' (p. 46). These were Himmler's SS and the department 'Deutschland' in the Foreign Ministry under Himmler's buddy, Martin Luther.

The editor, a Canadian historian who has done much research in this field, comes to the conclusion that Weizsäcker ought to have been acquitted. However, he admits that the question will long be debated whether this rather reserved top civil servant and *Mitläufer* did right to remain in office and undertake the precarious attempt to influence the foreign policy of the Third Reich in a moderate direction. Conditioned by his earlier experience as an officer in the Imperial Navy, Weizsäcker knew how to obey and sometimes how to command. By temperament rather quiet and probably a better listener than talker, he was not given to Ribbentrop's arrogant showmanship but tried to influence people by indirect rather than direct means, by a kind of step-by-step approach.

While in the 1930s Weizsäcker favoured Germany's return to the status of a great power, he dreaded another world war. Co-operating with the Italian ambassador, Attolico, he worked hard behind the scenes to avoid war during the crisis over the Sudetenland in September 1938, and of Munich he wrote later that he 'had perhaps not experienced a happier day' (p. 172). After having wrongly predicted in August 1939 that England would not honour its pledges to Poland, he anxiously asked General Brauchitsch 'whether we were obliged to let the Third Reich be destroyed on account of a mad adviser of Hitler's [*i.e.*, Ribbentrop]. R. would be the first to hang but others would follow' (p. 164).

In this collection of diary notes, private letters and memoranda the pages on Weizsäcker's final assignment as ambassador to the Holy See (1943–45) are of special interest to the student of international affairs. He adroitly

played on the Vatican's fear of Bolshevism and of a Russian advance in Central Europe, and in 1944 he tried to influence the postwar policies of the Western Allies through the mediation of the Vatican. In a memorandum in English destined for Archbishop Spellman in New York he argued that American and British troops alone should occupy Germany. ' Only they are fit for this job as their countries have no territorial claims against Germany.' (October 9, 1944, p. 383.)

Four years later, the prisoner at Nuremberg, resigned and stoical, quoted from a statement by the prosecution in the trial: ' It is horrible to note that the defendants did not *protest* in one single instance against these crimes ' and then suggests the alternative version: ' It is horrible to note that Germany lived in a dictatorship in which nothing could be achieved by protests ' (p. 448). Whether or not the reader accepts Weizsäcker's fatalistic *apologia*, this book remains an important source for the interpretation of a sinister period in German and European history.

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

Konrad Adenauer: Geschichtsverständnis, Weltanschauung und politische Praxis. By Anneliese Poppinga. *Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 1975. 296 pp. DM 32.00.*

It does not happen every day that a secretary of a leading statesman later writes a doctoral thesis on his attitude to history, his philosophical outlook and his political practice. Frau Poppinga worked with Konrad Adenauer from 1959 to the time of his death. This study, which is divided into two main parts, ' History and Politics ' and ' The *Weltanschauung* of Konrad Adenauer—contours, focal points and perspectives of his basic intellectual approach,' is something of a *tour de force*. For Adenauer was primarily a man of action and, although he frequently reflected on trends and features of contemporary history, he never developed an overall view of history.

Certainly Adenauer used historical analogies, when they suited his purpose. His bitter experiences of the National Socialist regime, for instance, caused him to draw analogies with the behaviour of Soviet Russia after 1945. While advocating the inclusion of the Federal Republic in a stable system of Western alliances in 1952, he declared that he was ' firmly convinced, that if the other states had made themselves strong, Hitler would never have attacked them. The situation today is similar to that then ' (p. 45). Another analogy was with the Versailles Treaty. There must not be, Adenauer warned after 1945, a second ' Versailles,' and fortunately there was not. With his policy of working for Germany's Western integration and good relations with the United States, Adenauer always feared the expansion of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and, to a lesser degree, a possible advance of American isolationism. For him German interests and European interests coincided. In the words of the author, he felt that ' in the shadow of the European flag the burden of the German past '—of which the Chancellor took a sober, realistic view—' could be more easily overcome, though this should not mean that Adenauer was motivated by opportunism ' (p. 133).

In the 1960s Adenauer was often criticised for ignoring the trend towards a general detente. Frau Poppinga maintains that his policy aimed at detente, at a phase of peaceful understanding. However, he always insisted that this must lead to German reunification, or at least to a partial solution on the

way to this goal. 'Without it in his view no genuine detente could happen' (p. 143). As we know, the subsequent governments, led by Brandt and Schmidt, have pursued quite a different course. In retrospect there remains the doubt whether Adenauer paid more than lip-service to that demand for German reunification.

The interpretation of Adenauer's policies and of their motives will occupy students of history for a long time. Yet the attempt in this book to compare Adenauer's attitude to political reality and his system of values with those of the sociologist Max Weber, or to consider his outlook on life with the help of the typology of *Weltanschauungen* developed by Karl Jaspers seems to this reviewer somewhat laboured and to bear little fruit. Undoubtedly Adenauer was to some extent conditioned by the traditions of Rhenish Catholicism, by an education in the classics, as well as by his later experiences as a lawyer and in municipal affairs as *Oberürgermeister* of Cologne in the 1920s. But his personality and his approach to politics are brought to life much better in the masterly biography by Terence Prittie [1] or in Frau Poppinga's earlier graphic account *Meine Erinnerungen an Konrad Adenauer.*[2]

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

The Sudeten-Problem 1933–1938: Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy. By Ronald M. Smelser. *London: Dawson. 1975. 324 pp. £9·00.*

THIS is a valuable study of the cultivation of Sudeten loyalties by different groups in the Third Reich. A sharp distinction is drawn between the various Nazi radicals, for whom incorporation of the Sudetenland was the only solution, and the traditional Pan-Germans, whose interest in the Sudetens, according to Professor Smelser, was that of preserving their 'integrity and independence against all outside encroachment' (p. 164). For him, this traditional attitude was incarnated in Hans Steinacher, whom he interviewed, with others, in 1968. Professor Smelser's distinction is, of course, a valid one; but one may doubt if before the war it was as firmly rooted in the minds of the traditionalists as it has since become. Long before the rise of Hitler, there was a fundamental ambivalence about *Volkstumspolitik.* What was the point of so assiduously keeping German contacts alight, unless one day someone might wish to blow them into flame?

The other key figure is Konrad Henlein, who is presented as an ally of the traditionalists until late in 1937, when he became Hitler's submissive accomplice. Professor Smelser makes a persuasive case. On the other hand, he shows Henlein throwing dust in the eyes of the British at an earlier date—first, a gullible gathering at Chatham House, later, interviews with Vansittart, who is described as 'sympathetic' (p. 148), and Churchill, whom Henlein 'managed to impress . . . to some extent' (p. 224). It is a pity that for these London visits Professor Smelser relies entirely on German sources. The same applies to Halifax's meeting with Hitler in November 1937.

Professor Smelser ascribes to Hitler an almost wholly passive role until the beginning of 1938; he is 'the ultimate opportunist' (p. 244), who had no 'carefully thought-out plan' (p. 213) either for the Anschluss with Austria

[1] *Konrad Adenauer 1876–1967.* London: Tom Stacey. 1972. Reviewed in *International Affairs,* July 1972, p. 492.

[2] Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 1970.

or for the Sudetenland. Professor Smelser is led towards this rather dubious conclusion by his acceptance of Mr. A. J. P. Taylor's interpretation of the Hossbach Memorandum. He holds that in mid-September 1938 neither Hitler nor Henlein had a plan of action after the risings in Sudetenland had failed, and it took Chamberlain's telegram, announcing his visit to Hitler, ' to resolve the impasse ' (p. 240). This picture of Hitler grasping at the chance to settle the crisis by diplomacy is difficult to reconcile with the evidence of his exasperation at Munich with a settlement depriving him of the opportunity to display Germany's armed might.

However, it would not be fair to hold against Professor Smelser a questionable reassessment of the Munich tragedy, which lies outside the scope of his book. What he has provided—and it is very well worth having—is a well-documented account of the labyrinths of *Volkstumspolitik*, the numerous agencies that aspired to direct it and the points at which it impinged upon the foreign policy of the Reich. In this area he has enriched our understanding of Nazism.

R. CECIL

Der Verwaltete Mensch: Studien zur Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland. By H. G. Adler. *Tübingen: Mohr. 1974. 1076 pp. DM 120.00.*

NAZI Germany's policies towards the Jews used to prompt the question, 'How could it have happened? '. The answers usually explained 'why' rather than 'how', and it was not until after the Eichmann trial in 1961 that more attention was devoted to the actual mechanics of the 'how' aspect, taking even further the findings of Hilberg's seminal work on the subject. In other words, what were the actual administrative or bureaucratic processes by which hundreds of thousands of German citizens were deprived first, of their means of livelihood and ultimately of their rights as citizens before the law; secondly, of their homes and apartments and indeed choice of where to live; and finally, of their lives after the deportations which constitute the subject-matter of this book. Which departments of state and local government became involved in this terrible process, what were the relationships between them, and what were the attitudes adopted by the officials involved? More important, what was the nature and legal basis of their respective responsibilities? But any attempt to pursue these questions in the context of Nazi Germany's Jewish policies comes up against another and equally fundamental point, and one which heightens interest in these other questions: what the author refers to as the dichotomy of the state and party apparatus in what is now acknowledged to have been somewhat less than a total dictatorship.

In an attempt to find answers to these and related questions, the author's well-known expertise in the field of Nazi-Jewish history has been brought to bear upon the administration of the deportation of the Jews from Nazi Germany. His approach is schematic and analytical rather than chronological, enabling him to pose and answer questions of sociology and political science in addition to what might be called purely historical ones, but each time returning to the basic issue: the nature and form of public administration in a modern state, especially in a dictatorship like the Third Reich, where such *Staatsrecht* as there was was largely the 'will' of one man, and where the fate of large sections of the population was decided by that modern convenience, administrative law. When one remembers that in the Third Reich

the Jewish question was largely administered by a force which seemed to combine both state and party functions, the Sicherheistdienst or Gestapo, it is not surprising that the 'how' question becomes increasingly easy to answer.

Apart from two general sections on Nazi Germany's Jewish policies and the deportations, Adler provides in other sections of the book fascinating and detailed insights into the administrative procedures and consequences of the deportations, the financial arrangements involved, Gestapo dealings with the Reich railway and postal authorities, and even the inter-departmental squabbling over the disposition of the property vacated by the Jews. Part V, based on records of the Würzburg Gestapo, recounts the fate of individual Jews and their families in the Würzburg area before and after deportation. The final section of the book is an analysis of administration in the modern state, with particular reference to the Third Reich. As Adler was bound to show, great emphasis is placed upon the role of the police and security forces since it was these which played the main part in the administrative 'management' of the Jewish question in the Third Reich. H. G. Adler's monumental work of scholarship must become a standard work of reference on the subject, enhancing as it does our knowledge of the diaspora of the Jews from 20th-century Germany.

JOHN P. FOX

Hitler in der spanischen Arena: Die deutsch-spanischen Beziehungen im Spannungsfeld der europäischen Interessenpolitik vom Ausbruch des Bürgerkrieges bis zum Ausbruch des Weltkrieges 1936–1939. By Hans-Henning Abendroth. *Paderborn: Schöningh. 1973. 411 pp. DM 29.80.*

DR. ABENDROTH's study of German intervention in the Spanish Civil War is a major contribution to the vast and ever-increasing literature on the war. While correcting previous accounts of Germany's role in the affair, for example, Manfred Merkes, *Die deutsche Politik im spanischen Bürgerkrieg 1936–1939*,[1] he goes much further by placing more emphasis on the European aspects and reactions of German policy in Spain, in this way relating the part played by intervention to the wider aims of German foreign policy in the late 1930s. He has also paid far more attention to the attitudes and policies of Franco and the nationalist regime, and has provided a useful and important supplement to his German sources by making full use of the available British documents. Abendroth's account underlines the total seriousness with which the European governments (including Russia) regarded the Spanish Civil War, and dispels any myths that may still linger on about the 'façade' of diplomacy of the war or that anybody at the time regarded it simply as a 'sideshow'. His book, therefore, is much more a 'European' than a purely 'German' study.

Although Hitler's initial motive for intervening on Franco's side was the negative aim of preventing a communist-led Spain which, allied to a leftist-orientated France, would further impede Germany's freedom of manoeuvre in Central Europe, more far-reaching considerations were at work. In November 1936 Hitler told the newly appointed German Chargé d'Affaires to Spain that his aim in Spain was to bring about a situation at the end of the war in which Spanish policy was not influenced by London, Paris or Moscow, and that in the expectation of a final struggle to determine the

[1] Bonn: Rohrscheid. 2nd ed. 1969.

new order in Europe, 'Spain doesn't find itself in the camp of the enemy but as much as possible Germany's friend' (p. 36). A desire to secure supplies of Spain's valuable ores for German rearmament was another important element in the complex of Germany's relations with Franco.

Abendroth breaks new ground in his account of British relations with Franco, and shows that British policy was the corollary of Hitler's for similar strategic, political and economic reasons, a point appreciated by the Germans (p. 320). In fact, the motives underlying British policy enabled Franco to maintain a fair degree of independence and manoeuvrability in his relations with all the European powers, including Germany and Italy. Although aided and supported by the latter, he had no wish to play the fly to the spider. In May 1938 he replied to German approaches about a friendship treaty by insisting on a secret agreement because he was afraid of the Anglo-French reaction (p. 211). Nor did his declaration to the British in September 1938 of a neutral Spain in the event of a European war endear him to the Germans (pp. 221–2). But by the time the British finally decided—against Vansittart's opposition—to attempt to pursue better relations with Franco at the end of the Civil War, it was too late (p. 271 ff.). His inclinations were towards the Axis camp, the decisive element apparently having been the bad impression created by the behaviour of the democracies at Munich (p. 279).

The author has done an excellent job in unravelling all the complicated strands in the story, and this important study therefore deserves to be widely read.

JOHN P. FOX

'Above Parties': The Political Attitudes of the German Protestant Church Leadership 1918–1933. By J. R. C. Wright. *London: Oxford University Press. 1974. 197 pp. (Oxford Historical Monographs.) £5·00.*

THE subject of this book is not as esoteric as its title might perhaps suggest. The Protestant church leadership was hardly the 'praetorian guard of the monarchy' that its socialist critics believed it to be, but it was nevertheless a significant element in the predominantly Prussian elite of Imperial Germany. Their reactions to the unwanted republic are therefore a useful guide to the dilemmas and divided loyalties of many conservative Germans who had a substantial stake in the old order and found themselves adrift in the new.

Dr. Wright's account of their relations with the new state is very good indeed. He has been able to draw upon a great deal of unpublished material not hitherto used by either German or non-German scholars and he presents his evidence in a style that is both elegant and economical. His scholarship is meticulous and his argument for the most part convincing.

The only serious criticism that might be made of the book is that it is too short. Important sections of the original doctoral thesis have been omitted or drastically pruned. A notable example is the chapter on foreign policy, which in the book is a mere seven pages long. In its present form it does justice neither to the complicated structure of the international Protestant community nor the peculiar problems that affected the external relations of the German churches. Professor Siegmund-Schultze, who badly needs a biography, has to be content with a footnote. Here, too, as elsewhere, the author simply has no space to comment on or explain the theo-

logical controversies that raged in the German church in this period and which were to play such an important part in the church struggle that followed.

These concessions to the author's own *Obrigkeit* (his publishers) are made all the more irritating by an epilogue on the Protestant churches in the Third Reich. The latter, it should be stressed, is both readable and intelligent, but it is also unnecessary. The twenty-five pages devoted to these well-worn themes could have been more profitably used in the main body of the book. Excessive brevity is however preferable to excessive length and Dr. Wright's book is still, despite its sins of omission, a very readable and important contribution to the literature on Weimar Germany.

Queen Mary College, London P. W. LUDLOW

The Great Inflation: Germany 1919–1923. By William Guttmann and Patricia Meehan. *Farnborough: Heath. 1975. 252 pp. £4·85.*

THERE is an unwritten rule in international economic organisations that dog does not eat dog. It protects governments—well, certainly, governments of rich countries—from interference with, and reversal of, their basic political choices and institutions at the hands of fellow-governments. Persuasion can go a long way—but some subjects and issues are 'out of bounds'. Good advice, however eminent and authoritative the source, cannot be pushed on a resistant subject.

Perhaps a book like this should make us think again about this rule—or perhaps, not us, the British, but our creditors and rescuers who one day may have to help us launch our 'rentenpound'. For its basic argument is that German economic mismanagement during and after the 1914–18 war led, through the resulting inflation, to the dislocation of political allegiances and structures and to the emergence of new political forces: these in turn produced foreign policy actions that disrupted or threatened international order and security. This second cause—and effect—is fairly generally accepted. It is also commonly believed that Hitler would never have got his chance but for the world economic depression. This book argues that the inflation of 1923 was a necessary condition for the 'decomposition of the middle class and its alienation from liberal ideas' which later allowed the depression to be a sufficient condition for the triumph of Nazism. 'Many minds were moulded by the experience of the Inflation into a Nazi mentality, and though this remained latent in many, it only needed the trauma of the great depression to set these forces loose.'

Originally researched for a television programme (of which Miss Meehan was the perceptive producer) the book's first aim is to tell the human story of the German inflation. This it does particularly well, not least because Dr. Guttman was himself a student in Munich at the time. More recently, he was for many years on the editorial staff of *The Observer*. And the pop history disguise he has assumed here conceals, as good journalism often does, both careful scholarship and serious thought.

Chatham House SUSAN STRANGE

Italian Foreign Policy 1870–1940. By C. J. Lowe and F. Marzari. *London, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1975. 476 pp. (Foreign Policies of the Great Powers.) £12·50.*

Italy, NATO, and the European Community: The Interplay of Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics. By Primo Vannicelli. *Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. 1974. 61 pp. (Harvard Studies in International Affairs, No. 31.) $3.25.*

BISMARCK called Italy the 'sixth wheel' of the European chariot. At the time of its unification it ranked well below the other Great Powers in population and resources; it had behind it a background of centuries of domestic division and foreign domination; and its immediate need was peace for consolidation—prestige could come later. So it seemed to the cautious politicians of the Right such as Visconti Venosta, who in 1875 said, 'Peace is an absolute necessity for our country.' But even before that, in 1870, Crispi's dictum was that 'Nationalism must be pushed to its furthest possible limits. . . .' In the opening words of this book, 'These contrasting programmes provide the key to the dialogue in Italian foreign policy from 1870 to 1940.'

The book falls naturally into two parts, the break coming after the end of the 1914–18 war with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire which had dominated so much of Italian diplomatic thinking. In the immediate post-unification period Italy was searching for allies and found in the Triple Alliance a means of ending its isolation. The counterpart was Crispi's adventurous attempt to assert a Mediterranean and even African role for Italy. And the Italian Nationalists, to whom he became a hero, were to provide the link between his aspirations and those of the 'strong man' of the second period, Mussolini. Both, by their ambitious policies, tried to force Italy into adventures which its resources were too weak to sustain.

Professor Lowe and the late Dr. Marzari, both lecturers at Canadian universities, provide a useful study of Italian foreign policy during these two formative periods; they thereby fill a gap, for, as the extensive bibliography indicates, English accounts of this subject have been largely confined to more comprehensive works (notably, Christopher Seton-Watson's *Italy from Liberation to Fascism: 1870–1925*.[1]) A book of this scope deserves a much more detailed index. A selection of documents is included (pp. 371–415).

Mr. Vannicelli's little book deals with Italian foreign policy after the Second World War. By that time the 'adventures' were a thing of the past —indeed were being studiously avoided. Italy had become a multi-party state but one under the uninterrupted government of a major party, the Christian Democrats. Its foreign policy played a subsidiary role by comparison with the government's more pressing domestic problems, both economic and political. Outwardly conformist, Italy, with an eye on its postwar helper, the United States, dutifully joined Nato despite protests from the Communists, who formed its second strongest party. It also joined the European Coal and Steel Community, leading into the EEC, despite objections at the beginning from powerful industrial groups. In Mr. Vannicelli's view, by the mid-1960s the Nato commitment had come to assume greater significance in Italian eyes than had efforts towards

[1] London: Methuen; New York: Barnes & Noble. 1967.

European political integration. His study shows most interestingly how domestic party politics have varyingly influenced Italy's attitudes towards both the international organisations.

MURIEL GRINDROD

Spain in Transition. By Arnold Hottinger. 1: Franco's Regime. *62 pp.* 2: Prospects and Policies. *64pp.* (*Washington Papers Vol. II, Nos. 18 and 19.*) *Beverly Hills, Calif. London: Sage for the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 1974. Pb: $2.50. £1·00 each.*

THESE two volumes together constitute a brief and generally well-balanced introductory essay on the politics of Spain as the Franco era draws to its close. The first volume endeavours to set Franco's regime in its proper historical context and seeks to explore major political, economic and social developments that have occurred during the regime's life-time. Thus there are sections on foreign policy, economic development, the Catholic Church and the position of the monarchy. Equally, there are sections on the regime's very tentative experiments in liberalisation and the reactions that these have provoked. Finally, the author examines Franco's attempts to provide for his own succession and the very limited political changes that he and his collaborators seem able or willing to accept. References to the assassination of Franco's first Prime Minister, Admiral Carrero Blanco, bring the volume to its conclusion and provide an opportunity to meditate upon the likely outcome of the more important drama that will be played out when Franco himself finally departs.

The second volume briefly examines the groups that will be principally involved in that drama. This discussion moves from the 'old guard' Falangists, at one end of the spectrum, to the Maoists and the Basque nationalist organisation, ETA, at the other. The author inevitably offers no more than thumb-nail sketches of each group, but for the uninitiated he provides a quite helpful guide to the forces likely to shape Spain's political future. On the other hand, it is perhaps strange that the most important group of all, the army, should not have received more systematic and thorough treatment. References to it are scattered throughout both volumes but this institution warrants a more careful and coherent analysis. Evidence on this subject is obviously difficult to acquire, but Dr. Hottinger could have probed more deeply. He could, for example, have made some use of the writings of leading military figures.

A major problem with this study is, in fact, the absence of a satisfactory bibliography. The abiding impression is of a rather hastily constructed survey that draws on a limited range of sources which, for the most part, go unacknowledged. It has nothing fresh to offer close students of Spanish affairs, whilst non-specialists have little opportunity to verify the author's assertions. Equally, the brevity of the study tends to give the non-specialist an unduly clear-cut view of what is frequently a complex and elusive subject. Nevertheless, students of international affairs, wholly lacking in specialist knowledge, could profit from these two crisply written and concise volumes.

University of Manchester KENNETH N. MEDHURST

Portugal's Struggle for Liberty. By Mário Soares. Trans. by Mary Gawsworth. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1975. 313 pp. £6·50.*

Portugal: The Last Empire. By Neil Bruce. *Newton Abbot, London, North Pomfret (VT), Vancouver: David and Charles. 1975. 160 pp. £3·95.*

Portugal's Struggle for Liberty was originally published in 1972 in an abridged French translation from which the present English text is rendered. The Portuguese original was written partly on the tropical island of S. Tomé, to which the author was deported by Dr. Salazar in 1968, and partly during his exile in Paris to escape arrest by Dr. Caetano's political police. It was only published in Portugal late last year. The text has not been updated but it is not without bearing on recent events in Portugal. The success of the Armed Forces Movement in April 1974, and its political complexion, would have been impossible without the long, tenacious and at times apparently hopeless struggle of many Portuguese against the right-wing autocracy that had befallen their country. Mário Soares is one of the most illustrious of these and his political autobiography goes some way to explain why. His upbringing was radical, republican and anticlerical (in the fully-fledged meaning of these adjectives in Latin Europe) and he became a communist in his university days. He found the party's orthodoxy stifling and soon left. From then on, in constant struggle against the Portuguese regime, he suffered frequent imprisonment and eventually, for his outspoken opposition to its colonial policies, exile.

It is therefore fitting that Dr. Soares should have been the Foreign Minister chosen by the AFM when the time for decolonisation came. This role he performed with enormous gusto and international success, being at the same time the General Secretary of the Portuguese Socialist Party and steering its course from a loose organisation about 200 strong on April 25, 1974, to the biggest mass party in Portugal, polling 38 per cent. of the popular vote only a year later. For his account of this remarkable year we will have to wait until a second volume of memoirs is published. But the makings of it are already in this first one: the constancy of purpose, the courage, the resilience, the self-assurance without pomposity, the lack of bitterness or resentment, a socialist vision that tries to avoid what he sees as the pitfalls of both West European right-wing social democracies and East European bureaucratic autocracies and, most important, the sheer enjoyment of it all. The events and people that the book depicts are alien to most British readers, but students of Portuguese affairs will find it an indispensable source for the civilian background of revolutionary Portugal and the brunt of its message will be clear to all: that no dictatorship can silence a people completely and that there will always be men who will not lose hope but will fight on against enormous odds. Mário Soares (with other socialists, a few liberals, communists and, after Vatican II, some left-wing Catholics) did that in Portugal. The world being what it is, their plight, although exemplary, was not exceptional; what is rarer is that the hope be fulfilled in time for the enjoyment of the hopeful. It is here that the AFM comes in. On the morning of April 25, 1974, in his flat in Paris, Dr. Soares must have felt like Adam awaking from his dream to find that it was true.

The English translation has occasional slips, one of them misleading: the rendering of 'éventuellement' by eventually on the last page ascribes to Dr. Soares a death wish totally alien to his personality.

Writing at the end of last October, Mr. Neil Bruce was sceptical of the impact that Mário Soares and his party might have in the country. His scepticism was ill-founded but is perhaps understandable: the tempo of

recent Portuguese political life has defied many guesses and, at any rate, Mr. Bruce is more familiar with the African problems than with Portugal, if a wealth of inaccuracies is anything to go by. That familiarity was of necessity with the empire as it was before April 1974, and one cannot help feeling that Mr. Bruce is nostalgic for that status quo. 'Nevertheless Mozambique had *one great advantage* over Angola when hostilities broke out in 1964: Portugal had been able to learn valuable lessons from the fighting in Angola and Guinea, and was militarily better prepared' (p. 78, my italics). Which, or whose, Mozambique one might ask? Be that as it may, Mr. Bruce seems reluctant to understand that if decolonisation, essentially the transfer of the powers of the state from a metropolitan (i.e. foreign) group to an indigenous one, is to succeed without ensuing chaos, a *sine qua non* condition is that the indigenous group should be able to exercise those powers. In the Portuguese case, therefore, they were handed over to Frelimo in Mozambique and to the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau. The lack of a liberation movement with clear supremacy over any others has made things more difficult in Angola, but neither there nor in the other two countries is it reasonable to believe that referenda, elections or councils of headmen, for the absence of which Mr. Bruce castigates the Portuguese handling of the problem, would have helped. *Portugal: the last Empire* is a short and readable introduction to its theme, but the expert will find no original insights or new material in it, and the layman may be misled by its factual errors and unwarranted interpretations.

JOSÉ CUTILEIRO

Le Conflit de Chypre 1946–1959. By François Crouzet. *Brussels: Bruylant. 1973. 1187 pp. Bel. Fr.: 3.040.*

THIS is the fourth and last work in a series sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for the purpose of studying international conflict. A newcomer to the subject of Cyprus, Professor Crouzet has produced in two volumes a monumental work which is completely free from the partisanship that has often affected the judgment of other writers on this embittered controversy. With the aid of research assistants he has covered the international and local aspects of the Cyprus problem in depth from the end of the Second World War up to the Zurich and London Agreements in 1959. Four excellent introductory chapters deal with the geographical and historical background, the merits and shortcomings of British rule, the movement for union (*Enosis*) with Greece and the Turkish obstacle to its realisation. He has usefully expanded the work already done in some detail by Hill and Kirk on the important period in Cypriot politics between 1945 and 1950.

The tendency to see the first Cyprus crisis in the context of colonialism has been responsible for much misunderstanding as to its true nature and for some of the blunders made by the British. Professor Crouzet indicates that the problem does not fit into the category of a typical colonial dispute but follows the pattern of the Balkan conflicts of the 19th and 20th centuries with their problems of irredentism and demands by ethnic groups, not for independence, but for union with existing states. The author suggests that had the British shown greater flexibility, the crisis which broke and became internationalised in 1954 might have been avoided. He considers the Turks to be the most intransigent of the antagonists. The weakness of the Greeks was their lack of realism. Professor Crouzet is probably the first authoritative writer to deal fully and fairly with the Turkish factor—' the rock upon which

the ship of *Enosis* was eventually to founder' (p. 161). Whereas the British interest, being political and strategic, could change, the Turkish veto, dictated by considerations of geography and race, was likely to be permanent. He is perhaps over-critical of the Radcliffe constitutional plan in that he disregards its great merit—built-in safeguards against the ultimate disaster of partition either de facto or de jure.

The subject suffers from excessive documentation which, as Professor Crouzet notes, is often poor in quality. The secrecy ban on the official archives obliged him reluctantly to rely mainly on oral interviews and a vast number of published sources, and in this last respect his book is exhaustive, for almost no published work in Europe or America has escaped his attention. The observations of certain commentators, however, have not always been set against the background of their own prejudices and vested interests, and taken at face value could be misleading. Greater research in Greece into 'X' (KHI) would have enabled Professor Crouzet to reach more definite conclusions about this terrorist organisation, the forerunner of EOKA, and EOKA itself could with advantage have been researched in depth at village level in Cyprus.

In assessing the diplomatic and political developments of the Cyprus dispute, their motivation and consequences Professor Crouzet is unlikely to be surpassed. His analysis of the modern Greek's preoccupation with Ancient Greece, of the Greek *philotimo* and its impact on hellenic nationalism should be heeded by everyone involved in Greek politics. The series of deadlocks which have made the Cyprus problem one of the most intractable of our time are clearly defined in many brilliant and perceptive passages. On the whole the author's conclusions are sound, but he sometimes attributes sinister motives to actions which have simple explanations. However much foreigners may believe otherwise, British policy tends to be empirical rather than Machiavellian.

The errors of fact in a work in which the overall approach is essentially scholarly, cautious and impartial come as a surprise, but may be inherent in the methods of research used in collating the basic material. For example Eden (the Earl of Avon) was not convalescing from jaundice but from three major operations when in 1953 he met Papagos, with whom he had one interview and not two as stated. Nutting's remarks on the Cyprus situation on June 17, 1952 (the author gives *Kathimerini*, June 21 and 22, 1952, as the source) were not made to the House of Commons but to a group of Greek journalists visiting England. It is inexact to describe Grivas as the only Greek army officer in EOKA; his early assistants were like himself Greek nationals of Cypriot origin who had also served in the Greek army. Makarios had lost control over Grivas before he was deported. To suggest therefore that his influence over the EOKA leader had declined as the result of his exile in the Seychelles is an over-simplification. Vlachos was Consul-General not Consul in Cyprus.

It is a pity that such an important and costly book should be marred by careless editing and proof reading. Misspelt names include those of General Sir Charles Keightley, Ambassador Peurifoy, Admiral Fechteler, John Platts Mills and Kemal Rustem. Michel (Pissas) is spelt alternatively in French and English, Cacoyannis in three ways. Ionnides should read Ioannides (Polycarpos). In Map No. 1, published by L'Institut Geographique, Paris, the northern range (Pentadaktylus) is misnamed 'Carpas Mountains', the Karpas being a low-lying region some 50 miles away stretching eastwards to the end of the Panhandle.

The practical use of this study as a unique work of reference is limited by the lack of a subject index. Nonetheless as the most important book yet to be published on the Cyprus question it is essential reading for diplomats and officials who are currently working on the problem and, in the long term, for all serious students of Greco-Turkish history.

NANCY CRAWSHAW

The Challenge of New Territories. By Finn Sollie et al. *(Oslo, Bergen, Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget. 1974. 172 pp. (New Territories in International Politics: Studies from The Fridtjof Nansen Foundation at Polhøgda: No. 1.)*

Science, Technology, and Sovereignty in the Polar Regions. Edited by Gerald S. Schatz. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Lexington Books, Heath for the Antarctican Society. 1975. 215 pp. £7·80.*

BOTH books are collections of papers, supported by documentary appendices. The first, prepared by the Fridtjof Nansen Foundation in Norway, concentrates on the North Polar regions, the second, based on a conference held by the Antarctican Society of Washington D.C., is concerned largely with Antarctica. The second tends to ask questions rather than offer answers, and to give attention to such matters as the application of criminal law and labour law in polar regions, which may pose conundrums for lawyers but can hardly be of prime importance in the management of these regions. The incompleteness of the Antarctic Treaty (1959) is stressed, as is the fact that we are already more than half-way through the agreed thirty-year period for suspension of territorial claims there. Appendix F is a valuable record, with many clear sketch-maps, of the recommendations of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Committee at seven meetings from 1961 to 1972.

The first study is the more useful of the two if only because it looks forward and offers answers and suggestions on many questions that the management of the polar regions presents: for example, that the developing countries are not likely to have great benefits from the creation of a UN régime for the sea-bed; that for international collaboration the Arctic should be divided into central, intermediate and national zones and the regions beyond national jurisdiction should be protected ecologically through joint administration and controls by the United States, Soviet Union, Canada, Denmark and Norway as littoral powers, and that the strategic factors in the Arctic as a buffer zone between America and Russia should be recognised and handled by Nato in consultation with Russia. There are also interesting studies of the exploitation of offshore raw materials, both in and outside the polar regions, and the promise and hazards for developing countries that it presents.

J. E. S. FAWCETT

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

The Future of Inter-Bloc Relations in Europe. Edited by Louis J. Mensonides and James A. Kuhlman. *New York, Washington: Praeger. 1974. London: Pall Mall. 1975. 314 pp. £7·25*

East European Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation. Edited by Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean. *New York, Washington: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1975. 254 pp. £7·75.*

THE first book is a serious, albeit experimental, collection of essays which sometimes have nothing to do with the future, but plenty with the past. The volume consists of papers read at a seminar held at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. The tone is set by Professor Kegley, who attempts a thematic conceptualisation in the introductory essay. Evidently the main concern of the American analysts is to assess the chance of success of the current Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations as well as the Collective Security treaty. After comparing the blocs and discussing military constraints, economic integrations, Berlin and Bonn's Ostpolitik, the tentative conclusions are on the whole optimistic. The second book is much less optimistic, but also much less academic and experimental. The analysts who contributed to this volume are employed by Radio Free Europe and their conclusions are, perhaps predictably, black: Mr. Brown finds hardly any impact on Eastern Europe of detente and Mr. Andras implies that European co-operation is incompatible with ideological struggle. Eastern Germany will always remain an exceptional case (Mr. Dornberg) while no great change is envisaged for Poland and Czechoslovakia (Mr. Dean) nor for Hungary (Mr. Robinson), as a result of detente in Europe. On the contrary Mr. King foresees difficulties for Romania and Mr. Stankovic for Yugoslavia. Only Professor Whetten injects a dose of realism into this volume in his objective discussion of the military dimension. Still, the books are topical and furnish Western readers with important information and arguments which have a bearing on the current negotiations between West and East.

University of Manchester J. F. BRADLEY

The Politics of Modernization in Eastern Europe: Testing the Soviet Model. Edited by Charles Gati. *New York, Washington: Praeger. 1974. London: Pall Mall. 1975. 389 pp. (Studies of the Institute on East Central Europe, Columbia University.) £9·75.*

THE extent to which Soviet domination of Eastern Europe has facilitated or hindered the process of 'modernisation' in that region is the theme of this collection of essays. Their purpose is to stimulate further discussion of the subject, rather than to provide a definitive appraisal of the political and economic development of those satellite countries over the past thirty years, and the authors remind readers that there are serious philosophical and methodological problems for the student of comparative politics with which they are merely beginning to grapple. Here they present discussions of what modernisation is and how it relates to Marxism, together with case histories of individual countries—a pertinent blend of theory and practice.

Modernisation studies are ultimately 'concerned with the policies that all countries must pursue if their peoples are to attain the levels of political, economic and social achievement made possible by the scientific and technological revolution' (Cyril Black, p. 22). The essays demonstrate that it is not possible to talk of Eastern Europe as a single bloc, for the verdict as to whether Soviet influence initiated or speeded up modernisation, or whether the wheels had been set in motion before the communist take-overs, varies

from country to country. In Romania Soviet influence was crucial. 'The Communist party elite provided the will to modernization and the will to carry it out' (Trond Gilberg, p. 156). In Hungary the situation was different. The interwar years changed the fabric of Hungarian society and set the stage for major changes. 'Revolutionary transformation was unavoidable. The choice under the circumstances was reduced to one between industrial and agrarian socialism' (Charles Gati, p. 83). The most poignant story is that of Czechoslovakia, which until the Second World War was the most 'modern' land of Eastern Europe. But under communism—aptly described as 'totalitarianism immobilism' (Otto Ulč, p. 114)—it stagnated and regressed. According to the standards of economic and technological modernisation, of all the satellite states Czechoslovakia suffered the most.

However, the general conclusion of the essays is that Eastern Europe has, according to the criteria of modernisation, become more industrialised, urbanised and educated under communist rule, though the extent of advancement has depended on the state of economic and social conditions prevailing at the time of the communist take-over, and the degree to which a country was exploited to benefit the Soviet Union.

In the political sphere, the broad view is that Soviet influence has been more uniform and all-pervasive, and here it has been detrimental and retrogressive. But economic modernisation has inevitable consequences which even the iron hand of communism cannot forever hold in check. Industrialisation and the drive for a higher standard of living requires individuals with differing skills, and soon enough they develop an awareness of their group identity and interests. As postwar history has demonstrated, hardly a year passes in Eastern Europe without some group, be it social, national, or occupational, proclaiming its demands. 'Modernization has created conditions that institutionalize if they do not legitimize [dissent], (Barbara Jancar, p. 353). How soon such political modernisation, as opposed to mere economic and technological modernisation, will take root in Eastern Europe remains a question for the future.

E. BALSOM

The Little Dictators: The History of Eastern Eu-ope since 1918. By Antony Polonsky. *London, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1975. 212 pp. £5·25.*

East Central Europe between the Two World Wars. By Joseph Rothschild. *Seattle, London: University of Washington Press. 1975. 420 pp. (A History of East Central Europe, Vol. IX; Eds.: Peter F. Sugar and Donald W. Treadgold.) $14.95. Pb.: $7.95. £4·00.*

APART from the surveys by Hugh Seton-Watson [1] and by C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer,[2] East Central Europe has, on the whole, been neglected by historians. Two new books on the subject are therefore to be welcomed. Both set out to deal with the inter-war history of, in the main, the successor states created by the Allies after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and to examine the most important social, economic and political problems of the era. There is some disagreement as to what constitutes East

[1] *Eastern Europe between the wars 1914–1941.* Toronto: Macmillan; London: Cambridge University Press. 1945. 2nd ed. 1946.

[2] *Independent Eastern Europe: a history.* New York: St. Martin's Press; London: Macmillan. 1962.

Central Europe, Dr. Polonsky taking the view that Austria should be included, Albania and Bulgaria excluded, Professor Rothschild the exact opposite. The authors, however, have different aims: Dr. Polonsky writes for the general reader, Professor Rothschild for scholars who are not acquainted with the subject, and for those students who may wish to specialise.

Dr. Polonsky writes well and clearly, though the treatment of the separate countries is rather brief. He manages, however, to touch on most of the explosive problems that plagued East Central Europe during the inter-war years, so that his work is a useful introductory guide to the political and economic systems of that time. Maps and statistics are additional bonuses. In all, an eminently readable work.

There are, however, three points I would like to take up with the author. Good outline histories need lucid and comprehensive introductions, not only countries is rather brief. He manages, however, to touch on most of the general problems which, because of the nature of the study, can only be referred to in passing. In this respect, it might well have been wiser had Dr. Polonsky amalgamated his epilogue with his introduction to give more depth to such themes as the Jewish problem, the Right-Radical movements, and the chronic underemployment which plagued the countries he discusses. Secondly, there is too little mention of foreign policy in an area particularly sensitive to balance-of-power problems. Finally, there is one further small point. I am not sure that Dr. Polonsky's decision to insert all the statistics together at the end of the book was a wise one. Presumably they were put there so as not to interrupt the flow of the narrative. But, given that they are both telling and clearly understandable, the general reader would have benefited from their incorporation in the appropriate place in the text.

Professor Rothschild's work, part of a new series on the history of East Central Europe, is on a larger scale. The introduction is excellent, ranging over a wide perspective, and is particularly interesting on the socio-economic problems of the countries included in the study. Use is made of the various states as examples of the main problems of the area; ethnic tensions are discussed with reference to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia; the Jewish question is seen as one of the main irritants in Poland and Romania; and peasant land hunger, as well as poor economic and industrial policies, particularly at the time of the Depression, are examined in some detail in most countries. Professor Rothschild shows how the nations concerned (except Czechoslovakia) failed to find the answers to their chronic rural overpopulation and low productivity—partly through inertia, but also partly through incompetence—and thus early on created a political climate in which it was possible for Right-Radicalism to be considered seriously as the antidote to the spiritual and political bankruptcy that affected not only all Europe, but East Central Europe in particular. There is a penetrating analysis of the role of the 'buffer intellectuals' in the peasant movements, and a detailed study of the lack of planning and direction in the industrialisation process which went hand in hand with an unsound peasant-based agriculture. However, the short survey of the culture of the area is too superficial to be of much value.

Once again there is too little mention of foreign policy. The initial success of the Bela Kun revolution, the disintegration of French morale, and the subsequent rise of a strong revisionist Germany all deeply affected the policies of the new nations of East Central Europe, and should surely have been discussed more fully.

There are two small quibbles: the shortage of footnotes is difficult to understand in a work aimed at the scholar (even though the author mentions this as editorial policy), and the maps tend to be too simplistic.

LISANNE RADICE

The Totalitarian Party: Party and People in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. By Aryeh L. Unger. *London: Cambridge University Press for the Centre of International Studies, London School of Economics and Political Science. 1974. 286 pp. £4·50. $ 13.95.*

WE are used to all sorts of definitions of, and speculations on, totalitarianism, so that we sometimes doubt whether the concept exists at all. At the outset of his book Dr. Unger also has his doubts. However, by concentrating on the Nazi party and the Soviet Communist party, he overcomes these doubts and puts his finger on something more tangible and less speculative in totalitarianism. He subjects the two parties to a functional analysis; moreover, he compares their respective roles, delves in depth into their organisation and ultimately concentrates his attention on the ostensibly common ground, the use of political agitation and propaganda. The concept of the leader (Fuhrer) in Nazi Germany is perhaps surprisingly comparable to the communist agitator and propagandist in Russia on all levels of the political spectrum. They are the key figures for the totalitarian parties' interaction with the masses, though in Germany this interaction was more subtle and technically more sophisticated than in the Soviet Union. However, in both countries this political process resulted in the 'total' usurpation of public power.

The author refuses to speculate with historical precedents and bases himself entirely on his own empirical research: this makes his book an almost unique contribution to the study of totalitarianism. An additional merit is that the author's view of totalitarian politics is unusually broad and sophisticated; he has mastered all the contemporary methods and approaches, although some of these are highly experimental, and he puts them to cautious and good use. As the subject of totalitarianism requires many more books of this type to become really comprehensible, it is to be hoped that further studies of it will be produced in this series.

University of Manchester J. F. N. BRADLEY

Siberia Today and Tomorrow: A study of Economic Resources, Problems and Achievements. By Violet Conolly. *London, Glasgow: Collins. 1975. 248 pp. £4·95.*

IN her postscript to this useful and readable volume, the author describes Siberia as 'mostly a closed book' to the outside world (p. 232). No one has done more to open that book than Dr. Conolly, both in the present study, and its predecessor,[1] and many readers will benefit from her detailed knowledge of the subject and her powers of lucid and lively exposition.

Some may be surprised to learn that the Russian Cossacks and wealthy merchant-traders made their way across Siberia and actually reached the

[1] *Beyond the Urals: Economic Developments in Soviet Asia.* London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1967. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1969, p. 152.

Pacific as early as the 16th century, the opening up of these territories being associated in the popular mind with the coming into operation of the Trans-Siberian railway at the end of the 19th century. The early lure was rich supplies of furs—mink, ermine, sable—to be found in the virgin forests of the East.

These are in as much demand as ever today, although the spotlight has shifted to the vast mineral resources discovered by geologists—tin, mica, tungsten, nickel, copper, rare metals, gold and diamonds, among others. In the energy field, the great Siberian rivers offer unlimited potential for the development of hydro-electric power, and the recent discoveries of West Siberian oil and gas fields are of particular significance at a time of world-wide energy crisis, and the growing exhaustion of energy supplies in European Russia.

But it is not for nothing that Russia claims to be a 'step-child of nature.' The author describes the obstacles which hamper the extraction and utilisation of these treasures, the wide prevalence of permafrost which hinders building, the extent of bogs, marshlands, uncleared forests, even seismic disturbances in the Soviet Far East regions. As if this were not enough, the main Siberian rivers disobligingly flow northwards into Arctic waters and away from the growing industrial centres. Neither railway nor road transport is anything like adequate, given the enormous distances to be served. The increasing volume of air traffic cannot fill the gap.

Dr. Conolly sees as the supreme obstacle to economic advance in Siberia the insufficiency and fluidity of the labour force required to man the factories and till the fields. She ascribes this failure to 'fix' labour, to the inveterate habit of Soviet authorities of concentrating on physical production to the detriment of providing housing and other essential facilities for the work force, and to unduly low wage rates which fail to compensate for climatic discomforts and associated high expenditure on everyday necessities. She deplores the absence of any special independent body for Siberian affairs, with the result that 'armchair economists' and centralised ministries in Moscow make decisions without benefit of first-hand knowledge of conditions on the spot (p. 43).

When to the exceptionally heavy costs of economic development are added the expensive military build-up in the Soviet Far East for strategic reasons, it becomes clear that the Soviet leaders have no alternative to their continuing advocacy of the policy of detente. Only a speedy injection of advanced technology from the West, with special emphasis on American co-operation, can ensure in the reasonably near future the hoped-for 'great leap forward' in bringing into use the wealth of the Soviet Union's huge Eastern territories (p. 75).

MARGARET MILLER

The Soviet Energy Balance: Natural Gas, Other Fossil Fuels, and Alternative Power Sources. By Iain F. Elliot. *New York, Washington: Praeger. 1974. London: Pall Mall. 1975. 277 pp. £8·00.*

IN his introduction, the author expresses the hope that this study will help to satisfy the need for current data on what is not only a vital sector of the Soviet economy but also a decisive factor in international relations, and he adds that the main object of the study is to contribute to the debate upon future Soviet industrial growth and regional development by providing some

of the necessary factual material. Mr. Elliot has succeeded admirably, not only in his compilation of a substantial and most comprehensive volume of data on the many different aspects of the Soviet energy industries, but also, through his historical treatment of individual energy sectors and through his level-headed interpretation of material from a great many, mainly Soviet, sources, he has created a very readable, clear and concise account of what is a notoriously complex subject. In addition to chapters containing a wealth of statistical data and explanatory text about the Soviet oil, coal and gas industries, their reserves and production positions and the state of technological progress currently achieved, Mr. Elliot has included similar chapters on peat and oil-shale, and a chapter on electricity production and alternative power sources, notably nuclear energy. He goes into the question of production and transportation costs, energy conservation, and the regional energy problems faced by various sectors of the Soviet economy, and the uneven distribution of energy in relation to consumption of the Soviet economy as a whole. He also touches, unfortunately rather briefly, on some foreign trade aspects of the Soviet energy situation. There are numerous maps, graphs and tables, and a glossary. A useful bibliography and copious annotations to each chapter make it clear that the published work of the foremost Soviet energy authorities has been consulted fully in the preparation of this book.

This reviewer is not aware of any other publication in the English language which presents such a complete and factually accurate picture of the Soviet energy situation up to the end of 1973, and it is perhaps a pity that the opportunity has not been taken to contribute even more to 'the debate' by the inclusion, for example, of a comparison of actual Soviet energy production performance with planned performance, and commentary upon the implications for future production plans of the shortcomings in the Soviet energy industries which have been so widely referred to in recent years in the relevant Soviet literature. A fuller section on the physical ability of the Soviet Union to supply its own needs and those of its Comecon and other customers over the next 10 years would have assisted the reader in relating the Soviet energy scene to that of the external world. The global energy crisis arising out of the Arab-Israeli conflict of October 1973 has caused the Soviet Union to reconsider its whole energy situation, and some of the comments in the book, for example about the envisaged decline of the Soviet coal industry, have to be accepted as having been written at a somewhat earlier date. Nevertheless, this is a very valuable contribution to the sum of general knowledge about the Soviet energy industries.

Chatham House JEREMY RUSSELL

Science and Technology as an Instrument of Soviet Policy. By Mose L. Harvey, Leon Gouré and Vladimir Prokofieff. *Coral Gables, Florida: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami. 1972. 219 pp. $5.95. Pb.: $4.95.*

THIS rather short although not expensive book, half of which consists of translated extracts from Soviet sources, is not a symposium but apparently throughout triple-authored (apart from the foreword by a former American ambassador to the Soviet Union, Foy D. Kohler, which focuses on scientific aspects of the competition between the two countries). It is a competently thorough survey, which is useful as a teaching aid rather than apt to inspire original thought.

Each of its five parts is supported by a documentary section. These references can save the time of researcher as well as student, and will especially help readers who lack a knowledge of Russian; the procedure is nevertheless heavy-handed and repetitious. The largest space is devoted to 'Soviet Perceptions of the Use of Science and Technology in the Struggle Between Systems', and to 'Performance Against Expectations: The Continuous Search for Greater Effectiveness.' Struggle but shortcomings: these are two of the book's main motifs.

The third motif is that military superiority has been the main goal of Soviet effort: 'it is generally estimated that some 80 per cent. of total Soviet allocations for scientific research and development goes to military requirements' (p. 15). Certainly some, indeed I would have thought most, estimates prefer a lower (although still high) percentage. The military priority is expressed in a marked difference in quality: 'The civilian sector gets what is left after the requirements of the favored security sector are met. And the difference is often as great as between night and day' (p. 57). The claim to the existence of such a broad gulf ought to be—but is not—supported by technical and operational evaluations of specific objects.

The analysis does not employ sophisticated techniques. The only graphs select from the annual reported figures, which produces an irregular and unjustified smoothing of the chronological series of expenditures upon science, education and defence.

RAYMOND HUTCHINGS

The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite: Legitimacy and Social Change in Mature Communism. By Thomas A. Baylis. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 1974. 314 pp. $12.50. £6·85.*

IN the 1960s the leaderships of many European communist countries experimented with economic reform, in an effort to cure some of the ills caused by Stalinist planning. East Germany was one of these countries: in 1963 Ulbricht launched the New Economic System (NES). The system was worked out and applied by a new generation of technical experts. Some of them, such as Erich Apel and Günter Mittag, reached the heights of the state and party leadership. Their position and influence encouraged some scholars, notably the West German sociologist Peter Christian Ludz,[1] to argue that the technical specialists were an 'institutionalised counter-elite' which could challenge the power monopoly exercised hitherto by the *apparatchiki*.

Thomas Baylis's rejection of the Ludz thesis is hardly surprising, considering the fact that the more adventurous elements of the New Economic System—the decentralisation of authority, the encouragement of initiative at lower levels and of flexibility—were dropped by the end of 1970. However, Baylis is not just benefiting from hindsight. He rightly points out that the original decision to introduce the NES was made not by the representatives of the new specialists (the 'technical strategic elite') in the party hierarchy, but by Ulbricht acting with the approval if not the encouragement of the Soviet Union (p. 237). Indeed, the economic specialists were never in a position to direct policy; Baylis writes: 'In the DDR's period of economic

[1] *Parteielite im Wandel: Funktionsaufbau Sozialstruktur und Ideologie der SED-Führung.* Köln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 1968.

reform and modernisation the leading party bodies have remained consistently and firmly in the hands of the *apparat* men and the ideologists. The economic specialists have been given hardly more than token representation, sufficient to provide an input of needed technical expertise but of little direct significance as a power factor ' (p. 213).

Yet Baylis believes the technical strategic elite had, and has, considerable scope for influence, given the party's continuing need for economic success. Although the ' decentralisers,' the advocates of the more innovative vision of NES, may have been quietened, he believes that there is a second opinion group among the technical strategic elite—' a mixture of the instinctual conservatives and the " computopians ", who believe economic rationality to be best served by a highly sophisticated form of centralised planning and control made feasible by a cybernetic systems perspective and the use of advanced techniques of data gathering, processing and analysis ' (pp. 259–60). The ' centralisers ' (as Baylis calls them) and the party bureaucrats share a common interest in maintaining central control and making the existing economic system work. In his view this sort of ' elite pluralism ' is more likely to produce a conservative form of oligarchy by coalition than any liberalisation (p. 276). Baylis's gloomy, but probably correct conclusion is strengthened by analyses of the political attitudes and behaviour of the technical intelligentsia as a whole, which show that its members, though sceptical, are basically socialist in outlook (Ch. 6). Outright opposition to the *apparatchiki* is not only unlikely but also difficult to organise.

Thomas Baylis, who teaches political science at the University of Texas, has written the first English language analysis of a field hitherto largely neglected outside the German-speaking world. He has combined a mastery of the unfortunately limited primary source material available, with an acute perception.

W. TREHARNE JONES

Memoirs. By József Cardinal Mindszenty. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. Documents translated by Jan van Heurck. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1975. 341 pp. £6·00.*

CARDINAL MINDSZENTY'S memoirs are more interesting as a revealing self-portrait than as a historical narrative. On the other hand, precisely because their author had a major role to play in contemporary Hungarian history and because he honestly describes himself as he really was, we gain an insight into the impact of his personality on the politics of post-1945 Hungary. This is the central area of interest in the book. Mindszenty was a devout and completely committed prelate, with a deep sense of the political, as well as the religious and ecclesiastical, significance of his high office. Unfortunately he failed to sense that the revolution of 1944–45 was not exclusively imposed on the Hungarian people by force. There was a widespread desire for change, albeit within the existing framework.

In the given situation, Mindszenty's personality was a major obstacle to bringing church thinking into line with the demands of society. While he obviously had a strong sense of the social mission of the church and, for example, accepted the need for land reform, he had nonetheless a strongly traditional view of his own position as Primate and failed to perceive that direct intervention by the church in the affairs of the state was unacceptable in the climate of post-1945 Hungary. Mindszenty's conception of the

Primate's function as representing the historical continuity of the Hungarian monarchy, even at a time when it was evident that the majority of Hungarians had come to regard the institution as irrelevant, was a good illustration of this.

Yet by refusing to change, Mindszenty emerged as a rallying point, once the communists had betrayed those who had co-operated with them in the hope of building a democratic Hungary—this was one of the paradoxes of his life. He suffered abominably and his resistance was in vain, for it was clear that no political or moral force in Hungary could have prevented the introduction of communism. When confronted by an ideology as inexorably driven and as inflexible as his own, Mindszenty responded with total resistance. This had its strength in enhancing his moral authority, but also its weakness in that it made any compromise between church and state extremely difficult for decades. But it is impossible to deny either the contradictory or the tragic dimension in Mindszenty's life.

GEORGE SCHÖPFLIN

Beyond Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism. By Sharon Zukin. *London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1975. 302 pp. £7·50. $15.50.*

IN any polity the extent to which the practice of politics adheres to the proclaimed ideology is worthy of examination, and nowhere more so than in Yugoslavia, where the doctrine of self-management and the elaborate set of institutions that accompany it purport to enable the citizens to govern themselves at every level of political, social and economic activity.

Sharon Zukin set out to discover how ordinary Yugoslavs perceived their influence within the political system. For this purpose she lived for a year in Belgrade, carried out in-depth interviews with ten Serb families representing different income groups, educational and occupational achievement, and attended several meetings of the smallest unit of self-government, the *mesna zajednica,* whose function is to enable the people to put forward their needs and ideas, and so regulate the services offered on a local level.

Dr. Zukin's grass-roots observations are not encouraging. Officially, the Yugoslavs had seen self-management as the means by which they would attain the socialist goal of eliminating alienation. It is true that in Yugoslavia state controls over the citizen in both his public and private life are laxer than in any other communist-dominated state. But to judge from her conversations, self-management has not brought an awareness to the average man that he exercises any worthwhile control over what happens to him. There is a general air of resignation in spite of the apparent opportunities for the people to influence their rulers. Instead, they realise that 'the problems they are summoned to "resolve" are not the burning issues of life and death . . . The citizen can rest assured that these issues will be resolved by other organs, other individuals' (p. 179). Thus the great majority have opted out of politics, and this is particularly true of the younger generation. They lack the experiences of the war and the dispute with Stalin which acted as a unifying force for most of their parents. They are not interested in Work Brigades or a common struggle to improve the lot of the people as a whole, but in the material signs of the good life.

What this means for the future of Tito's brand of communism Dr. Zukin does not attempt to predict. But her conclusion is not optimistic.

'Self-management as an ideological goal has little relevance to people's everyday lives. Instead, Yugoslavs appear preoccupied with the standard of living' (p. 98).

E. BALSOM

MIDDLE EAST

The Israeli Army. By Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz. *London: Allen Lane. 1975. 461 pp. £6·00.*

THE Jewish soldiers who fought with Allenby in Palestine in 1917–18 were judged by him to be unreliable; the Arabs who accepted his command he rated more highly, though often wild and wayward. *The Israeli Army* tells of Jewish men and women in military service in quite different circumstances in that same territory: struggling to wrest and maintain a homeland, at first from the British mandated authority, latterly against the Arabs.

Because this is an important and, on the whole, well-designed book, it may be convenient to comment first on its weaknesses, a few of which may tax the reader's patience. The most prominent of these is tautology, doubtless a consequence of two men writing to a single theme—for example, there is a good deal of repetition concerning equipment policy for the Israeli air force in the sections beginning at p. 122 and p. 192. There are also a number of technical inaccuracies of which the most striking is the statement on pp. 168 and 346 that the Russian wire-guided anti-tank missile known in the West as Sagger is semi-automated, when actually it is manually controlled.

On the other hand, the partisan approach admitted by the authors, pro-Jewish, anti-Arab, is not a weakness: rather a strength. It gives a spiritual stamp to narratives and judgments which enhances understanding of the Israeli viewpoint while yet warning that the Arab case may not be getting a full statement. Equally, some of the comment on tactics or training or organisation is somewhat simple, but this brings to life the difficulties of a nation almost without experience of any kind, feeling its way forward in the development of a national defence force. Thus an officer comments on seeing a comprehensive Egyptian defensive position, 'How is it possible to plan in detail a defensive array . . . without knowing at all what the attacking force will be and from which direction they will attack'? Here is the elementary student who has not yet learned that the defensive art lies in anticipating nicely the answer to both questions. Yet, as the authors manifest, the Israelis learnt from their mistakes, if sometimes painfully, often more quickly than some nations with a longer military tradition and experience.

Wherever sympathies may lie concerning the diaspora of the Palestinian Arabs and the occupation of Arab territories by Israeli troops, the fact is that the Israeli Army—a term covering the national land, sea and air forces—is a formidable obstacle to any attempt to resolve the issue by force of arms. The authors' frank account of the 1973 campaign in the final section of their book endorses this fact. Still, having regard to the proven bravery and capacity for sacrifice of Egyptian and Syrian servicemen, and their recently demonstrated technological skills, perhaps some Arab authors should write a similar recent history of their forces to make the same point from the other side of the hill.

ANTHONY FARRAR-HOCKLEY

AFRICA

China's African Revolution. By Alan Hutchison. *London: Hutchinson. 1975. 313 pp. £5·00.*

China's Policy in Africa 1958–71. By Alaba Ogunsanwo. *London: Cambridge University Press for the Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics. 1974. 310 pp. £6·50. $19.50.*

As Africa regained its independence one problem which faced its leadership in world affairs was how to move out of the Anglo-French, and generally Western, strait-jacket. At the same time African leaders had little wish to encourage communism and endanger the structures of their new states. How could they play the aid game between the West, the Soviet Union, and China, without encouraging revolution? Until now the literature on the Chinese part in this has been very scarce and these books are to be welcomed for taking the story of Chinese-African relationships out of the realm of rumour-mongering and scare stories.

Hutchison is a journalist with considerable African experience who went to Tanzania in 1969, while Ogunsanwo is a Nigerian academic whose work began as a London thesis. (Although, as Hutchison's book tells us, Ogunsanwo was imprisoned in Tanzania while doing his fieldwork.) Hutchison writes as a journalist: his book is based on sympathetic and illuminating observation on what he knows and has seen and a basic knowledge of source books and other newspapers. He focuses on the Chinese-Tanzanian relationship and his concern is to stress what an unsinister relationship this is. A close, hard-headed, matter-of-fact aid relationship, which, through the railway project also makes a spectacular splash, and which is of enormous benefit to the African participants. Indeed both books stress the utilitarian nature of Chinese aid in Africa, and the power which African states have shown, in spite of Western assumptions, to handle and deal with the Chinese presence. For the rest, Hutchison traces the story of Chinese failures and successes on the long march between the Bandung conference and the United Nations seat and he stresses, as does Ogunsanwo, the importance to China of gathering recognitions and votes in Africa. Hutchison's conclusion, which goes against the mainstream of predictions of increased Chinese involvement in Africa, even suggests that, the New York seat attained, China's interest in African involvement will wane. But the book suffers from the attempt to be encyclopaedic, as does Ogunsanwo's.

Hutchison oversimplifies his analysis of the differences between the Russian and Chinese stance on revolution and the African class struggle, and here Ogunsanwo's account of the Chinese position, which is based on a wealth of Chinese material, has the edge, and is more subtle. This is a reflection of the real difference between the two books: a qualitative one regarding the sources on which they are based. Ogunsanwo's command of the source material is far more complete; he shows the wealth of material available for analysis (in English) and his book comes with a far more comprehensive apparatus of statistical and bibliographic information. Both books rely too on unattributable sources—an occupational hazard of both journalism and the contemporary historian—but Ogunsanwo uses this sparingly and the wealth of his own sources should convince both him and (hopefully) Hutchison, of the desirability of avoiding bar gossip and 'well placed sources' which cannot be weighed and which rarely add anything to a general line of argument.

In general what the books do teach us is that Western decolonisation in Africa was relatively successful in that it handed over power to African elites which were, more or less uniformly, deeply suspicious of communism and which held, and continued to hold, the revolutionary side of the foreign policies of communist powers at bay. First Russia, then China, came round to accepting the bourgeois nationalist governments of Africa. The Chinese, as Ogunsanwo shows, stressed that the anti-colonialism of the African leadership was more important than the apparent weakness of their anti-feudalism. Both books explain that Chou's famous remark that Africa was ripe for revolution really meant change and was not aimed at the African bourgeoisie as a whole. But while Chinese policy in Africa became 'normalised' in one sense, and it became a larger aid-giver than Russia, there was another level on which Chinese radicalism appealed to African leaders. In the south, Chinese theories of guerrilla war had obvious relevance. And more significantly, there was the Chinese model of rural, low technology development and of self-reliance—a Third World image which neither the Russians nor the West could match.

University of Sussex MARTIN CHANOCK

Ghana: Nkrumah's Legacy. By Kwesi Armah. *London: Rex Collings. 1974. 182 pp. £3·00. Pb.: £1·80.*

Black Star: A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah. By Basil Davidson. *London: Allen Lane. 1973. 225 pp. £2·50.*

Development and the Debt Trap: Economic Planning and External Borrowing in Ghana. By Andrzej Krassowski. *London: Croom Helm in association with The Overseas Development Institute. 1974. 166 pp. £5·50.*

'GHANA'S debt', writes Mr. Krassowski, 'is the best known of the legacies left from the Nkrumah era' (p. 2). Mr. Armah feels that it ought not to be so: to him Nkrumah's abiding legacies were his pan-African policies paralleled at home by his efforts to unite a country divided by ethnic loyalties and class division. Mr. Armah, who was an important party functionary throughout the drive for independence and Ghana's High Commissioner in Britain at the time of Nkrumah's fall in 1966, has written his personal account of the history of Ghana from colonial times to the second coup in 1972 which resulted in the fall of Dr. Busia's civilian government and the institution of the National Redemption Council directed by Colonel Acheampong. Unlike Mr. Davidson, who belatedly seeks to revive the cult which notoriously surrounded Kwame Nkrumah in his heyday, Kwesi Armah concentrates on policies rather than personality and gives a balanced account of Ghana's pre-independence problems and conflicts; his assessment of the National Liberation Committee, which overthrew Nkrumah, and particularly of Dr. Busia's government, which he sees as a continuation of the former's rule, is naturally hostile but on the whole accurate. Busia's credibility as a liberal democrat was severely undermined by his policies when in office, particularly the expulsion of aliens and his 'no court' statement after the judiciary had declared the dismissal of a public corporation employee to be unconstitutional. These and other acts alienated the government from its natural allies, and Acheampong's coup, after the devaluation of the cedi, found it friendless.

Mr. Armah is not so well balanced, however, when he gives an account of the Nkrumah period. One of the most exasperating traits of the Nkrumah era was that politicians seemed to believe that all that was required to get something done was to say that it was going to be done, and Mr. Armah has not yet learned that this is not so. His assessment of CPP policies consists largely of quotations from the successive economic plans. While we may question, as Mr. Krassowski does, whether these plans were at all realistic, we must question the extent to which anyone in power took them seriously.

Mr. Krassowski shows how the CPP government's attempt to restructure the economy went awry partly because of its refusal to accept any plan discipline. New opportunities (and the credits to pay for them) were seized without any sort of evaluation and without abandoning old projects: by 1966, the economy appeared wholly dependent on the goodwill of its creditors, whereas the thrust of policy intentions in the previous ten years had been to relieve Ghana of its colonial dependence. Mr. Davidson remarks that by 1960 '[Nkrumah] had become the victim of a situation that increasingly escaped his control, or even his influence' and it was this that 'moved [him] increasingly towards a personal assertion of authority' (p. 166). It is clear from Mr. Armah's account—and Mr. Krassowski affirms it—that Nkrumah had no appreciation of economics. He did not manage to assert his authority in the economic sphere, nor could he have done so.

Mr. Krassowski's book is a clear account of the policies that led to Ghana's crisis. He sees its roots in the colonial era when agriculture was underplayed, a policy which was continued by the CPP government, alongside a massive growth of public investment. These policies, together with the instability of the cocoa market and thoughtless government borrowing on short and medium term through suppliers' credits, led to the reserves and the payments deficit. Not only is the book a valuable critique of Ghana's over-ambitious policies but it also describes the attempts made by successive governments to reschedule the debts in the face of Western governments anxious not to create a precedent. But some at least of the responsibility must lie with Western governments for guaranteeing the credits. The NLC accepted the obligation to repay the debts in full and received little accommodation; but after Colonel Acheampong repudiated part of the debt and unilaterally rescheduled the rest, 'Western governments have since then offered Ghana the most generous settlement package it has yet received' (p. 147).

University of Bath E. HORESH

Guinea-Bissau: A Study of Political Mobilization. By Lars Rudebeck. *Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. 1974. (Distrib. by Almqvist and Wiksell.) 277 pp. Pb: Sw.kr. 40.00.*

THE long armed struggle in Guinea-Bissau gives the new republic a very special interest for students of West African politics. Even before the collapse of the repressive regime in Portugal, the liberation movement there had achieved a degree of success unparalleled elsewhere in Black Africa in establishing itself as the de facto authority over, probably, the greater part of the country, and initiating radical social and economic policies in the liberated zone. No other African state has yet achieved full autonomy under comparably experienced leadership. Nowhere else has a Marxist party machine, forged in war, been transformed so smoothly and unambiguously

into the governmental structure of an independent state. The policies adopted by the new government and its success or failure in tackling problems of underdevelopment, which are desperate even by African standards, are clearly going to be important pointers for the future of the whole region.

This country has also long been, for obvious reasons, the worst documented in West Africa, so that any serious well-informed book about it deserves a degree of welcome. When this has been said, however, there is little more to commend Dr. Rudebeck's highly polemical study. The author travelled quite widely inside the country in 1970 and 1972 as the guest of the PAIGC and he has worked hard to keep abreast of events, carrying his narrative down to September 1974, but he has nothing to say which will be new to readers familiar with the published writings of Mr. Hamilcar Cabral and the bulk of the official and semi-official pronouncements of the liberation movement. Although he makes ostentatious recognition of the partisan nature of most of his sources, his whole approach is one of uncritical enthusiasm for the revolution which he describes. Under a thin disguise of Marxist scholarship, this is essentially no more than another propaganda hand-out written for the most part in the tawdry 'newspeak' of those who assume the 'emancipation of oppressed peoples' to be identical with the advance of totalitarian socialism.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London D. H. JONES

Saints and Politicians: Essays in the organization of a Senegalese peasant society. By Donal B. Cruise O'Brien. *London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1975. 213 pp. (African Studies Series.) £4·50. $13.95.*

THE argument of this book, based on field work among the Wolof, the largest ethnic group in Senegal, in 1966–67, is that the modern Senegalese state has inherited from the French colonial administration an 'institutional fragility', the result of the lack of 'social legitimacy and institutional authority' needed for 'firm political control' of the Wolof. Accordingly, intermediaries, standing between the 'nominally bureaucratic state and the rural mass,' continue to play an essential political part. Such intermediaries may be characterised as Saints or Politicians. The former are the leaders of the three Sufi Muslim orders found in Senegal (of whom the Mourides are the most specifically Senegalese). The latter may also be these same Saints in another role; chiefs, whether rulers of pre-colonial Wolof states or the subsequent appointees of colonial administration; traders, about whom Dr. O'Brien has rather less to say; or the elected candidates of political parties. Electoral politics have a long history in Senegal because of the privileged voting rights of the 'old communes', Saint Louis, Dakar, Goree and Rufisque during the colonial era, and this is shown to have significant consequences in current political action. The same individual may, of course, perform more than one role. But apart from that, there is in Senegal 'a characteristic network of linkages between them': 'Bureaucratic state, political party, market economy, holy order, each sub-system is fully intelligible . . . only within an overall pattern of alliances between individuals which cut across sub-system boundaries. The pattern which emerges from such alliances, locally termed that of "clan politics", amounts in its own bizarre way to the structure of a Senegalese political system' (p. 12).

Dr. O'Brien emphasises the severe constraints imposed by the limited natural resources available to the Wolof, and indeed to all rural people in

Senegal, the country's dependence on the French market, and on the other hand, the support available to the present regime from France and through President Senghor. But he sees 'clan politics' as likely to remain an essential condition of survival for any new regime, while little relevant to economic stagnation or external dependence. Nonetheless, 'one must fear for the future viability of the local political style in the light of the country's continuing economic stagnation . . . the prognosis for a spoils system cannot be good when the means of corruption become exhausted' (p. 200).

Three of the five essays have been published elsewhere but have been revised, updated and in one case extended here. Their appearance in book form is nonetheless welcome and the book can be warmly recommended as an excellent introduction to Senegalese society and one which, though far from unsophisticated in its analysis, is written in a clear and jargon-free style, wholly accessible to the general reader. It is a pity all the same that some unhappy lapses have not been removed: 'precondition to' (p. 162), 'exploitationary' (pp. 106 and 128), 'means to which this initiative might have been employed' (p. 95) or indeed 'disemployed' (p. 67)—respectably archaic though it may be.

Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London K. E. Robinson

ASIA

Modernization in South-East Asia. Edited by Hans-Dieter Evers. *Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, London, New York, Melbourne: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. 1973. 249 pp. £7·25.*

This volume is the product of a conference held in 1971 under the auspices of the Institute of Southeast Asian studies in Singapore. Its theme and focus arise from dissatisfaction among students of political, social and economic change over the inability of an allegedly Western-centric social science to account adequately for the nature and pathology of post-colonial societies. The contributors do not much differ in what they understand by modernisation. Indeed there is a general sense in which it is represented in its different aspects as something equivalent to individual fulfilment; thus Professor Eisenstadt contemplates the political dimension of modernisation as based on wide participation of the masses, who do not accept the traditional legitimacy of their rulers and hold them accountable in terms of secular values and efficiency. The various papers, organised into four sections on political, economic, social and religious dimensions of the subject, to some extent pivot on Eisenstadt's chapter which discusses the influence of traditional and colonial political systems on the development of post-traditional social and political orders. In so far as he criticises absolute distinctions between tradition and modernity, and recognises the role of tradition in either sustaining or undermining an order which has modernising objectives, his paper is unexceptionable rather than seminal. Two related case studies, using examples from Indonesian and Philippine experience, point up both the obstructive role of traditional patterns and also how they might be overcome. In his discussion of Indonesia, Dr. Nawawi asserts that 'the real complaint against the Dutch is not that they came and subjugated but that they were not dominant enough' (p. 31).

In the section on economic development, Professor Dore provides a stimulating critique of what he calls unilineal development as applied to late-starters amongst states. He exemplifies his argument with a discussion of the folly of the pre-career qualification pattern, while Dr. Goh Keng-swee as a practitioner evaluates the planning performance of those Asian countries which have been subject to Western impact. The chapters on social development include two radical analyses; one by W. F. Wertheim in which he seeks to explain peasant resistance to change in terms of distrust of repression, and another by the editor of this volume who identifies social stratification in terms of a coalescence of strategic groups and who sees in this the sprouting of class conflict. However, a complementary paper by Dr. Bador on social stratification among Malays in Perak points up traditional obstacles to the emergence of such consciousness. Among the papers in the final section on religion, Professor Alatas examines the relationship between Islam and modernisation and concludes that it does not serve as an obstacle to that process. There is no attempt at an overall conclusion to this disparate set of contributions. At the outset, however, the editor devotes himself to a critique of an earlier notion of Eisenstadt's concerning the breakdown of modernisation. He suggests a radical alternative whereby breakthrough to modernisation can be achieved only by a breakdown of established social and political structures. The various and interesting papers which make up this volume do not provide consistent support for this thesis.

London School of Economics MICHAEL LEIFER

Metropolitan Growth: Public Policy for South and Southeast Asia. Edited by Leo Jakobson and Ved Prakash. *New York, London, Sydney, Toronto: Halsted Press, Wiley for Sage Publications. 1974. 301 pp. £9·50.*

THE growth of large urban conurbations in the less-developed part of the world has been an established feature of the postwar world, and the drift from rural to urban areas has nowhere been more marked than in South and South-east Asia. Cities such as Calcutta, Singapore and Jakarta not only usually contain a major proportion of the total urban population but also act as focal points of development, commerce and government. Such cities are often the symbols of nationhood and personal advancement, and present the ideals of livelihood to which the poor, unemployed rural migrant aspires. Too often the rural poor, who daily swell the population of these cities, not only fail to find their goals, but become trapped in one of the worst forms of human existence, the overworked urban system. If abject poverty, chronic malnutrition and unemployment are ever to be effectively solved, the battle must first take place in the great metropolitan areas of the world.

Against this background, this volume takes up the main problems arising out of these primary issues, relating them to the broader perspectives of national planning and economic development. The basic approach is theoretical, with case studies taken from Calcutta, Karachi and Singapore. The main infrastructural problems specifically dealt with are water supply, housing and finance. The editors, writing in Chapter 9, lay much of the blame for the appalling conditions prevailing in cities squarely at the feet of the politicians and planners, who, they maintain, hold a negative attitude, and it is, therefore, hardly surprising that 'programs dealing with urbanization and urban development are given low priority in national planning' (p. 279).

And in answer to the question, 'Can the city ever be successfully managed?', a qualified 'yes' is given if planners would only adopt a realistic approach and provide the necessary policies and finance. In condemning the 'master-planning approach', there is thought to be 'an enormous untapped development potential . . . which could be unleashed through intensive programs of community organization' (p. 282). The finance of such mass self-help projects should only require 'seed money' to operate.

The usefulness of this collection of essays really depends on whether one is of the opinion that the emphasis placed on the city in modern society is justified, since by identifying urbanisation with modernisation, one falls into the trap of taking a pro-urban bias in the conflict of rural-urban differences. This assumes the ultimate superiority of urban society over rural society, relegating the countryside to a repository of 'folk' culture and as a reservoir of industrial labour. This is fundamentally at variance with the desire on the part of others (notably China) to relegate the city role and reduce rural-urban differences. It is really a case of whether rural and urban communities in developing countries need to continue on the basis of the Western experience. In spite of the success of Singapore, urbanisation is not really working in Asia, so why persist in trying to universalise the Western experience? Nevertheless, the book maintains an interesting insight into some of the successes and failures of the Asian city, as well as providing individual chapters on urban problems which will be of use to other countries.

K. P. BROADBENT

Banking Structures and Sources of Finance in the Far East: Describing the banking systems of Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, China, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. Edited by Philip Thorn. *London: The Banker Research Unit. 1975. 155 pp. Pb: £14·00*

THE Banker Research Unit is now well established as the leading British source of current information on international banking, especially on banking in those regions, mainly in the developing countries, where the situation is changing very rapidly. In recent years, there has been a particularly rapid development of banking systems in South-east and East Asia, and a survey of this development was badly needed. Philip Thorn's survey contains a mass of useful information, which is much more up-to-date than would be possible in a more academic study, and includes an interesting if necessarily rather speculative account of the banking system of China.

Although the survey indicates the general lines on which the banking system is developing in each of the countries covered, it is to be hoped that future editions will provide more material in two main areas. First, at the analytical level, it describes, but does not really explain, the way in which each system works. In that respect the section on Japan, for instance, compares unfavourably with the relevant articles in supplements on Japan that have been published by *The Economist*; and the section on Malaysia is devoid of discussion of the policy framework which is necessary to any understanding of recent changes in that country. Secondly, at the factual level, more detailed information on individual banks in each country would be useful, especially foreign banks. Admittedly, this information is obtainable from other publications of the Banker Research Unit, but at £14.00 one has a right to expect completeness.

As a work of reference, the survey would gain, also, from a more careful organisation of each country section. At present, there appears to be no consistent principle in the arrangement of sub-sections. Another minor limitation of its usefulness for reference purposes is the number of misprints, including misprints in the spelling of proper names and what appear, on grounds of internal consistency, to be misprints in some of the figures given.

Since a survey of this kind is most useful if brought regularly up-to-date, it should be possible, in a second edition, to eliminate these blemishes from what should become a standard work of reference.

Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University JOHN WHITE

Soviet Policy toward India: Ideology and Strategy. By Robert H. Donaldson. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1974. 338 pp. (Russian Research Center Studies 74.) £7·50.*

Indo-Soviet Relations 1947–1972: A Documentary Study. By Bimal Prasad. *Bombay, Calcutta, New Delhi, Madras, Bangalore: Allied Publishers. 1973. 494 pp. Rs. 50.00.*

RUSSIAN ambitions in the Indian sub-continent date back to Peter the Great and they were not relinquished when the communists took over in 1917. Whereas Soviet-Chinese relations have been well recorded, the student is not so well provided for in the field of Soviet-Indian relations. Robert Donaldson's book goes some way to fill this gap, for he has written a scholarly and lucid survey of Soviet policy from Lenin to Brezhnev.

His thesis is that the interaction between communist ideology and the politico-strategic needs of the Soviet state, it is the latter that has had the decisive influence on the formulation of Soviet policies in India. When it suited the communist leaders in Moscow, the CPI was instructed to take the offensive against imperialists and social democrats; when their policy changed, the Indian communists were told to collaborate with the national bourgeoisie in the formation of a 'national democratic front'. What makes the book so interesting is that the author goes on to consider how the Marxist-Leninist doctrine had to be revised as a result of this interaction. It was not until the 1960s that Soviet ideologues produced a sophisticated analysis of the Indian social and political scene which described India as passing through a series of 'intermediate stages' on the road to socialism, and which also endorsed the diplomatic and military strategies of the Soviet Union.

Donaldson's account of the way in which the Russian leaders manipulated the CPI should interest students of Indian politics in particular. Despite an occasional attempt to follow their own vision, Indian communists in the main submitted to the instructions from Moscow, with serious consequences for their party. Admittedly, it had been ridden by factional disputes for years, but it was its support for the Soviet Union in the quarrel with China that finally produced an irrevocable schism. Furthermore, by agreeing to tone down its criticism of the Congress Party in the late 1960s, it forfeited its claim to be the leader of the revolutionary movement in India.

During the last few years of Stalin's rule, the Soviet attitude towards India began to soften. However, it was between 1955–59 that the turning point was reached in the relationship between the two countries. Khrushchev's

visit to New Delhi in 1955 symbolised the Soviet belief that Nehru's government could be used to further the objectives of Soviet foreign policy. By the end of the decade the supposedly menacing claims of China had brought them much closer and it was the fear of Peking that pushed them into a formal alliance in 1971. The diplomatic and ideological significance of this triangular relationship is examined in detail in the second half of the book, although the author does not on every occasion give due weight to the Chinese case.

Donaldson describes the main goals of Soviet policy in the Indian subcontinent as stability, the reduction of American influence and the prevention of Chinese penetration. He recounts the twists and turns of Soviet policy in the pursuit of these goals, from Khrushchev's visit to Kosygin's mediation at Tashkent and Brezhnev's somewhat reluctant support of New Delhi in the war over Bangladesh. By 1972 considerable progress had been made towards achieving all three aims with the presence of the Soviet Union firmly institutionalised. What one looks for in vain at the end of the book is an examination of the firmness of the Indian commitment to an anti-China alliance. Could not the Soviet-Indian friendship be as ephemeral as Soviet-Chinese friendship or the 'eternal' Sino-Indian friendship? One cannot help feeling that the Russians in the last twenty years have over-estimated the politico-strategic capabilities of India just as British politicians tended to do in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

This is a valuable contribution to the study of Soviet-Indian relations and those students who want to pursue the subject further will find the bibliography invaluable.

The more books of documents there are for students the better and for this reason alone Prasad's collection should be welcomed. Apart from the texts of a few trade agreements and the 1971 treaty, the volume consists of official communiqués and extracts from the speeches of the leaders of the two states. What this book lacks is balance and objectivity: the author does not include a single document from the period 1947–52, when relations between India and the Soviet Union were far from cordial.

University College of Swansea J. E. WILLIAMS

Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860–1923. By Francis Robinson. *London: Cambridge University Press. 1975. 469 pp. £9·00.*

HERE is a pioneering work that deploys large resources to make a limited point. British rule in India, especially in its last seven decades, was bedevilled by the assumption that 'the Muslims' were a united bloc, underprivileged, potentially dangerous, hence to be placated. This assumption (taken over until recently by historians both in Britain and in the sub-continent) itself helped to bring about what it took for granted. It incited the Muslim upper classes of North India—heirs to a long tradition of government and culture—to speak for all Indian Muslims. First through Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's movement (centred on the future Aligarh University), later through the Muslim League, this privileged urban minority made good its claim: its efforts 'to preserve a strong position not to improve a weak one' (p. 346) were ultimately a chief cause of partition, though a partition that left out of Pakistan the elite's northern base.

This interpretation, first fully developed by Anil Seal,[1] informs the work of his pupil Dr. Robinson; it has influenced the more wide-ranging studies of Peter Hardy[2] and Paul Brass.[3] In its main lines it is persuasive and valuable. The difficulties come with its detailed working out and its shaping theory of politics.

Like some other recent works of the Seal school Dr. Robinson's illustrates 'Indo-Namierism.' It gives a large place to personalities and connections: hence a 77-page appendix made up of biographies, in themselves a most useful monument of research. It also takes the self-interest of individuals and elite groups to be virtually the only motive force in politics.

Thus the 'Young Party' or service-based elite that challenged the old Aligarh group, and especially the Young Party's leader Mohamed Ali, were driven by the 'new possibilities of making politics a means of livelihood' (p. 324); their rapprochement with Congress was a mere horse-trade. The ulama (theologians) who rushed into politics over the post-1918 threat to the Khilafat (Caliphate) were likewise driven by the thirst for power; as private schoolmasters in competition with government schools they 'had most to gain from driving the Khilafat agitation more extreme' (p. 325); one of them 'treated himself to a Chevrolet' (p. 265). There is something in all this. But it is like explaining Lloyd George Liberalism almost wholly through the Fund and the embellishment of Churt. The British for their part appear passive; they respond to elite challenges. In a story packed with new and interesting detail the guiding thread of interpretation ends by looking, in every sense, doubtful.

University of Sussex JOHN ROSSELLI

China and the Great Powers: Relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Edited by Francis O. Wilcox. *New York, Washington: Praeger in co-operation with the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C.; London: Pall Mall. 1974. 103 pp. £4·50.*

Sino-American Détente and Its Policy Implications. Edited by Gene T. Hsiao. *New York, Washington: Praeger in co-operation with the Asian Studies Program of Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville; London: Pall Mall. 1974. 319 pp. £7·75. Pb. ed. 1975. $6.95. £3·00.*

China's Foreign Relations since 1949. By Alan Lawrance. *London, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1975. 261 pp. (The World Studies Series.) £5·95.*

THE three books under review all deal with the highly topical and relevant subject of China's foreign policy, and its implications for the rest of the world. The first two, edited by Wilcox and by Hsiao respectively, are composite volumes arising out of lectures and seminars sponsored by American universities in 1973. They represent part of the explosion of interest, discussion and ferment in the United States after the extraordinary and historic demarche made by President Nixon in visiting China in 1972. The interest

[1] *The emergence of Indian nationalism: competition and collaboration in the later nineteenth century.* London: Cambridge University Press. 1968.

[2] *The Muslims of British India.* London: Cambridge University Press. 1972.

[3] *Language, Religion and Politics in North India.* London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1974. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1975, p. 288.

attaching to the reopening of high-level relations between the two governments is matched by the reaction among public opinion in the United States. The extraordinary number and variety of Americans visiting China, many of them for the first time, has tended to breed in the United States itself a fashion of euphoria and enthusiasm no less extreme than previous hostility and suspicion.

Senator Mansfield, whose lecture is reproduced in the Wilcox book, says that 'Chinese society today is strong and unified, perhaps as never before in history. It has a dynamism based on the "one for all and all for one" concept . . . To visit China is to feel, personally, the vitality of a vast, intelligent and highly competent people and the social enthusiasm that has been generated by their society' (p. 61). This view is reminiscent of what was being said by some students of China about twenty years ago, but it has surely been considerably modified by internal events in China in recent years, both before, during and after the cultural revolution. The senator also seems ignorant of the reorganisation of SEATO, which he criticises (despite his having had a hand in signing the Treaty in Manila in 1954) as defunct and out-of-date, notwithstanding its present emphasis on regional economic and technical aid and co-operation. One can only hope that his voice will not be a dominant one in the formulation of American policy towards China in the years ahead.

The other lectures in the book go much deeper, and are refreshingly realistic. J. G. Stoessinger on Sino-Soviet relations, Reischauer on China's relations with Japan, and Professor Cohen on the more diplomatic-legalistic issues (for example, Taiwan) in Sino-American relations are contributions of the highest quality. Reischauer is especially perceptive. He challenges the now widespread concept of a 'quadrilateral' power-play in Asia, as between China, Japan, the Soviet Union and United States. 'This', he says, 'is all largely fanciful. The nuclear balance of power remains essentially bipolar. China is only a regional military power, and Japan not a power at all. The four or five 'great powers' are not even roughly symmetrical; they are therefore not interchangeable players, as in the nineteenth-century model of the balance of power' (p. 40).

Doak Barnett is one of those, in the Hsiao book, who accepts the 'quadrilateral' view of Asia today, though in his version it is modified in terms of military, economic and political power, 'and the existing relationships are by no means equilateral' (p. 28). He would rather use the term 'multipolar'. The many-sided nature of relationships in Asia today—and how complicated it all is!—is well brought out by the other participants in this symposium, who deal with matters ranging from purely Sino-American issues, such as the prospects for scholarly exchange, to the widening ripples from detente reaching Korea, Indochina, India, Nato and Moscow. The editor himself contributes a most informative chapter on rapprochement between China and Japan, which he sees as based on a coincidence of some of their basic national interests in the region, and which was only accelerated by Nixon's new policy.

The third book under review is a comprehensive documentary survey of China's relations with the outside world in more or less chronological sequence. Dr. Lawrance, who visited China in 1972, provides a linking commentary to each section. It will doubtless be a useful volume for teachers and students, for whom it is chiefly intended. There is likely to be a steady stream of books dealing with China's foreign policy in future, and one can

only deplore the mounting cost that the reader will have to pay for each new volume.

University of Hull VICTOR FUNNELL

China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements. By Jay Taylor. *New York, Washington: Praeger. 1974. London: Pall Mall. 1975. 384 pp. £9·75.*

MR. TAYLOR'S book undertakes to record and analyse the kaleidoscopic changes in China's dealings with the communist revolutionary movements operating within the countries of South-east Asia throughout the 1960s, and to do so both comprehensively and objectively. The conscientious reviewer should, I believe, state this at the outset so that his reader may appreciate the complexity of the undertaking and its quite extraordinary difficulty. Unlike the professional historian, the author is without the benefit of being able to consult state papers stored in some national archive, or of access to the private papers or opinions of those political leaders who brought about the events described. He is dealing, in the case of China, with a totalitarian regime, controlling all the information media and the publishing houses, which is suspicious of foreigners and denies them free access to people, places, or documents, and which subscribes to a communist ideology enamoured of secrecy and clandestinity. The South-east Asian communist revolutionary movements, which constitute the other end of the relationship, are—hardly surprisingly—tight lipped about their own affairs and averse to public revelations about either their circumstances or intentions.

Indeed, it is not without irony that Mr. Taylor, a career Foreign Service Officer employed by a government currently engaged in disclosing to the entire world its most tightly guarded secrets, be they White House tapes, Pentagon papers, CIA files, or whatever, should publish a book dealing with an area of activity about which reliable information is virtually non-existent. Yet, by diligently combing masses of communist publications, the monitoring reports of broadcasts, and the numerous published works about the area or the developments within it, the author has assembled almost as much hard information as it is possible to do, given the paucity of primary source material. But the limits of what can be accomplished through the use of such secondary material are apparent on every page in the repeated use of such words as 'probably', 'may', 'might', 'appear to', and the like. To point this out is not to suggest that the book should not have been attempted. It is a serious study of an important subject and there is much to be learned from it, yet it cannot be regarded as the definitive work on that subject because of the nature of its sources. It makes a worthwhile contribution to knowledge of the political relationships in that area of the globe.

The scope of the author's researches was necessarily wide, extending to the countries of Indochina, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines, to say nothing of the Soviet Union and the United States, whose influence upon the events described was often decisive. On the whole the standard of accuracy achieved is very high, which makes all the more regrettable the occasional errors missed in proof reading. Confusion of the years 1968 and 1969 in the pages dealing with the Tet offensive in Vietnam and its follow-up attacks, for example, makes the text most misleading, if not meaningless. On occasion the sheer volume of research would seem to have proved too great to handle, as when Mr. Taylor speculates

about disagreement in the North Vietnamese leadership during 1967 and bases his conclusions upon a superficial report in the magazine *Newsweek*, seemingly ignorant of the 'Hoang Minh Chinh affair' and the copious detail available about the arrests of many senior North Vietnamese communists for their criticism of the party line at that time. It would, however, be unjust to make too much of these minor blemishes in an otherwise scholarly and informative book.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London P. J. HONEY

The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937. By Lloyd E. Eastman. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1974. 398 pp. (Harvard East Asian Series 78.) £8·25.*

Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925–1937. By Diana Lary. *London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1974. 276 pp. (Cambridge Studies in Chinese History, Literature and Institutions.) £6·50. $19.50.*

THIS review is written after hearing the news of Chiang Kai-shek's death. Since these books on the Nanking period of Kuomintang rule (1927–37) are both written in the shadow of the Generalissimo, it may be appropriate to quote one of the conclusions reached about him. Professor Eastman observes:

> There can be no dispute that Chiang Kai-shek was a preponderating force within the Nationalist regime . . . Even at the end of the Nanking decade, the Chinese people sensed little loyalty for, nor did they tend to identify with, the party or the government. But Chiang personally had won the trust and respect of much of the nation . . . He was widely regarded as the one Kuomintang figure who transcended the petty factional jealousies within the party, and who alone could hold together the divisive regime during a war with Japan. Chiang Kai-shek's strengths were monumental; neither were his weaknesses small (pp. 278–9).

These two excellent studies are complementary, Eastman dealing with Nanking and the Kuomintang, Lary dealing with the most potent source of opposition to it, the Kwangsi clique in the south-west. They are pioneer works and are remarkable for their moderate and balanced judgment in grappling with problems where these qualities are hard to sustain. Both authors cope skilfully with a wide variety of source material, present their story in a lucid way and reach important conclusions.

Professor Eastman's theme is that the Kuomintang, which set out with the revolutionary ideal of attaining unity, security and national pride, very quickly showed its incapacity to lay the foundation for an effective political system. By a series of case-studies, he gives a political and economic survey of Kuomintang actions and the opposition which they generated. Despite the opposition, by 1935 the country was being integrated by the administration, politically and territorially, to an extent not known for two decades. In this the Kuomintang was abetted by the Japanese attempt in August 1936 to seize Suiyuan province. The outburst of patriotic fervour which this aroused played into the hands of the Generalissimo who, having subdued the warlords and apparently defeated the communists, came at last to be recognised as a national figure. While on the outbreak of war with Japan, China was

more unified and better armed than a decade earlier, its political institutions were weak and unrepresentative and the problems of the peasantry and the urban population alike had been neglected.

Diana Lary makes an important contribution to the history of the regions, an indispensable subject of research in 20th century China. She reviews the story of the Kwangsi clique in two main periods. From being involved in regional ventures in the warlord period, the Kwangsi leaders in 1925 engaged themselves in national politics as soldiers of the Northern expedition. After the retreat to Wuhan, they tried to secure predominance over Hunan and Hupei and were for the first time defeated by the Kuomintang. According to Professor Lary, from 1930 they nursed their wounds, content to administer the 'limited area of Kwangsi in a constructive way'. When they proceeded to campaign against the weakness of Nanking's resistance to Japan, they were trounced a second time. By 1936, therefore, Kwangsi was integrated into the national system (though its provincial powers remained strong) and the clique came close to extinction. While it is sometimes useful to have a simple framework of this kind, this reviewer is not entirely convinced that it fits the facts, or that the Kwangsi clique became so parochial after 1930.

These two valuable research monographs will be of service to a wide readership. They are indispensable pioneer works for those interested in Chinese history and politics. While they do not have an international emphasis, they set the scene for an understanding of the Chinese background of the Manchurian and Shanghai crises. Since the Japanese army was blowing down the necks of the Kuomintang leadership during the Nanking decade, these books are important too for Japanese historians. They reinforce the old oracular dictum of Sun Yat-set that 'without Japan there is no China; without China there is no Japan'.

London School of Economics IAN NISH

The Failure of Democracy in South Korea. By Sungjoo Han. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, Calif., London: University of California Press. 1974. 240 pp. $10.00. £5·00.*

IN April 1960, after the obviously rigged presidential elections of the previous month, increasing political protest and student demonstrations led to the fall of Syngman Rhee, who had dominated South Korean politics for twelve years. After a short interim, in which a caretaker government headed by Hŏ Chŏng held office, a general election in July 1960 inaugurated the so-called Second Republic, with a government led by Chang Myŏn. The life of the Second Republic was brief: Chang Myŏn's government faced increasing opposition and political disorganisation, and was finally overthrown by the military in May, 1961. The short-lived Korean experiment with democracy collapsed ignominiously.

Professor Han's primary objective is to discover the reasons for this collapse. In pursuit of this objective, he gives a detailed account of the working of Chang Myŏn's government, analyses its strengths and weaknesses, and examines the combination of factors that led to its failure and overthrow. Although the focus of the book is a narrow one, the author tries to put the events of 1960–61 into a wider perspective, rightly emphasising what he describes in a chapter heading as 'The Legacy of the

First Republic'. There are good sections on the dominant roles of the police and the military in Korean politics, on the development and factional tendencies of the major political parties, and on the continuing weakness of left-wing and progressive forces, always suspected of being soft on communism. Professor Han shows how, largely because of the ever-present communist threat from the north, effective national politics from 1948 onwards, whether under Syngman Rhee, Hŏ Chŏng, Chang Myŏn or the military, could only take place within a narrow, restrictive and conservative framework. Above all, the book is a devastating indictment of Korean politics and politicians of all shades of opinion in the period. The politicians are shown to be irresponsible, prone to factionalism, obsessed with intra-party squabbles, intent on political manoeuvres for personal reasons, and incapable of rising to the level of the challenges facing them. In the circumstances, the take-over by the military has a smack of inevitability about it.

The book is not without its shortcomings. Professor Han rightly concentrates his analysis at the leadership level, supplying careful and detailed appreciations of the careers and policies of the various prominent political and military figures. However, this is at the expense of a certain lack of balance; he has little to say about political and social attitudes at lower levels. Again, his discussion of the role of the military, while lengthy, tends to be in fairly general terms. In addition, he provides little comment on Syngman Rhee's influence, if any, after his fall, and his references to the attitude of the United States throughout the upheavals of the period are brief and tantalisingly obscure.

However, these criticisms must not be allowed to detract too much from a valuable study, based on a wide range of Korean and English-language sources. It certainly helps to fill a large gap in modern Korean political studies, and it raises important general questions about the prospects for political freedom and democracy in developing countries.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth DAVID STEEDS

Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century. By Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky. *Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1973. London: Oxford University Press. 1974. 327 pp. £5·75.*

Japan and World Trade: the Years Ahead. By Haruko Fukuda. *Farnborough: Saxon House; Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, Heath. 1974. 155 pp. £4·00.*

A Japanese View of Détente. By Hisahiko Okazaki. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Heath for the Atlantic Council of the United States. 1974. 117 pp. £5·85.*

Prologue to the Future: The United States and Japan in the Postindustrial Age. Edited by James William Morley. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Heath for Japan Society, Inc. 1974. 224 pp. £4·60.*

United States-Japanese Relations: The 1970s. Edited by Priscilla Clapp and Morton H. Halperin. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1974. 234 pp. £4·00.*

The Price of Prosperity: Lessons from Japan. By Chiaki Nishiyama and G. C. Allen. *London: The Institute of Economic Affairs. 1974. 66 pp. (Hobart Papers 58.) £0·60.*

Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy. By J. A. A. Stockwin. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1975. 296 pp. (Modern Governments; Gen. Ed.: Max Beloff.) £7·00. Pb: £3·50.*

AFTER the problems of the underdeveloped countries Japan is fast becoming the second political subject to which the largest number of books are being devoted. Yet, luckily, the phase of dithyrambic admiration is giving place to more sober analyses, descriptions and forecasts.

Japanese Economic Growth is one of the best examples of objective historical analysis. Its central purpose is to explain Japan's exceptional rate of growth in the present century, and since 1945 in particular. As an attempt to fit Japan's experience into a historical growth model of the type familiar to western economists, the authors discuss in great detail and with impressive documentation, factor inputs and aggregate productivity, sectoral growth patterns and intersectoral relations, as well as the labour situation, diminishing dependence on imported technology, and the past and future prospects of foreign trade. The writing of the book began in 1961, but it was not published until 12 years later. Thus it is doubly noteworthy that the authors, resisting the fashion of wildly optimistic forecasts, have correctly foreseen not merely that '. . . some of the very favourable factors in Japanese growth may be transitory . . .' (p. 242) but also the coming mutations in the intellectual climate. 'Perhaps the Japanese, who have led the world in growthmanship, will also be the first to redirect their energies toward socially more beneficial activities . . .' (pp. 233–4). In face of such massive knowledge and scholarship it may be pretentious to look for shortcomings. Nevertheless, some readers may find that the specifically Japanese sociological heritage and the discipline and cohesion inherent in it, are inadequately treated, and that, with part of the book devoted to the future, relations with China are completely ignored.

Haruko Fukuda's book is devoted principally to Japan's trade prospects. She thinks that the enlarged EEC's economic policies are bound to affect Japan's prospects adversely and she seems to see the future rather in terms of a Pacific free trade area. Her doubts about the global approach lead her to consider '. . . closer economic integration with Australia and other Pacific and Asian economies . . .', hinting that such a framework would also '. . . be useful in working towards a balanced relationship with China, and mitigate the political difficulties with which Japan is faced in the aid relationship with the less developed countries of Asia . . .'. The author's vision is clearly confirmed by developments. The current recession and the emergence of China as a major oil producer in the years to come, merely confirm her conclusion that 'The potential for great achievements in working to create a more civilized society for the nations of Asia is immense' (p. 131).

A Japanese View of Détente muses about co-existence, detente diplomacy and Japan's relations with the communist countries. It is the work of a professional and still active diplomat and, as a consequence, it is far too cautious to reveal anything of real interest.

The two books in the endless series devoted to American-Japanese relations are panel volumes, each with a number of both American and

Japanese contributors. *Prologue to the Future* deals with the 'postindustrial' age and those of its sectors most likely to differ from contemporary society. The impact of over-abundant information and the prospects of what the Japanese call the communications society are discussed in great detail. But here we are on the borders of futurology and recent economic developments have amply demonstrated its fragility. As for *United States-Japanese Relations*, it contains some penetrating essays—as, for example, those of Edwin O. Reischauer always are—but its contents as a whole merely confirm that, updating apart, there is nothing really new or original to be added to this over-treated subject.

The Institute of Economic Affairs' Hobart Paper, *The Price of Prosperity*, provides a refreshing change of atmosphere. It is brief, dense and stimulating. An incisive, short paper by Professor Nishiyama is followed by a somewhat longer one by Professor G. C. Allen. The first pinpoints some of the keys to Japan's spectacular growth. The second discusses its deeper causes and attempts to draw some lessons for Britain and, by implication, for the West as a whole.

Professor Nishiyama shows with concise logic how, in Japan's case, Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' has been supplanted by, what he calls, 'group dynamics à la Japonaise' (p. 23). The strict line of balanced budgets laid down by the occupation authorities' policies and made possible by fast expanding fiscal revenues, '. . . helped to reinforce the return of the Japanese economy to the age-old "over-loan" mechanism . . .' (p. 25). This, in turn, strengthened the bureaucrats' power to decide how to allocate money and gave substance to the so-called administrative guidance. As a result, Japan's free enterprise economy has been far better placed to realise desirable structural changes than has been its Western counterpart relying more heavily on monetary policy and thus on private decisions.

If Japan's effort was built on 'teams without heroes' (p. 16) and on the resulting cohesion and consensus, as Professor Allen explains, the situation in the West has been quite different. 'The relationship can be understood only if one appreciates the importance in Japanese society of vertical divisions which qualify, or mitigate, the conflict of classes' (p. 44). Here we come to the heart of the matter, to the basically different socio-cultural background of Japanese and Western society. For without due attention to that fundamental difference, mere economic analysis or comparison cannot be really revealing.

Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy is a view of the postwar Japanese scene and is of the highest quality. '. . . since the 1950s three things stand out above everything else', sums up Mr. Stockwin. 'These are an explosive economic growth, a stable conservative government and an acute political division on fundamental issues . . . on some basic issues of politics there has been so little agreement or meeting of minds between the main political participants of right and left as to negate what are usually taken as the requirements for pluralist democracy' (p. 240). In a few pages one is offered what is probably the best, briefest and clearest explanation of the country's highly complex electoral system available in the English language. On the other hand, though repeatedly referred to, the full political potential of the mushrooming civic movements is perhaps not sufficiently explored. Similarly, the facts given do not fully explain why the division of the working class into first and second class categories is so tenaciously maintained and relatively docilely accepted. But these are minor blemishes.

As a whole, Mr. Stockwin's book is a model of a comprehensive, clear and very well informed synthesis and it is likely to be of great help to all those seeking a readable and up-to-date picture of Japan's economics and politics.

TIBOR MENDE

Britain and East Asia 1933–1937. By Ann Trotter. *London: Cambridge University Press for the Centre of International Studies, London School of Economics and Political Science. 1975. 277 pp. £7·70. $23.50.*

BETWEEN the Manchurian crisis of 1931–33 and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, Britain faced the likelihood that its pose as a major Far Eastern power—which was often self-deceiving, as well as deceiving many others—would soon be exposed. The growing crisis in Europe made it all the more unlikely that a solution could be found to this dilemma. But even within its own boundaries, the East Asian conundrum proved too much to unravel: how to help bring about a stable China, good for trade and investment, without offending a Japan which increasingly sought and asserted a special position for itself in China? How to secure friendship with Japan without seriously offending China and the United States? How to reach political and naval agreement with Japan while at the same time resisting the encroachment of its exports upon the markets for Lancashire textiles?

Dr. Trotter has provided a clear, well-documented and valuable guide to this scene as viewed from Whitehall. She has brought out how finely-balanced were the alternatives involved for Britain (the China market, for example, although the focus of some inflated hopes for the future, accounted for only two per cent. of Britain's overseas trade at the time), how intangible factors played a major part (the loss of British interests in China to Japan, she correctly judges, 'would have broadcast British impotence to the world'), and how confused were many of the feelings and reactions involved ('an ambivalent attitude to Japan,' she writes, 'in which suspicion of her was combined with a desire to be friendly with her, was not uncommon in the cabinet and in the House of Commons' (p. 89)). Dr. Trotter is also able to show how over-optimistic were those who believed that moderate factions in Japanese naval and political circles might still take charge and bring about an agreement that would stabilise the position in the Far East and extricate Britain from its dilemma. In this respect Chamberlain at the Treasury had a distorted view of the Japanese scene, just as he was later to misjudge the European dictators; nor did he seem to appreciate the strength of national feeling in China and its consequent resistance to foreign control in the economic and financial fields.

Chamberlain and the Treasury wanted action to ease Britain's position in the Far East, and above all to improve relations with Japan and so ease Britain's naval burden. To this end, they despatched Sir Frederick Leith-Ross on his well-known mission to the Far East, and yet, as the Foreign Office wearily pointed out, his schemes to aid China financially served only to worsen relations with Japan. Dr. Trotter is particularly good on the wrangles surrounding Leith-Ross and on the unhappy consequences as a whole of dual Foreign Office-Treasury diplomacy in the Far East. She also provides useful correctives to earlier writings on British reactions to Japan's Amau statement of 1934, when there was clearly a strong desire to avoid any suggestion of a united front with the United States against Tokyo, and

on the failure of the pro-Japanese movement in Whitehall in the same year, which was killed, not as some have suggested, by the Dominions and Lord Lothian, but rather by Japan's own failure to respond.

In all this, Dr. Trotter has briefly touched upon the concurrent problems in Europe which were facing British policy-makers. One feels that the perspective of her book would have been improved if she had gone rather further in this direction—for example in the section, beginning on page 51, on 'Britain's Naval Problems.' (The recently-published *Documents on British Foreign Policy, Second Series, XIII* [1] is a useful reminder of how Europe and the Far East interlocked in these years.) One would also have been grateful if Dr. Trotter had told us something of the estimates made by British officials during her period of the Chinese communist movement (or why there were no estimates). She might also have made rather more of the fears surrounding the extra-territoriality question, with reference to such documents as the Feetham Report on Shanghai, and of the racial question surrounding her subject. One small error might also be mentioned: the State Department divisions had 'Chiefs,' not 'Heads'; but none of these comments alters the main conclusion, that this is an important and well-written volume.

University of Sussex CHRISTOPHER THORNE

NORTH AMERICA

The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World 1945–1973. By Raymond Aron. Trans. by Frank Jellinek. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1975. 339 pp. £6·50.*

THE branch of the humane sciences which cannot be illuminated by the discriminating genius of Professor Raymond Aron has yet to be invented. Without arrogance or pretension, he addresses himself to a succession of those issues in which intellect, passion and interest combine to maximise confusion, and by the sheer play of his intelligence and liberality reduces them to something about which we can, in the deepest sense of the words, at least agree to differ. International relations abounds in such tangled skeins, and none is more tangled than the role and purposes of the United States in the postwar world. Here indeed is an issue worthy of Professor Aron's greatest talents.

The aftermath of America's disengagement from Vietnam constitutes, moreover, a singularly propitious moment for a fresh look at the unceasing debate about the sources, nature and direction of American policy. Two years and more have elapsed since Professor Aron finished his book, but although this lends a quaint air to some of the passing judgments ('I can speak out confidently and assert that it is on Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger that a European pins his hopes for a foreign policy governed by reason' (p. x)), what is much more striking is the continuing relevance to our present intellectual agenda of all the book's main conclusions.

The book falls into two parts, the first an inquiry into the bases of American political behaviour since 1945, the second doing the same for America's economic impact on the postwar world. It is not too much to

[1] London: HMSO. 1973. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1974, p. 351.

say that the first sets the framework for the second; Professor Aron would hardly deny subscribing to the primacy of politics. And of the first part it is the initial chapters, with their brilliant analysis and refutation of the cold war revisionists, that constitute the most original and valuable section; what follows by way of exposition of the rigidities and extravagancies of Kennedy and Johnson and the innovations of Nixon is more familiar if no less admirable.

The book's second part, 'The United States in the World Market,' begins in a rather similar manner by laying bare the shifts and confusions of the 'para-marxist' interpreters of 'dollar diplomacy' and proceeds to assess three major manifestations of American economic policy—the Marshall Plan, the aid programme and American corporate investment overseas. Aron concludes that no *single* aim underlay these varyingly successful operations and that they cannot properly be understood if they are regarded as designed solely to promote American security or even American economic self-interest. Once again, it is in the unsparing analysis of the concepts so lightly bandied about alike by critics and supporters of the United States that the critique's distinctive value lies.

A postscript, taking its departure point from the 25th anniversary of Kennan's 'containment' article (but oddly ignoring the author's own subsequent claims to have been misunderstood) provides a somewhat awkward, even largely repetitive, coda to the book. Perhaps it is inevitable that as the historian approaches today and reaches out to speculate about tomorrow the vapours of the sibyl should replace the sunshine shafts of the analyst. It may even be appropriate that we are left uncertain whether the last three words of the text derive their significance from the cosmonauts or from Shakespeare.

New College, Oxford H. G. NICHOLAS

In Search of American Foreign Policy: The Humane Use of Power. By Lincoln P. Bloomfield. *New York, London, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1974. 182 pp. £4·00. Pb: £1·20.*

Contemporary American Foreign Policy: Minimal Diplomacy, Defensive Strategy, and Détente Management. By Lawrence L. Whetten. *Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Heath. 1974. 360 pp. £7·30.*

THESE two volumes continue the debate about what went wrong with American foreign policy during the cold war and its aftermath, and about how it ought to be conducted in the age of detente. But they are very different books. Bloomfield's relatively short, highly introspective essay is the more provocative, focusing on the deficiencies of American foreign-policy makers and not analysing in any detail the situations with which they dealt. Whetten presents a systematic textbook concentrating on three aspects of American foreign policy in transition, *viz.*, the Nixon doctrine, the strategic implications of parity in weapons systems, and the problems of detente. Both books were published before the final collapse of South Vietnam.

There are three stages to Bloomfield's attempt to define an effective but humane foreign policy for the United States. First, the American role in world politics after 1945 is described as a liberal approach combining internationalist and interventionist policies and supported by a broad consensus at home. Bloomfield explicitly rejects the revisionist thesis that

American policy was directed by an elitist Establishment pursuing abroad its class interests. Rather the American response to a perceived Soviet threat in the first postwar decade is defended.

Bloomfield's second step is to ask the critical question 'What went wrong?' His answer is not original: American policy-makers confused ideology and national interest, values and tactics, and hence mistakenly applied the techniques which worked for Western Europe (and South Korea?) in the late 1940s to the Third World in the 1950s and 1960s. Bloomfield's principal aim is to define criteria whereby the United States can intervene to protect its vital interests without reproducing the counter-productive consequences of earlier interventions. And one of his recommendations is less intervention and more diplomacy. Too often the United States opted for stability at the price of propping up tyrannical regimes while undermining the credibility of American foreign policy by a rhetoric which insisted that the aim was to defend freedom and democracy. But why were such mistakes committed? Partly because lying about foreign policy became institutionalised until successive administrations 'finally outraged the American people' and destroyed the consensus. The problem here is that it could be argued that the policies would have been accepted by the people if the truth had been told, *i.e.*, the United States is defending a despotic regime in South Vietnam because this is vital to the security of the United States.

But why the bad policy—and the lies? Bloomfield opts for incompetence rather than the economic or territorial imperialism offered by revisionist historians. The incompetence is derived from a variety of sources—individuals such as Dulles, a military bias, civilians playing soldiers and an imperious attitude stemming from the arrogance of power. Bloomfield himself left the State Department after the 1956 Suez crisis because the attempts by policy planners, including Bloomfield, to develop comprehensive solutions to the substantive problems of the Middle East, *i.e.*, 'borders, Palestine refugees and waterways' (p. 85), were downgraded by Dulles who saw the main problem as 'Russian military invasion of the Middle East' (p. 86).

Bloomfield's third step is to provide a set of criteria whereby American foreign policy can avoid repeating past mistakes. Above all, attitudes must change. 'Important changes in policy will flow logically from changed perspectives. But in some other areas the United States will find itself doing much the same thing as before' (p. 129). The changes began when Johnson felt compelled not to stand again in 1968.

Bloomfield has written an important, provocative book because he has asked challenging questions. In some ways it is a relief to turn away from his personal and soul-searching testament to Whetten's analysis of changes taking place in contemporary American foreign policy and the international system. Whetten's book is extremely concise. Perhaps his most important contribution is to provide a much more sophisticated set of policy recommendations for the United States than Bloomfield. Whetten's proposals are based on a complex model of international politics which clearly separates out the problems faced by the United States in three distinct areas: the Western allies, including Japan; a threefold super-power system comprising China, Russia and the United States itself; and the Third World. He is also alive to the dangers of detente and the isolationist pressures within the United States stimulated by Vietnam and the Watergate crisis. His chapters on the requirements of American strategy in an age of nuclear parity and detente are particularly persuasive.

Both books are worthwhile additions to required reading on the role of the United States in world politics today.

University of Glasgow PETER FOTHERINGHAM

War, Presidents and Public Opinion. By John E. Mueller. *New York, London, Sydney, Toronto: Wiley. 1973. 300 pp. £4·00. Pb: £2·50.*

BRITISH students of American diplomacy do not usually have ready access to data on public-opinion polls in the United States. Mueller has served us well by focusing on the Korean and Vietnam wars, reproducing data in extended form, and pondering judiciously upon it. He is aware of the way such data is often abused and is therefore particularly careful in his analysis of the wording of survey questions, for changes in stimuli can produce significant changes in response. For example, the response is consistently more favourable to America's intervention overseas when the question specifically mentions a communist threat than when the word communist is omitted.

The 'follower' response is one of the most important factors in determining opinion on foreign policy matters; followers being those who customarily support presidential initiatives whatever their direction. In May 1966, 50 per cent. favoured bombing North Vietnam; after bombing began this rose to 85 per cent. The cessation of bombing in 1968 produced a similarly striking shift in support of the changed policy, and such phenomena must therefore qualify the simplistic hawk-dove analysis of public opinion.

One of Mueller's general conclusions is that the Vietnam war was no more unpopular than the Korean war until its costs escalated; another, that may surprise some readers, is that the better educated most consistently supported both wars. Only as they became more doveish did their position come to echo that of the poorly educated. He also suggests that television did not, as was widely supposed, greatly influence opinion against the war. The last part of the book is devoted to an analysis of the trend of presidential popularity since 1945, with the interesting and still debatable conclusion that 'Korea had an additional independent negative impact on President Truman's popularity that Vietnam did not have on President Johnson's' (p. 267).

University of Keele D. K. ADAMS

Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism. By Allen Yarnell. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, Calif., London: University of California Press. 1974. 155 pp. £4·50. $8.95.*

THE presidential election of 1948 has become the high point of Truman hagiography. The spectacle of the President, hamstrung by a Republican Congress, and facing the experienced Republican candidate Governor Dewey, fighting for his political life, and, against all the odds, winning, usually comes out as a glorious triumph for the man, and for the liberal, New Deal version of Democracy which Truman represented. But by no means all liberal Democrats saw Truman in that way; and his party, already torn by disaffection, had to face, not only the revolt of the Southern Dixiecrats under Strom Thurmond, but also the attraction of a major third-

party candidate in Henry Wallace, a man with impeccable New Deal antecedents. Professor Yarnell's study of the election campaign of 1948 is concerned to some degree with the reasons for Wallace's action, and with the extent to which the Progressive Party which he led was dominated, behind the scenes, by communists; but his principal concern is with the reaction of the President and his party to this threat from the left. By close study of party documents, and in particular of an important memorandum on electoral tactics by Clark M. Clifford, one of Truman's closest advisers, he establishes that for the President's supporters, the main enemy was the Republican party; even in the case of the Negro vote, the principal fear was of a defection, not to the Progressives, but to the Republicans. It was by his attacks on a reactionary Republican Congress that Truman hoped to keep liberal voters in line; and any movement to the left in domestic affairs was not attributable to the influence of the Progressive challenge. In any case, the main Progressive objection to Truman lay in his foreign policy, and here, as Yarnell demonstrates, the effect of Wallace's movement was merely to confirm the Administration in its anti-communist and cold war postures. It is the enthusiasm with which Americans for Democratic Action, that company union of liberal intellectuals, accused the Progressives of being no more than a communist front that makes them the villains of Yarnell's book. *Democrats and Progressives* points out convincingly that the Progressives' effect on Truman's campaign strategy was marginal; and in its assertion that Truman and the ADA, in their attacks on Wallace, were guilty of Red-baiting, it adds an interesting footnote to the popular, and questionable, revisionist thesis that the cold war was all Truman's fault anyway.

Emmanuel College, Cambridge GERARD EVANS

Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939–1945. By J. L. Granatstein. *Toronto, London: Oxford University Press. 1975. 436 pp. £11·00.*

THIS study of the Mackenzie King government during the Second World War is based upon scrutiny of an extensive range of public and private papers in archives in Canada, the United States and Britain. The focus of the work is political, inevitably so because what Canada did during the Second World War depended on solving problems of its own domestic politics. Unlike Poland or the Netherlands, Canada did not find itself at war ineluctably through circumstances external to itself: it declared war because Britain had declared war. True, the Canadian government did this after obtaining the nearly unanimous support of the democratically elected Canadian Parliament, but the Canadian decision to go to war against the German Reich cannot be explained in terms of political differences between Canada as such and Germany. The Canadian government and people considered themselves in 1939 a part of a large political entity, the British Commonwealth and Empire, and they went to war for this reason on the strength of a decision made by the British government about which the Canadians had been little consulted and about which those few who thought at all about the matter were at best dubious.

Canada's political problems stemmed from belonging to a political entity larger than the country Canadians knew in their concrete daily lives. The terms on which and the degree to which Canada should, and even did,

participate in the affairs of the British Commonwealth and Empire were matters of difference and dispute. Mackenzie King saw this very clearly. It sometimes seemed as if he was the only Canadian politician who grasped the fact that energy spent disputing about the degree and method of participating in the war 'at Britain's side' could only diminish the contribution to winning a victory, and that an optimal solution of the problem of maximising the Canadian contribution involved compromise.

Surprisingly, Professor Granatstein does not much explore Mackenzie King's concept of a 'balanced war effort' which was central to his solution of Canadian political problems during the years 1939–45. King developed this concept well before the catastrophic spring of 1940 and well before he had J. W. Pickersgill to guide his mind. The concept itself was protean in possibilities and solutions, because it offered something for everyone, even for pacifist socialists and patriotic maniacs. A balanced war effort offered jobs and opportunities in the production of war materials and food after the bleakness of the depression years. It meant opportunities for pay and allowances, adventure, travel, heroism, sacrifice and escape from the boredom of provincial life to the men and women, mostly young, with a taste for these things.

The scale of the balanced war effort grew with the expansion of the conflict. Canada was able to *give* to Britain and its allies five times as much per head of population as the United States. Having demonstrated this capacity to give, it became evident that there was a material basis for social reform and an improved quality of popular life in Canada itself. Mackenzie King had spent most of his life talking about social reform. When he saw social reformers beginning to win elections he resolved to cease talking and start acting. Unemployment insurance, family allowances and industrial expansion without serious inflation enabled him to defeat his enemies within and without the Liberal Party. Even the lethal political weapon of 'conscription' he was able to blunt and turn aside.

As a man Mackenzie King had few attractive qualities. As a professional politician, however, he was peerless. The world might well be a safer and happier place had Roosevelt and Churchill not despised and patronised him.

University of Birmingham H. S. FERNS

LATIN AMERICA

The Brazilian Communist Party: Conflict and Integration 1922–1972. By Ronald H. Chilcote. *New York, London: Oxford University Press. 1974. 361 pp. £8·75.*

Anarchists and Communists in Brazil, 1900–1935. By John W. F. Dulles. *Austin, London: University of Texas Press. 1974. 603 pp. $12.50. £6·00.*

THESE two books provide sharply contrasted contributions on the development of the far-left working-class movements in Brazil. For the general reader the advantage of Dr. Chilcote's book, covering the period up to 1972, is somewhat offset by the fact that, as he is a political scientist, only about half his book is devoted to a chronological survey of the period under discussion. The remainder is given up to analytic chapters on party

organisation, the roles of leaders and followers, and conflict and integration in the national, local and cross-national environments. The shortcomings of this approach, for all except political scientists, is that this deliberately 'scientific' *modus operandi* not only makes it difficult for the reader to appreciate the broad sweep of events, but also reduces the importance of personal factors—such as the career of Luís Carlos Prestes, the charismatic military rebel of the 1920s who has been secretary-general of the Communist party since the mid-1930s.

This is perhaps one of the main weaknesses of the political-science approach; the business of science is to deduce universal laws and to use them for prediction, but no political scientist could have predicted, say, the rise of Castro's brand of communism in Cuba, and the phenomenon of Prestes is in some ways not unlike that of Castro—except in its lack of final success.

Dr. Chilcote's book is, however, extremely valuable for the wealth of factual material it contains, particularly the very illuminating appendices and bibliography.

Professor Dulles, unlike Dr. Chilcote, is a historian with a proper sense of the importance of narrative and personality, and his book can be recommended wholeheartedly. His subject is both wider in scope and more restricted in time than Dr. Chilcote's, in that he is concerned with the whole radical working-class movement in Brazil and can study the interactions of the anarchists, the communists, the 'yellow' unions and the 'progressive bourgeois' politicians, thereby building up a broad, rich synthesis of the type that is denied by definition to the practitioner of the more 'scientific' approach. Many of the same characters figure in both books; in Dr. Chilcote's they are political units, appropriately labelled, but in Professor Dulles's they are human beings, active in politics. This is particularly true because Professor Dulles has been able to augment the ordinary published sources with interviews with many of the principal actors concerned in the events he describes, and he has also had access to the unique library of working-class movement periodical literature collected by the prominent anarchist Edgard Leuenroth. This imparts an enviable depth and richness to the text, which is also greatly enhanced by Professor Dulles's lucid prose style.

In any event, here are the two books: Dr. Chilcote's is a useful study, which will appeal mainly to political scientists, and contains much vital reference and bibliographic material; Professor Dulles's is an absorbing narrative, on a wider canvas that clearly relates Dr. Chilcote's subject matter to its background and, in this reviewer's opinion, gives a clearer and more profound insight into the subject—though of course over a shorter time-span.

JOHN BROOKS

Getulio Vargas of Brazil, 1883–1954: Sphinx of the Pampas. By Richard Bourne. *London, Tonbridge: Knight. 1974. 236 pp. £4·50.*

A book on Brazil by a British author is welcome evidence that the interpretation of the Brazilian scene for English readers has not become a complete monopoly of American academics. Richard Bourne's study of Vargas, based on secondary sources, contributes little that is new about the history of Brazil at mid-20th century. But as a lucid narrative of the events

that originally started Brazil on the course that may well lead it to world power status by the end of the century, and a biographical analysis of the man who presided over them between 1930 and (apart from the 1945–1951 interregnum) his suicide in 1954, it is a valuable contribution to the understanding of a key period in the country's political and economic evolution.

Brazil, a very large country, lurches forward during long periods of internal stability. Three men are associated with three of these distinctive periods since independence from Portugal over a century and a half ago. Under Dom Pedro Segundo Brazil's dimensions, unity and culture were firmly established, and this facilitated the transition to a federal republic comparatively smoothly and without violence in 1889. Getulio Vargas was the instrument of the next fundamental change when innovatory forces broke the paternalist mould into which Brazil had been cast by its colonial and imperial past, its geographical dimensions and its primary-producing economy. It was under his benevolent authoritarian rule that the process of modernisation was begun.

After a lapse of twenty years, during which stability and continuity were interrupted by the effervescence of internal politics, economic development moved into high gear once again. The man responsible this time was Marshall Castelo Branco, leader of the military coup of 1964 against the chaotic Goulart regime and President of Brazil until 1967.

The controversies surrounding the Vargas regime and the one introduced by President Castelo Branco is about whether they were self-seeking dictatorships serving narrow interests, or responses to deep-rooted national aspirations bent on transforming the 'sleeping giant' into a modern industrialised state. In this sense, studies of the men largely responsible help to provide definitive answers. Books on Vargas have proliferated in recent years, especially in the United States. The process of examining in depth the role of Castelo Branco is only beginning.

The merit of Richard Bourne's contribution is that it presents an unbiased picture of Vargas the man and national leader, and of the forces at work during his long government, with due recognition of the obstacles he had to overcome. In this respect it must rank among the most rewarding of the many books on the subject for beginners in Brazilian studies, as well as for more specialised students seeking a 'back-drop' against which to pursue narrower researches into the period.

British neglect of serious Latin American and especially Brazilian studies persists despite the Parry Commission recommendations. It is to be hoped that Mr. Bourne's book will stimulate further studies of comparable usefulness. British re-entry into Latin America should not be confined to trade fairs, royal visits and commercial investment: it should be accompanied by more dialogue on an academic level.

ROBERT DERVEL EVANS

Bureaucratic Politics and Administration in Chile. By Peter S. Cleaves. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, Calif., London: University of California Press. 1975. 352 pp. £9·20.*

PETER CLEAVES disarmingly remarks in his preface that 'bureaucracy is commonly believed to be a very boring subject for analysis' (p. xv). Although this book is by and large informative and interesting, there are some

passages both turgid and obscure. The author is rightly critical of much American political science treatment of the role of bureaucracy in developing countries. If conventional analysis is inappropriate, it is a pity that so much space has been used to dismiss it. Although Dr. Cleaves disagrees with the premises of much previous work on bureaucracy, he is nevertheless inclined to accept the method of presentation, in which relatively straightforward propositions are dressed up in cumbersome language, related in peculiar fashion to other propositions, and finally pushed into a graph or diagram.

However, this book is a useful corrective to superficial theorising (and in fairness to the author's style he does display a nice sense of irony at times). And, more important, it is a solid and well-researched contribution to the study of Chilean politics and the bureaucracy. It is largely limited to considering the Christian Democratic administration of 1964 to 1970. Three chapters look at overall economic planning, and four examine the interplay between the ministries, the decentralised agencies, the private contractors and the urban poor in the housing sector.

If the Christian Democrats' reform programme was a failure, then in no small measure was this due to executive inability to control the public bureaucracy. The power of what the author calls the 'restrictive coalition' led by the finance ministry was greater than that of the 'developmentalist coalition'. How the conservatives beat the reformers is explained in great detail and illuminates many areas of Chilean politics—the irresponsibility of Congress, the power of decentralised agencies, the persistence of bureaucratic structures and procedures well past their original purpose or use, and the way the bureaucratic system is organised to impede real reform. The then President Frei does not emerge from this account as a whole-hearted reformer by any means. Although Dr. Cleaves does not stress the point, the ambiguities of the Christian Democrats towards reform allowed the bureaucrats to maximise their own power to retain the status quo, even though the 'restrictive coalition's' economic policies restricted growth but not inflation.

The attempt of the Christian Democratic government to create a new housing ministry was long overdue—twenty-three public agencies under eight ministries created administrative anarchy in an area of great social need. Yet the attempt at reform failed. Congress refused to legislate for the necessary administrative reforms, fearful of an increase in the power and prestige of the executive. The agencies threatened by the reform, including the well-established ministry of public works, tried with all the powerful means at their disposal to block the reform. They were supported by private interests which had no wish to upset a mutually beneficial arrangement. Finally the impatience of the urban poor could not be resisted by a government whose prestige had sharply declined, and a trickle of urban land invasions became, in 1969–1970, a flood.

Although this book does not deal directly with the Allende period, its conclusions and analysis are obviously relevant. The combined power of an irresponsible Congress and an entrenched and self-serving bureaucracy working in harmony with private interests created formidable obstacles for even the mild attempts at reform of the Christian Democrats; how much more formidable they became in the Allende period is sadly well known.

St. Antony's College, Oxford ALAN ANGELL

SECOND WORLD WAR

Too Serious a Business: European armed forces and the approach to the Second World War. By Donald Cameron Watt. *London: Temple Smith. 1975. 200 pp. £3·50.*

PROFESSOR WATT is one of the most prolific authorities on contemporary history. His latest book is in fact a series of lectures he gave at the University of Cambridge in 1973 and breaks new ground in surveying the role of the officer class in Europe in the interwar period and after.

Assuming that the military played a significant part both in binding European society together before the First World War and, ironically, in producing that conflagration, Watt investigates how far their successors influenced both internal politics and foreign policies. In one way, he sees their influence as considerable and important. They thought in the old European terms, rescuing something from the chaos of the Versailles settlement, and eventually fought in what was, at least for a few years, a European civil war representing their political failure. On the other hand, after 1918 public opinion was opposed to militarism and the politicians were hostile to military budgets. The soldiers therefore had a lesser standing and fewer means to power. They were not helped by the existence of the League of Nations and the long-continued talk of world disarmament. The politicians also had a greater conceit of themselves; parliamentarians or dictators, it made precious little difference. As a new war approached, the military found themselves in a peculiar position, unwilling to push for it and almost unable to contemplate it. In 1938–39 they acted on both sides of the Rhine as forces for peace and were pressed into war by the ambition or resolution of their masters. They ended up fighting for two visions of Europe.

In some ways it is a dull theme, an exposition of the unheroic. In some ways, too, Watt has to strain the evidence to make it comparable, to align British, French, Italian and German officers. The assumption about 1914 is not altogether viable, and the theme is to some extent, therefore, phantom-chasing.

Yet Watt's lectures seem designed to provoke; and further, in particular sociological, study may add credibility and impact to his arguments. In addition, some of his incidental themes are very good value. He uses his breadth of reading and power of analysis, for example, to provide a first-class check-list of the technological successes and failures of the respective high commands as well as to illustrate their understanding and misunderstanding of their enemies and the way they could or would fight. And he carries his probe temptingly into the post-1941 and post-1945 periods. No doubt his synthesis will push other writers into more detailed studies later.

The New University of Ulster W. V. WALLACE

Hitler's War Aims. By Norman Rich. Vol. 1: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion. *1973. 352 pp. £4·50.* Vol. 2: The Establishment of the New Order. *1974. 548 pp. £5·95. London: Deutsch.*

PROFESSOR RICH'S two-volume study of Hitler's war aims has many virtues. It is clearly organised, thoroughly researched and lucidly written. The first volume traces the development of Hitler's foreign policy up to and

including the declaration of war on the United States, while the second is concerned with the politics and government of occupied Europe. There are ample quotations from numerous primary sources and generous acknowledgment, both in the footnotes and the very useful bibliographies, of a formidable array of secondary authorities. The second volume is particularly useful, and any student looking for a sensible and informative introduction to Nazi policy in virtually every part of occupied Europe would be well advised to begin with it.

For all its merits, however, it is difficult not to feel certain misgivings about at least two features of the work. The first is a tendency, particularly in the first volume, to rate thoroughness and comprehensiveness higher than brilliance and originality. There are substantial chunks of volume 1 which read very much like potted history and as there are already several extremely good introductions to Hitler's prewar policy available in English, one wonders why the author felt it necessary to spin out his tale at such length. The second volume covers less familiar territory, but even here the work becomes in parts unnecessarily daunting. It more than passes muster as a reference work; there may be few, however, who will read it from cover to cover.

The second disquieting feature is more fundamental. Like most writers on the foreign policy of the Third Reich, Professor Rich places considerable emphasis on the ideological factor and on Hitler's personal influence over the development of German policy. But orthodoxy can be carried too far, and it is regrettable that in volume 1 he pays so little attention to the factions that surrounded the Führer, and that in volume 2—in which perforce lieutenants like Göring and Himmler are more in evidence—he dismisses so summarily all but a few of the non-Germans with whom the occupying authorities had to deal. The history of German hegemony over the greater part of Europe in the Second World War is not merely a chapter in the history of Germany, still less just an episode in Hitler's biography. In Professor Rich's work, however, non-Germans are with few exceptions bit actors, who shuffle on and off without leaving any significant stamp on the development of the plot. As a result complicated events are not infrequently discussed in an oversimplified and misleading context. One example, taken from the chapter on Norway under German occupation, will suffice:

> The resignation of the Norwegian Supreme Court on December 21st 1940, gave the government an opportunity to reorganise the Department of Justice and to appoint members of the Nasjonal Samling to the vacated positions on the Supreme Court. Early in the following year the large-scale resignations of members of the clergy, including the majority of bishops and deans, afforded an opportunity to reorganise and control the state church (p. 132).

Reading this bland comment, one might be forgiven for concluding that the resignation of the Supreme Court and of all the bishops and 95 per cent. of the clergy in the spring of 1942 (not 1941) suited the authorities quite well, when in fact Paal Berg's departure was one of the most dramatic indications of the failure of the Germans to get their way—Berg quickly became the key figure in the civil resistance centred first on Kretsen and subsequently in Hjemmefrontledelsen—while the almost total disintegration of the state church, long before Stalingrad, was a remarkable corporate act of resistance by a body of men not normally given to radical gestures. Himmler, in an intervention not referred to in this book, would seem to

have taken the latter a good deal more seriously than Professor Rich does. Here and elsewhere in the book Professor Rich is in danger of becoming the prisoner of the voluminous, but nonetheless one-sided, evidence available in German archives. In this, of course, he is by no means unique. But the time has surely come for European historians to write European rather than Germanocentric—or Anglocentric—history.

Queen Mary College, London P. W. LUDLOW

The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany. Vol. 1. By John Erickson. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1975. 594 pp. £12·00.*

THAT the first volume of Professor Erickson's history of the Russian campaigns is written with impressive authority and an apparently total command of the difficult source-material will surprise nobody acquainted with his previous work in the field of Soviet military studies. No more distinguished effort is likely to appear until the publication of his second volume, and the two books together should long constitute a classic work of reference. Perhaps the only competitor is Colonel Albert Seaton's *The Russo-German War 1941–1945*,[1] but while this had a better grasp of the German operations it is fair to say that these have been more frequently discussed in detail than the Russian, on which Professor Erickson has brought to bear not only an unexampled knowledge of the official and unofficial documents, but also a relationship with Russian commanders and historians which seems to have gone far beyond formalities.

Nobody could pretend that this is an easy book to read. It is impossible to make a *War and Peace* out of a minutely detailed record of the Great Patriotic War. There are hundreds of paragraphs here which seem to be filled with little more than the names of commanders, units and places. This is unavoidable, and Professor Erickson has been wise to follow the less attractive course, shunning 'fine writing' and communicating the multitudinous individual facts which are essential for a true understanding of the Russian achievement. This is a book essentially for specialists, and here is what the specialist wants to know—strengths, orders of battle, topographical information, casualties, movements, plans, the names and characteristics of commanders. In the one instance where Erickson attempts narrative writing on an extended scale, in his account of the Stalingrad operations, he shows great capacity, and this is encouraging, since in some of the drily enumerative paragraphs his style tends to verge on the pedestrian. (He has not been helped by desultory proof-reading.)

The view-point is that of Stavka—of Stalin and the Russian High Command. The dereliction of that command in destroying its best military minds in the prewar purge; misunderstanding the potentialities of armour as though Russian generals were diehards of the British cavalry; producing an army before the German invasion which functioned according to the doctrines of the Civil War—all this is authoritatively analysed, as well as Stalin's persistent refusal to believe in a German attack. But the fine detail of this book enables one also to envisage with deeper understanding the miraculous way in which the Russians, brought over and over again to the rim of disaster, clawed their way back and learned, in the process, the

[1] London: Arthur Barker. 1971. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1971, p. 805.

techniques of modern warfare which they have never forgotten. Not the least interesting theme is the gradual revelation, which Professor Erickson carefully documents, of the inefficiency of the Communist Party's structure and ethos as an instrument of war. Even Professor Erickson however has failed to elucidate exactly how the Russians overcame the vast administrative difficulties of supply and reinforcement, the problems presented by the switching of great armies over large distances and cruel terrain, the phoenix-like re-creation of their shattered war industries.

Though this excellent book is confessedly about the war in Russia, it lacks a dimension in that relations with Britain and the United States, particularly in respect of war material, are not explored with precision. But the greatest lack must be ascribed to the publishers. It is both absurd and disgraceful that a book on this subject, published at so high a price, should contain no maps. The reader feels the need for their guidance almost continuously.

RONALD LEWIN

Resistance in Europe 1939–1945. Edited by Stephen Hawes and Ralph White. *London: Allen Lane. 1975. 235 pp. £4·50.*

THIS book is a curious mixture. It is based on a course of ten lectures delivered at the University of Salford in March 1973. The choice of subjects is odd, the standard of research and writing distinctly uneven. Several of the essays, perhaps even the majority, are rather undistinguished. A piece on the German resistance, for example, recites old tales at excessive length, while the essays on the individual and the resistance community in France and French Catholics during the war—like so many other books on 'European' resistance this one gives far too much space to France—are more agreeably written, but scarcely more original. At least three of the contributions, by contrast, are very good indeed: an account of resistance in Auschwitz by Dr. Garlinski, a thoughtful essay on the French Communists by H. R. Kedward and a splendid, iconoclastic piece on the economic and strategic effectiveness of the resistance by Alan Milward. The latter's conclusion that 'resistance was one of the least successful, and in terms of opportunity one of the most costly, of all wartime strategies' will not do—as he himself appears ready to admit when discussing moral and psychological aspects of the subject—but his suggestion that resistance historians should adopt a less anecdotal and more analytical approach to the subject is entirely apposite, and might have been heeded by some of his fellow contributors.

One final lament: a book without footnotes or index and with only an inadequate bibliography is irritating, whatever its origins.

Queen Mary College, London P. W. LUDLOW

Jewish Resistance in Nazi-Occupied Eastern Europe; with a historical survey of the Jew as fighter and soldier in the Diaspora. By Reuben Ainsztein. *London: Elek. 1974. 970 pp. £12·50.*

THERE is so much in Mr. Ainsztein's study of Jewish resistance that is remarkable and important that it is difficult to know where to begin in analysing its contents or singing its praises. His fundamental objective in

writing the book was to disprove the long established and widely held belief that the Jewish victims of Nazi atrocities had accepted their fate with quiet resignation. The legend has been almost axiomatic with both defenders and detractors of the Jews, the latter quoting it as a cardinal element in their attack, the former explaining it away with references to the quietist traditions of two thousand years of ghetto existence. The Jews, it sometimes seemed, were too good, too god-fearing to strike down their enemies.

Mr. Ainsztein argues against both groups of writers. Not only was there plenty of Jewish resistance in Eastern Europe: there is also ample evidence of a tradition of militancy in Jewish history from which the resisters could draw both justification and inspiration. He advances his case in monumental manner, reviewing both the history of two thousand years and the particular horrors of five years in Poland and the occupied territories of the Soviet Union. The pages dealing with the latter, (pp. 215–849), are extremely impressive, as Mr. Ainsztein pulverises his opponents with instance after instance in district after district of Jews' refusal to accept their fate. At the end he apologises for not having covered some types of resistance activity (p. 817). He has, however, said quite enough, and it is hard to believe that any serious writer will ever again be able to portray East European Jewry as devoid of militancy. As, in passing, he sheds new light on resistance in general—it is instructive for example to compare his chapters on Poland (pp. 396–681), with Dr. Ciechanowski's recent study of the Warsaw Rising [1]—it is difficult to exaggerate the merits of his work.

There are of course some defects, two of which ought perhaps to be mentioned here. The first section, dealing with the militant tradition in Jewish history before 1940, is too long to be effective polemic, and too brief to be a fundamental investigation of what is an important problem in its own right. It is a pity that Mr. Ainsztein did not confine himself to a brief statement, to be followed perhaps in due course by a quite separate study. The second blemish is more understandable, but nevertheless somewhat irritating. The rehabilitation of Eastern Jewry should not necessitate, as on occasions in this book it seems to, a depreciation of other resistance groups, gentile and Jewish, in other parts of Europe. The rescue of Danish Jews remains a remarkable story even though it should now, quite rightly, be set beside the no less remarkable rescue of Bulgarian Jews. For obvious reasons, Mr. Ainsztein seems at times to advance his argument too vigorously. But these are minor lapses compared with the considerable virtues of the book as a whole, and despite its length, Mr. Ainsztein's book deserves to be widely known and read.

Queen Mary College, London P. W. LUDLOW

War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: The Chetniks. By Jozo Tomasevich. *Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1975. 508 pp. $20.00. £11·50.*

THE history of Yugoslavia during the Second World War continues to fascinate historians and others interested in resistance just as it excited public opinion in Great Britain during the war itself. The interest aroused at the time was out of all proportion to the events in the Yugoslav territories

[1] *The Warsaw Rising of 1944.* Cambridge, London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1974. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1974, p. 506.

if these are considered in the overall perspective of the global war. This was partly due to the heroic and deeply tragic war experience of the Yugoslav peoples, partly also to the bitter controversy about what actually took place during the war. The historian writing today is still faced with a daunting collection of legend, propaganda, polemical history and personal memoirs. These have to be re-examined minutely, collated and compared with the great mass of documentary evidence now available, before any kind of balanced historical assessment of what took place in Yugoslavia between 1941 and 1945 can be achieved.

Professor Tomasevich is attempting this monumental task in a projected three-volume history of Yugoslavia during the Second World War. It should be said at once that this first volume on the Chetniks is most impressive. It is a scholarly examination of a massive amount of evidence both from secondary sources, and more important, from contemporary documents—German, Italian, British, American and Yugoslav (Russian sources are for the most part not available). In the preface the author states that his aim is to get 'as near as possible to the truth.' To do this, he tries first to establish the facts, *wie es eigentlich gewesen,* then he gives his own assessment of them. He is meticulous in showing the sources for his information and has been fortunate in finding a publisher willing to put footnotes at the bottom of the page. Where there are areas of uncertainty or conflicting evidence these too are noted. Yet the book itself presents a deceptively lucid account of a most complex and difficult subject. If the next two volumes maintain this high standard, the whole work will be a uniquely outstanding contribution to the history of the Yugoslav peoples and to the history of the Second World War.

The present volume consists of three parts. The first provides a general introduction to the whole series. It gives a background history of Yugoslavia between the two world wars, of the critical events on the eve of war and it describes the German invasion and occupation. Much of this part is based on secondary sources and it is perhaps in this part that Professor Tomasevich has left work for other researchers to continue. Part two deals with all that is known about the Chetnik movement (as well as its prewar background) from the summer of 1941 to June 1943. It includes detailed accounts of the Chetniks' objectives and organisation, their ambivalent policy in Serbia, and their close collaboration with the Italians, in Slovenia and Croatia as well as in Montenegro. A section is given to an account of Chetnik relations with the Yugoslav government-in-exile and with the British government. Part three, entitled *Decline and Disaster*, describes the disintegration of the Chetnik movement after the Italian collapse; the many agreements made between different groups of Chetniks and the Germans; the British break with the Chetniks and Mihailovich's desperate search for support from the US government, even from the Russians. This part chronicles the slow collapse into total disaster, eventually leading to the final months when Mihailovich was abandoned by nearly all his supporters and was lured to his doom by a secret communist radio station masquerading as friendly Chetniks. It makes sorry reading.

Whilst following the chronology of the war, Tomasevich's account has a thematic structure which allows him to pose and answer the major questions that have always been asked about Mihailovich and the Chetniks. Was Mihailovich really the leader of a resistance movement? How many Chetniks were there? What kind of people joined this movement and how were they organised? Did Mihailovich control them and by what means? What were

his objectives as a leader? Who shared his aims and helped him to plan and direct his policy? Careful scrutiny of documents now available gives answers to many of these questions, though the personality of Mihailovich remains strangely elusive. For a historian trying to establish what really happened it is fortunate that the Allies captured German and Italian documents, that British sources have now been opened to the public, and that, although secret service material is not available, some of it at least has slipped through the net of secrecy. Tomasevich reveals that the Germans had cracked Mihailovich's cipher and were able to report on his most secret doings; the British on their side had broken the Germans' military cipher and received all the information passed on German signals. Surprisingly, as can be seen from British Foreign Office documents (which do not reveal the secret intercept source of their intelligence reports) the British knew that Mihailovich's Chetniks were collaborating with Italians and Germans but did not let it deter them from recognising and aiding Mihailovich. They believed that Mihailovich would come over to the British side if there should be an Allied landing in the Balkans. This was exactly what Hitler believed and was the reason why he would not allow his officers to arm the Chetniks. The Italians had a very different view. They believed in using the Chetniks as fighting soldiers in their campaigns against the Partisans (pp. 209–226). Why did Mihailovich choose this path of collaboration? Was it because of his incurable self-deceptive optimism that led him to underestimate the strength of the Partisans and believe that they could be exterminated as rivals for postwar power? Clearly, the policy was a mistake, for it led both Germans and British to mistrust him, and eventually left him stranded without friends and unable to compete with the Partisans for the support of Yugoslav peoples outside Serbia.

Professor Tomasevich's view is that Mihailovich lacked the necessary gifts for strong effective leadership; that he had an overriding commitment to Serbian hegemony (p. 467) and a very limited comprehension of 'the extent to which the old order had been demolished not merely by defeat and occupation but by the rise of the Partisan movement . . . and . . . of the intense desire of all South Slav nations and nationalities for political, economic and social reform.' Professor Tomasevich is an American of Dalmatian Croat origins and his search for the truth allows him to be detached. He gives no justification for Mihailovich, a warmer appreciation of whose Serbian dream could probably be given only by one who shared it. Seen in the harsh light of recorded fact, without the clothes of earlier mythology, Mihailovich's Chetniks appear here as a loosely organised, poorly led, ideologically weak, localised movement which collapsed through its own weakness and because it had no share in the war aims of the great powers involved in the world war. It looked back rather than forward and failed to understand the aspirations of the majority of the ordinary people in Yugoslavia.

It might have been interesting if Tomasevich had compared Mihailovich and Tito, but except for passing references—sometimes of great importance—the Partisans are not discussed in this volume. Later volumes will show if Professor Tomasevich is able to maintain this attitude of detachment.

Within such a beautifully presented book it may seem carping to complain of the author's idiosyncratic habit of translating titles of Serbo-Croat articles into English, thus giving the reader a false impression that they are published in that language. This is a minor flaw in a most impressive

work of dedicated scholarship that is likely to remain the standard book on this subject for a long time.

Simon Fraser University, British Columbia PHYLLIS AUTY

British Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece. Edited by Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg. *London: Macmillan in association with the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London. 1975. 308 pp. £8·00.*

THE war in the Balkans and its romantic savageries attracted a highly individualistic assortment of British participants, noblemen, novelists, politicians, scholars, not to mention the professional soldiers, some cast in the Byronic mould, some only slightly less distinguished. Some astonishing feats were performed, like the kidnapping of the German general Kreipe and the demolition of the viaduct over the Gorgopotamos river. The supporting services in London and Cairo did not show up so well.

The opening of the official British records in 1972 led to a conference organised by the University of London School of Slavonic and East European Studies, at which the heroes and historians of the adventure could meet, pool their experiences and examine the new evidence; this book is the result. 'British readers,' says Professor Seton-Watson (p. 295), 'will probably find the story of conflict between government departments . . . unedifying.' We see the Foreign Office constantly bickering with the military and para-military agencies which were conducting operations in the Balkans. It was for the Foreign Office alone, they claimed, to make policy; others should confine themselves to military duties. But the wonder was that British missions in the field kept as clear of politics as they did; even the eating of a rissole in German-occupied Greece or Yugoslavia was construed as a political act. Mr. Sweet-Escott, defending the 'Special Operations Executive,' observes: 'They [the resistance movements] were risking their lives for war aims of their own which differed in many important respects from ours. Rarely was this elementary truth grasped by the Foreign Office' (p. 15).

The complicating factor was, of course, that the war in Greece and Yugoslavia was not simply resistance to an invader, but a bitter civil war; the best of British intentions could not reconcile the irreconcilable. Chaos was compounded by the inaccessibility of the battleground, the breakdown of communications and all the disadvantages of operating in a strategic backwater. If Britain exercised any influence on events in the Balkans, it was through the character and gifts of the men who went there; the squabbles at headquarters hardly mattered at all.

Several of these men contribute to the book, which consists of seven 'papers,' a couple of 'statements,' and transcripts of the subsequent discussions. The practice of publishing the proceedings of conferences of this kind does not make for literary excellence; and the discussions, in particular, resemble the not always readable tape-recorded interviews which are sometimes reproduced in newspapers and magazines. It is not to be expected that contributors like C. M. Woodhouse and F. W. D. Deakin, who have already transformed their personal adventures into works of scrupulous scholarship, would find much to add to what they have said in their books. But there is an account of 'British Decision-making over Yugoslavia' by Elisabeth Barker, a model of effective historical writing, which sets out the dilemma over support for Mihailovich or Tito Chetniks

or Partisans. Similarly, Richard Clogg provides a vivid chronicle of the oscillations of British policy towards the quarrelling guerrilla factions in Greece.

The general reader is warned in the editors' preface that 'no attempt is made to give a coherent picture of events in Yugoslavia and Greece between 1941 and 1945' and he is referred to the select bibliography. Conferences are like that; they are for those who participate in them. But the book could not fail to fascinate anyone to whom the events are familiar and the personalities no strangers.

KENNETH MATTHEWS

The John Doe Associates: Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace, 1941. By R. J. C. Butow. *Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1975. 480 pp. £9·75.*

THE tradition of diplomatic activity conducted by non-professional persons is well established in the United States, and the official *Foreign Relations* volumes for 1941 contain frequent references to the John Doe Associates, so-called by Stanley Hornbeck, adviser on political relations in the Department of State. The nature of their activities is well established, but until Butow's present study they have received little serious attention. The leading figure was an opinionated and determined priest, Father James M. Drought, Vicar General of the Catholic Foreign Mission Society of America. His associates were the Superior General of Maryknoll, Bishop James E. Walsh; Tadao Wikawa, a Christian Japanese financial expert who had been chief executive of the Central Bank of Co-operative Societies; and Colonel Hideo Iwakuro of the Japanese General Staff. They worked closely with, and seem to have manipulated, the Japanese ambassador, Admiral Nomura. Their contact man with the administration was Frank Walker, postmaster-general and a leading Catholic Democrat. Although FDR met Drought and Walsh once, he resisted the temptation to play a personal role, perhaps because their proposals for the immunisation of the Pacific from war seemed to be based on acceptance of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine, and the Associates were therefore forced to work through the Japanese ambassador and the State Department. Although convinced of the realism of their scheme, they ran up against the entrenched departmental rejection of any negotiation based upon recognition of the fruits of aggression.

Butow, from the Maryknoll archives and numerous Japanese collections, splendidly traces the interconnections of private and official diplomacy, and the extraordinary fashion in which Drought managed to insert his own proposals into the negotiations, thereby compounding the problems of Admiral Nomura who was soon out of his depth. But although the activities of the John Doe Associates confused matters at crucial stages, the official documents suggest that the all-important figure of Stanley Hornbeck remained sceptical and clear-headed. Despite Butow's detailed detective work, the degree of influence enjoyed by John Doe's patron, Frank Walker, and the precise roles of Wikawa and Iwakuro in the confused spectrum of Japanese domestic politics, remain unclear. In a curious way, Secretary Hull, often accused of being over-principled, emerges well from Butow's account: his commitment to the search for an honourable peace led him into frequent backstairs, late-night meetings in his hotel apartment that must indeed have seemed strange.

University of Keele D. K. ADAMS

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THIS is the third in the series of bibliographical aids to the study of Latin America and the West Indies which has been initiated by the Committee on Latin America. The first two were concerned with locating serials, whereas the third aims at making collections in the United Kingdom better known and at facilitating their use. 146 libraries of all types and covering a wide range of subjects are included. An appendix contains other useful addresses and a list of relevant serial publications.

The three compilers are librarians well known in the field of Latin American studies and their work is a model for a directory of its kind. Any researcher who reads the introduction carefully and consults the list of libraries and the index will find that the directory admirably fulfils its purpose.

Chatham House D. H.

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INFORMATION ABOUT CHATHAM HOUSE

A members' ballot was held in July to replace the eight members of the Council retiring this year on the completion of their three-year term. The following were elected: Miss Nancy Balfour, OBE; Professor the Hon. Alastair Buchan, CBE; Richard Goold-Adams, CBE; Lady Jackson, DBE (Barbara Ward); Sir Frank Roberts, GCMG, GCVO; Professor Hugh Seton-Watson, FBA; Christopher Tugendhat, MP; and the Rt. Hon. Sir Kenneth Younger, KBE.

In addition, the Earl of Drogheda, KG, KBE, Gerald Elliot (Chairman, Scottish Branch) and C. C. P. Pocock, CBE, were co-opted as members of the council for one year. A further co-option is reserved for a staff representative to be elected by staff ballot.

Mrs. Margaret Cornell retired from the staff of the Institute at the end of August. She has been replaced as Administrative Director by Miss Eileen Menzies (formerly Assistant Administrative Director) and as Editor of *The World Today* by Mrs. Liliana Brisby (formerly Associate Editor).

BOOKS REVIEWED, OCTOBER 1975